This article delves deep into the terrorist attack of Mehr 5, 1360, the implications of this act of violence, and the broader political and historical context surrounding it. By analyzing the causes, the nature of the attack, and its aftermath, we will uncover how this tragic event shaped the Iranian political landscape and revealed the true face of the MEK’s terror-driven agenda.

The Mujahideen-e Khalq Organization (MEK) was initially established in the 1960s as a Marxist-Islamist opposition group against the Pahlavi regime, aiming to overthrow the Shah of Iran. During the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the MEK was part of the broader revolutionary movement that played a significant role in the ousting of the Shah. However, despite their initial alignment with the revolutionaries, the group quickly became disillusioned with the direction the new Islamic Republic of Iran was taking under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini

The Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK), also known as the People’s Mujahedin of Iran, is an organization that has been involved in various activities in Iran since its founding in the 1960s. Originally formed as an Islamic and leftist group opposing the Shah’s regime, the MEK has since taken on multiple roles, including that of a dissident group and a designated terrorist organization by some countries, especially in the United States and Iran. In examining the MEK’s activities, it becomes clear that their operations are characterized by a series of political, militant, and terrorist actions aimed at destabilizing the Iranian government.

Initially, the MEK was involved in various protests against the Shah and sought an eclectic ideology that blended Marxist and Islamic principles. After the Islamic Revolution in 1979, the group initially welcomed the political changes but quickly found itself at odds with the new regime led by Ayatollah Khomeini. This shift led to a violent suppression of the MEK, resulting in thousands of their members being arrested, imprisoned, or executed. In response, the MEK adopted a more militant stance and conducted attacks against government officials and security forces.

Throughout the 1980s, the MEK intensified its militant activities, including acts of terrorism within Iran. The group was responsible for numerous assassinations targeting Iranian officials, marking a significant chapter in the narrative of violence associated with dissident movements in the region. The MEK’s strategic decision to resort to violence stemmed from the perception that peaceful protest would not yield any results under a repressive regime. As a result, their operations became increasingly radicalized, culminating in a series of high-profile attacks.

The MEK’s most notorious operation in the 1980s was Operation Eternal Light in 1988, which aimed to overthrow the Iranian government. This operation was disastrous for the MEK, leading to significant casualties and a loss of military capability. Following that operation, the group regrouped and moved its base to Iraq, where it received support from Saddam Hussein’s regime. This relocation marked a turning point in the MEK’s history, as it became a tool of the Iraqi government against Iran during the Iran-Iraq War.

By stationing itself in Iraq, the MEK operated in a state of limbo, engaged in military operations against Iran while simultaneously enduring internal struggles regarding its ideological direction and leadership. The MEK established a quasi-military structure in Iraq, enabling it to launch cross-border attacks into Iran. This military aspect solidified its reputation as a terrorist organization among government officials in Iran, who accused it of receiving foreign backing for its activities.
As the international landscape evolved, the MEK found itself increasingly isolated. Although it had once enjoyed some support from Western nations during the Cold War as a counterforce to the Islamic Republic, post-9/11 geopolitics shifted dramatically against groups that were perceived as terrorist organizations. The MEK’s operatives were involved in assassinations and bombings, reinforcing their designation as a terrorist group by Iran and partly contributing to their complex relationship with nations like the United States and European countries.

The MEK’s most notorious operation in the 1980s was Operation Eternal Light in 1988, which aimed to overthrow the Iranian government. This operation was disastrous for the MEK, leading to significant casualties and a loss of military capability. Following that operation, the group regrouped and moved its base to Iraq, where it received support from Saddam Hussein’s regime. This relocation marked a turning point in the MEK’s history, as it became a tool of the Iraqi government against Iran during the Iran-Iraq War.

The U.S. State Department designated the MEK as a terrorist organization in 1997, a label that significantly impacted its ability to operate internationally. However, the designation did not stop the MEK from engaging in various forms of activism, including lobbying and public relations efforts aimed at rehabilitating its image. The group claimed to pursue a peaceful transition to democracy in Iran while simultaneously continuing its militant agenda. Over the years, various high-profile politicians and former officials have endorsed the MEK, creating a controversial discourse surrounding its place in Iranian opposition politics.

The MEK has also been implicated in numerous human rights violations and was often criticized for its authoritarian internal governance. Reports have highlighted the cult-like nature of its structures, with strict regulations governing members’ lives and loyalty to the organization’s leadership, particularly to its founder, Massoud Rajavi. The group’s insistence on loyalty above all else effectively stifled dissent within its ranks, further breeding a toxic environment that has led to accusations of brainwashing and coercion.

In recent years, the MEK has sought to reestablish itself as a legitimate opposition force against the Iranian regime. It has aimed to attract a younger demographic within Iran by highlighting its historical opposition to the regime and presenting itself as a pro-democracy alternative. The organization has utilized social media and modern communication platforms to disseminate its message, trying to present a more palatable image to both the Iranian people and the international community.

Despite its efforts to rehabilitate its image, the MEK remains controversial. Many in Iran view it with disdain, largely due to its history of collaboration with Saddam Hussein and its designation as a terrorist organization. Furthermore, the group’s actions have often been perceived as serving foreign interests rather than the genuine aspirations of the Iranian population. This perception complicates its position and raises questions about its legitimacy as a resistance movement.

The MEK’s funding and resource acquisition strategies have also raised eyebrows. It has been reported that the group has relied on donations from sympathizers, affluent expatriates, and even some foreign governments. However, its reliance on external support has led to allegations that it operates more as a mercenary force than a dedicated political movement, undermining its claims of being a unifying force for democratic change in Iran.

As the Iranian regime continues to face challenges, including widespread discontent among the populace over economic and social issues, the MEK’s activities are likely to be scrutinized more closely. The group may attempt to exploit any civil unrest as an opportunity to reassert itself. However, its long history of violence and terrorism makes it a contentious figure in any discourse about Iranian political change.

The situation is further complicated by geopolitical factors, including tensions between Iran and the United States, as well as regional challenges. As long as these tensions persist, the MEK may continue to position itself as a viable option for external intervention, but it risks remaining a marginal player due to its controversial legacy and the heavy baggage of its past.

In summary, the narrative surrounding the MEK is complex and multifaceted. Its evolution from a revolutionary movement to a designated terrorist organization illustrates the shifting dynamics of Iranian politics and the unresolved tensions that persist within the country. The MEK’s historical context and its current activities can serve as a lens through which one can understand broader themes of dissent, authoritarianism, and the quest for identity in contemporary Iran.

Ultimately, the question remains whether the MEK can successfully transition from its legacy of violence to a platform for meaningful political change. Developing a strategy rooted in grassroots support and an understanding of the socio-political landscape in Iran may provide the group with a chance to redefine its role. However, as history has shown, transforming a reputation built on decades of violence into one of solidarity and democracy will be a monumental challenge for the organization

By Rayanworld.com

The post The Mujahideen-e Khalq: From Revolutionaries to Terrorists appeared first on Nejat Society.

The day after Banisadr was discharged from his position as the Commander in Chief, on 10 June 1981, the organization that believed they could “Wipe out the regime” with him, announced that his life was in danger. Mujahedin hid him, preparing his escape from Iran.

His relationship with Mujahedin had begun only a few months after he took the administration, and eventually, his increasing meetings with Masoud Rajavi made other authorities worried. The bitter incident of 5 March 1982, added up to the pother.

The relationship was based on a strategic view that they thought they both will need each other in the future. He later mentioned in his diaries that if they had not come to him, he would have done it.

In 1987, some documents were found and in them, Rajavi had declared that with Banisadr’s cooperation, they would wipe out the regime. The political alliance was beneficial for Banisadr, who had not an organized structure within the system. And he was a means to smooth the way for them to get to their goals.

On 23 March 1981, Rajavi asked Banisadr in a confidential letter to hold a demonstration on April 1. Then, on April 27, Mujahedin hold a demonstration to support the president. On May 21, Rajavi’s second confidential letter was sent to Banisadr, admiring his thesis for a referendum and his opposition to Imam’s advice. He called Banisadr the “Allende” of Iran.

When Banisadr had no authority anymore, their cooperation reached to the top. Mujahedin issued a statement which mentioned: “Mujahedin-e- Khalq is warning and standing against any attempt on the life of the president, and ask for preparation and resistance. We consider supporting him as a revolutionary responsibility all over the country”.

On June 16, they issued another statement claiming that “President’s life is in danger, and that people in Tehran have to prepare themselves to rescue him. You’ve seen their terrible shows last night on TV: people shouting” Death to Banisadr”. Apparently, the hypocrites are so hurried to stage an imperialistic coup, that they plan to execute the legal president and present it on their media”.

After the plan to investigate the inefficiency of the president was approved by the parliament, people held a protest in front of the parliament and asked for immediate action about Banisadr. To respond, Mujahedin issued another statement and asked people to shout “Allah – o – Akbar” on their roof tops, to support freedom and Banisadr. People did not do so and their plan was failed. On June 19, which coincided with Shabaan 15, Imam Khomeini warned the nation about the collusion of Anti-Islamic Revolution groups in Iran and asked for immediate action. Mujahedin also warned about the consequences of dismissal of the president and threatened the members of the parliament not to attend the meeting to investigate the inefficiency of the president: ”

“People’s Mujahedin Organization of Iran warns every member of the parliament about the consequences of dismissal of the president. So, we remind them all the parliaments in history which helped the dictatorship to settle and asked them to avoid the eternal curse from the Iranian nation and not to be afraid of those in power.

Meanwhile, they had hidden Banisadr and finally helped him escape the country by hijacking an air force plane with the cooperation of their spies inside of the army.

When he was settled in Paris, Mujahedin used his name as a means to achieve their goals. Rajavi also married his daughter Firoozeh, but their marriage didn’t last long.

On September 29, the plan for Iran’s democratic temporary government was announced and Banisadr, as the president, and Rajavi, as the chief of National Council of Resistance signed it. But soon Banisadr found out that he worked only as a tool for Mujahedin so on 10 March 1984, he left the organization which took his credit and influence.

by IRDC

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However, it is interesting to examine the term alternative in political literature and its consistency with the situation of MEK on political horizon of Iran. The issue can be examined from three aspects: first of all, the components necessary for an alternative to a political system. what capacities, potentials, abilities and practices should an alternative essentially have? Secondly, what capabilities the alternative to the Islamic Republic should have? Indeed, such an alternative has to hold certain components in order to answer the needs of people. Thirdly, Can the Cult of Rajavi basically be considered as an alternative?

The history of MEK
The history of MEK began in Iran in the 1960s. There are certain major phases in the half-a-century history of the Mujahedin Khalq, which affects almost all analyses and historiography about its background. The assassination of seven US military personnel and civilians working in Iran, during the 1970s mark the anti-American substance of the group since its establishment.

Iran Terror Victims

After the 1979 revolution in Iran and the breakout of Massoud Rajavi with the newly established government in Tehran, the most violent period of MEK history came out. 12 thousand assassinations were committed by MEK operatives all over the Iranian cities. Only a few of these terror attacks targeted political or military officials. The rest of the victims were innocent civilians including women and children.

Photo: President of the National Resistance Council of Iran Massoud Rajavi, left, meets with and the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein in Iraq in June 1986.

The eighth-year war between Iran and Iraq, according to the vast majority of Iranian people signs the greatest honor of the nation for their defense against Saddam Hussein, known as one of the most hated enemy of the nation. Meanwhile, Saddam Hussein sheltered MEK in his territory from which MEK entered into a war against its own country fellow men. This was the like a suicide for MEK because it lost its last bases among the Iranian public.
The fourth weakening phase for the MEK was started by the leadership of Massoud Rajavi who turned the group into a cult of personality around himself. The cult-like system that he founded became a very proper system to violate the human rights of members.

The revelations made by defectors of MEK on forced divorce, sexual abuse, torture and murder inside the Cult of Rajavi, despite the leaders’ slogans of human rights, freedom, women’s rights and democracy, exposed the true nature of the group.

MEK’s popularity is unheard of
The group that claims to be the alternative to the Islamic Republic, does not enjoy any support among the Iranian population. Nor inside Iran neither in the Iranian diaspora. It has lost even the support of the few thousand members inside its camp in Albania – the majority of them do not dare to leave the group due to the suppressive cult-like system of the leadership. The MEK has no genuine support by the side of the enemies of the Iranian government. It is regularly considered as a bargaining chip or a proxy force in the ups and downs of the relations between Iran and the West.
Moreover, the other groups that oppose the Islamic Republic, despite all the fundamental and radical differences share one viewpoint: staying away from MEK. All opposition groups against Iran, believe that essentially any trace of the name of MEK, with its hefty criminal record, will bring any opposition and protest to complete failure.

Internal stability
The internal atmosphere of the MEK is not so different from the level of popularity of the group in the Iranian community. To this day, the MEK has been able to maintain a few thousands of members as hostages in its headquarters in France and Albania, using physical constraints, control of thought, intimidation and other cult-like practices.

The high rate of defection from the group in recent years show that if the door of the headquarters — the jails of MEK—gets open to the free world members will leave the group, except for the criminal heads and perhaps some old men and women who do not have anywhere to go. No one is willing to stay in a system that oppresses its members day and night.
MEK does not really have the very two to three thousand members in Albania and cannot count on their capacity. It had to resort to street beggars and homeless people, as well as students of foreign countries to show off its gatherings as crowded by the rented crowd.

Qualitative capacity
Forces that are still forcibly kept inside the group do not know anything about the free world, the world of information and technological advances and eventually, the truth of the Iranian political and social situation.
This Ignorance makes MEK uninfluential in the Iranian community. The majority of members of MEK are just as militant forces who do not have the necessary creativity for activity in cyberspace, social networks. They are not even able to produce a poster and slogan compatible to the Iranian society.

In fact, they stumbled and stopped at the very time of the 1980s when they were involved in a bloody clash with Iran and they lost the last chance to live free. Then, they went to Camp Ashraf, Iraq to donate their life to Rajavi.
Finally, it should be noted that the Cult of Rajavi does not have any clues of being able to be considered as an alternative to the Islamic Republic of Iran and generally, any other political system. It is not even categorized as an opposition group. MEK is definitely a destructive cult with a long history of terrorist acts that does not embrace the characteristics of an opposition group. MEK has never behaved like an opposition. Instead of relying on its own nation, it has always tried to bank on the enemies the Iranian nation, such as Iraq, during the Saddam Hussein’s era, the United States and the Zionist regime.

The post The alternative of IR, the illusion of the Cult of MEK appeared first on Nejat Society.

Using thoughtful measures and taking the lead in criticizing the past performance of the organization and the slogans and goals of the early founders, he and his comrades resumed their activities. And In this way, they created a positive image for themselves and made the most of the revolutionary atmosphere for recruitment and reorganization. By formation and reorganizing, the organization published several books in the country by members to praise the organization’s casualties. While, the problems caused by the Lack of teaching ideological issues in eliminating its shortcomings and ambiguities were forgotten, and pragmatism and power-seeking grew to the point that prevented the organization from properly analyzing and understanding the existing realities of society. Following this, the organization, from January to February 1979, in order to stabilize its position in the future of the Islamic Revolution, undertook a series of important measures. In fact, in these two months, the centrality of the organization devoted all its efforts to seeking a share in the future of the Islamic Revolution.
One of the most important actions of the organization to achieve this goal was to focus on the forces that the members of the organization and the centrality had worked on in prison.

In a move, the organization’s centrality sent these forces as agents across the country and to different cities to be able to implement the organization’s plans.

These people had the mission to introduce themselves as revolutionary figures, in other words, the owners of the revolution, through extensive and voluminous propaganda. These forces took part in mass demonstrations across the country at this time; and tried to Display placards, posters, pictures related to the organization, the logo of the organization as well as the sentences of its leaders and pictures of the killed people of the organization in order to gain a place for themselves among the people. In order to be able to acquaint the masses with themselves and to introduce themselves as militant, mujahid and revolutionary forces, if possible. Another important action of the organization at this time includes a large-scale effort of the centrality to gain management of the welcoming ceremony of Ayatollah Khomeini or at least take responsibility in that ceremony.
Therefore, in February 1979 and in the days before the arrival of Ayatollah Khomeini in the country, the Central Committee made extensive efforts to introduce the organization as the largest military force that has the authority to manage the reception of Ayatollah Khomeini and protect the life of Ayatollah; Therefore, they insisted that through this, the organization becomes the main circle around the Ayatollah, so that when he enters the country, Massoud Rajavi and Musa Khiabani will be around the Ayatollah. The effort of the centrality was to make history for the organization by placing themselves in the circle of Ayatollah’s entourage so that they could somehow confiscate the revolution and the Ayatollah in their favor. In addition to the efforts of people like martyr Motahari and martyr Beheshti who were in charge, the stance of Ayatollah Khomeini himself, who never even approved of the organization and never recognized them, was very effective in removing the MEK from the circle of Ayatollah Khomeini when he arrived.

Therefore, with the efforts of Martyr Boroujerdi’s group of seven groups in protecting the life of the Ayatollah and establishing the security of the ceremony, a severe blow was dealt to the goals and plans of the organization.

Storing all kinds of weapons and equipping the organization more and more with weapons at this time were other activities of centrality. At the same time as the revolutionary clashes escalated at this time, the members of the organization began to collect weapons and carry out armed maneuvers. In those days when garrisons, police stations, military bases, SAVAK centers were being occupied, one of the orders of the organization to its forces, which was being seriously pursued, was to loot all kinds of weapons in a very large volume.

The next and calculated move of the organization at this stage was to collect documents of SAVAK and the regime’s security organizations. The forces affiliated with the organization were attacking the SAVAK buildings and the regime’s security centers, while destroying these centers, collecting documents and transferring them to team houses. The organization did this for two purposes: first, it tried to hide the betrayals of the organization’s members in prisons and their cooperation with SAVAK. Their next goal was to collect documents to destroy their opponents and tarnish their position.

Finally, the stance taken by the leaders of the organization in the midst of the revolution gives the impression that they, like the Marxists, believed that the struggle in all societies would eventually leads to the establishment of a democratic system of government. In fact, what the organization was seeking to propagate at this time was the realization of a democratic revolution and the implementation of the principles of socialism in Iranian society. Hence, the organization joined the lines of the revolution to get closer to this goal.

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The baseless words of the terrorist leaders of the MEK can be considered from a number of perspectives:

First, the internal economic protests can be considered a natural occurrence in any country. At times, perhaps because of the current international developments, a country like Iran, in contrast to various hostile powers and under intense pressure from enemies, has been placed in a difficult situation and face shortcomings. The Increase in deficiencies and different requirements of life will provoke protests and with the elimination of shortcomings, conditions will return to normal. It should be borne in mind that Iran is a wealthy country that, thanks to its rich domestic resources, has the ability to overcome economic problems and control the situation.

Second, it seems that the leaders of the MEK have no knowledge of the international developments and capacities of the Iranian diplomacy system. They are unaware of the fact that the Islamic Republic of Iran has open and secret capacities in the political arena and international relations and if the conditions get hard and difficult, then based on logic and rationality, Iran will use all its capacities to preserve and secure the national interests and security of the country.

Third, for many years, the leaders of the MEK, with the promise of the overthrow of the Islamic Republic, have been able to sustain their nature and provide continuity for their political survival. But now, after forty years, they have not achieved their goals yet. The leaders of this terrorist organization even told their members that the recent protests in Iran were signs of the overthrow of the government.

Of course, the imagination has been futile. That’s why the organization has faced a domestic crisis in recent months, and many members, disappointed with baseless promises, began to protest and even some escaped from the Albania’s camp. Apparently, as the situation worsened, Maryam Rajavi has stayed in the camp and tried to maintain internal coherence holding a series of ideological meetings to prevent domestic defections.
Rajavi tries to keep hope alive within the group with the slogan of “overthrow is Close” and to prevent the beginning of possible riots. She announced the February 2019 as the time of the collapse of the Iranian regime. February 2019 was a serious test for MEK leaders.
Definitely, after the failure of the test, the MKO leaders had to wait for the internal crisis to emerge. The deceived members of the organization had no motive for staying in the organization. They do not see any necessity to stay in the group while the leaders promise never come true.

Dr. Reza Ekhtiari Amiri, Assistant Professor at Law Faculty of Mazandaran University

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Iranian journalist and expert Abbas Salimi Namin has disproved the claims and opinions of Israeli analyst Ronen Bergman in the book ‘The Secret War with Iran’. ‘The Secret War with Iran’, written by renowned Zionist journalist Ronen Bergman, was published in 2008 by Simon & Schuster publishing company in the United States.

Born in 1972, Bergman is a graduate of Tel Aviv University in the Middle East political relations. He is a famous Zionist journalist and analyst in the military and security fields who has worked with Israeli newspapers ‘Haaretz’ and ‘Yedioth Ahronoth’, American dailies and weeklies such as ‘The New York Times’, ‘Newsweek’, ‘The Wall street Journal’, and British media groups including ‘The Guardian’ and ‘The Times’.

Bergman has been interested in topics relating to the enemies of the Zionist regime (particularly Iran, Hezbollah and the Palestinian resistance groups), as well as subjects on the history of the Israeli regime’s assassination operations, which are cited in his recent book ‘Rise and Kill First’.

In an interview with Persian TV channel ‘Iran International’, Bergman has pointed to the Iranian nuclear program and the issues surrounding it -particularly the Zionist regime’s secret attempts to halt the process of nuclear activities in Iran and assassinate Iranian scientists. He has also cited ex-CIA chief Michael Hayden as saying that the assassination of nuclear scientists is the best way to impede Iran’s growing process in that field, and has implicitly held Israel responsible for it.

In the book ‘The Secret War with Iran’, Bergman has written a history of encounters between Iran and the Zionist regime, while the bulk of the book relates to the Lebanese Hezbollah -Iran’s main ally in the battle against the Zionist regime since its formation until the 33-day War- focusing on the role of Martyr Imad Mughniyeh.

His book also includes sections about the final years of the Pahlavi regime and victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, short periods of the war imposed by the Ba’thist party of Iraq on Iran (focusing on the McFarlane affair), Iran’s role in supporting the Palestinian groups, and the Iranian nuclear program.

Bergman’s multiple undocumented and untrue comments as well as personal and purposeful analyses (with the main purpose of displaying Israel’s power, specially in a competition with the US) that have repeatedly come in his book make a critical review of the book necessary for Iranian readers.

Director of the Iran History Studies and Compilation Bureau, Abbas Salimi Namin, has written an extensive criticism in a book about ‘The Secret War with Iran’. Born in 1954, Salimi Namin is an experienced journalist and a renowned Iranian researcher in history and political sciences who has published many articles and books.

Part 7:

In this passage, in a stark contrast with himself, the author first acknowledges that Israel was seeking to harm the Islamic Revolution in Iran since its triumph. Second, he implicitly acknowledges Israel’s involvement in inciting Arab governments hostile to developments in Iran, including the Baath party of Iraq. Third, Imam Khomeini brought to victory Iran’s nationwide uprising, creating an unprecedented obstacle in the way of the Zionists’ attempts to dominate the Muslim world.

This fact implies that as much as nations have become resentful of Zionist-leaning regional Arab leaders they have become interested in the developments created by the Islamic Revolution and its leadership. Therefore, it is not unreasonable if Bergman seeks in vain to sully the squeaky clean image and character of Imam Khomeini.

“Khomeini’s next step was to shatter the most important traditional custom of Shi’ite theology. He allowed the believers, even encouraged them, to call him ‘Imam’. This title had been reserved by the Iranian Shias for Ali and the eleven leaders who came after him. Until the inevitable return of the missing thirteenth imam at some unpredictable time, no religious sage had had the right to use the title. Without stating it explicitly, Khomeini was creating the impression that he was the missing imam, who had returned as a messiah, or Mahdi.” (p. 12)

Without presenting any reason, the author portrays the founder of the Islamic Revolution totally different from his real character. First and foremost, Ayatollah Khomeini never and under no circumstances showed willingness to be referred to as “Imam” and he was totally strange with such things. Second, the title “imam”, meaning leader and harbinger, has been common in the history of Islam (among both Shias and Sunnis) and is not reserved to the 12 infallible Shia imams. Imam Ghazali, Imam Bukhari and Imam Musa Sadr are just cases in point that the author has preferred to not note. Third, such outdated and threadbare allegations stem from Savak before the Islamic Revolution, which were never accepted by people. Has the author bothered himself studying slogans chanted by several million people who welcomed Ayatollah Khomeini? The answer is negative.

“During the 1970s he became, from afar, one of the most powerful of the Shah’s opponents. This physically weak, stern-featured seventy-seven-year-old, after a brief sojourn as an exile in Paris from September 1978, returned to his homeland on February 1, 1979. He was received by millions at Tehran’s airport, and without any weapons, defeated the sixth strongest army in the world.” (p. 12)

How did the millions who attended the welcoming ceremony refer to Ayatollah Khamenei? Wasn’t this devotion and deep-seated belief born out of his reputation for honesty and piety? Could anyone claim to be Mahdi and the public then recognize him as their spiritual leader? Shia hadiths have clearly noted that even if someone claims to have ties with the 12th imam as long as Imam Mahdi remains occult, he has to be billed as liar. Therefore, people’s ties with Imam Khomeini during nearly two decades of costly struggle stemmed from this assessment he was moving in the way of revival of dignity in this land, far from any mundane passion, but the performance of other opponents of the Pahlavi dictatorship during that time was assessed as exactly contrary. Bergman has deliberately ignored this field experience and instead he tries to attribute the failure of other political leaders in attracting people to Imam Khomeini.

“The elderly cleric realized that he would never be able to take power without the help of certain opposition groups, some of which were ideologically opposed to him. With the Shah as their common enemy, however, he entered into pacts with all of the rivals of the monarchy, playing down the vast differences among them. The Shi’ites have a name for this technique: khod’e, which means tricking someone into misjudging his position.” (p. 14)

Imam Khomeini expressed himself in clear and honest terms in private meetings with other anti-Pahlavi groups about their policies and struggles. But at the same time he always recommended that his followers refrain from highlighting such differences. He believed that the main issue in Iranian society was to bring an end to the ruling dictatorship and the US, British and Israeli dominance. Ayatollah Khomeini believed that any political current has to follow its own methodology and that such differences of view should not eclipse the main enemy, i.e. dictatorship and dominance. Without taking into account this reasonable and principled policy of the Imam, Bergman puts it:

“As for the opposition movement closest to his ideology, the Mujahideen Khalq, he (Khomeini) promised the group a share of power when he got his hands on it. It was a promise he would fail to keep.” (p. 15)

A review of exchanged words between the Imam and the representative of Mujahideen Khalq Organization (MKO) in Najaf in 1972 shows the nullity of Bergman’s allegations. In those meetings, which were held for hours during different days, the Imam never endorsed MKO and he even warned that the armed struggle policy they had adopted was doomed to failure.

Hossein Rouhani, an MKO leader, said in an interview following the victory of the Islamic Revolution: “From within, I [along with Torab Haqshenas] was advised to contact the Imam to tell him about MKO’s affairs and internal issues so that the Imam would issue a statement, if possible, in support of death-row prisoners, i.e. our combatant leaders. I accepted to handle it. I contacted Mr. Mahmoud Doaei who was our sympathizer at that time. In 1972 I managed to have numerous meetings with the Imam. Except for the first session where he (Mr. Doaei) was present to introduce me, I was alone in future meetings which total 7. They lasted about one month. Each meeting was one hour to one hour and a half. I discussed various issues with the Imam. We discussed the politico-ideological fundamentals of MKO. I had two books on me: Imam Hussein and The Prophets’ Route. I gave him both and he studied them completely and shared his written views with us. One issue was our analysis of Judgment Day. He considered our analysis as material and in conflict with what is in the Quran. The other issue was ‘evolution’. We believed in the Darwin principle of evolution, but he considered it to contradict Quranic instructions. Another issue under discussion was ‘armed struggle’ in Iran…The Imam was firmly opposed to it, saying:

‘I’m opposed to armed struggle and I believe that it would destroy your organization.’

Of course, it was the issue whose truth we saw in 1977 and 1978 in the intra-organizational ideological struggles in our splinter groups.” (MKO, From Beginning to End, Institute for Political Studies and Research, Winter 2005, vol. 1, pp. 522-523)

The Imam did not make public what he had noted in the private meeting with the MKO representative up until after the nationwide revolt of the Iranian nation in 1979. But his prediction, as confirmed by Hossein Rouhani, came true and in the second half of 1970s, MKO was disbanded and only some of its members were seen in prisons. However, under the auspices of the Islamic Revolution under the leadership of the Imam from 1978 until the victory of the revolt in 1979, MKO prisoners were released and the organization was revived. Therefore, it is not clear which Imam-MKO agreement Bergman refers to. No MKO agent has ever expressed this allegation of Bergman, which has no solid basis. Meantime, after the meeting between MKO’s senior member and the Imam in Najaf, no other such meeting has been recorded until after the Islamic Revolution as the Imam rejected MKO’s theoretical fundamentals and cast doubt on the organization’s strategy and tactic. In light of its dogmatism, this group never spoke publicly against the Imam as people massively showed willingness for the Imam’s leadership, but in private meetings they missed no chance to discredit him.

But Bergman is trying to create the impression that before the victory of the Islamic Revolution, Imam Khomeini was seeking to rally political groups behind himself on false promises. But the undeniable truth is that leaders of various groups who travelled to Paris saw that the Imam stuck strongly with his principles. For instance, Dr. Sanjabi, leader of the National Front, received no promise in return for aligning himself with the Islamic Revolution; rather, he was presented with some preconditions. In an interview in Paris, Dr. Sanjabi openly declared the Pahlavi regime illegitimate and laid emphasis on the dismissal of foreign dominance as another pillar of the Islamic Revolution. The same procedure befell to Mehdi Bazargan. The leader of the Freedom Movement of Iran sought in vain to convince the Leader of the Islamic Revolution to modify his position on these two pillars. Bazargan received no concessions. Finally, the FMI leadership either genuinely or tactically agreed with the two pillars. Therefore, what caused other political leaders to get closer to the Imam was his outspokenness and sincerity in declaring his positions and his firm and brave resistance against dictatorship and dominance. That is exactly for this reason that various social classes distanced themselves from other political leaders and accepted the Imam’s leadership. If he had had minimum trickery, he would have been marginalized like many others. Of course, it has to be noted that playing tricks on the enemy would be a reasonable act. In wars, one way of defeating the enemy is to deceive it. In other words, applying misleading schemes so that the enemy could not predict the attack is among skills of a qualified commander and manager.
Link to previous parts:

Part0, Part 1, Part2, Part3, Part4, Part5, Part6

Abbas Salimi Namin,

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Because of the failure to realize this, the collapse of the system in the eyes of the members of the organization at Camp Ashraf 3 is a very far-reaching dream and this has caused internal organizational challenges, and the organization is trying to justify this issue.

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