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MKO’s position in the policies against Iran

As Noam Chomsky has stressed, “the escalation to attack undefended civilian targets is just a ‎classic illustration of terrorism” and “the United States happens to be the only state in the world ‎that has been condemned by the World Court for international terrorism”.‎

Supporting a resistance, legal or illegal, against any outside threat or invasion is one thing, but ‎backing and organizing a terrorist army for imperious purposes and political interests is a ‎different thing. Why has the US government, which denounces other governments’ involvement ‎with terrorism, been supporting MKO (Mojahedin Khalq Organization) and removed it from its ‎list of the designated FTO? How the US chooses to use the group’s violent and terroristic ‎capacity, especially when it still has a historical falling out with Washington and has won ‎nobody’s trust because America and capitalism have historically been the organization’s primary ‎enemies?‎

Possibly, it’s because MKO is regarded an enemy of the current Iranian regime and can be ‎utilized in the most horrific and possible way of foreign intervention, that is, to wage wars ‎against those who oppose the US. Many believe that the US is using the MKO to disrupt Iran’s ‎nuclear program and it is quite possible, however, that the MKO is also being used to set the ‎stage for, or even to effect, the regime change. Although at the first look it sounds so simplistic, ‎but it is an undeniable fact that the US cannot overlook MKO as a possible political lever of ‎pressure against Iranian regime whatever the consequences might be.‎

What the US policy makers have been inattentive to in their decision makings against the Iranian ‎regime is the people themselves. Any wrong step further deepens the already wide gap between ‎the two countries, as the imposed sanctions has so far proved ineffective to change a national ‎perspective on the opponents and oppositions. In relation to MKO, its delisting doesn’t help the ‎US to recreate a different image of the group within Iran; in contrast, the move has negative ‎ramifications since MKO is long despised inside Iran. Paul Pillar, a former top CIA analyst who ‎served as the National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia asserts that: ‎‎“Delisting will be seen not only by the Iranian regime, but also by most Iranian citizens, as a ‎hostile act by the United States. The MEK has almost no popular support within Iran, where it is ‎despised as a group of traitors, especially given its history of joining forces with Saddam Hussein ‎during the Iran-Iraq War.”‎

Regardless of the unwritten agreements about the West’s manipulation of the group’s ‎potentialities, MKO leaders insist to take its delisting to be a victory over the US in a legal and ‎universal battle that proves rightness and veracity of its historical, organizational, ideological and ‎political positions. The claim implicitly suggests that the group desists to be used by the US in ‎any plan against Iran. However, neither the US covert support for MKO since at least ‎‏2008‏‎ nor ‎the group’s renunciation of its role as a possible proxy have authenticated a behind the curtain ‎plot in any form against Iranian regime.‎

The time is not still ripe for either to speak up of what they have up their sleeves and there is no ‎evidence of reckoning on MKO in any options against Iran. But one thing is for certain at the ‎moment; MKO fiercely embraces, circulates and glorifies the terrorist deeds and operations of ‎Syrian insurgents who are disturbing the country to end Assad’s rule. If the US plans to draw a ‎pattern seen repeated in Libya and most recently in Syria, that is to say, arm, train and support ‎terrorist insurgents in pursuit of regime change, that is a second fatal mistake. It is so naïve to ‎think that a group of armed terrorists deployed against Iran can possibly change a nation’s ‎perspective even if they are wrangling over internal problems.‎

By N. Morgan

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