In Iran, the week preceding the anniversary of their martyrdom is commemorated annually as Government Week, honoring the two great leaders and their service to the country before and after the 1979 Islamic Revolution.

The bombing, which took place on August 30, 1981, was carried out through the infiltration of Masoud Keshmiri, an operative of the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MKO) terrorist group, into Iran’s state apparatus. According to accounts from survivors and witnesses, Keshmiri had concealed an explosive device inside a briefcase and placed it beneath the table during a meeting at the Prime Minister’s office.

How was the bombing carried out?

The attack occurred in the afternoon of August 30, 1981, at the Prime Minister’s office on Pasteur Street in central Tehran.

President Rajaei, Prime Minister Bahonar and a number of senior military and security officials had gathered for an extraordinary meeting when the bomb was detonated.

Keshmiri, who had infiltrated the government while posing as a security official, reportedly served tea to those attending the meeting before placing a briefcase containing the explosive device underneath the meeting table.

Subsequent investigations determined that the briefcase contained a sophisticated bomb loaded with more than one kilogram of TNT. The device bore similarities to the explosive used in the Hafte Tir bombing two months earlier.

Investigators only uncovered the technical characteristics of the explosives used in the two attacks months later. As a result, authorities had not initially possessed sufficient information to identify the methods used or prevent another attack of the same nature.

After planting the bomb, the perpetrator reportedly spoke briefly with Khosrow Tehrani, who headed the intelligence unit at the Prime Minister’s office at the time. He then left the meeting, using an excuse to avoid suspicion.

He made his way toward Pasteur Square, where he reportedly met accomplices who assisted him in reaching a safe location and escaping.

According to testimonies from survivors and eyewitnesses, the massive bomb detonated after one of those present opened the briefcase. The magnitude of the explosion destroyed the first and second floors of the building where the meeting was underway.

Eight people were martyred and 23 others were injured.

The blast left the bodies of Rajaei and Bahonar so severely burned that their identities were subsequently established through dental records, according to reports from that time.

Who were Rajaee and Bahonar?

Rajaei and Bahonar were the principal targets of the terrorist bombing. Both had assumed their respective offices only about four weeks before they were assassinated.

Rajaei, a mathematics teacher and graduate of Tarbiat Moallem University, was aged 48 when he was martyred.

Following the victory of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, he became Minister of Education, serving in the position for seven months. He later entered the Islamic Consultative Assembly, representing Tehran, and served as a lawmaker for 15 months.

Rajaei subsequently became prime minister. Following the removal of President Abolhassan Banisadr, he was elected Iran’s second president with a large majority of votes.

A number of major public institutions and infrastructure projects have been named after him, including Teacher Training University in Tehran, a power plant in Qazvin Province, a port in Hormozgan Province and a dam in Mazandaran Province.

Bahonar was an Islamic theologian who studied at the Qom Seminary and later at the University of Tehran, where he earned a doctorate. He was 47 at the time of his martyrdom.

Following the Islamic Revolution, Bahonar served as Minister of Education and was elected to parliament, representing both Kerman and Tehran at different times.

He also became Secretary General of the Islamic Republican Party following the martyrdom of Ayatollah Mohammad Hossein Beheshti.

Bahonar was additionally a member of the Assembly of Experts for the Constitution, the body responsible for drafting Iran’s post-revolutionary constitution.

Rajaei and Bahonar were buried alongside the victims of the Hafte Tir bombing at the Hafte Tir mausoleum in Tehran’s Behesht-e Zahra cemetery.

Six other people were also martyred in the attack. They included Abdol-Hossein Daftarian, the Prime Minister’s chief financial officer, and Vahid Dastjerdi, the head of Iran’s police force.

MKO’s campaign of bombings

While no organization immediately claimed responsibility for the attack on Rajaei and Bahonar, the subsequent investigation identified Keshmiri as an MKO operative who had infiltrated the security apparatus by posing as a security official.

The bombing came just two months after another major MKO terrorist attack in Tehran, targeting a meeting of the Islamic Republican Party (IRP), then Iran’s leading political party.

The June 28, 1981 attack became known as the Hafte Tir bombing, after the date on the Iranian calendar on which it occurred. It was among the deadliest terrorist attacks in the early years of the Islamic Republic and was aimed at destabilizing the newly established system through a campaign of targeted violence.

More than 90 senior officials, including lawmakers and cabinet ministers, were attending the meeting when the bomb exploded. They had gathered to hear a speech by Ayatollah Seyyed Mohammad Beheshti, who was then head of Iran’s judiciary.

The bombing followed another attempted assassination one day earlier.

On June 27, 1981, then-Friday prayer leader Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei was delivering a speech at Tehran’s Abuzar Mosque when an explosive hidden inside a tape recorder detonated. The attack by MKO operatives severely injured his arm, vocal cords and lungs.

The sophistication of the explosives, the materials employed and the methods used to conceal the devices led Iranian investigators to conclude that foreign intelligence agencies had also played a role in supporting the MKO’s terrorist campaign.

Keshmiri ultimately escaped Iran using a forged passport. Several of his associates were arrested and convicted, while authorities launched extensive security checks among employees of state institutions to identify possible infiltrators.

The precise circumstances of Keshmiri’s subsequent life have never been publicly established. Reports say he escaped to Europe and has continued to live in one of the European countries.

More than four decades later, the August 30 bombing remains one of the deadliest terrorist attacks, while Government Week continues to commemorate Rajaei and Bahonar and their exemplary contribution to the country and an occasion to renew the pledge to continue their unfinished mission.

Press TV

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Ideological Syncretism and Sectarian Tightening:

Founded in 1965 by Mohammad Hanifnejad, Saied Mohsen, and Ali-Asghar Badizadegan, the organization initially sought to synthesize progressive Islamic theology with modern Marxist socio-economic analysis (seeking a “scientific Islam”). While this appealed to a specific stratum of university students and radicalized intellectuals under the Pahlavi monarchy, it lacked the broad cultural resonance of traditional Shi’a clerical networks or the universal appeal of secular nationalism. Following the devastating internal ideological purge of 1975—known as the Opportunist Crisis (ضربه اپورتونیستی), in which a splinter faction declared itself Marxist—the leadership under Massoud Rajavi doubled down on an intensely regimented, dogmatic interpretation of revolutionary Islam, purging dissent and narrowing ideological boundaries.

Militarism over Civil-Political Integration:

From its inception, the PMOI’s strategic bedrock was armed struggle. While this was seen as a necessary response to the absolute repression of the Shah’s dictatorship, the organization struggled to transition from a clandestine guerrilla network to an open, mass-based political party after the 1979 Revolution. After the revolution, the MEK quickly reverted to a binary paradigm of violent confrontation –killing dozens of civilians– rather than building durable, non-violent coalitions with the wider spectrum of the Iranian democratic opposition, civil rights groups, and nationalist fronts.

The Exile and Military Alignment Phase:

Following the relocation of the organization’s leadership and primary military infrastructure first to France and later to Saddam Hussein’s Iraq (where they formed their so-called National Liberation Army of Iran) proved to be a fatal blow to their domestic nationalist credentials. Aligning with a foreign government engaged in a devastating eight-year war against Iran, alienated the vast majority of Iranians, who viewed the move as an unforgivable breach of national sovereignty.

Anti-National and Controversial Actions of the Organization

Throughout its history, several specific actions, tactical decisions, and structural developments alienated the MEK from the broader Iranian public consciousness:

Relocation to Iraq During the Iran-Iraq War:

In the mid-1980s, transferring the PMOI base of operations to Ba’athist Iraq and establishing the National Liberation Army (NLA) under the patronage of Saddam Hussein during active wartime destroyed their standing as an independent nationalist alternative. For most Iranians—even those deeply opposed to the clerical regime—national defense against a foreign invader superseded internal political grievances.

Sectarian Internal Dynamics:

Over the decades, particularly during their encampment at Camp Ashraf in Iraq and later in Albania, observers, human rights organizations, and former members documented deeply insular, cult-like internal practices. Mandatory ideological sessions, the enforced separation of families, and absolute loyalty demands directed toward leadership figures Massoud and Maryam Rajavi alienated potential allies within the broader Iranian intellectual and diaspora communities.

The Escalation of Urban Guerrilla Warfare (Post-June 1981):

Following the institutionalization of the Islamic Republic and the dismissal of President Abolhassan Banisadr, the MEK initiated a nationwide armed campaign in June 1981 involving bombings, targeted assassinations of high-ranking clerics and officials, and armed street clashes that ended with the assassination of civilians.

Rigid Rejection of Gradualist or Moderate Reform:

Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, the organization maintained an all-or-nothing political posture, famously dismissing reformist movements within Iran. This alienated pro-democracy reformers inside the country who were attempting to carve out gradual spaces for civil society.

a political movement earns and sustains the backing of an entire nation through several fundamental pillars. Uncompromising commitment to national sovereignty, primacy of civilian and democratic norms, ideological inclusivity, internal democracy and accountability are the four pillars that the MEK has failed to engage in its half-a-century long history.

Mazda Parsi

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According to the claims of the MEK media, after participating in military operations in 1988, Mojgan Mahdavi “was quickly promoted to the command of one of the combat units due to her qualifications.”

The study of the process of young Iranians educated in universities in Western countries, including the United States, joining the MEK in the 1970s and 1980s is one of the important and thought-provoking topics in the history of contemporary political and social developments in Iran. The phenomenon of attracting students living abroad to ideological and radical movements has multidimensional psychological, political, and social roots and factors that have been analyzed by researchers in political history and the psychology of closed organizations.

It is noteworthy that many people joined political movements at that time, but it was only the members of the MEK who, after nearly half a century, did not separate from the organization and went to their deaths without having achieved anything from the so-called years of struggle.

How could a person with a university education in the West abandon everything and join the centralized structure and military base of the MEK in the deserts of Iraq? Documentary sources, sociological research, as well as the memories of former members, cite the following four factors as the main reasons for such choices:

1. The revolutionary vibe that dominated the atmosphere in Iran and the world in the years leading up to the 1979 Revolution, the strong tendency of young people towards justice-seeking and anti-authoritarian thoughts, and the initial appeal of the MEK’s slogans of combining Islam and modernity and fighting the Pahlavi regime, caused many educated young people in Iran and abroad to be attracted to the organization.
2. Student associations abroad played a prominent role in the process of recruiting young university students. “Muslim student associations” affiliated with or inclined to the MEK in American and European universities, which acted as the main centers for recruiting, propagating, and brainwashing Iranian students, were widely active in those years.
3. Identity crises and a sense of national responsibility were another factor in pushing young people to join radical revolutionary groups such as the MEK. Students studying abroad sometimes faced a sense of remorse over the political conditions within the country or poverty and tyranny, and the organization exploited this feeling and turned it into an absolute organizational commitment.
4. After individuals entered the secret organization and then the private army of the MEK in Iraq, in the isolated space that the leaders of the organization had created, over time, through self-criticism meetings (current operations) and severing ties with the outside world and family, the individual independence of the members was destroyed.

The process of Mojgan Mahdavi becoming a completely obedient agent of the group or a senior commander (as is the case with many high-ranking members of the organization) is the product of a complete reconstruction of the personality within the context of an extremist political cult. In this structure, over time, “Massoud and Maryam Rajavi” replace all individual, emotional and social values, and one sees his or her entire identity in the survival of the group and absolute obedience to the leaders.

It so happens that after Neda Hassani’s self-immolation to protest Maryam Rajavi’s arrest in France, in 2003, Mojgan Mahdavi addresses the people present in the Ashraf dining hall and says passionately: “If the leadership (Massoud and Maryam Rajavi) orders us, we all have a duty to self-immolate and we will convey the organization’s voice of protest to them (French Government).”

Mazda Parsi

The post From Studying in America to Death in a Village in Albania appeared first on Nejat Society.

The Mujahedeen-e-Khalq (MEK), a prominent and controversial Iranian opposition group, exemplifies how extreme ideological indoctrination and cult-like mechanisms can dominate the human mind. Founded originally on a hybrid ideology blending Islamism, Marxism, and feminism, the group later centralized its internal dynamics around absolute fealty to its leadership, specifically husband-and-wife team Massoud and Maryam Rajavi. Analysts and former members have frequently characterized the internal environment of the MEK as operating through intense psychological conditioning, often described in academic and investigative literature as brainwashing or coercive control.

The indoctrination process within the MEK typically involves several key psychological and structural components:

Absolute Leadership Devotion: Members are conditioned to direct total allegiance toward the Rajavi family, treating their directives as infallible moral and political truths.

Social Isolation and Severing Ties: Historical accounts and expert analyses indicate that members were often forced to break familial and marital bonds—such as mandatory divorces instituted for older members in the late 1980s—to redirect their total emotional and psychological investment exclusively toward the organization.

Monopolistic Information Control: Within closed environments such as former bases like Camp Ashraf and Camp Liberty, members experienced strict control over incoming information, ensuring that the group’s ideological narrative remained unchallenged by external perspectives.

Identity Fusion: Individual identity is systematically dismantled and replaced with a collective, militant identity dedicated entirely to the overthrow of the Iranian government, where self-sacrifice is glorified as the ultimate virtue.

The first cost that the members and supporters of the MEK have paid is the abandonment of personal reason. When all the answers are prepared by Massoud Rajavi, there is no need for individuals to think for themselves.

The second cost is the loss of individual identity and, as a result, personal responsibility. When someone else thinks and makes the decisions, you no longer exist to be responsible for those decisions.

The third cost is the loss of freedom. MEK members do not choose any aspect of their lives; they just obey. From major choices such as choosing the group’s leader or even choosing the color of their clothes, the leaders are responsible. In this structure, obedience replaces questioning, and “Yes Sir!” replaces “why?”

Mazda Parsi

The post The Psychological Impact of MEK Ideology on Members appeared first on Nejat Society.

While the organization’s public-facing media arm, Simaye Azadi, heavily promotes cyclical grassroots telethons (such as the Hamyari or solidarity fundraising programs), critics, intelligence researchers, and defectors argue that these contributions alone cannot account for the vast capital required to maintain the group’s global infrastructure.

The Scale of MEK’s Modern Expenditures

Operating a cult-like movement across the world requires substantial and continuous financial outlays. The primary operational expenses that heavily outstrip standard grassroots fundraising include:

Camp Maintenance and Logistics in Albania: Following the relocation of thousands of MEK members from Iraq to Albania (settling primarily in a fortified compound near Manez, known as Ashraf 3), the organization assumed the financial responsibility of housing, feeding, healthcare, and daily sustenance for approximately 2,000 to 3,000 members who live a communal lifestyle without standard external employment.

International Lobbying and High-Profile Speaking Fees: Lacking the support of Iranian people, to secure and maintain political backing in the West, the MEK—acting largely through its political wing, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI)—has historically engaged prominent American and European political figures, retired military generals, former cabinet officials and parliament members as keynote speakers at its annual summits. Investigative reports published by outlets such as The Guardian and The New York Times have documented substantial speaking fees and travel reimbursements provided to high-profile Western dignitaries who advocate for the group’s political platform.

Global Demonstrations and Logistics: Organizing massive rallies in cities like Paris, Berlin, Washington D.C., and Brussels involves heavy logistical costs. These include chartering hundreds of buses, booking large convention centers, erecting massive stages, and coordinating international travel for expatriate participants and attendees.

Historical Capital Reserves and Saddam Hussein-Era Funding

As noted in testimonies from former MEK members and investigative accounts, the financial bedrock of the group experienced a transformative injection during its decades-long base of operations in Iraq under the regime of Saddam Hussein (from the mid-1980s until the 2003 U.S.-led invasion).

Oil-for-Food and State Subsidies: Historical investigative reporting and U.S. government intelligence assessments have indicated that Baghdad provided the MEK with millions of dollars in direct financial subsidies, extensive military hardware, and commercial privileges (including allocations of Iraqi oil certificates that could be resold on international markets).

Investments and Real Estate: Defectors and former high-ranking insiders have repeatedly testified that a significant portion of the capital accumulated during the Iraqi period was funneled into international front companies, commercial real estate holdings, and diverse financial investments across Europe and North America. According to these testimonies, these legacy investments established a substantial, self-sustaining financial cushion that survived the transition out of Iraq and continues to underwrite major organizational expenditures today.

Fraud, Smuggling, and Legal Investigations

During the late 20th century, particularly while operating exile networks in Europe and North America, the MEK’s front organizations faced numerous legal crackdowns. Federal and international law enforcement agencies launched investigations into systemic financial crimes used to sustain the group. These illicit fundraising mechanisms included:

• Charity Fraud: Operating faux charitable fronts that solicited donations from unsuspecting diaspora communities under the guise of aiding Iranian orphans, refugees, or political prisoners, while the funds were actually redirected to MEK military and political apparatuses. Iran Aid was one of these fraudulent charities that was banned by British government.
• Welfare and Social Security Scams: In countries such as the United States, Canada, and various European nations, members engaged in organized schemes involving fraudulent welfare claims, unemployment benefits, and document forgery. The group even exploited the payments the European governments allocated the children of Mujahed parents who were smuggled to Europe and North America during the 1990s.
• Smuggling Rings: Federal investigations in the United States and Europe uncovered passport forgery and smuggling rings tied to MEK networks, resulting in criminal indictments and prison sentences for dozens of members.

High-Dollar Lobbying and Lack of Public Disclosure

Following its removal from the U.S. Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list in 2012 and the European Union’s earlier delisting, the MEK intensified its public relations and political influence campaigns . The organization, alongside various seemingly independent Iranian-American front groups and sympathetic political action committees, began spending millions of dollars to secure political support in Washington, D.C., and European capitals .

This phase of fundraising and spending introduced acute transparency controversies:

• Exorbitant Speaker Fees: Prominent Western political figures, retired generals, and former high-ranking government officials—including former Vice President Mike Pence and former National Security Advisor John Bolton—received massive speaker fees (ranging from tens of thousands to over $400,000 per appearance) for addressing MEK rallies and conferences . Investigative reports by journalists and diplomats revealed that these funds were funneled through opaque speaker bureaus and front organizations, obscuring the direct financial pipeline connecting the MEK leadership to American policymakers .
• Obscure Revenue Streams: Despite claiming to represent a popular democratic movement, the MEK has consistently failed to provide transparent financial audits or public disclosures detailing how millions of dollars are raised, who donors are, and how foreign assets are managed. Critics, government watchdogs, and investigative journalists note a profound lack of accountability regarding the true benefactors behind the organization’s multi-million-dollar lobbying footprint .

In conclusion, while public-facing telethons like Hamyari serve a vital role in sustaining media operations and demonstrating active community engagement, financial investigators and former members concur that the macro-level expenditures of the MEK—ranging from European real estate and camp infrastructure to high-powered international lobbying—rely heavily on historical asset accumulations, legacy investments from the era of Iraqi state patronage, and contributions from wealthy elite benefactors rather than small-scale grassroots donations alone.

Investigations by government bodies, human rights organizations, and scholarly analyses have repeatedly highlighted that a significant portion of the MEK’s financial resources has historically relied upon internal coercion. Former members and independent investigative reports indicate that the organization operates under a strict, authoritarian, cult-like structure led by figures such as Massoud and Maryam Rajavi. Within this framework, members have reportedly been subjected to financial coercion, the surrender of personal assets, and forced labor, all funneled back into the organization’s centralized treasury to bankroll its international operations.

Mazda Parsi

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Amir Yaghmai rebuilt his life after leaving the MEK, but his childhood trauma never left him. Although he wrote his memoirs of his entangled life with the Cult of Rajavi in recent years and published them on social media, he still occasionally posts photos, notes. His notes from his experience in the MEK on his personal account on X, are not only interesting but also instructive. The following photos and notes are from Amir, who is in his forties, who shares his childhood experience in a terrorist cult with his audience in a profound way:

Amir Yaghmai in the MEK’s kindergarten

In ordinary families, family  photos are usually framed and placed on the wall or on the shelves; but in the environment where we grew up, that is, in the MEK bases, almost the only images that were allowed to be in front of our eyes were the images of the leaders of the organization: Massoud and Maryam Rajavi.

In this photo, I am playing with a toy instrument in one of the MEK bases in Paris. Behind me is a framed image of the wedding ceremony of Massoud and Maryam Rajavi in ​​Paris.

Even in the simple and childish moments of our lives, the presence of the organization’s leadership was constant; as if an image of family and personal life was not supposed to form in our minds, instead it had to be replaced with the image of “leadership”.

Children in the MEK’s kindergarten

Collective work was considered a value in the MEK; to the point that even we three- or four-year-old children in kindergarten were not exempt from it. They would give us a piece of cloth or a handkerchief and ask us to clean the radiators.

In this picture, I am the child standing in front, wearing a blue shirt and putting my hand over my mouth; as if I had already gotten sick of these forced tasks imposed on children.

This picture was taken around 1986, in one of the MEK kindergartens in Paris.

Photos of Maryam and Massoud Rajavi in the MEK’s kindergarten

Photos of Maryam and Massoud Rajavi on the wall in the MEK’s kindergarten

Around 1984, in the kindergarten of the MEK in Paris. I am the same child in the red dress and holding a balloon.

What attracts attention most in this photo is the atmosphere of the children’s playroom. On the walls, instead of cartoons, children’s characters, or paintings that would be appropriate for a child’s world, there are numerous photos of Massoud and Maryam Rajavi.

In one of the photos on the left, Massoud Rajavi is seen caressing the face of a child. From the very first years of life, we were taught that Massoud Rajavi was our ideological “father.” We grew up in an environment where the face and image of the leader of the organization were an inseparable part of everyday life and even the children’s playroom.

Today, when I look at this photo, the question that comes to mind most of all is why a kindergarten should be decorated with pictures of the leaders of a political organization instead of creating a world full of colors, stories, and children’s characters. This photo is not just an old photo for me; It is a document of an environment in which our childhood was tied to the ideology of the organization from the very beginning.

Mazda Parsi

The post A Child behind the Ideological Bars of Massoud and Maryam Rajavi appeared first on Nejat Society.

Common patterns in the recruitment and deception process

One of the most important common aspects of the structure of the Epstein cult and the Rajavi cult is the use of sophisticated techniques of deception and psychological preparation to ensnare victims. In Jeffrey Epstein’s organization, victims were mainly recruited from among young girls with tempting promises of careers in the modeling industry, while in the MEK, recruitment was often carried out with promises of fighting for freedom, social justice or asylum in Europe and a better job and life to overcome personal crises. In both cases, the cult leaders initially introduce themselves as “saviors” or powerful supporters who can create a bright future for the individual. Over time, this process leads to the creation of intense emotional and financial dependence, such that the individual has no way of returning or making independent decisions.

Anya is the pseudonym of one of the women who was one of Jeffrey Epstein’s victims. In a recent interview with the BBC, she confirmed the statements of other female victims of Epstein: “I am still trying to come to terms with the fact that I was abused for years.” According to her, although she was apparently free, in reality she was trapped in restrictions and dependencies that acted like invisible chains, and she only realized this after Epstein’s death.

The female victims of Massoud Rajavi, however, did not and do not even enjoy apparent freedom. They have been imprisoned for years in closed camps of the organization in Iraq or Albania, but with Rajavi’s special values, such as the “denial of individuality and gender”, not only do they not realize their captivity, but they see themselves on the path to “perfection” and “salvation of the people.”

The victims who managed to escape the physical and mental bars of the MEK, after leaving the organizational context, managed to break away from the invisible chains and, like Batoul Soltani, Nasrin Ebrahimi, Fereshteh Hedayati, Zhina Hossein Nejad, and many others, speak of what happened to them in Rajavi’s cult of personality.

Destruction of individual autonomy

In the clinical psychology literature of cults, the destruction of individual autonomy and the right to choose is the main foundation of the dominance of cult leaders. In Epstein’s cult, victims such as “Anya” have testified that Epstein deprived them of the ability to think independently by constantly humiliating them, criticizing their physical appearance, and controlling their relationships and finances. Similarly, in Rajavi’s cult, Massoud Rajavi used meetings called “ideological revolution,” “bait,” “weekly bath,” and “current operations” and intense mental control to destroy the personal, emotional, and family attachments of members. Forced divorces, forced celibacy, separating children from parents, and imposing ideas in which the individual does not have the slightest right or will for his or her personal life are evaluated precisely in this context; a strategy whose ultimate goal is to turn people into unwilling tools serving the interests of the cult leader.

Creating all-encompassing dependency and tools of economic and social control

The victim’s attachment to the system is the main obstacle to their escape or protest. In Epstein’s organization, women lacked independent bank accounts, health insurance, or financial support, and Epstein trapped them in invisible chains with the phrase “I am your health insurance.” In Rajavi’s cult, the complete severance of members’ connections with the outside world, family, and society, as well as strict control over all their basic necessities, placed them in a position where they could not imagine any refuge outside the organization. The use of fabricated debts or embarrassing documents in Epstein’s cult to silence victims is very similar to the creation of a sense of permanent guilt and organizational accountability in the MEK. The self-criticism meetings held daily in Camp Ashraf and Ashraf 3 under the title of “Current Operation” function to create a sense of permanent shame and indebtedness to “Brother Massoud” and “Sister Maryam.”

Humiliating rituals and physical control (Salvation dance and naked dance)

One of the most obvious points of commonality between these two organizations is the use of collective and humiliating rituals to break self-respect and ensure non-disclosure. Published testimonies from Epstein’s victims, including Anya, mention cases in which women were forced to strip and dance in front of Epstein’s camera and eyes so that, as he said, “they would never be able to act against him”; because having this visual evidence turned the fear of humiliation into a tool for silence.

This method is exactly reminiscent of the phenomenon known as the “Salvation Dance” in the leadership council of the MEK, which was carried out under the management of Maryam Rajavi and under the orders of Massoud Rajavi. There, too, under the guise of fabricated ideological concepts, women members of the Leadership Council were forced to take actions that violated their privacy and human dignity and fatally cemented their emotional and organizational ties to Massoud Rajavi. In both systems, the purpose of these forced rituals is to create a point of no return for the victim, so that she feels that she has no way to protest or leave because of her participation in a humiliating and dirty act.

Finally, examining the structure of these two organizations shows that the apparent differences between an unhealthy network of financial and sexual corruption (Epstein) and an extremist political organization (Rajavi) do not prevent their deep and substantial similarities in the use of mind control tools, the exploitation of people, and especially the victimization of women.

Mazda Parsi

The post A Comparative Analysis of Psychological Control Mechanisms in Jeffrey Epstein’s Cult and the MEK appeared first on Nejat Society.

This alliance emerged amid the eight-year war that Saddam’s West-backed regime imposed upon the Islamic Republic shortly after the triumphant 1979 Islamic Revolution.

As the protracted war entered its final phase, the MKO terrorists executed this major offensive operation against Iranian territory.

In a swift and devastating response, Iranian armed forces launched Operation Mersad – which translates to “Ambush” – a counteroffensive that effectively annihilated the MKO forces within a mere three days, inflicting more than 4,800 casualties upon the terrorist group and forever crushing their military ambitions. [The operation is called by the MEK Forough Javidan which means Eternal Light]

What was the strategic objective behind the attack?

Following eight years of imposed war and five years of overt and covert military collaboration between Saddam’s army and the MKO terror cult, the Iraqi dictator and his terrorist allies found themselves with no territorial gains to show for their efforts.

This frustrating reality prompted the West-backed Iraqi regime and its collaborators to fundamentally alter their strategic approach.

By mid-July 1988, both Iran and Iraq had formally accepted a United Nations resolution that effectively brought the war to a close. The front lines had calmed considerably, and the majority of Iranian forces were stationed along the border in southwestern Khuzestan province, where the most intense combat operations had been concentrated throughout the war.

Despite the ceasefire agreement, Saddam stubbornly clung to his ill-fated dream of achieving victory and implementing the so-called “regime change” in Iran. He envisioned the MKO as a Western puppet that could be installed in Tehran to replace the Islamic Republic’s leadership.

Together, the Iraqi dictator’s Ba’athist regime and the MKO leadership devised an ambitious plan for a swift, surprise invasion originating from Iran’s central-western Kermanshah province, approximately 500 kilometers north of the primary front, with the objective of penetrating deep into Iranian territory.

Their strategic goal was to reach Tehran rapidly, overthrow Iran’s leadership, and declare a new government before Iranian reinforcements could be mobilized from the southern front.

Unlike previous joint attacks conducted by the Ba’athist regime and the MKO, this offensive was specifically designed to be carried out solely by MKO terrorists. They mistakenly assumed that this approach would make the Iranian public more receptive to their presence and cause.

To execute this elaborate plan, Saddam equipped 7,500 MKO members with state-of-the-art weaponry, including 1,300 tanks and military vehicles, sophisticated anti-aircraft systems, and additional military hardware. The Iraqi dictator further promised air support and repeated bombing campaigns against western Iranian airbases to facilitate the MKO’s advance.

How did the incursion begin?

On July 22, 1988, the Ba’athist regime forces initiated the operation by launching large-scale chemical attacks against Iranian border villages situated within the planned invasion corridor. These brutal chemical strikes were designed to weaken local defenses and pave the way for the MKO’s entry into Iranian territory.

Four days later, on July 26, the Iraqi air force bombarded major airfields near Hamadan and Tabriz, which served as Iran’s key western military bases. That same day, MKO forces crossed the border, marking the beginning of their ground invasion.

Simultaneously, Iraq staged a diversionary assault near Khorramshahr in the southwest, attempting to divert Iran’s military attention and delay reinforcements to the northern front.

The MKO terrorists advanced swiftly through Qasr-e Shirin and Sarpol-e Zahab, towns that had been abandoned due to the chemical strikes. They continued their eastward advance via Road 48 in the Ravand River valley. The terrorists occupied the sparsely populated towns of Kerend-e Gharb and Eslamabad-e Gharb, pushing approximately 120 kilometers from the border. However, Tehran still lay an imposing 600 kilometers away – far beyond their reach.

Contrary to the MKO’s expectations, local residents did not welcome them as liberators. Rather, the Iranian population viewed them as foreign aggressors and collaborators with the enemy.

Local civilians fiercely resisted the MKO, even opening fire on the terrorists, demonstrating their unwavering loyalty to the Islamic Republic.

How was the invasion annihilated?

The courageous local resistance bought crucial time for Iran’s military to regroup, reorganize, and prepare a comprehensive counteroffensive against the invading MKO terrorists.

Iranian Army units under the command of General Ali Sayad Shirazi, alongside Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) and Basij forces led by General Mohsen Rezaei, were swiftly deployed to the area.

Military analysts subsequently slammed the MKO’s maneuver as tactically flawed and strategically unsound. The terrorist convoy was stretched in a vulnerable column that lacked adequate protection from flanking attacks and possessed only one rear exit, creating a tactical nightmare for the advancing forces.

On July 27, just one day into the offensive, IRGC troops blocked the road at Chaharzebar pass, successfully preventing the MKO terrorists from advancing toward Kermanshah city.

Meanwhile, Iranian forces cut off their retreat and supply lines at Hassanabad pass to the west, effectively trapping the entire MKO convoy in the narrow valley.

Iranian airbases, which had been quickly repaired after the Iraqi air raids, deployed fighter jets that relentlessly bombarded the MKO column from above. Attack helicopters targeted and destroyed armored vehicles, further decimating the terrorist forces.

Eventually, reinforcements from Khuzestan joined the battle, and these Basij and IRGC units dismantled the remainder of the MKO terrorist forces while eliminating all checkpoints the terrorists had established in the towns they had briefly occupied.

What war crimes were committed by the MKO?

Throughout the doomed offensive, the Iraqi-MKO coalition committed numerous war crimes against Iranian civilians, demonstrating their complete disregard for human life and international humanitarian law. One of the most horrific crimes was the chemical bombing of Zardeh, a village near the border in Kermanshah province.

This brutal attack, viewed as part of Saddam’s broader Al-Anfal genocidal campaign against Kurds and other populations, killed 275 civilians, including innocent children and women.

Many others suffered lasting health effects from exposure to chemical agents, with some still experiencing the consequences decades later.

In addition to the Zardeh massacre, several other villages in the region were attacked with mustard gas and nerve agents, resulting in hundreds more civilian casualties. Survivors of these attacks have experienced severe long-term health issues, including neurological disorders, various cancers, and birth defects in subsequent generations—a tragic legacy that continues to affect Iranian families.

Eslamabad-e Gharb also sustained significant destruction through Iraqi air raids and MKO shelling, which were carried out in reprisal for local resistance against the terrorist forces.

Among the most horrifying crimes committed by the MKO was their attack on the town’s hospital, where they massacred all the injured patients and medical personnel, then set their bodies ablaze in an act of unspeakable barbarism.

What were the aftermath and consequences?

Operation Mersad marked a pivotal point in the region’s contemporary history as the final battle of the eight-year imposed war. The operation shattered Saddam’s last hopes of defeating Iran militarily and demonstrated the Islamic Republic’s resilience and determination to defend its sovereignty against all aggressors.

For the MKO terror cult, the loss was catastrophic and irreparable. The operation annihilated the group’s military ambitions, demoralized their ranks, and effectively ended their role as an armed organization capable of threatening Iranian security. The group’s transformation from a military force into a political organization based abroad was accelerated by this crushing defeat.

On the eve of the aggression, MKO leader Masoud Rajavi had delivered a grandiose speech at their base, confidently predicting the capture of Tehran within 48 hours. Two days later, he faced utter failure and had to address the decimated remnants of his group, with nothing to show for their efforts.

MKO leadership subsequently offered a range of excuses for their catastrophic failure, from claims of a planned withdrawal – a narrative debunked by images of destroyed convoys and abandoned equipment – to assertions that fighters had been safely relocated to other bases, which simply did not exist.

Perhaps the most persistent myth, still perpetuated in MKO propaganda to this day, is the claim that their members were captured and mass executed by Iranian armed forces. Such narratives attempt to obscure the group’s military defeat in a campaign characterized by aggression, terrorism, and genocidal actions, and instead shift blame onto Iran for the consequences of the MKO’s own disastrous decisions.

What legal response can be taken against MKO terrorists?

The MKO’s military cooperation with the Ba’athist regime of Iraq represented a significant transformation from political opposition into armed collaboration with a foreign enemy during wartime, a serious violation of Iranian law.

Under Article 508 of Iran’s Islamic Penal Code, cooperation with hostile regimes against the Islamic Republic can result in imprisonment of one to ten years. This provision clearly applies to the MKO’s actions during Operation Mersad.

Other legal provisions may also apply to the MKO’s activities. Article 279 defines moharebeh (enmity against God and warfare against the Islamic system) in cases involving armed action intended to create fear or oppose the Islamic system, while Article 501 criminalizes the intentional disclosure of classified information in circumstances constituting espionage. The MKO’s actions fall under multiple categories of criminal offenses under Iranian law.

The operation also raised significant questions under international humanitarian law, particularly regarding prisoner-of-war protections under Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention. POW status generally requires combatants to belong to armed forces or qualifying organized resistance groups that meet specific conditions, including responsible command, recognizable insignia, openly carried weapons, and compliance with the laws of war.

The MKO’s status is therefore legitimately disputed, given its formal cooperation with Iraq, lack of clear formal affiliation with Iraqi forces, and violations against civilians, including the massacres at Zardeh and Eslamabad-e Gharb.

Article 5 of the Convention provides for competent tribunals to determine disputed status, leaving the question open for proper legal determination.

Iran also has solid grounds for domestic jurisdiction because the attack occurred on Iranian territory and was carried out largely by Iranian nationals. Historical cases involving wartime collaborators in France, Norway, Croatia, and India demonstrate that states have legitimately prosecuted nationals who fought alongside foreign enemies against their own countries.

It, therefore, presents a significant case involving wartime collaboration, national security offenses, espionage, armed rebellion, and the legal limits of combatant protections under international law.

Press TV

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For years, concerns and allegations have been raised by former members, researchers and journalists about the internal functioning of the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK), including the separation of members from their families, control of personal lives, restrictions on communication and psychological pressure. These allegations must be investigated by competent institutions without prejudice and within the framework of the law. Criticism of an ideology or an organization is not an attack on a nation or individuals; it is part of the right to freedom of expression and dialogue in a democratic society.

Albania has shown its humanitarianism by accepting and supporting those who have sought safety and refuge. But humanitarianism must never mean renouncing the fundamental rights of individuals. Every human being must enjoy freedom of conscience, contact with family, freedom of movement and the right to freely choose to remain or leave any organization. The voices of former members must also be heard without fear or prejudice.

The main challenge is not just to a specific organization, but to any ideology that prioritizes obedience over freedom, discipline over conscience and organization over human dignity. No structure can survive if it demands absolute obedience and denies the right to think differently.

Albania must remain a country where the rule of law, human rights and democratic values ​​are respected. The fight against authoritarian ideologies will not be won with hatred, but with transparency, justice, strong institutions and unconditional respect for human dignity.

Aldo Solullari

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Political analysts and foreign policy experts suggest that Rudy Giuliani and other prominent U.S. political figures support the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK or its political vitrine the NCRI) due to strategic calculations rather than an endorsement of the group’s internal popularity or its history as it is a formerly terrorist designated group.

The Contrast with Public Opinion in Iran

The MEK lacks widespread support inside Iran; independent experts and historians note that the vast majority of the Iranian public deeply distrusts the group. The group’s most significant historical betrayal is that during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, the MEK allied with Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, fighting against Iranian soldiers. This action alienated nearly all segments of Iranian society.

Violation of human rights under the cult-like structure of the group have been documented. Human rights organizations and former members have frequently accused the MEK of operating as a cult, further damaging its credibility as a democratic alternative.

Why U.S. Figures Support the MEK

Direct Opposition: Despite its violent, extremist background and cult-like structure under the rule of Rajavi, The MEK is the most highly organized, well-funded, and vocal opposition group actively seeking to overthrow the current Iranian government. For the group’s American sponsors, the logic is: the enemy of my enemy is my friend. For Washington hawks, the primary goal is regime change in Tehran; the MEK is seen as a ready-made instrument to pressure the current government.

High-budget Lobbying: The MEK runs a highly sophisticated, multi-million-dollar public relations campaign in Western capitals, presenting themselves as pro-democracy and secular. Many high-profile Western politicians, including Giuliani, have historically received substantial financial compensation for speaking at MEK/NCRI events.

Rudy Giuliani has reportedly been paid hundreds of thousands of dollars over more than a decade for delivering brief speeches and lobbying on behalf of the MEK.

The Financial Details of Giuliani’s income via MEK

Estimated Fee Per Speech: While Giuliani’s exact cumulative earnings from the MEK remain undisclosed, his standard fee via the Washington Speakers Bureau was $100,000 to $200,000 per appearance during his peak speaking years. Reports indicate he was paid handsomely—at least $20,000 or much more per brief appearance for MEK-specific events.

Frequency: Robert G. Torricelli, a former U.S. Senator acting as a legal representative for the MEK, confirmed that Giuliani was directly paid for an initial series of three or four speeches early in his advocacy. Since then, Giuliani has met with MEK officials or spoken at their annual events at least once every year.

Luxe Travel Demands: Financial disclosures from Giuliani’s peak speaking era show his standard contract required hosts to provide luxury accommodations, including private travel on a Gulfstream IV jet or larger for out-of-town events.

How the Payments Were Funneled

Because the MEK was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) by the U.S. State Department until September 2012, direct financial transactions with the group were illegal. To bypass this, the funding was structured through intermediaries including front organizations, lobbying firms and speakers’ bureaus.

Money is funneled through a network of U.S.-based Iranian-American immigrant organizations and community groups aligned with the MEK like the Organization of Iranian-American Communities (OIAC) which is a U.S. based grass-roots group. These local groups pay the international lobbying law firms like DLA Piper. DLA Piper routed the funds through a professional speakers’ bureau, which ultimately issued the official checks to Giuliani and other U.S. officials.

Chronology of Paid Appearances of Rudy Giuliani

2011–2012 (The Delisting Campaign): Giuliani was hired to give a series of high-profile speeches in Washington, Paris, and London. His explicit objective was to pressure the State Department to remove the MEK from the terrorist list.

2012 Treasury Investigation: The U.S. Treasury Department opened an investigation into Giuliani and other politicians to determine if receiving these funds violated U.S. sanctions laws against terrorist entities. No charges were filed, and the MEK was delisted months later.

Post-2012 Rallies: Free from legal restrictions, Giuliani continued appearing as a paid speaker at massive MEK annual rallies in Paris, Albania, and Poland and Italy frequently sharing the stage with Maryam Rajavi to call for immediate regime change in Iran.

However, during an MEK rally in Albania, in 2019, Rudy Giuliani described the group as a “government-in-exile”, saying it is a ready-to-go alternative to lead the country if the Iranian government falls. Now, 7 years later, Giuliani must understand that the MEK is still stuck in Albania and Iranians despise it more than ever.

Mazda Parsi

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