At the core of the Belgian institutional pushback lies a fundamental democratic reality: neither Maryam Rajavi nor Reza Pahlavi can legitimately claim to be the representative of the Iranian people. Belgian authorities, independent legal scholars, human rights advocates, and diverse diaspora associations independently raised severe objections to Pahlavi’s visit precisely because elevating any unelected exile figure undermines the principle of popular sovereignty. For Belgian Foreign Minister Maxime Prévot and other independent critics, determining the future leadership of Iran is a choice that must belong solely to the Iranian people through a free, democratic process, rather than through foreign-conferred recognition of monarchist or formerly terrorist designated factions like the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK).

The controversy began when Georges-Louis Bouchez, leader of Belgium’s Francophone liberal MR party, proposed hosting Reza Pahlavi at the Belgian Chamber of Representatives. However, this proposal faced immediate institutional roadblocks. Belgian Foreign Minister Maxime Prévot publicly cautioned against treating Pahlavi as the sole or legitimate representative of the Iranian opposition. Prévot explicitly stated that deciding who should lead Iran is a choice that must belong solely to the Iranian people, emphasizing that the Iranian opposition is deeply diverse and that granting official recognition to one faction could be misinterpreted as partisan Belgian backing.

Following these warnings, the parliamentary Conference of Presidents failed to reach a consensus, leading to the official cancellation of the parliamentary reception. Concurrently, an attempt to shift the event to the Brussels regional Parliament also failed due to active opposition from multiple political groups who warned against providing a platform that could be used for unilateral political self-promotion.

While MEK networks, NCRI-related communities campaigned vigorously against the visit, a wide coalition of independent voices acted independently of any single political group to oppose Pahlavi’s elevation.

Belgian Academics and Jurists and political figures, and civil-society representatives—acting completely independently—separately urged authorities not to elevate Pahlavi. Their core argument rested on the premise that a democratic transition in Iran must emerge from grassroots popular sovereignty rather than foreign sponsorship of an authoritarian model like Pahlavi. However, they never consider the MEK as a popular opposition group.

The Belgian episode demonstrates a vital diplomatic principle: representation cannot be manufactured abroad. Because neither Pahlavi nor groups like the MEK possess a democratic mandate conferred by the Iranian population through free elections, European institutions face severe ethical and political risks when granting them unearned platforms. The resistance in Brussels was driven by the recognition that Iran’s real political struggle is not a choice between a crown and a scarf.

Mazda Parsi

The post Why Neither Pahlavi nor the MEK Can Claim to Represent Iran? appeared first on Nejat Society.

As claimed by the MEK propaganda, most “insurgent cells” are active in the province of Sistan and Baluchestan, particularly in the city of Zahedan. This raises the question: why is the activity of these insurgent cells most concentrated in Zahedan? In other words, how do MEK operatives manage to target Baluch youth and persuade them to pose for photographs featuring slogans associated with Maryam or Massoud Rajavi? Perhaps a more precise question is: could the presence of Baluch separatist groups—such as Jaish al-Adl, now operating under the new name “Front of People’s Fighters” (Jebhe-ye Mobarezin-e Mardomi in Persain)—be the primary reason?

Examining the relationship between the MEK and armed Baluch separatist groups—such as Jundullah and Jaish al-Adl—constitutes a complex issue within the realms of national security of Iran. To better understand this subject, one must closely examine historical precedents, shared interests, and the geopolitical and security shifts occurring in Iran’s border regions, particularly in Sistan and Baluchestan province.

Following its expulsion from Iraq and subsequent relocation to a base in Tirana, Albania, the MEK sought to re-establish its presence inside Iran by forming structures known as “insurgent cells”. However, as previously noted, the coverage of these cells is largely confined to the MEK-run media outlets; there is no tangible or concrete evidence of their existence on the ground, nor are they reflected in independent media or on social networks. In this context, the concentration of many of the alleged activities—attributed to the “insurgent cells”—within Sistan and Baluchestan (specifically the city of Zahedan) stems from the group’s efforts to recruit members in volatile, peripheral border regions.

Historical Roots of the MEK’s Relations with Armed Groups in Iranian border provinces

The contemporary political history of Iran demonstrates that, over the past decades, the MEK has spared no security or military means in its efforts to strike at the ruling political structure. During the group’s presence in Iraq (in the 1980s and 1990s), it maintained extensive ties with various intelligence services and local armed groups—including Kurdish and Arab separatist factions along Iran’s western borders, as well as Baluch separatist groups along its eastern borders.

Following the emergence of armed Salafi groups in southeastern Iran—such as Jundullah, led by Abdolmalek Rigi, in the 2000s, and subsequently Jaish al-Adl—security analysis and documents have acknowledged the existence of communication channels between these entities. Although the MEK has clear ideological differences with the Baluch groups—ranging from its historical, eclectic “Marxist-Islamic” ideology and its current, ostensibly democratic-leaning platform, to the Jihadi-Salafism of the Baluch factions—and while a deep, formal strategic alliance between them appears unlikely, their shared objective—the overthrow of the Islamic Republic—has fostered a degree of tactical overlap and mutual exploitation.

There are several reasons why Sistan and Baluchestan—and specifically Zahedan—have been identified as a purported hub for the activities of the MEK mercenaries. Due to its vast area, extensive shared borders with Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the presence of human and drug trafficking networks, the province of Sistan and Baluchestan has a high degree of security vulnerability. This characteristic creates a favorable environment for concealment, the movement of armed operatives, and clandestine activities.

Furthermore, the MEK seeks to exploit existing social fissures and the grievances of minority groups, positioning itself as a champion of minority rights. The dissemination of biased reports regarding these regions via the group’s propaganda machine represents an attempt to co-opt local and civil protests for its own agenda.

Moreover, in a region continually prone to instability—owing to the presence of terrorist groups like Jaish al-Adl and frequent border clashes—the MEK attempts to attribute acts of violence or minor arson incidents to its so-called “insurgent cells”. By doing so, it leverages the prevailing climate of insecurity to exaggerate its own capabilities.

Structural Commonalities and Similar Background

Both entities—MEK and Jaish al-Adl—have histories marked by acts of violence, bombings, and armed or suicide operations targeting Iranian citizens and security forces. While Jundullah and Jaish al-Adl are rooted in Salafi ideology and ethnic separatism, and the MEK operates as a totalitarian, cult-like structure with a history of assassinating thousands of Iranians, both employ the same tactics within the broader framework of a “hybrid war” against Iran: the use of terrorism, psychological warfare, and the exaggeration of hollow achievements in the digital space.

Ultimately, the lack of any genuine resonance of these so-called “insurgent cells” among the general public or within independent media suggests that the MEK’s claims are primarily intended for internal consumption—aimed at strengthening the morale of members remaining at Camp Ashraf 3 in Albania and securing foreign financial support. Furthermore, the MEK’s purported connection to volatile regions like Zahedan represents an opportunistic attempt to exploit security-related tensions in that province for its own ends.

Mazda Parsi

The post Tactical Links Between the MEK and Separatist Groups in Iran appeared first on Nejat Society.

The phenomenon surrounding the MEK and its political engagement across European municipalities, such as the reported event involving Maryam Rajavi at the City Hall of Cuneo, Italy, highlights a complex intersection of international lobbying, domestic Iranian political aspirations, and European media dynamics. While the MEK and its political umbrella, the so-called National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), actively promote these engagements through their own media channels, mainstream Western media outlets and local Italian press frequently choose to bypass or entirely ignore these events. Furthermore, the Iranian mostly do not care about the group. They actually despise the MEK.

Critics argue that this selective coverage—or lack thereof—illustrates a broader pattern: that the organization struggles to garner genuine, organic grassroots support among the Western public or the Iranian diaspora, relying instead on organized attendance and high-profile paid speakers. Conversely, representatives of the MEK and their parliamentary supporters in Europe claim that these conferences serve as vital platforms for advocating for a secular, democratic republic.

Because of its historical alignment with Saddam Hussein and past involvement in violent operations against Iranian civilians and officials, the group was designated as a terrorist organization by the United States, the European Union, and the United Kingdom. It was subsequently delisted following successful multi-million-dollar lobbying in 2012. However, it has not been successful to engage the attention of the media.

Today, the group’s extensive lobbying efforts—often featuring prominent retired Western politicians and parliamentarians—continue to draw sharp rebukes not only from the Iranian people, which frequently protests European hosting of MEK figures as “state sponsorship of terrorism,” but also from independent analysts and journalists who scrutinize the group’s internal practices, authoritarian legacy, disinformation campaign and opacity regarding financial backing.

Mazda Parsi

The post Echoes in an Empty Room: MEK Propaganda, Western Media Silence, and the Cuneo Case appeared first on Nejat Society.

His prolonged absence—dating back to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, which coincided with Nowruz 1382 in Iranian calendar—has become an unspoken mystery and a source of crisis for the organization’s internal structure and external views on it. The dimensions of keeping Masoud Rajavi’s status hidden can be categorized into several key areas:

The Legitimacy Crisis and the Risk of Organizational Collapse

The MEK is built upon a highly hierarchical, ideological system centered around a cult of personality revolving entirely around Massoud Rajavi. In such structures, the leader serves as the pivotal unifying figure, a spiritual guide, and the absolute decision-maker. He acts as the heartbeat of the organization; all his followers and supporters are dependent upon him. Concepts such as being “connected to him” or “becoming one with him” are rituals that members are expected to undergo.

Among the leadership of the MEK, there is a prevalent fear that the organization could collapse entirely in the absence of Massoud Rajavi. Formally announcing his death or permanent disappearance—without an undisputed successor in place—could lead to departure of members, profound disillusionment among members, and, ultimately, the disintegration of the organization. For this reason, the remaining leaders have attempted to mask this significant void by periodically releasing old audio or video messages, or written texts, attributed to him.

The video recently circulated by the group’s supporters—accompanied by reverent praise—purports to be the latest footage of Massoud Rajavi, showing him in a trench in Iraq, dressed in combat outfit.

Speculation Regarding his Death During the 2003 Attacks

Since the onset of the U.S.-led military invasion of Iraq in the spring of 2003, the group’s camps—most notably Camp Ashraf—became targets of extensive bombardment and security threats. Reports from former members of the group and international observers suggest that Massoud Rajavi may have been killed during those initial attacks.

However, due to the secretive and highly secure nature of the MEK, rank-and-file members and the media were never granted clear access to medical records or visual evidence that would definitively establish his fate.

The Role of American and Israeli Intelligence Services

Some analysts believe that the persistent ambiguity surrounding the status of Massoud Rajavi was not merely an internal organizational decision, but rather a strategy to preserve an intelligence asset. Following the fall of Saddam Hussein, the subsequent departure from Iraq, and the relocation to Albania, the MEK—while having lost its military and operational effectiveness—attracted the attention of certain foreign governments and intelligence services due to its existing intelligence network and history of spying activities within Iran.

Western powers and the group’s regional backers like Israel may have deemed the preservation of this structure—even amidst the ambiguity of an absent or hidden leadership—to be useful for exerting political and intelligence-related pressure against the Islamic Republic.

Mazda Parsi

The post Various Aspects of Massoud Rajavi’s Disappearance appeared first on Nejat Society.

For some time now, a group of female members of the group has been seen driving around in specific vans near Albanian schools, sparking widespread alarm in the area where these terrorists reside.

According to Faraq News, Albanian analysts state: “It has been revealed globally that the terrorists known as the ‘People’s Mujahedin’ [MEK] in Albania are operating as a branch of the Mossad. Both the state police and the media are aware that the Mossad stands behind the MEK, yet they are afraid to take action against them. These female terrorists have been targeting schools to prey on children… The abducted children are then taken to Mossad-run child abuse centers, where they are used to blackmail and manipulate Western elites—much like the network of Jeffrey Epstein.” However, the potential objectives behind the presence of this “scum” near Albanian schools may include the following:

– Deceiving and brainwashing adolescents at a vulnerable age

By exploiting the curiosity of adolescents—under the guise of activities that appear cultural, educational, or charitable—the MEK attempts to instill a terrorist ideology and covertly draw them in.

– Targeting children for blackmail and corruption networks

According to field analyses, it is possible that children who are abducted or lured in are sent to centers linked to foreign intelligence services, where they are used in networks involving child abuse, blackmail, and the manipulation of Western elites—a model similar to the network of Jeffrey Epstein.

– Gathering information and identifying families susceptible to exploitation

The suspicious presence of women from this group—in vehicles with tinted windows—may be the initial step in identifying families, mapping the routes children take, and infiltrating the social circles of adolescents.

The post MEK agents near schools in Tirana, Albania appeared first on Nejat Society.

Research into the MEK’s practices—including reports by Human Rights Watch and the RAND Corporation, as well as the memoirs of former members of the group—reveals that the group employs multifaceted mechanisms for mind control and member isolation. Through strict censorship and enforced isolation, the organization has successfully implemented these mechanisms, thereby gaining control over the minds and all aspects of the lives of the residents of the MEK headquarters.

The conduct of the MEK leaders, Massoud and Maryam Rajavi, when measured against international human rights standards, constitutes a gross violation of the rights of the residents of the isolated Camp Ashraf 3, located in the village of Manëz in northern Albania.

The following points summarize the violations of MEK members’ rights through censorship, assessed against international human rights standards—including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted in December 1948) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted in December 1966):

1. Total deprivation of access to independent news and forced consumption of the organization’s exclusive media.
2. Forced ideological scrutiny, psychological coercion to extract confessions, and interrogation regarding personal thoughts during meetings.
3. Imposition of severe psychological pressure, prolonged isolation, and brainwashing.
4. Deprivation of the right to independent thought, forced alteration of beliefs, and mandatory acceptance of the leadership’s ideology.

In light of the systematic human rights violations within the MEK’s camps—such as those previously reported at Camp Ashraf in Iraq and subsequently at Ashraf 3 in Albania—international human rights bodies, host governments, and responsible civil society organizations are expected to take serious, practical steps. Numerous reports by Human Rights Watch and advocacy groups have emphasized the need for urgent action in this regard.

Key expectations of human rights bodies and governments include:

Conducting independent and impartial investigations:

International organizations, such as the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, should dispatch independent inspectors to these camps to assess the situation of trapped members, the possibility of free departure, and the status of their mental health and individual rights.

Guaranteeing freedom of coming and going and communication with families outside MEK bases:

A primary demand of human rights bodies and anxious families is to break the isolation and enable members to communicate freely with the outside world, use personal communication devices, and meet openly with their families—privileges from which they have been deprived for years.

Safeguarding the rights of individuals who have left:

Ensuring the physical safety, legal rights, and asylum status of those who manage to escape or break away from these structures—particularly in countries where the camps are located, such as Albania—is a legal obligation of the host government and asylum authorities.

Documenting and prosecuting human rights violations within MEK camps:

Documenting instances of human rights abuses, severe physical and psychological restrictions, and cult-like pressures—treating them as violations of fundamental human rights—and striving to hold the perpetrators of such conduct accountable in international forums.

Mazda Parsi

The post Expectations of human rights bodies regarding censorship within the MEK appeared first on Nejat Society.

In return for the Rajavi cult’s loyal services, Saddam Hussein handed over a number of Iranian prisoners—including Mohammad-Ali—to the MEK, subjecting them to a different form of captivity. Mohammad-Ali has been in the isolated camps of the group for 38 years. He is currently held in the Manëz camp in Albania under the control of the MEK.

The Jamali family has made significant efforts to establish contact with Mohammad-Ali but has not yet succeeded.

Recently, Mr. Mokhtar-Ali Jamali, Mohammad-Ali’s brother, visited the West Azerbaijan branch of the Nejat Society. He once again urged the office director to ensure that his family’s voice reaches Albanian officials, international bodies, human rights organizations, and the International Committee of the Red Cross.

The Jamalis’ phone numbers are:

04433458442

09144394249

The post The Jamalis’ Plea for Help: Save Our Brother from the MEK! appeared first on Nejat Society.

In the 56^th court session to try the MEK as an entity and 104 of its high-ranking members, 4 individuals of the Karaj propaganda show, appeared as “informed witnesses” to testify about how they were approached, recruited, and exploited. During their testimonies, the witnesses detailed the methods used by MEK agents and recruiters—often operating through online platforms or intermediaries—to lure vulnerable citizens. The arrested ones are now free. They got back to their normal life after passing the legal procedures.

The court proceedings shed light on the ongoing tactics employed by the MEK to recruit domestic elements for propaganda and subversive activities, highlighting the legal consequences faced by those who collaborate with designated entities, even when initially deceived. These 4 people, who remain unanimous, explained that they were unaware of the true nature and violent history of the group when they initially engaged with them:

A retired woman

This individual is a retired woman who was unwittingly drawn into the staged motorcade and propaganda parade in Karaj through her brother, who had himself been approached and deceived by recruiters connected to the MEK network. In her court testimony, she explained that her brother had invited her to what was deceitfully described as a festive birthday celebration or a private family gathering, assuring her that participation was harmless and even involved financial compensation. She stated before the judges that she had no knowledge whatsoever of any affiliation with the Mujahedin-e Khalq organization, nor did she realize that the event would be filmed and subsequently edited with opposition flags and slogans to create a false narrative of domestic unrest. Expressing deep remorse and sorrow for her inadvertent presence in the video footage, she emphasized how the organizers exploited family ties and financial needs to manipulate ordinary citizens into serving their subversive propaganda goals.

A young worker

This witness is a young worker employed at an auto parts factory who found himself unwittingly entangled in the staged propaganda parade in Karaj due to financial pressures and trust in a coworker. In his court testimony, he explained that his colleague, who was struggling economically and engaged in sideline work, invited him and others to participate in what was presented simply as the creation of an advertising clip. The witness stated that they were told the presence would last only 15 to 20 minutes, with specific payment rates promised depending on whether they participated with a motorcycle or a car. Emphasizing his complete unawareness of any hidden political motives or connections to the MEK, he testified that he joined the location solely out of friendship and trust in his coworker, having no idea that the footage would later be manipulated for hostile propaganda purposes.

Duped by a trusted coworker

This witness is a working professional who, alongside colleagues of about ten years, was duped into participating in the staged Karaj video under the guise of an advertising project. In his court testimony, he explained that a trusted coworker invited him to take part in what was described as a commercial teaser for a 61st birthday celebration, asking him to bring his personal vehicle to a specified location. He noted that upon arriving at the designated spot, he recognized that most of the attendees were ordinary workers and wage-earners just like himself, and because of deep-seated workplace trust and financial familiarity among them, he accepted the proposition without any suspicion. He firmly testified before the judges that he had zero knowledge or awareness of any hidden political agendas, subversive plots, or connections to the MEK behind the filming session.

Father of a two-year-old child

This witness is a 35-year-old married man with a two-year-old child who became unwittingly entangled in the staged Karaj propaganda clip due to friendly workplace ties and a lack of awareness regarding the true nature of the event. In his court testimony, he stated that he had recently been released from prison after about a month of detention related to the incident and was trying to rebuild his life alongside his wife. Explaining how he was drawn in, he testified that recruiters or associates merely asked him to wear a specific T-shirt for a company’s promotional advertisement and take a few photos, promising a simple commercial task. He strongly emphasized to the judges that his personal beliefs, lifestyle, and behavior bore absolutely no resemblance to or compatibility with the final edited video released by the MEK.

Extracted from Mizan News Agency report and translated by Nejat Society

The post Testimonies of Participants in the MEK’s Staged Propaganda Stunt in Karaj appeared first on Nejat Society.

Former New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani has maintained a long-standing, visible, and politically contentious relationship with the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) and its political umbrella organization, the so-called National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI). This association has drawn frequent scrutiny from journalists, political analysts, and international observers—including a notable September 23, 2026 report and commentary by investigative journalist Will Bredderman highlighting Giuliani’s scheduled address to a rally organized by the Organization of Iranian American Communities (OIAC), an entity linked to the MEK.

Giuliani’s scheduled address to a rally organized by the OIAC

Critics and reporters have frequently noted that the MEK was historically designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) by the United States Department of State in 1997 due to its past armed struggle against the Shah’s regime and the Iranian government, as well as accusations of killing Americans during the 1970s. However, following extensive legal lobbying, a bipartisan political campaign, and a formal legal review, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton officially revoked the MEK’s terrorist designation in September 2012. Throughout the years leading up to and following this delisting, high-profile American and European political figures—including Giuliani have regularly spoken at MEK-linked conferences and rallies.

Will Bredderman uses the word “dogged” to describe how Rudy Giuliani’s ties to the MEK have followed him.  In his advocacy for the formerly-designated terrorist group, he is persistent, relentless, and stubborn. “Dogged” connotes Giuliani’s deep involvement with the MEK—marked by years of paid speeches and vocal lobbying for regime change in Iran— which remains a crucial, controversial shadow over his public legacy.

Mazda Parsi

The post Giuliani’s MEK ties have dogged him for years appeared first on Nejat Society.

Following the public announcement of Yazdan’s death in June 2026, his family utilized social media, specifically creating a dedicated Instagram account under the name Yazdan Teimorian, to mourn publicly and share his history. Most captions of Yazdan’s photos indicate the sufferings of Yazdan and his separated family under the rule of the MEK leaders. This is their most recent post:

“Love you, miss you every day. He had been sick in Ashraf Hospital and was kept away from his family. They didn’t let him have a last goodbye or even a last phone call with us. It’s so unfair.

Years ago, during our last phone call, he said, “Please bring the baby girl, my granddaughter, so I can hold her in my arms.” He needed his family and was longing for us.”

Analyzing this short heartfelt message reveals several critical themes concerning human rights, family separation, and the systemic control exercised over aging members in Ashraf 3, Manez, Albania.

Denial of End-of-Life Contact and Compassion

The post highlights that Yazdan Teimorian was sick in Ashraf 3 and was deliberately kept away from his relatives. In humanitarian terms, end-of-life care typically emphasizes comfort, dignity, and family reconciliation. The family’s grievance— “They didn’t let him have a last goodbye or even a last phone call with us”—underscores how ideological or organizational strictures can prevail fundamental human empathy, denying both the aging member and his family the opportunity for saying goodbye.

The Unfulfilled Human Desire for Familial Connection

The poignant recollection quoted by the family— “Please bring the baby girl, my granddaughter, so I can hold her in my arms”—illustrates the profound yearning for generational continuity and familial love that persists despite decades of separation. For decades, many members within the restrictive structures of the Cult of Rajavi are cut off from routine domestic life, marriages, and child-rearing. Highlighting this plea emphasizes that beneath decades of organizational commitment, core human attachments and the desire for parental and grandparental bonds remained entirely intact.

Institutional Control and Information Asymmetry

Reports surrounding the Teimorian family’s interactions with the MEK—including restricted visits during trips to Albania and delayed or tightly controlled notifications regarding his death—demonstrate a pattern of information gatekeeping. Organizations that isolate their rank-and-file members from the outside world often maintain strict control over communication channels to prevent defections, external influence, or independent oversight, unfortunately resulting in profound grief for families on the outside who are left unable to support their aging loved ones effectively.

To cope with the prolonged absence and the rigid barriers erected by the MEK, Yazdan’s family navigated their grief and fought against institutional silence through several distinct actions. Through social media, his daughter Sepideh and other relatives published commemorative posts, family photographs, and details regarding his life inside the organization to counter the information vacuum controlled by the group.

Mazda Parsi

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