For some time now, a group of female members of the group has been seen driving around in specific vans near Albanian schools, sparking widespread alarm in the area where these terrorists reside.

According to Faraq News, Albanian analysts state: “It has been revealed globally that the terrorists known as the ‘People’s Mujahedin’ [MEK] in Albania are operating as a branch of the Mossad. Both the state police and the media are aware that the Mossad stands behind the MEK, yet they are afraid to take action against them. These female terrorists have been targeting schools to prey on children… The abducted children are then taken to Mossad-run child abuse centers, where they are used to blackmail and manipulate Western elites—much like the network of Jeffrey Epstein.” However, the potential objectives behind the presence of this “scum” near Albanian schools may include the following:

– Deceiving and brainwashing adolescents at a vulnerable age

By exploiting the curiosity of adolescents—under the guise of activities that appear cultural, educational, or charitable—the MEK attempts to instill a terrorist ideology and covertly draw them in.

– Targeting children for blackmail and corruption networks

According to field analyses, it is possible that children who are abducted or lured in are sent to centers linked to foreign intelligence services, where they are used in networks involving child abuse, blackmail, and the manipulation of Western elites—a model similar to the network of Jeffrey Epstein.

– Gathering information and identifying families susceptible to exploitation

The suspicious presence of women from this group—in vehicles with tinted windows—may be the initial step in identifying families, mapping the routes children take, and infiltrating the social circles of adolescents.

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Research into the MEK’s practices—including reports by Human Rights Watch and the RAND Corporation, as well as the memoirs of former members of the group—reveals that the group employs multifaceted mechanisms for mind control and member isolation. Through strict censorship and enforced isolation, the organization has successfully implemented these mechanisms, thereby gaining control over the minds and all aspects of the lives of the residents of the MEK headquarters.

The conduct of the MEK leaders, Massoud and Maryam Rajavi, when measured against international human rights standards, constitutes a gross violation of the rights of the residents of the isolated Camp Ashraf 3, located in the village of Manëz in northern Albania.

The following points summarize the violations of MEK members’ rights through censorship, assessed against international human rights standards—including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted in December 1948) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted in December 1966):

1. Total deprivation of access to independent news and forced consumption of the organization’s exclusive media.
2. Forced ideological scrutiny, psychological coercion to extract confessions, and interrogation regarding personal thoughts during meetings.
3. Imposition of severe psychological pressure, prolonged isolation, and brainwashing.
4. Deprivation of the right to independent thought, forced alteration of beliefs, and mandatory acceptance of the leadership’s ideology.

In light of the systematic human rights violations within the MEK’s camps—such as those previously reported at Camp Ashraf in Iraq and subsequently at Ashraf 3 in Albania—international human rights bodies, host governments, and responsible civil society organizations are expected to take serious, practical steps. Numerous reports by Human Rights Watch and advocacy groups have emphasized the need for urgent action in this regard.

Key expectations of human rights bodies and governments include:

Conducting independent and impartial investigations:

International organizations, such as the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, should dispatch independent inspectors to these camps to assess the situation of trapped members, the possibility of free departure, and the status of their mental health and individual rights.

Guaranteeing freedom of coming and going and communication with families outside MEK bases:

A primary demand of human rights bodies and anxious families is to break the isolation and enable members to communicate freely with the outside world, use personal communication devices, and meet openly with their families—privileges from which they have been deprived for years.

Safeguarding the rights of individuals who have left:

Ensuring the physical safety, legal rights, and asylum status of those who manage to escape or break away from these structures—particularly in countries where the camps are located, such as Albania—is a legal obligation of the host government and asylum authorities.

Documenting and prosecuting human rights violations within MEK camps:

Documenting instances of human rights abuses, severe physical and psychological restrictions, and cult-like pressures—treating them as violations of fundamental human rights—and striving to hold the perpetrators of such conduct accountable in international forums.

Mazda Parsi

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In return for the Rajavi cult’s loyal services, Saddam Hussein handed over a number of Iranian prisoners—including Mohammad-Ali—to the MEK, subjecting them to a different form of captivity. Mohammad-Ali has been in the isolated camps of the group for 38 years. He is currently held in the Manëz camp in Albania under the control of the MEK.

The Jamali family has made significant efforts to establish contact with Mohammad-Ali but has not yet succeeded.

Recently, Mr. Mokhtar-Ali Jamali, Mohammad-Ali’s brother, visited the West Azerbaijan branch of the Nejat Society. He once again urged the office director to ensure that his family’s voice reaches Albanian officials, international bodies, human rights organizations, and the International Committee of the Red Cross.

The Jamalis’ phone numbers are:

04433458442

09144394249

The post The Jamalis’ Plea for Help: Save Our Brother from the MEK! appeared first on Nejat Society.

In the 56^th court session to try the MEK as an entity and 104 of its high-ranking members, 4 individuals of the Karaj propaganda show, appeared as “informed witnesses” to testify about how they were approached, recruited, and exploited. During their testimonies, the witnesses detailed the methods used by MEK agents and recruiters—often operating through online platforms or intermediaries—to lure vulnerable citizens. The arrested ones are now free. They got back to their normal life after passing the legal procedures.

The court proceedings shed light on the ongoing tactics employed by the MEK to recruit domestic elements for propaganda and subversive activities, highlighting the legal consequences faced by those who collaborate with designated entities, even when initially deceived. These 4 people, who remain unanimous, explained that they were unaware of the true nature and violent history of the group when they initially engaged with them:

A retired woman

This individual is a retired woman who was unwittingly drawn into the staged motorcade and propaganda parade in Karaj through her brother, who had himself been approached and deceived by recruiters connected to the MEK network. In her court testimony, she explained that her brother had invited her to what was deceitfully described as a festive birthday celebration or a private family gathering, assuring her that participation was harmless and even involved financial compensation. She stated before the judges that she had no knowledge whatsoever of any affiliation with the Mujahedin-e Khalq organization, nor did she realize that the event would be filmed and subsequently edited with opposition flags and slogans to create a false narrative of domestic unrest. Expressing deep remorse and sorrow for her inadvertent presence in the video footage, she emphasized how the organizers exploited family ties and financial needs to manipulate ordinary citizens into serving their subversive propaganda goals.

A young worker

This witness is a young worker employed at an auto parts factory who found himself unwittingly entangled in the staged propaganda parade in Karaj due to financial pressures and trust in a coworker. In his court testimony, he explained that his colleague, who was struggling economically and engaged in sideline work, invited him and others to participate in what was presented simply as the creation of an advertising clip. The witness stated that they were told the presence would last only 15 to 20 minutes, with specific payment rates promised depending on whether they participated with a motorcycle or a car. Emphasizing his complete unawareness of any hidden political motives or connections to the MEK, he testified that he joined the location solely out of friendship and trust in his coworker, having no idea that the footage would later be manipulated for hostile propaganda purposes.

Duped by a trusted coworker

This witness is a working professional who, alongside colleagues of about ten years, was duped into participating in the staged Karaj video under the guise of an advertising project. In his court testimony, he explained that a trusted coworker invited him to take part in what was described as a commercial teaser for a 61st birthday celebration, asking him to bring his personal vehicle to a specified location. He noted that upon arriving at the designated spot, he recognized that most of the attendees were ordinary workers and wage-earners just like himself, and because of deep-seated workplace trust and financial familiarity among them, he accepted the proposition without any suspicion. He firmly testified before the judges that he had zero knowledge or awareness of any hidden political agendas, subversive plots, or connections to the MEK behind the filming session.

Father of a two-year-old child

This witness is a 35-year-old married man with a two-year-old child who became unwittingly entangled in the staged Karaj propaganda clip due to friendly workplace ties and a lack of awareness regarding the true nature of the event. In his court testimony, he stated that he had recently been released from prison after about a month of detention related to the incident and was trying to rebuild his life alongside his wife. Explaining how he was drawn in, he testified that recruiters or associates merely asked him to wear a specific T-shirt for a company’s promotional advertisement and take a few photos, promising a simple commercial task. He strongly emphasized to the judges that his personal beliefs, lifestyle, and behavior bore absolutely no resemblance to or compatibility with the final edited video released by the MEK.

Extracted from Mizan News Agency report and translated by Nejat Society

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Former New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani has maintained a long-standing, visible, and politically contentious relationship with the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) and its political umbrella organization, the so-called National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI). This association has drawn frequent scrutiny from journalists, political analysts, and international observers—including a notable September 23, 2026 report and commentary by investigative journalist Will Bredderman highlighting Giuliani’s scheduled address to a rally organized by the Organization of Iranian American Communities (OIAC), an entity linked to the MEK.

Giuliani’s scheduled address to a rally organized by the OIAC

Critics and reporters have frequently noted that the MEK was historically designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) by the United States Department of State in 1997 due to its past armed struggle against the Shah’s regime and the Iranian government, as well as accusations of killing Americans during the 1970s. However, following extensive legal lobbying, a bipartisan political campaign, and a formal legal review, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton officially revoked the MEK’s terrorist designation in September 2012. Throughout the years leading up to and following this delisting, high-profile American and European political figures—including Giuliani have regularly spoken at MEK-linked conferences and rallies.

Will Bredderman uses the word “dogged” to describe how Rudy Giuliani’s ties to the MEK have followed him.  In his advocacy for the formerly-designated terrorist group, he is persistent, relentless, and stubborn. “Dogged” connotes Giuliani’s deep involvement with the MEK—marked by years of paid speeches and vocal lobbying for regime change in Iran— which remains a crucial, controversial shadow over his public legacy.

Mazda Parsi

The post Giuliani’s MEK ties have dogged him for years appeared first on Nejat Society.

Following the public announcement of Yazdan’s death in June 2026, his family utilized social media, specifically creating a dedicated Instagram account under the name Yazdan Teimorian, to mourn publicly and share his history. Most captions of Yazdan’s photos indicate the sufferings of Yazdan and his separated family under the rule of the MEK leaders. This is their most recent post:

“Love you, miss you every day. He had been sick in Ashraf Hospital and was kept away from his family. They didn’t let him have a last goodbye or even a last phone call with us. It’s so unfair.

Years ago, during our last phone call, he said, “Please bring the baby girl, my granddaughter, so I can hold her in my arms.” He needed his family and was longing for us.”

Analyzing this short heartfelt message reveals several critical themes concerning human rights, family separation, and the systemic control exercised over aging members in Ashraf 3, Manez, Albania.

Denial of End-of-Life Contact and Compassion

The post highlights that Yazdan Teimorian was sick in Ashraf 3 and was deliberately kept away from his relatives. In humanitarian terms, end-of-life care typically emphasizes comfort, dignity, and family reconciliation. The family’s grievance— “They didn’t let him have a last goodbye or even a last phone call with us”—underscores how ideological or organizational strictures can prevail fundamental human empathy, denying both the aging member and his family the opportunity for saying goodbye.

The Unfulfilled Human Desire for Familial Connection

The poignant recollection quoted by the family— “Please bring the baby girl, my granddaughter, so I can hold her in my arms”—illustrates the profound yearning for generational continuity and familial love that persists despite decades of separation. For decades, many members within the restrictive structures of the Cult of Rajavi are cut off from routine domestic life, marriages, and child-rearing. Highlighting this plea emphasizes that beneath decades of organizational commitment, core human attachments and the desire for parental and grandparental bonds remained entirely intact.

Institutional Control and Information Asymmetry

Reports surrounding the Teimorian family’s interactions with the MEK—including restricted visits during trips to Albania and delayed or tightly controlled notifications regarding his death—demonstrate a pattern of information gatekeeping. Organizations that isolate their rank-and-file members from the outside world often maintain strict control over communication channels to prevent defections, external influence, or independent oversight, unfortunately resulting in profound grief for families on the outside who are left unable to support their aging loved ones effectively.

To cope with the prolonged absence and the rigid barriers erected by the MEK, Yazdan’s family navigated their grief and fought against institutional silence through several distinct actions. Through social media, his daughter Sepideh and other relatives published commemorative posts, family photographs, and details regarding his life inside the organization to counter the information vacuum controlled by the group.

Mazda Parsi

The post The Tragic Impact of MEK Isolation on Yazdan Teimorian and His Family appeared first on Nejat Society.

The MEK’s deception in Karaj

But after the people appearing in footage were arrested, it became clear that the scene was not a political demonstration- it was commissioned performance.

A staged performance presented as “support for Karaj’s Youths”.

The MEK claimed that 15 youths had ridden through the streets of Karaj carrying the MEK emblem to demonstrate their support.

MEK-affiliated media presented the footage as an act of political support.

Fifteen people arrested-the story was exposed

Just one day later, all 15 people involved were arrested.

They reportedly admitted that they had been hired to perform a commissioned stunt connected to a 61^st birthday celebration—and had been paid to participate.

They thought they were filming a birthday video. The participants said they knew nothing about a political purpose. The videographer had been recruited through Divar –an Iranian online classified platform—to film a birthday celebration. Most of other participants were workers at an auto-parts company.

The MEK emblem was added later

The participants were originally filmed and photographed holding a completely blank white banner.

The MEK emblem was then digitally added to the banner, and the altered images were circulated as evidence of a political demonstration.

Propaganda for the MEK, consequences for the unaware

The MEK presented a commissioned performance as “grassroots support”, placing uniformed participants at risk of arrest and persecution.

The incident is a clear example of manufactured propaganda – and of using other people to advance the MEK’s agenda.

Ray Torabi’s Instagram account

The post How the MEK tried to sell a stage stunt as grassroots support? appeared first on Nejat Society.

The alignment of high-ranking Western political figures, such as former U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, with the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) presents a complex geopolitical paradox. On one hand, the MEK has historically possessed a deeply contested domestic standing inside Iran, largely stemming from its alignment with Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War and its rigid internal structure characterized by scholars and journalists as a cult of personality centered on leaders Massoud and Maryam Rajavi. On the other hand, it has been able to cultivate a network of prominent bipartisan American and European politicians who advocate for its cause as a viable democratic alternative to the government in Tehran.

To understand why figures like Mike Pompeo endorse the MEK despite its widely recognized lack of a grassroots public base within contemporary Iran, one must examine the convergence of aggressive anti-Iran advocacy, intelligence-sharing networks, lobbying dynamics, and a shared strategic objective centered on regime change.

Scholars of international relations and Middle Eastern politics note that the phenomenon of Western politicians supporting the MEK is largely driven by a policy vacuum regarding Iran. In authoritative geopolitical analyses, such as those found in modern political science literature examining U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, the prevailing bipartisan consensus in Washington DC following the 1979 Iranian Revolution has been the containment or ultimate overthrow of the Islamic Republic. However, successive U.S. administrations have struggled to find a unified, organized domestic opposition inside Iran capable of executing a successful transition of power.

The MEK, operating through its political wing, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), has spent decades presenting itself as the most disciplined, structured, and ready-to-govern alternative to Islamic Republic. For hawks advocating a “maximum pressure” strategy, the MEK’s polished apparatus under pro-democracy gestures offers an accessible interlocutor that speaks the language of Western liberal democracy in its public PR campaigns, regardless of its internal dictatorship under the rule of Massoud Rajavi or its violent past.[3]

Furthermore, the relationship is heavily sustained by political lobbying and financial payment. Investigative journalism and academic studies have extensively documented that prominent American figures—ranging from former mayors and retired generals to former cabinet secretaries like Mike Pompeo, Rudy Giuliani, and John Bolton—have received substantial speaking fees to attend MEK rallies in Paris, Brussels, and Washington.

While these politicians frequently frame their support around universal values of human rights, democracy, and freedom for the Iranian people, the financial incentives and the high-visibility platform provided by the NCRI create a mutually beneficial arrangement. The MEK gains invaluable political legitimacy, mainstream media visibility, and proximity to the levers of Western power, while participating politicians signal their hawkish credentials to domestic diaspora communities.

Another critical dimension is intelligence cooperation and geopolitical utility. During the height of the Cold War and the post-9/11 era, exile opposition groups frequently served as conduits for intelligence regarding target states. Although the MEK was removed from the U.S. State Department’s Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list in 2012 following an intense legal and lobbying campaign, its historical intelligence networks regarding Iran’s clandestine nuclear program and military infrastructure have historically attracted security-minded officials.[5] For the U.S., and Israel, any group committed to the violent or structural collapse of Iranian government can be viewed as a tactical asset, irrespective of its domestic popularity poll numbers inside Iran.

Finally, the rhetoric employed by figures like Mike Pompeo—framing the MEK or its affiliated diaspora gatherings as the voice of the Iranian populace—often reflects the insular nature of exile politics. Diaspora communities in the West can sometimes present monolithic desires, which political figures eager for a straightforward narrative readily amplify. Consequently, the endorsement of the MEK is less about a rigorous sociological assessment of the group’s popularity inside Iran, and more about employing a readily available, aggressive instrument designed to maintain maximum pressure on Iran.

Mazda Parsi

The post Why Mike Pompeo’s Embrace of the MEK Ignores Its Lack of Popular Base appeared first on Nejat Society.

The decision followed years of intense and costly political lobbying that brought together former American officials, members of the US Congress, lawyers and political advocates – all of them sharing common hostility toward the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Presented publicly as a matter of law and humanitarian concern, the delisting nevertheless provided the MKO with an opportunity to reconstruct its international image – from a notorious terrorist outfit to a so-called “political opposition.”

An organization with a long record of armed attacks, assassinations, cooperation with the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein and coercive internal practices could now present itself to Western audiences as a democratic Iranian “opposition” movement.

That transformation remains one of the most striking examples of political rebranding surrounding an organization whose history is replete with terrorism and extremism.

The MKO’s evolution tells a very different story from the one promoted by its supporters.

Established in the 1960s with an ideological tilt toward Marxism, it eventually became an armed organization operating from Iraqi territory under Saddam’s regime, especially during the eight-year war imposed on the Islamic Republic of Iran in the 1980s.

Its history includes targeted attacks against elected Iranian government officials and civilians, the killing of American personnel in Iran, military aggression against its own country alongside Ba’athist forces, and involvement in the suppression of anti-Saddam uprisings in Iraq.

Yet despite that record, the organization succeeded in cultivating influential allies in Washington, because of their shared hostility toward the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Its rise in the West was built through an extensive campaign of lobbying, political networking, paid speaking engagements and legal challenges. Former senior American officials from both major parties publicly advocated on its behalf, while members of Congress repeatedly pressed successive administrations to reconsider its designation.

The campaign eventually succeeded. What followed, however, was not the emergence of the Iranian “opposition” movement that its foreign supporters had envisioned. Instead, the MKO became increasingly dependent on an aging membership, foreign political patrons and an elaborate political and media infrastructure outside Iran.

Its eventual isolation in Albania illustrates the limits of attempting to manufacture political legitimacy abroad while pushing an agenda that has very few takers today.

A history shaped by violence and political betrayal

The organization emerged in the 1960s and its initial objective was to overthrow the Pahlavi monarchy, but armed struggle soon became central to its methods.

After the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the organization rapidly entered into a violent confrontation with the Islamic Republic, which rapidly escalated into an armed campaign against government institutions, officials and supporters.

Among the most consequential attacks came in June 1981, when a bombing at the headquarters of the Islamic Republic Party in Tehran resulted in the martyrdom of Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti and scores of other officials. Later that year, President Mohammad Ali Rajai and Prime Minister Mohammad Javad Bahonar were also assassinated by the terror group.

The terror cult subsequently became responsible for thousands of cold-blooded killings during its armed campaign. The total number of people killed by MKO is approximately 16,000.

The organization’s relationship with Baathist Iraq represented an even more consequential stage in its development. During the 1980s war, the MKO moved its principal military infrastructure into Iraq and entered into an alliance with Saddam Hussein. Its forces subsequently conducted military attacks against Iran from Iraqi territory and fought alongside Saddam’s forces.

The relationship did not end with aggression against Iran. The MKO also assisted Saddam in suppressing the Kurdish and Shiite uprisings that erupted in Iraq in 1991. Former members have described the participation of MKO forces in those operations.

The organization’s violent record also extended to Americans. During the 1970s, MKO operatives targeted American military personnel and civilians working in Iran. Lt. Col. Lewis L. Hawkins was assassinated in 1973, while Army officers Col. Paul Shaffer and Lt. Col. Jack Turner were killed in 1975. American civilian contractors William C. Cottrell Jr. and Donald G. Smith were murdered in 1976.

The terror organization was also involved in plots against American diplomatic and political targets, including an attempted assassination of US Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II in 1970.

Two years later, a bomb was detonated at a Tehran mausoleum shortly before President Richard Nixon was scheduled to attend a ceremony there.

The MKO’s campaign subsequently acquired an international dimension. In April 1992, supporters of the cult carried out simultaneous attacks against Iranian diplomatic facilities across North America and Europe. In New York, armed MKO terrorists entered Iran’s Mission to the United Nations and took hostages. Similar violent attacks occurred in cities including Ottawa, Bonn, Hamburg, The Hague, London and Paris.

This record became a major obstacle to the organization’s later attempt to present itself as a conventional democratic “opposition” movement. The political image promoted in Washington was increasingly difficult to reconcile with its decades-long history of armed activity.

Building influence in Washington

Long before the 2012 delisting, the MKO had developed a sophisticated system for cultivating political relationships in the United States. Even while designated as a terrorist organization, it found ways to establish connections with American politicians and political networks.

A 1985 New York Times report noted that at least 19 members of US Congress had signed letters or statements distributed by the terror organization, apparently without realizing that the US State Department regarded the MKO as responsible for killing Americans.

The organization also established groups that presented themselves as humanitarian or political organizations. One example was the so-called Iran Relief Fund, which solicited donations from Americans. In 1984, the organization reportedly collected almost $100,000 in Maryland and Virginia before authorities moved against it after its connection to the MKO became known.

By the early 1990s, the MKO had established contacts reaching into the upper levels of American politics. Reports in the American media in the 1990s described contacts between the organization and figures surrounding the incoming Clinton administration, including a private letter from then-President-elect Bill Clinton to Massoud Rajavi and a meeting between an MKO foreign-policy adviser and Vice President-elect Al Gore.

At the same time, the organization was seeking support from influential pro-Israel political networks in Washington.

According to a 1993 Guardian report, MKO figures believed that gaining respectability and influence over the Clinton administration’s Iran policy would require the backing of Washington’s powerful pro-Israel lobby.

Politicians such as Gary Ackerman, Robert Torricelli, Dan Burton and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen became prominent supporters of the anti-Iran terror organization. MKO-related material appeared in the Congressional Record, while members of Congress participated in events and hearings supporting the group’s campaign.

The common ground was not necessarily ideological. It was opposition to the Islamic Republic of Iran. That shared objective gave the MKO political value to actors who otherwise had little reason to embrace its ideology or history.

The relationship became particularly consequential in 2002. That year, the MKO publicly disclosed information concerning Iranian nuclear facilities at Natanz and Arak. The intelligence was subsequently linked to the Israeli regime, which had supplied the information to the organization for public release, revealing their inner dealings.

The episode became emblematic of the network surrounding the MKO: Israel supplied intelligence, the MKO served as the public messenger, and the revelation helped intensify international pressure on Iran.

The lobbying campaign that secured delisting

The campaign to remove the MKO from the terrorist list was unusually extensive. One of its most visible features was the recruitment of former senior US officials as public advocates.

They appeared at MKO events and delivered speeches supporting the group’s removal from the terrorist designation. Reports placed individual speaking fees in the tens of thousands of dollars, with some appearances reportedly generating payments of between $20,000 and $50,000.

The roster crossed party lines. Former New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani emerged as one of its most prominent advocates, speaking at MKO gatherings in Europe and the United States.

Former UN ambassador and Trump aide John Bolton repeatedly argued that the designation was politically motivated and advocated a tougher American policy toward Iran. Former House Speaker Newt Gingrich also appeared at MKO events and promoted its anti-Iran cause.

Other Republican figures involved in the campaign included former Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge, former Attorney General Michael Mukasey and former FBI Director Louis Freeh.

The organization simultaneously recruited Democratic figures, helping give its campaign the appearance of bipartisan backing. Former Pennsylvania Governor Ed Rendell was among the more prominent Democratic supporters and openly discussed receiving substantial speaking fees. Former Vermont Governor Howard Dean and former New Mexico Governor and UN Ambassador Bill Richardson also publicly supported the terror group’s position.

The practice generated criticism from American officials concerned about the relationship between the payments and an organization that remained formally designated as terrorist.

Senator John McCain repeatedly supported delisting and visited Camp Ashraf in Iraq, where he publicly expressed solidarity with MKO members. Senator Roy Blunt became a leading supporter of a bipartisan Senate initiative concerning the protection of MKO members in Iraq.

In the House, lawmakers including Ted Poe and Bob Filner pressed the administration to act. Nearly 100 representatives eventually backed H.Res. 60 during the 112th Congress, calling for the MKO to be removed from the terrorist list.

The political campaign was accompanied by a legal strategy. Former Attorney General Michael Mukasey and attorney Viet D. Dinh were among those involved in legal efforts challenging the State Department’s handling of the terror organization’s designation.

Court decisions in 2010 and 2012 placed additional pressure on the department, requiring it to act within deadlines established by the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.

The organization had therefore created pressure on multiple fronts: politicians were demanding delisting, former officials were campaigning publicly, lawyers were challenging the designation in court, and the MKO continued to cultivate its image as a democratic “opposition” movement.

Eventually, the strategy succeeded. On September 28, 2012, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced the removal of the MKO from the Foreign Terrorist Organization list.

From political project to isolated enclave

More than a decade after delisting, the results of that project remain difficult to reconcile with the expectations created by its Western supporters.

The MKO succeeded in changing its legal status in Washington. It built relationships with prominent politicians. It also established an elaborate international lobbying network.

But it did not gain legitimacy anywhere. Instead, the terror cult became increasingly concentrated around its headquarters in Albania, where its members and political infrastructure were relocated after the closure of Camp Ashraf in Iraq.

The most serious confrontation with its Albanian hosts came in June 2023. Albanian police raided the MKO’s Ashraf-3 compound near Tirana, confiscating computers and entering buildings on the site. The operation triggered resistance from residents and violent clashes with police, resulting in injuries on both sides.

The incident exposed the limits of the protection the organization had enjoyed in Albania. For a group accustomed to portraying itself as internationally protected, the raid was a major shock.

It also drew renewed attention to what was taking place inside Ashraf-3. The compound had evolved into a vast political and communications center, a hub for organized online influence operations directed against Iran.

In 2021, Facebook removed hundreds of accounts associated with a coordinated influence operation linked to the MKO’s presence in Albania. It proved that Ashraf-3 was functioning not as a residential community but as an organized center for political messaging and digital activity.

Yet the deeper problem confronting the MKO is demographic and political. Its membership is aging, while the cult has struggled to attract a younger generation. Former members have described a highly controlled internal environment involving separation from family, intense ideological discipline and restrictions on members’ ability to leave or maintain independent lives.

The limits of political reinvention

The MKO’s history since 2012 can therefore be understood as a struggle between image and political reality. The terror cult won its campaign for delisting after years of lobbying, secured endorsements from prominent American politicians, established a new base in Albania and continued presenting itself internationally as the nucleus of a future Iranian government.

But the central objective remained elusive: demonstrating meaningful support from the international community. The larger political project has encountered a far more difficult obstacle, which is the lack of legitimacy and acceptance from both Iranians and non-Iranians.

The MKO managed to remove the “terrorist” label in the US. What it has not managed to remove is its real image and agenda that is all about terrorism and extremism.

By Press TV Website Staff

The post Fourteen years after US delisting, MKO terror cult’s political rebranding collides with its violent legacy appeared first on Nejat Society.

Mohammad Karami, former member of the MEK, speaks of how Maryam Rajavi became so versatile in the MEK. Mohammad Karami was interviewed by Akbar Karami, the owner and interviewer of a YouTube channel on which the conversation was published. In this interview, Akbar Karami questions Mohammad Karami about the internal structure and functioning of the MEK, the rise of Maryam Rajavi, decision-making, treatment of dissent, finances, and the organization’s ideological practices.

In the MEK, leaving means disagreeing

This may be the key to understanding Karami’s description. In an ordinary political organization, you can say: “I disagree with the leadership.”

And, ultimately: “I resign.”

Karami describes an organization in which leaving could itself be interpreted as a form of ideological betrayal. That creates an enormous asymmetry of power.

If the leadership controls your housing, your employment, your social relationships, your access to information, your relationship with your spouse, your relationship with your children, your ability to leave, then “voluntary membership” becomes meaningless.

This is one reason Human Rights Watch’s investigation is significant: the witnesses specifically described abuse occurring after they expressed a desire to leave.

How did the “Maryam Rajavi story” develop?

The process of promotion of Maryam Rajavi can be divided into roughly four stages.

Stage 1 — Maryam as a senior revolutionary

Maryam was originally one of several important MEK figures. She was not initially the supreme leader.

Stage 2 — 1985 ideological revolution

This is the turning point. Massoud promoted Maryam to a position of extraordinary authority, followed by the divorce from Mehdi Abrishamchi and marriage to Massoud. The organization presented this as an ideological transformation rather than an ordinary leadership succession.

Stage 3 — Maryam as the embodiment of the new leadership

Over time, Maryam became much more than an administrator. She became a symbol of the organization’s ideological transformation. This is important because it means loyalty to Maryam could become intertwined with loyalty to the organization itself.

Stage 4 — After Massoud’s disappearance

After Massoud disappeared in 2003, Maryam became increasingly prominent as the movement’s public leader and international representative. Today, the organization’s public communications overwhelmingly revolve around Maryam Rajavi.

So the evolution was not simply a conventional promotion through bureaucratic ranks. Karami’s argument is that the organization constructed a system in which personal loyalty to the Rajavi leadership became an ideological obligation.

What does Karami say about MEK’s financial resources?

Karami says that during the Iraq period, the organization had access to very large financial resources and developed mechanisms for moving, disguising, laundering or accounting for money.

In one detailed account, he testifies that members were instructed to create documentation for supposedly legitimate expenditures involving families and children, including documents that he says were used to create a paper trail for large sums of money.

He also describes the use of organizations and associations outside Iraq as part of the financial infrastructure.

It is also independently documented that Saddam Hussein’s government provided the MEK with financial and military support during the organization’s Iraq period. The U.S. State Department reported that after MEK leaders moved to Iraq in 1986, Saddam’s regime provided basing, financial support and training. It also reported evidence of Iraqi funding during the Oil-for-Food period. Human Rights Watch likewise states that Iraqi financial and logistical support ended after Saddam’s government fell in 2003.

The MEK, a religious cult

This is probably the most useful way to understand what Karami is arguing. He argues that the

organization operates through mechanisms normally associated with a high-control religious or cult-like organization, despite presenting itself as a political movement.

There are several characteristics he points to: charismatic leadership; ideological absolutism; extreme personal loyalty to the leadership; separation from outsiders; restrictions on intimate relationships; compulsory ideological sessions; confession/self-criticism; punishment for dissent; difficulty leaving; control over personal life. This is an internal conception of the leader as possessing special ideological authority.

This characterization isn’t unique to Karami. A 2006 U.S. State Department report explicitly described the MEK as displaying “cult-like characteristics,” citing ideological indoctrination, “eternal divorce,” ideological cleansing sessions and separation of children from parents.

RAND also identified characteristics it considered typical of cultic organizations, including authoritarian control, restrictions on marriage, emotional isolation, forced labor, physical abuse and limited exit options.

The bottom line of Karami’s interview

The MEK’s real system of power is not primarily its formal organizational chart. It is a system of personal and ideological control centered on the Rajavi leadership. In Karami’s account, in the MEK, ideology legitimizes the leadership. Leadership determines the correct political line. Hierarchy transmits that line downward. Ideological meetings make members internalize it. Criticism becomes self-criticism. Dissent becomes an ideological problem. Leaving becomes betrayal. Control over personal life makes departure difficult.

And Maryam Rajavi’s importance emerged from this system rather than simply from winning an internal election.

Karami is describing a system in which the leadership has extraordinary authority and in which lower-level officials enforce decisions throughout the organization. That explains how someone can become “all-powerful” without personally issuing every order.

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