Research into the MEK’s practices—including reports by Human Rights Watch and the RAND Corporation, as well as the memoirs of former members of the group—reveals that the group employs multifaceted mechanisms for mind control and member isolation. Through strict censorship and enforced isolation, the organization has successfully implemented these mechanisms, thereby gaining control over the minds and all aspects of the lives of the residents of the MEK headquarters.

The conduct of the MEK leaders, Massoud and Maryam Rajavi, when measured against international human rights standards, constitutes a gross violation of the rights of the residents of the isolated Camp Ashraf 3, located in the village of Manëz in northern Albania.

The following points summarize the violations of MEK members’ rights through censorship, assessed against international human rights standards—including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted in December 1948) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted in December 1966):

1. Total deprivation of access to independent news and forced consumption of the organization’s exclusive media.
2. Forced ideological scrutiny, psychological coercion to extract confessions, and interrogation regarding personal thoughts during meetings.
3. Imposition of severe psychological pressure, prolonged isolation, and brainwashing.
4. Deprivation of the right to independent thought, forced alteration of beliefs, and mandatory acceptance of the leadership’s ideology.

In light of the systematic human rights violations within the MEK’s camps—such as those previously reported at Camp Ashraf in Iraq and subsequently at Ashraf 3 in Albania—international human rights bodies, host governments, and responsible civil society organizations are expected to take serious, practical steps. Numerous reports by Human Rights Watch and advocacy groups have emphasized the need for urgent action in this regard.

Key expectations of human rights bodies and governments include:

Conducting independent and impartial investigations:

International organizations, such as the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, should dispatch independent inspectors to these camps to assess the situation of trapped members, the possibility of free departure, and the status of their mental health and individual rights.

Guaranteeing freedom of coming and going and communication with families outside MEK bases:

A primary demand of human rights bodies and anxious families is to break the isolation and enable members to communicate freely with the outside world, use personal communication devices, and meet openly with their families—privileges from which they have been deprived for years.

Safeguarding the rights of individuals who have left:

Ensuring the physical safety, legal rights, and asylum status of those who manage to escape or break away from these structures—particularly in countries where the camps are located, such as Albania—is a legal obligation of the host government and asylum authorities.

Documenting and prosecuting human rights violations within MEK camps:

Documenting instances of human rights abuses, severe physical and psychological restrictions, and cult-like pressures—treating them as violations of fundamental human rights—and striving to hold the perpetrators of such conduct accountable in international forums.

Mazda Parsi

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Following the public announcement of Yazdan’s death in June 2026, his family utilized social media, specifically creating a dedicated Instagram account under the name Yazdan Teimorian, to mourn publicly and share his history. Most captions of Yazdan’s photos indicate the sufferings of Yazdan and his separated family under the rule of the MEK leaders. This is their most recent post:

“Love you, miss you every day. He had been sick in Ashraf Hospital and was kept away from his family. They didn’t let him have a last goodbye or even a last phone call with us. It’s so unfair.

Years ago, during our last phone call, he said, “Please bring the baby girl, my granddaughter, so I can hold her in my arms.” He needed his family and was longing for us.”

Analyzing this short heartfelt message reveals several critical themes concerning human rights, family separation, and the systemic control exercised over aging members in Ashraf 3, Manez, Albania.

Denial of End-of-Life Contact and Compassion

The post highlights that Yazdan Teimorian was sick in Ashraf 3 and was deliberately kept away from his relatives. In humanitarian terms, end-of-life care typically emphasizes comfort, dignity, and family reconciliation. The family’s grievance— “They didn’t let him have a last goodbye or even a last phone call with us”—underscores how ideological or organizational strictures can prevail fundamental human empathy, denying both the aging member and his family the opportunity for saying goodbye.

The Unfulfilled Human Desire for Familial Connection

The poignant recollection quoted by the family— “Please bring the baby girl, my granddaughter, so I can hold her in my arms”—illustrates the profound yearning for generational continuity and familial love that persists despite decades of separation. For decades, many members within the restrictive structures of the Cult of Rajavi are cut off from routine domestic life, marriages, and child-rearing. Highlighting this plea emphasizes that beneath decades of organizational commitment, core human attachments and the desire for parental and grandparental bonds remained entirely intact.

Institutional Control and Information Asymmetry

Reports surrounding the Teimorian family’s interactions with the MEK—including restricted visits during trips to Albania and delayed or tightly controlled notifications regarding his death—demonstrate a pattern of information gatekeeping. Organizations that isolate their rank-and-file members from the outside world often maintain strict control over communication channels to prevent defections, external influence, or independent oversight, unfortunately resulting in profound grief for families on the outside who are left unable to support their aging loved ones effectively.

To cope with the prolonged absence and the rigid barriers erected by the MEK, Yazdan’s family navigated their grief and fought against institutional silence through several distinct actions. Through social media, his daughter Sepideh and other relatives published commemorative posts, family photographs, and details regarding his life inside the organization to counter the information vacuum controlled by the group.

Mazda Parsi

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The alignment of high-ranking Western political figures, such as former U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, with the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) presents a complex geopolitical paradox. On one hand, the MEK has historically possessed a deeply contested domestic standing inside Iran, largely stemming from its alignment with Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War and its rigid internal structure characterized by scholars and journalists as a cult of personality centered on leaders Massoud and Maryam Rajavi. On the other hand, it has been able to cultivate a network of prominent bipartisan American and European politicians who advocate for its cause as a viable democratic alternative to the government in Tehran.

To understand why figures like Mike Pompeo endorse the MEK despite its widely recognized lack of a grassroots public base within contemporary Iran, one must examine the convergence of aggressive anti-Iran advocacy, intelligence-sharing networks, lobbying dynamics, and a shared strategic objective centered on regime change.

Scholars of international relations and Middle Eastern politics note that the phenomenon of Western politicians supporting the MEK is largely driven by a policy vacuum regarding Iran. In authoritative geopolitical analyses, such as those found in modern political science literature examining U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, the prevailing bipartisan consensus in Washington DC following the 1979 Iranian Revolution has been the containment or ultimate overthrow of the Islamic Republic. However, successive U.S. administrations have struggled to find a unified, organized domestic opposition inside Iran capable of executing a successful transition of power.

The MEK, operating through its political wing, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), has spent decades presenting itself as the most disciplined, structured, and ready-to-govern alternative to Islamic Republic. For hawks advocating a “maximum pressure” strategy, the MEK’s polished apparatus under pro-democracy gestures offers an accessible interlocutor that speaks the language of Western liberal democracy in its public PR campaigns, regardless of its internal dictatorship under the rule of Massoud Rajavi or its violent past.[3]

Furthermore, the relationship is heavily sustained by political lobbying and financial payment. Investigative journalism and academic studies have extensively documented that prominent American figures—ranging from former mayors and retired generals to former cabinet secretaries like Mike Pompeo, Rudy Giuliani, and John Bolton—have received substantial speaking fees to attend MEK rallies in Paris, Brussels, and Washington.

While these politicians frequently frame their support around universal values of human rights, democracy, and freedom for the Iranian people, the financial incentives and the high-visibility platform provided by the NCRI create a mutually beneficial arrangement. The MEK gains invaluable political legitimacy, mainstream media visibility, and proximity to the levers of Western power, while participating politicians signal their hawkish credentials to domestic diaspora communities.

Another critical dimension is intelligence cooperation and geopolitical utility. During the height of the Cold War and the post-9/11 era, exile opposition groups frequently served as conduits for intelligence regarding target states. Although the MEK was removed from the U.S. State Department’s Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list in 2012 following an intense legal and lobbying campaign, its historical intelligence networks regarding Iran’s clandestine nuclear program and military infrastructure have historically attracted security-minded officials.[5] For the U.S., and Israel, any group committed to the violent or structural collapse of Iranian government can be viewed as a tactical asset, irrespective of its domestic popularity poll numbers inside Iran.

Finally, the rhetoric employed by figures like Mike Pompeo—framing the MEK or its affiliated diaspora gatherings as the voice of the Iranian populace—often reflects the insular nature of exile politics. Diaspora communities in the West can sometimes present monolithic desires, which political figures eager for a straightforward narrative readily amplify. Consequently, the endorsement of the MEK is less about a rigorous sociological assessment of the group’s popularity inside Iran, and more about employing a readily available, aggressive instrument designed to maintain maximum pressure on Iran.

Mazda Parsi

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The decision followed years of intense and costly political lobbying that brought together former American officials, members of the US Congress, lawyers and political advocates – all of them sharing common hostility toward the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Presented publicly as a matter of law and humanitarian concern, the delisting nevertheless provided the MKO with an opportunity to reconstruct its international image – from a notorious terrorist outfit to a so-called “political opposition.”

An organization with a long record of armed attacks, assassinations, cooperation with the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein and coercive internal practices could now present itself to Western audiences as a democratic Iranian “opposition” movement.

That transformation remains one of the most striking examples of political rebranding surrounding an organization whose history is replete with terrorism and extremism.

The MKO’s evolution tells a very different story from the one promoted by its supporters.

Established in the 1960s with an ideological tilt toward Marxism, it eventually became an armed organization operating from Iraqi territory under Saddam’s regime, especially during the eight-year war imposed on the Islamic Republic of Iran in the 1980s.

Its history includes targeted attacks against elected Iranian government officials and civilians, the killing of American personnel in Iran, military aggression against its own country alongside Ba’athist forces, and involvement in the suppression of anti-Saddam uprisings in Iraq.

Yet despite that record, the organization succeeded in cultivating influential allies in Washington, because of their shared hostility toward the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Its rise in the West was built through an extensive campaign of lobbying, political networking, paid speaking engagements and legal challenges. Former senior American officials from both major parties publicly advocated on its behalf, while members of Congress repeatedly pressed successive administrations to reconsider its designation.

The campaign eventually succeeded. What followed, however, was not the emergence of the Iranian “opposition” movement that its foreign supporters had envisioned. Instead, the MKO became increasingly dependent on an aging membership, foreign political patrons and an elaborate political and media infrastructure outside Iran.

Its eventual isolation in Albania illustrates the limits of attempting to manufacture political legitimacy abroad while pushing an agenda that has very few takers today.

A history shaped by violence and political betrayal

The organization emerged in the 1960s and its initial objective was to overthrow the Pahlavi monarchy, but armed struggle soon became central to its methods.

After the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the organization rapidly entered into a violent confrontation with the Islamic Republic, which rapidly escalated into an armed campaign against government institutions, officials and supporters.

Among the most consequential attacks came in June 1981, when a bombing at the headquarters of the Islamic Republic Party in Tehran resulted in the martyrdom of Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti and scores of other officials. Later that year, President Mohammad Ali Rajai and Prime Minister Mohammad Javad Bahonar were also assassinated by the terror group.

The terror cult subsequently became responsible for thousands of cold-blooded killings during its armed campaign. The total number of people killed by MKO is approximately 16,000.

The organization’s relationship with Baathist Iraq represented an even more consequential stage in its development. During the 1980s war, the MKO moved its principal military infrastructure into Iraq and entered into an alliance with Saddam Hussein. Its forces subsequently conducted military attacks against Iran from Iraqi territory and fought alongside Saddam’s forces.

The relationship did not end with aggression against Iran. The MKO also assisted Saddam in suppressing the Kurdish and Shiite uprisings that erupted in Iraq in 1991. Former members have described the participation of MKO forces in those operations.

The organization’s violent record also extended to Americans. During the 1970s, MKO operatives targeted American military personnel and civilians working in Iran. Lt. Col. Lewis L. Hawkins was assassinated in 1973, while Army officers Col. Paul Shaffer and Lt. Col. Jack Turner were killed in 1975. American civilian contractors William C. Cottrell Jr. and Donald G. Smith were murdered in 1976.

The terror organization was also involved in plots against American diplomatic and political targets, including an attempted assassination of US Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II in 1970.

Two years later, a bomb was detonated at a Tehran mausoleum shortly before President Richard Nixon was scheduled to attend a ceremony there.

The MKO’s campaign subsequently acquired an international dimension. In April 1992, supporters of the cult carried out simultaneous attacks against Iranian diplomatic facilities across North America and Europe. In New York, armed MKO terrorists entered Iran’s Mission to the United Nations and took hostages. Similar violent attacks occurred in cities including Ottawa, Bonn, Hamburg, The Hague, London and Paris.

This record became a major obstacle to the organization’s later attempt to present itself as a conventional democratic “opposition” movement. The political image promoted in Washington was increasingly difficult to reconcile with its decades-long history of armed activity.

Building influence in Washington

Long before the 2012 delisting, the MKO had developed a sophisticated system for cultivating political relationships in the United States. Even while designated as a terrorist organization, it found ways to establish connections with American politicians and political networks.

A 1985 New York Times report noted that at least 19 members of US Congress had signed letters or statements distributed by the terror organization, apparently without realizing that the US State Department regarded the MKO as responsible for killing Americans.

The organization also established groups that presented themselves as humanitarian or political organizations. One example was the so-called Iran Relief Fund, which solicited donations from Americans. In 1984, the organization reportedly collected almost $100,000 in Maryland and Virginia before authorities moved against it after its connection to the MKO became known.

By the early 1990s, the MKO had established contacts reaching into the upper levels of American politics. Reports in the American media in the 1990s described contacts between the organization and figures surrounding the incoming Clinton administration, including a private letter from then-President-elect Bill Clinton to Massoud Rajavi and a meeting between an MKO foreign-policy adviser and Vice President-elect Al Gore.

At the same time, the organization was seeking support from influential pro-Israel political networks in Washington.

According to a 1993 Guardian report, MKO figures believed that gaining respectability and influence over the Clinton administration’s Iran policy would require the backing of Washington’s powerful pro-Israel lobby.

Politicians such as Gary Ackerman, Robert Torricelli, Dan Burton and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen became prominent supporters of the anti-Iran terror organization. MKO-related material appeared in the Congressional Record, while members of Congress participated in events and hearings supporting the group’s campaign.

The common ground was not necessarily ideological. It was opposition to the Islamic Republic of Iran. That shared objective gave the MKO political value to actors who otherwise had little reason to embrace its ideology or history.

The relationship became particularly consequential in 2002. That year, the MKO publicly disclosed information concerning Iranian nuclear facilities at Natanz and Arak. The intelligence was subsequently linked to the Israeli regime, which had supplied the information to the organization for public release, revealing their inner dealings.

The episode became emblematic of the network surrounding the MKO: Israel supplied intelligence, the MKO served as the public messenger, and the revelation helped intensify international pressure on Iran.

The lobbying campaign that secured delisting

The campaign to remove the MKO from the terrorist list was unusually extensive. One of its most visible features was the recruitment of former senior US officials as public advocates.

They appeared at MKO events and delivered speeches supporting the group’s removal from the terrorist designation. Reports placed individual speaking fees in the tens of thousands of dollars, with some appearances reportedly generating payments of between $20,000 and $50,000.

The roster crossed party lines. Former New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani emerged as one of its most prominent advocates, speaking at MKO gatherings in Europe and the United States.

Former UN ambassador and Trump aide John Bolton repeatedly argued that the designation was politically motivated and advocated a tougher American policy toward Iran. Former House Speaker Newt Gingrich also appeared at MKO events and promoted its anti-Iran cause.

Other Republican figures involved in the campaign included former Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge, former Attorney General Michael Mukasey and former FBI Director Louis Freeh.

The organization simultaneously recruited Democratic figures, helping give its campaign the appearance of bipartisan backing. Former Pennsylvania Governor Ed Rendell was among the more prominent Democratic supporters and openly discussed receiving substantial speaking fees. Former Vermont Governor Howard Dean and former New Mexico Governor and UN Ambassador Bill Richardson also publicly supported the terror group’s position.

The practice generated criticism from American officials concerned about the relationship between the payments and an organization that remained formally designated as terrorist.

Senator John McCain repeatedly supported delisting and visited Camp Ashraf in Iraq, where he publicly expressed solidarity with MKO members. Senator Roy Blunt became a leading supporter of a bipartisan Senate initiative concerning the protection of MKO members in Iraq.

In the House, lawmakers including Ted Poe and Bob Filner pressed the administration to act. Nearly 100 representatives eventually backed H.Res. 60 during the 112th Congress, calling for the MKO to be removed from the terrorist list.

The political campaign was accompanied by a legal strategy. Former Attorney General Michael Mukasey and attorney Viet D. Dinh were among those involved in legal efforts challenging the State Department’s handling of the terror organization’s designation.

Court decisions in 2010 and 2012 placed additional pressure on the department, requiring it to act within deadlines established by the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.

The organization had therefore created pressure on multiple fronts: politicians were demanding delisting, former officials were campaigning publicly, lawyers were challenging the designation in court, and the MKO continued to cultivate its image as a democratic “opposition” movement.

Eventually, the strategy succeeded. On September 28, 2012, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced the removal of the MKO from the Foreign Terrorist Organization list.

From political project to isolated enclave

More than a decade after delisting, the results of that project remain difficult to reconcile with the expectations created by its Western supporters.

The MKO succeeded in changing its legal status in Washington. It built relationships with prominent politicians. It also established an elaborate international lobbying network.

But it did not gain legitimacy anywhere. Instead, the terror cult became increasingly concentrated around its headquarters in Albania, where its members and political infrastructure were relocated after the closure of Camp Ashraf in Iraq.

The most serious confrontation with its Albanian hosts came in June 2023. Albanian police raided the MKO’s Ashraf-3 compound near Tirana, confiscating computers and entering buildings on the site. The operation triggered resistance from residents and violent clashes with police, resulting in injuries on both sides.

The incident exposed the limits of the protection the organization had enjoyed in Albania. For a group accustomed to portraying itself as internationally protected, the raid was a major shock.

It also drew renewed attention to what was taking place inside Ashraf-3. The compound had evolved into a vast political and communications center, a hub for organized online influence operations directed against Iran.

In 2021, Facebook removed hundreds of accounts associated with a coordinated influence operation linked to the MKO’s presence in Albania. It proved that Ashraf-3 was functioning not as a residential community but as an organized center for political messaging and digital activity.

Yet the deeper problem confronting the MKO is demographic and political. Its membership is aging, while the cult has struggled to attract a younger generation. Former members have described a highly controlled internal environment involving separation from family, intense ideological discipline and restrictions on members’ ability to leave or maintain independent lives.

The limits of political reinvention

The MKO’s history since 2012 can therefore be understood as a struggle between image and political reality. The terror cult won its campaign for delisting after years of lobbying, secured endorsements from prominent American politicians, established a new base in Albania and continued presenting itself internationally as the nucleus of a future Iranian government.

But the central objective remained elusive: demonstrating meaningful support from the international community. The larger political project has encountered a far more difficult obstacle, which is the lack of legitimacy and acceptance from both Iranians and non-Iranians.

The MKO managed to remove the “terrorist” label in the US. What it has not managed to remove is its real image and agenda that is all about terrorism and extremism.

By Press TV Website Staff

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Mohammad Karami, former member of the MEK, speaks of how Maryam Rajavi became so versatile in the MEK. Mohammad Karami was interviewed by Akbar Karami, the owner and interviewer of a YouTube channel on which the conversation was published. In this interview, Akbar Karami questions Mohammad Karami about the internal structure and functioning of the MEK, the rise of Maryam Rajavi, decision-making, treatment of dissent, finances, and the organization’s ideological practices.

In the MEK, leaving means disagreeing

This may be the key to understanding Karami’s description. In an ordinary political organization, you can say: “I disagree with the leadership.”

And, ultimately: “I resign.”

Karami describes an organization in which leaving could itself be interpreted as a form of ideological betrayal. That creates an enormous asymmetry of power.

If the leadership controls your housing, your employment, your social relationships, your access to information, your relationship with your spouse, your relationship with your children, your ability to leave, then “voluntary membership” becomes meaningless.

This is one reason Human Rights Watch’s investigation is significant: the witnesses specifically described abuse occurring after they expressed a desire to leave.

How did the “Maryam Rajavi story” develop?

The process of promotion of Maryam Rajavi can be divided into roughly four stages.

Stage 1 — Maryam as a senior revolutionary

Maryam was originally one of several important MEK figures. She was not initially the supreme leader.

Stage 2 — 1985 ideological revolution

This is the turning point. Massoud promoted Maryam to a position of extraordinary authority, followed by the divorce from Mehdi Abrishamchi and marriage to Massoud. The organization presented this as an ideological transformation rather than an ordinary leadership succession.

Stage 3 — Maryam as the embodiment of the new leadership

Over time, Maryam became much more than an administrator. She became a symbol of the organization’s ideological transformation. This is important because it means loyalty to Maryam could become intertwined with loyalty to the organization itself.

Stage 4 — After Massoud’s disappearance

After Massoud disappeared in 2003, Maryam became increasingly prominent as the movement’s public leader and international representative. Today, the organization’s public communications overwhelmingly revolve around Maryam Rajavi.

So the evolution was not simply a conventional promotion through bureaucratic ranks. Karami’s argument is that the organization constructed a system in which personal loyalty to the Rajavi leadership became an ideological obligation.

What does Karami say about MEK’s financial resources?

Karami says that during the Iraq period, the organization had access to very large financial resources and developed mechanisms for moving, disguising, laundering or accounting for money.

In one detailed account, he testifies that members were instructed to create documentation for supposedly legitimate expenditures involving families and children, including documents that he says were used to create a paper trail for large sums of money.

He also describes the use of organizations and associations outside Iraq as part of the financial infrastructure.

It is also independently documented that Saddam Hussein’s government provided the MEK with financial and military support during the organization’s Iraq period. The U.S. State Department reported that after MEK leaders moved to Iraq in 1986, Saddam’s regime provided basing, financial support and training. It also reported evidence of Iraqi funding during the Oil-for-Food period. Human Rights Watch likewise states that Iraqi financial and logistical support ended after Saddam’s government fell in 2003.

The MEK, a religious cult

This is probably the most useful way to understand what Karami is arguing. He argues that the

organization operates through mechanisms normally associated with a high-control religious or cult-like organization, despite presenting itself as a political movement.

There are several characteristics he points to: charismatic leadership; ideological absolutism; extreme personal loyalty to the leadership; separation from outsiders; restrictions on intimate relationships; compulsory ideological sessions; confession/self-criticism; punishment for dissent; difficulty leaving; control over personal life. This is an internal conception of the leader as possessing special ideological authority.

This characterization isn’t unique to Karami. A 2006 U.S. State Department report explicitly described the MEK as displaying “cult-like characteristics,” citing ideological indoctrination, “eternal divorce,” ideological cleansing sessions and separation of children from parents.

RAND also identified characteristics it considered typical of cultic organizations, including authoritarian control, restrictions on marriage, emotional isolation, forced labor, physical abuse and limited exit options.

The bottom line of Karami’s interview

The MEK’s real system of power is not primarily its formal organizational chart. It is a system of personal and ideological control centered on the Rajavi leadership. In Karami’s account, in the MEK, ideology legitimizes the leadership. Leadership determines the correct political line. Hierarchy transmits that line downward. Ideological meetings make members internalize it. Criticism becomes self-criticism. Dissent becomes an ideological problem. Leaving becomes betrayal. Control over personal life makes departure difficult.

And Maryam Rajavi’s importance emerged from this system rather than simply from winning an internal election.

Karami is describing a system in which the leadership has extraordinary authority and in which lower-level officials enforce decisions throughout the organization. That explains how someone can become “all-powerful” without personally issuing every order.

The post How Did Maryam Rajavi Become All-Powerful in the MEK? appeared first on Nejat Society.

Based on Mohammad Karami’s account, the picture he presents is of an organization in which formal titles and committees exist, but ultimate authority is concentrated at the top around the Rajavi leadership.

Karami’s description is essentially of a highly centralized, hierarchical organization. His argument is that the MEK has layers of commanders, committees and responsible officials, but these do not function like independent centers of authority. Instead, decisions ultimately flow upward to the Rajavi leadership and then downward through the hierarchy.

This is particularly important because the MEK publicly presents itself as a movement committed to democratic principles. A 2012 U.S. State Department briefing, however, said that there was no evidence that the way the MEK governed itself demonstrated an interest in democratic principles, and cited documentation concerning its treatment of its own members.

Karami’s own history is relevant here: he says that after becoming an MEK member he eventually opposed aspects of the organization’s policies, was imprisoned inside the organization, and was threatened when he wanted to leave.

How did Maryam Rajavi become so powerful?

This is probably the most interesting part of the story. Karami’s account needs to be understood against the background of what the MEK itself called the “ideological revolution” beginning in 1985.

In January 1985, Massoud Rajavi appointed Maryam Qajar Azodanlu as his co-equal leader. Soon afterward, Maryam divorced Mehdi Abrishamchi and married Massoud Rajavi. The organization presented these events as the beginning of a profound ideological transformation.

According to Karami, this wasn’t simply a promotion for Maryam. It fundamentally changed the internal structure of authority. Massoud Rajavi already possessed supreme authority. Maryam was elevated to an unprecedented position alongside him. The marriage between Massoud and Maryam was presented as an ideological event rather than merely a private marriage. Members were expected to accept the new ideological interpretation.

The “ideological revolution” subsequently became a mechanism for restructuring the personal and organizational lives of members. Maryam’s authority increasingly became inseparable from loyalty to the Rajavi leadership itself.

Karami describes the process as transforming Maryam from a senior organizational figure into a central symbolic and ideological authority.

There is independent evidence that the transformation was indeed substantial. Contemporary descriptions of the 1985 “ideological revolution” say that the organization introduced compulsory divorces and restrictions on marriage, while RAND characterized the resulting leadership structure as involving “near-religious devotion” to the Rajavis and identified a number of characteristics associated with cultic organizations. However, the broad historical sequence Karami describes is well documented.

What happened to Massoud Rajavi’s authority?

It would be misleading to imagine that Maryam suddenly replaced Massoud and became an autonomous leader. For many years the organization was essentially built around Massoud and Maryam Rajavi together, with Massoud occupying the supreme ideological position.

After Massoud disappeared following the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, Maryam increasingly became the public and organizational face of the movement. The circumstances and current status of Massoud have never been publicly established with certainty.

Maryam was gradually incorporated into the system of supreme Rajavi authority, and when Massoud disappeared, she became the surviving visible center of that system.

How are decisions made?

Karami’s description suggests a distinction between discussion inside the organization and genuine disagreement with the leadership.

Members could discuss how to implement a decision, and there were meetings in which people were expected to speak. But according to former members such as Karami, this did not mean that members could fundamentally challenge the leadership’s decisions.

The most important mechanism was the organization’s ideological meetings. These meetings required members to examine their own thoughts, motivations and behavior. The leadership could characterize disagreement not simply as a different political opinion but as evidence that the individual had an ideological or psychological problem.

The U.S. State Department also described the MEK as having “cult-like characteristics,” including ideological indoctrination and compulsory ideological sessions.

What happens when somebody disagrees?

This is where Karami’s account becomes especially serious. He says that disagreement could result in repeated ideological questioning, pressure to confess or “correct” one’s thinking, isolation from other members, demotion or reassignment, detention, physical mistreatment, threats concerning what would happen if the person attempted to leave.

Karami says he personally experienced imprisonment within the organization after opposing its policies. In one of his accounts, he says that in 1985 he was imprisoned because of his opposition to what he considered the organization’s sectarian policies, and that Massoud Rajavi subsequently threatened him several times over leaving.

There is significant independent corroboration that former members made similar allegations.

Human Rights Watch interviewed 12 former MEK members about conditions in the organization’s Iraqi camps between 1991 and 2003. They described detention, physical and psychological abuse, coerced confessions, and punishment after expressing a desire to leave. HRW subsequently re-interviewed the witnesses after criticisms of its report and said it remained satisfied with their credibility.

At the same time, it is important to say that the MEK disputes these allegations and has characterized much criticism from defectors as part of an Iranian government disinformation campaign.

To be Continued

Mazda Parsi

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When the death news was published publicly, his family got to know about it. His daughter Sepideh published a letter on her Instagram account addressed her late father in mourning for him, revealing dark aspects of the difficult and painful experience of the Teimorian family during the years of involvement with the MEK.

Consequently, his family opened an Instagram account and published photos in memory of him, although the group had not presented them any document that officially proved his death. The posts reveal some facts about Yazdan’s life in the MEK and the grieves of the whole family. The ID of the account is: Yazdan Teymourian

Some of the posts on that Instagram account indicate that the Teimorians had previously traveled to Albania to visit their beloved father before the news of his death was out. An Instagram post shows a man with this caption: “They sent this person telling us that Yazdan didn’t want to see us! It came out later that it was a lie!”

Yazdan Teimorian’s clothes that the MEK sent to his family

Today, the family has a picture of the grave of their deceased father in the MEK’s cemetery near Manez, Albania. They also have some of his clothes. The last post is about the belongings left behind by their father. Cherishing the memory of Yazdan, his family wrote:

“He served Mojahedin for 47 years, not allowing us to see him and not allowing him to call us, even in his last days they didn’t let him call us. Now Mojahedin send us few of his clothes. But why not when he was alive, we were allowed to see him wearing it? As if they used him and prevented all contact and now, he’s dead we can have a few clothes of him. And upon arrival in Tirana, he called us several times telling us he wanted to see us and have contact! We are so heart-broken!”

Yazdan Teimorian was married to Mina Adnani. The were forced to divorce under the rule of the MEK leader, Masoud Rajavi. The divorced couple had three children, Sahar, Sepideh and Musa.

The post Yazdan Teimorian’s Family:  We Are so Heart-Broken! appeared first on Nejat Society.

Robert John Blackman CBE MP is a British politician who has served as chairman of the 1922 Committee and chair of the Backbench Business Committee since 2024 is a member of the Conservative Party, he has been the Member of Parliament for Harrow East since 2010. He is an ardent supporter of the MEK. He has also received in the group’s headquarters in Albania where he made a speech on behalf of the group.

His recent post to on his X account was slammed by women and young people inside and outside Iran.  An Iranian user on X replied Blackman: You do not get to “stand with the Iranian people” while actively legitimizing a group that the Iranian people themselves overwhelmingly reject.  Another user asked him how much he was paid in exchange for the support he voices for the MEK terrorist group. #MEKTerrorist became viral again.

While the UK government has banned Maryam Rajavi from entering the UK on national security grounds, Blackman has repeatedly questioned the British Parliament for her case.

Blackman has been previously condemned for his support for the MEK. A petition was launched on Change.org in which the signatories asked the British government to investigate Bob Blackman’s relationship with the MEK and any undeclared financial interest. The petition reads: “As British citizens and supporters of democracy, we believe Members of Parliament should be held to the highest standards of transparency and accountability, particularly when advocating on behalf of foreign political organisations.” The signatories call for transparency.

Iranian users assert that their legitimate questions about Blackman’s relationship with the MEK should be answered impartially because the group has invested heavily in political lobbying.

Any undeclared financial or non-financial benefits connected to Blackman’s advocacy for the MEK should be investigated and the findings should be made public.

Blackman should know that laundering an extremist terrorist cult under the cover democracy does not make him an ally of Iranian women and young people.

If he truly stands for freedom, democracy, and human rights, start by acknowledging that Parliament’s record including his own, shows a worrying willingness to ignore Iranian voices in favor of a deeply hated group by Iranians.

Mazda Parsi

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What makes the report disturbing is not simply the use of AI. It is the deception.

According to Anthropic, at least four operators involved worked for official NCRI media. In one case, about 8,400 Telegram posts from a real political activist were fed into an AI system so it could imitate his language and style. The system was then used to assist conversations with people in his real network who, according to Anthropic, did not know they were interacting through an AI-assisted impersonation.

The operation went further. More than 500 social-media channels were scraped, and people were categorized by factors including location, age, profession, political orientation and previous arrests. Around 51,944 archived messages were analyzed to build political and psychological profiles of specific individuals in Iran.

Anthropic also describes AI-generated personas made to look like ordinary Iranians while promoting Maryam Rajavi’s political program, coordinated Instagram accounts, and efforts to conceal the MEK connection so political messaging could appear independent or grassroots.

This is not normal political persuasion. It is manufactured authenticity: creating the appearance of spontaneous public opinion while hiding the organized actor behind it.

That matters because people form political judgments partly by observing what they believe other people think and support. If coordinated accounts, artificial identities and fabricated content create a false impression of popularity or consensus, the information environment itself is being manipulated.

The legal implications may also be serious. Political opinions are treated as sensitive personal data under European data-protection law and Albanian law. Systematically collecting political information about identifiable people, profiling them and using those profiles for targeted influence may therefore raise major questions about privacy, lawful processing and transparency. Identity impersonation can also be unlawful under national laws, depending on the jurisdiction and harm caused.

This does not by itself prove that the MEK, NCRI or any named individual committed a specific crime. Anthropic is not a court, and criminal liability depends on evidence, jurisdiction and who actually controlled the operation.

There is also an important limitation: while Anthropic identified operators connected to official NCRI media, common methods and references to MEK leadership, it says it could not determine the precise degree of centralized control by the MEK’s senior leadership.

That distinction matters. Criticism should be evidence-based.

But the democratic question remains: a movement claiming to offer Iran a democratic future must also be judged by the methods it uses to gain influence today.

If support is genuine, it should not need to be simulated.

If legitimacy is genuine, it should not need to be manufactured.

Democracy cannot be built by fabricating the very public opinion later presented as proof of democratic legitimacy.

Amir Yaghmai

The post Democracy Cannot Be Built with Fake Voices appeared first on Nejat Society.

In their memory, I want to share part of my own story, which I write about in my upcoming autobiography, *Mojahedin Child*.

That day, I was seventeen years old and was at the People’s Mojahedin’s Bagherzadeh camp in Iraq.

After yet another long and exhausting leadership meeting, we had been given time for training. I was standing by a soccer field when one of our higher commanders, who was called Brother Kamal, came running with some papers in his hand. He was out of breath and excited. He gathered us and read aloud the news that a passenger plane had flown into one of the World Trade Center towers.

All around me, people began clapping their hands, whistling, and cheering.

When he returned with the news of the attack on the second tower, the cheering erupted again. Training was canceled. We were ordered to prepare for a celebration.

We put on our green uniforms and gathered in the hall called “40 Columns.” The tables were set with cakes and pastries. Music was playing. Some had started dancing Kurdish dances.

On TV screens around the hall, images were shown of the planes flying into the towers. The fire. The smoke. The same sequences, over and over again.

Every time the planes hit, people stood up, applauded, and cheered. Between the tables, others walked around offering cakes.

I myself felt no joy.

I was exhausted and numb after months of psychological pressure. I had grown up in Sweden and France. I felt no hatred toward the United States or the Western world. On the contrary, I liked American culture.

I stood there wondering what what had happened would mean for us. Up until then, I had believed that the Iranian regime was our real enemy. Now I saw a festive mood that I hadn’t even experienced after the Mojahedin’s most successful military operations. I hadn’t understood how deep the hatred toward the United States ran.

Toward evening, I left the celebration and went to the dormitory. The music and singing could be heard late into the night.

At a later meeting, I heard Massoud Rajavi describe the attacks as a “gift” to the Mojahedin members. He meant that the world’s attention would now shift from Iraq to Iran. I couldn’t understand his reasoning.

This is my own memory of what I saw, heard, and thought as a seventeen-year-old.

Today, twenty-five years later, I am also telling it to bear witness to what ideological hatred can do to people’s capacity for compassion. How people can be transformed into symbols of an enemy, until their death becomes something to celebrate.

But those who were killed that day were not “imperialism.” They were people. Each one had a name, a life, and people waiting for them.

Today, I want to let my memory of the cheering in that hall be met by something entirely different: sorrow for the victims, respect for those who tried to save others, and compassion for all who were left behind.

Their death was no victory. It was a human tragedy.

We must never forget.

Amir Yaghmai

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