GTG-84006: Disrupting a distributed MEK/NCRI-aligned influence operation that used a shared AI agent to impersonate real people and recruit inside Iran

We identified and removed a distributed influence operation that targeted Iranian audiences inside the country and abroad. To deceive users, the operation impersonated a real-world activist by tasking the shared AI agent to clone the activist’s personal Telegram account, then instructing it in Persian that it was now that person. The actor directed Claude to read roughly 8,400 of his Telegram posts to copy his writing style, and then used it to run live political conversations with his contacts. To our knowledge, these contacts did not know they were speaking with an AI-assisted account.

Although the actors did not share account infrastructure or show visible signs of coordination, our investigations linked this activity to People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK), and its political front, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI).

Our investigation showed that at least four individuals running this campaign work for official NCRI media outlets. The operation relied on staffed NCRI/MEK media properties across multiple platforms, including broadcast television, satellite and shortwave radio, Instagram, Telegram, and X/Twitter. While the presence of committee approval loops and notes about MEK leadership suggest central tasking is likely, we are not able to verify the level of centralized control.

Using the Breakout Scale, we would assess this operation as Category Two (multiple platforms, with distribution through the network’s own NCRI media properties and amplifier accounts.)

Key findings

The operation successfully scraped over 500 social media channels to build detailed profiles of individuals inside Iran. They then grouped these targets by city, age, occupation, political alignment, and arrest history likely to help them tailor their messages to the specific audiences.

The network analyzed roughly 51,944 archived messages from these conversations to build detailed psychographic dossiers on dozens of specific individuals in Iran. To spread their message further, the impersonation accounts also sent a fabricated breaking news headline to more than 30 contacts simultaneously.

To promote NCRI president Maryam Rajavi’s ten-point plan, the network created AI-generated avatars for each article. The actors animated these avatars, gave them Persian audio, and styled them to look like average Iranians, while intentionally hiding the fact that they were AI-generated.

The people behind the campaign used an automated pipeline to run networks of Instagram accounts that coordinated their posting schedules. They adjusted the content to fit different target audiences. To hide their true motives, initial posts intentionally avoided naming the Mojahedin, making the group’s propaganda look like unaffiliated, neutral news.

The operation focused its messaging on the Iranian government, monarchist groups, and the Pahlavi camp. The actors spread a fabricated video attacking a member of the Pahlavi family and used the “Neither Shah Nor Sheikh” framing against the targets. This content was designed to strengthen the MEK’s position in the Iranian opposition.

Attack lifecycle and AI usage

The network relied on Claude to support all phases of its influence operation. The actors managed these tasks using a shared AI agent platform, where each workspace maintained its own long-term memory files. Over time they updated these files with specific instructions, such as lists of banned words, approved sources, account management rules, and ways to avoid detection. This allowed the agent to keep producing content without a human user directing each session. One actor loaded MEK founding doctrine into the model’s memory as “strategic base data” for others within the operation to reuse.

The human management behind this operation was highly structured. This included an approval loop by a dedicated committee and a formal review process from content correctors to managers. Throughout their communication, the actors repeatedly used the phrase “per our contract” and made regular references to the MEK leadership. We found that the same operational playbook was applied uniformly across all workspaces.

A majority of the output was Persian-first as it swapped the organic 2022 protest slogan  “Woman, Life, Freedom” for the MEK variant “Woman, Resistance, Freedom”.

Different aspects of the influence operation of the MEK using AI

One of the MEK’s distributed network bound by a shared Claude-based agent platform (named “Viktor”), spanning live impersonation, surveillance inside Iran

Anthropic report on MEK using AI

Disruption and mitigations

We found this activity as part of our internal investigations and banned the accounts. At this point, we are not able to independently confirm how much authentic engagement was drawn by the network’s amplification accounts.

IoCs with network handles, associated websites and dissemination accounts behind the MEK’s activity

Anthropic’s  Threat Intelligence team

Read the full report at: https://www.anthropic.com/threat-intelligence-report-september-2026

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The Paris-based NCRI said earlier in ⁠the day that the Paris police had banned ​their rally ​at ​the last minute ‌and linked it to a call by France’s Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot with his Iranian counterpart Abbas ‌Araqchi on ​Thursday.

“This allegation is ​false. ​The minister did ‌not mention this protest ​or ​request its cancellation,” the ministry said in a ​statement ‌sent to Reuters.

​John Irish, Reuters

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The Sazan Island project and redevelopment of a former communist‑era military facility span the Vjosa‑Narta lagoon and surrounding wetlands, an ecologically sensitive area known for bird migration routes and marine wildlife such as sea turtles. Environmental groups warn that bulldozers and excavators have already begun clearing sand, pine forests, and coastal habitats.[2] The government’s decision in 2024 to grant “strategic investor” status to Kushner’s affiliated firm Affinity Partners allowed accelerated approvals, bypassing standard competitive bidding and streamlined land‑use permissions.[3] Critics argue this effectively circumvented normal legal safeguards.

The proposed development, tied to Kushner’s investment firm, envisions a massive transformation of Albania’s southern coastline. Plans reportedly include 10,000 hotel rooms and villas, along with a luxury resort on Sazan Island. Albania’s Prime Minister, Edi Rama, has defended the project as a strategic investment that could turn his country into a premier Mediterranean tourism destination.

But Albania’s Special Prosecution Office Against Corruption and Organised Crime (SPAK) has opened an inquiry into decisions made in 2024 that altered the legal status of land in the Vjosa‑Narta region and around Sazan. Authorities are examining whether protected areas were reclassified specifically to enable the Kushner‑linked project.[4]

Public anger intensified when heavy machinery began carving access routes and fencing off land. In Tirana, thousands of protesters marched for consecutive days, carrying pink flamingo cutouts, a symbol of the threatened lagoon ecosystem.[5]  They challenge the legality of land‑status changes, the granting of “strategic investor” privileges, and the absence of completed environmental impact assessments. Demonstrations have turned confrontational with protestors breaking through police cordons and necessitating the deployment of water cannons to disperse hostile crowds. Viral videos showed security forces dragging away demonstrators at the construction site.

The continuing protests reflect not only environmental concerns but also broader frustration with perceived corruption, lack of transparency, and the influence of foreign investors over public land. A central question fuelling public outrage is whether the land, especially Sazan Island, could legally be transferred to foreign interests, or leased for private development at all. According to officials, despite the scale of the project, final environmental impact assessments have not yet been completed. This raises questions about whether construction activity already underway is lawful.

Sazan Island’s historical status as a military zone and its ecological sensitivity complicate any private development. The environmental issue is that such projects often expose tensions between economic modernisation narratives and the institutional fragility of environmental oversight. The Sazan case fits this pattern, with critics arguing that the government’s accelerated approval process reflects broader concerns about transparency and political favouritism.

It is certain that the controversy surrounding the proposed development of Sazan Island by entities linked to Jared Kushner has drawn renewed attention to Albania’s long‑standing position at the intersection of regional politics, foreign influence, and global strategic interests. Indeed, while the current dispute is rooted in environmental, legal and governance concerns, it also resonates with earlier episodes in Balkan political history, including the recently cancelled Kushner‑associated development project in Serbia, the 1935 Zionist exploratory mission to Albania and Albania’s contemporary role as host to the Mujahedin‑e Khalq (MEK), an Iranian opposition group. Taken together, these episodes illustrate how Albania’s geography and political orientation have repeatedly placed it within broader geopolitical currents.

The Albanian controversy closely parallels events in Serbia, where the government recently cancelled a Kushner‑associated real‑estate development involving the former Yugoslav military headquarters in Belgrade. Public opposition in Serbia centred on concerns about non‑transparent negotiations, the valuation of state property and the symbolic implications of transferring historically and architecturally significant property to politically connected foreign investors.[6] The main spark that ignited the public protest against the Kushner-associated real estate was the fact that the Yugoslav military headquarters was bombed twice by the United States Air Force during the NATO campaign in 1999, and that the American investor, ironically, promised to build a memorial for people who died in the bombing of the buildings.

Political analysts have argued that the Serbian government’s reversal reflected a combination of public pressure, legal uncertainty and political risk, particularly given the sensitivity of the 1999 illegal NATO campaign.[7] The Serbian case has since been invoked by Albanian civil society groups as evidence that such agreements can be halted when institutional accountability mechanisms function effectively.

The parallels between the two cases reveal a pattern of public distrust, environmental concerns and political sensitivity surrounding foreign mega‑projects tied to politically influential figures.

While the development is simply a business project driven by profit, politically influenced but not politically motivated, the Sazan Island debate has revived scholarly interest in a lesser‑known episode of interwar history: the 1935 Zionist exploratory mission to Albania. During this period, Zionist leaders, facing British restrictions in Mandatory Palestine, examined several alternative sites for potential Jewish settlement. Albania’s religious tolerance, low population density, and Mediterranean access made it an intriguing candidate for resettlement. Although the proposal never advanced beyond preliminary discussions, it foreshadowed Albania’s later role during the Holocaust, when the country became the only Nazi‑occupied territory in Europe where the Jewish population increased, due to widespread adherence to the Albanian code of besa. The Albanian code of besa, a customary ethic of honour and protection, played a significant role in motivating Muslim and Christian families alike to shelter Jewish refugees. This legacy has become a foundational narrative in modern Albania–Israel relations, frequently invoked by both governments as evidence of a historically rooted moral affinity. Contemporary Albanian and Israeli diplomatic discourse frequently mentions this historical legacy, framing it as evidence of a long‑standing empathy between the two nations.

The Prime Minister’s defence of the Sazan project on the ground that it offers long-term gains for the Albanian tourism sector is symptomatic of the influence of foreign political considerations on domestic policy decisions. For example, Albania’s acceptance of the Mujahedin‑e Khalq (MEK), an Iranian opposition organisation exiled originally from Iran and later from Iraq, adds an instructive dimension to the country’s geopolitical positioning. The MEK’s presence has been the subject of controversy, given its contentious history and the Iranian government’s designation of the group as extremist. Hosting the MEK has placed Albania at the centre of a sensitive geopolitical triangle involving Iran, the United States, and Israel. Albania’s decision reflects its broader strategy of aligning with Western security interests, particularly in the post‑2014 period.

The convergence of these episodes, the Sazan Island dispute, the 1935 Zionist mission and the MEK’s presence, highlights a recurring theme in Albanian political history: the country’s strategic location has repeatedly made it a site of external interest, geopolitical experimentation, and contested sovereignty.

While the specific actors and circumstances differ across decades, the underlying dynamics remain consistent. Albania’s political choices, whether concerning land use, foreign investment or security partnerships, are shaped by the interplay between domestic governance structures and broader international pressures. The outcome of the Sazan Island controversy will therefore not only determine the fate of a single development project but will also signal how Albania navigates the complex geopolitical landscape of the 21st century.

But the main message to take away from this controversy is that sometimes corporate greed trumps even well-intended political intentions. Indeed, the Sazan project proves the veracity of Mahatma Gandhi’s statement that the “Earth provides enough to satisfy every man’s needs, but not every man’s greed.”

[1] Anna Skinner,’ Ivanka Trump, Jared Kushner Island Resort Project Under Scrutiny – Here’s Why’, Newsweek, 2 June 2026, at https://www.newsweek.com/jared-kushner-trump-albania-resort-environmental-corruption-protests-12021501.

[2] Urooba Jamal, ‘Kushner Island? Why a planned resort has provoked protests in Albania’, Aljazeera, 5 June 2026, at https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/6/5/why-the-kushners-plan-to-build-an-albanian-resort-has-sparked-protests.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Anna Skinner,’ Ivanka Trump, Jared Kushner Island Resort Project Under Scrutiny – Here’s Why’, Newsweek, 2 June 2026, at https://www.newsweek.com/jared-kushner-trump-albania-resort-environmental-corruption-protests-12021501.

[5] Zana Cimili, ‘What to know about the growing opposition to Trump family-linked resort in Albania’, AP, 4 June 2026, at https://apnews.com/article/albania-kushner-trump-development-protest-tourism-sazan-8d7d0e216c28d23fe1b2e51cbb05b926.

[6] Petrović, M., ‘Urban Redevelopment and Political Economy in Belgrade’, Southeast European Studies Quarterly, vol. 9, no. 2 (2024): 77–101.

[7] Vučinić, D., ‘Foreign Investment and Public Resistance in Serbia.” Balkan Policy Forum Papers 2024.

Dejan Hinic is a financial and investment expert operating from Belgrade, Serbia He received his law degrees from the University of Belgrade and the University of Queensland.

Gabriël Moens AM is an emeritus professor of law at the University of Queensland where he served as the Garrick Professor of Law. He also served as pro vice-chancellor and dean at Murdoch University. He is the co-author of The Legal Right to Disobey Law, Sidestream Press, 2026.

By Dejan Hinic and Gabriël Moens, Canberra Daily

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Vocal Media is Exploring the alleged Pasteur Street incident, Iran’s security response, and the controversial history of the MEK opposition group:

The organization Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK) has claimed that around “250 of its operatives” carried out an attack in central Tehran targeting the office and residence of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. However, Iranian officials and state media have denied that any such incident occurred.

No evidence or images of the alleged attack have surfaced. The Pasteur district—where the Supreme Leader’s residence, the Presidential Office, the Supreme National Security Council, the Judiciary Secretariat, the Guardian Council, and the Assembly of Experts are located—remains under strict security measures.

In a statement issued last night, the MEK said its operatives launched the attack on Monday morning at that location and caused some damage, but that “100” of its members were killed or arrested.

Iranian media described the claim as a “comical and theatrical reaction,” writing that four MEK members had attempted to create noise in central Tehran using “a plastic pipe made to resemble a children’s toy,” but were arrested during a patrol.

Ahmad Bakhshayesh Ardestani, a member of the Iranian parliament’s National Security Committee, said: “I think it is unlikely for them to carry out such an operation, but I am not aware of the details of this news, nor do I know whether such an incident has occurred.”

The extremist group Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK), which blends Islamic and Marxist ideology, supported the 1979 Iranian Revolution that led to the overthrow of the Shah. However, its relations with Ayatollah Khomeini soon deteriorated.

The MEK is banned in Iran. The Iranian government designates it as a terrorist organization and accuses it of conspiring and carrying out actions against the state. Many MEK members have been imprisoned or executed for membership in the group.

What did the MEK claim, and what are Iranian officials and media saying?

The MEK said its operation began at the time of the morning call to prayer and continued until noon. According to its statement, the attack targeted the “Motahari Complex” inside the Supreme Leader’s residential compound, and “150 out of 250” operatives safely returned to their bases.

The group further claimed that its members inflicted “heavy casualties” on the security personnel guarding the complex. Pasteur Street and its surrounding area house the Supreme Leader’s residence, the Presidential Office, the Supreme National Security Council, the Judiciary Secretariat, the Guardian Council, and the Assembly of Experts.

Although Ahmad Bakhshayesh expressed ignorance about the source of the report, he added: “They believe the country has become weak and that the security and intelligence institutions are preoccupied with other matters, so they want to portray the country as weak through terrorist operations.

The website “Bolten News,” which is considered close to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, wrote that “last night, the sound of consecutive explosions in the Pasteur Street area considered the most secure area of the capital raised serious questions among officials and supporters about how the enemy dared to reach the heart of Tehran.

Yesterday, the hashtag “Pasteur” briefly trended on the social media platform X in Iran. However, aside from reports of explosions and gunfire, no images or concrete evidence have emerged so far. Iranian news agencies have denied these reports.

According to the newspaper Hamshahri, strict security measures are in place around Pasteur Street, South Palestine Street, Azerbaijan Street, Keshvar-Doust Street, and Imam Khomeini Street. Entry into the area requires a special card, and only security units, armed forces vehicles with green license plates, or vehicles belonging to authorized officials and diplomats with special permits are allowed access.

The anti-Iran group Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK)

The MEK is an exiled opposition group that supports the overthrow of the Islamic Republic. It is also known as the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI).

Founded in 1965 as a left-wing militant organization, it strongly opposed the Shah of Iran and participated in protests that ultimately led to the end of his rule and the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979.

Initially, the group supported Ayatollah Khomeini, founder of the Islamic Republic. However, after its leader Massoud Rajavi was barred from participating in the first presidential election, the MEK adopted an anti-government stance.

It began an armed struggle to overthrow the Islamic Republic and claimed responsibility for the assassination of several key figures.

As authorities cracked down on MEK supporters also known as the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI) Massoud Rajavi fled to Paris.

Later, he and most of his followers moved to Camp Ashraf in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq near the Iranian border. There, the movement gradually took on characteristics of a cult, including the veneration of Massoud Rajavi and his wife Maryam.

Maryam Rajavi joined the resistance movement as a student in Tehran in the early 1970s and, in 1985, assumed joint leadership of the group at her husband’s direction.

During the 1980s Iran–Iraq War, the MEK carried out several armed attacks inside Iran with the support of Saddam’s forces, which caused it to lose much of its domestic support.

The MEK’s relationship with the West has been complex. During the presidency of reformist Mohammad Khatami, the United States and the European Union designated the group as a terrorist organization. However, during the tenure of his hardline successor Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, those designations were later revoked.

The MEK achieved a propaganda success in 2002 when it revealed the existence of key Iranian nuclear facilities, contributing to prolonged tensions between the Islamic Republic and the West.

In post-Saddam Iraq, the group disarmed and was eventually relocated to Camp Liberty, a former U.S. military base near Baghdad. Later, the MEK transferred its members to Albania, where they now reside at Camp Ashraf 3. Today, the organization’s headquarters is based in Albania.

Camp Ashraf 3 is located near Manëz in Albania’s Durrës district and serves as the central headquarters for the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (MEK), housing approximately two to three thousand members. After relocating from Iraq, the exiled Iranian opposition group has settled in a secure compound, focusing on activities aimed at overthrowing Iran’s government.

The MEK’s leaders are based in France, and in 1993 they selected Maryam Rajavi as Iran’s “future president.” Group members also refer to her as the “President-elect of Iran in exile.”

The Council on Foreign Relations, in an article about the group, wrote that analysts describe the militant organization as a cult due to its complete loyalty to the Rajavi family. It has been reported that in the late 1980s, older women in the group were forced to divorce their husbands, and young women were not allowed to marry or have children.

The article also states that Massoud Rajavi has been missing since the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, and his current status and whereabouts are unknown.

Some analysts consider him dead. Iran expert Karim Sadjadpour told the Council on Foreign Relations in an interview: “Cult leaders generally don’t retire. They either die or go to jail. If Massoud Rajavi is alive, I would be surprised.”

Real Content, Vocal Media

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In a report published by Sharq Daily about the killing of Zahra Bohlulipour and several other students during the protests, her friends are quoted as saying that on Friday, January 10, Raha and several of her friends came to the conclusion that the dormitory was not safe; for this reason, they gathered their belongings to go to a friend’s house. They arrived at one of the city squares where they were shot by some motorbike riders.

After the shooting ends, the group tries to escape until one of her friends notices that Raha is still there. When he turns to her, he sees that she is bleeding. Later, at the hospital, they say that the bullet hit her heart and lungs.

Raha was laid to rest on January 14 in Firuzabad, a city near Shiraz.

An MEK-affiliated website, titled “Women’s Committee of the National Council of Resistance,” published Raha’s photo claiming that she was a member of the MEK: “Mujahed Martyr Zahra Bohlulipour (Raha), born in 2007, was a student of Italian language at the Faculty of Languages ​​and Literature of Tehran University.”

The MEK-affiliated media even went a step further and published a message from Ali Safavi, an official of the so-called NCRI in the United States, who addressed Raha as “My dear sister, Zahra!” and wrote: “You now stand among 100,000 MEK martyrs”.

This extremely opportunistic and hypocritical act by the MEK has sparked a wave of anger and hatred among Raha’s friends who knew her closely. Her friends and acquaintances tried to clarify that she had no link with the MEK by publishing messages on social networks. Her family had previously denied their young daughter’s connection to the MEK.

Following this claim by MEK, the General Student Union Council of Tehran University also issued a statement strongly condemning rumors about the connection of Tehran University students with armed terrorist groups including the MEK.

One of Raha Bohlulipour’s friends wrote on her X social media account: “Raha (Zahra) Bohlulipour has never been linked to any armed group, including the so-called MEK, false claims and manipulated images spread by this discredited group aim to mislead public opinion and whitewash crimes.”

Another friend, who is also very upset about Raha’s blood being confiscated by the MEK, wrote: “Raha was the most alive person I had ever seen in my life. Be Raha’s voice. Raha has nothing to do with the MEK.”

Another user wrote in defense of Raha’s name: “Raha Bohlulipour has nothing to do with this dirty organization. A free, loving girl full of life…”

Yes, Raha, like many other Iranian girls, loved life and could not be a member of a group that denies life in practice and even removes the word “life” from the manifestations of its struggle. The fake narrative of the MEK that Raha’s blood was attributed to them can be proven in different ways. While the so-called NCR Women Committee website has included the fake slogan “Women, Resistance, Freedom” on its front, Raha wrote “Women, Life, Freedom” in her last message on Telegram.

Raha’s young body now rests in a corner of Iranian soil. Her grieving family and friends no longer have Raha, the very girl who was passionate about life. They are enduring this great pain while worrying that their beloved’s name will be tainted by the MEK’s notorious name.

Mazda Parsi

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The truth that the Iranian audience cannot forget is that the MEK has no base among Iranians, and every time there is a publicity frenzy for MEK demonstrations, they respond appropriately to the group’s propaganda on social media by trending the hashtag #MEKterrorists.

In these situations, social media users try to enlighten and inform Iranian and non-Iranian audiences by publishing content about the cult-like, terrorist, and treacherous nature of the MEK and its unpopularity among Iranians.

The main purpose of the MEK demonstration is political competition and rallying against Reza Pahlavi because they have already failed the competition on the streets of Iran.

However, Massoud and Maryam Rajavi need a demonstration with a significant crowd for such a rally in front of the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin. In the previous days, MEK agents tried to attract the attention of citizens in the freezing weather of Berlin without mentioning the MEK by name, exploiting the protests of the Iranian people, but they were only met with hatred and disgust from Iranians living in Berlin, the videos of which are available on social networks.

The texture and arrangement of the crowd at MEK rallies

Based on his field observations and numerous reports on other MEK demonstrations, the composition of the participants and their arrangement in the rallies are as follows: the first rows are reserved for members and sympathizers of the group; in next rows, non-Iranians are placed to increase the size of the crowd.

This arrangement is the same in all MEK rallies. The ones in the first rows, with pictures of Massoud and Maryam Rajavi and MEK flags in their hands excited to appear to be supporters of the group, but the flags of Ukraine and Syria, etc. in the rows behind them indicate that it is not a national protest of Iranian patriots.

In various European countries, MEK agents visit refugee camps and promise free trip (for example to Berlin), travel expenses, and hotel accommodations to persuade a number of refugees to participate in demonstrations.

The Arab, Ukrainian and African refugees are told by the MEK recruiters that the demonstration will feature well-known speakers from all over Europe who have influence in national parliaments or the European Parliament so the larger the crowd, the greater the possibility of influencing asylum policies.

The full coverage of travel expenses and the appeal of a temporary escape from the harsh environment of refugee camps provide many refugees with a chance to escape from the harsh conditions of refugee camps for a few days. Here is the account of a Polish student who attended an MEK-run rally in Germany in 2015.

How to recruit local crowds

For the February 7 rally in Berlin, the MEK produced leaflets and small posters in both Persian and German with identical graphics. The German version of these flyers was distributed in high schools or sports clubs and in neighborhoods where immigrants live the most.

The flyers are designed to be “youth-friendly” and reads “In support of the uprising of the Iranian people” and does not name the organizer of the demonstration. The MEK organization knows well how much it is hated by the people, which is why it refuses to write its name.

There are some intermediaries who are paid to recruit their friends. For instance, if he or she brings five people with him, he will receive 2,500 euros. For each additional person, he will receive 500 euros more.

In exchange for money, the intermediaries are responsible for recruiting participants and conveying the organizers’ messages to the participants. The more people they recruit, the more they receive. Some participants also receive money directly from these intermediaries just to attend the demonstration waving the flags that are given to them.

The MEK – through intermediaries – advises participants to refrain from dialogue or interviews. Therefore, documentation is not easy. Asking friendly and informal questions should be flexible, and tailored to the situation on the scene. The MEK agents have coerced their forces to prevent documentation of their nationality and their motivation of participating the rally.

Mazda Parsi

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This report adds: “The MEK is also trying to show the espionage series “Tehran” on one of our televisions jointly with the Israeli non-governmental organization “Sot” (Izraeli Sot – Voice of Israel) in Albania.

“The MEK, in cooperation with pro-Israel organizations in Albania, is trying to screen the two mentioned films between January 31 and February 11,” the report states. “I see that the MEK pays special attention to films and cinema in our country”.

“ARGO” produced in 2012 and “September of Shiraz” in 2015 are political dramas that are based on the events after the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran.

The television series “Tehran” produced in 2020 in Israel tells the story of a Mossad agent who enters his hometown Tehran to carry out espionage and sabotage missions.

Recently, there were reports that the political activities of the MEK were limited in Albania, and even Edi Rama said in a talk with the New York Times reporter that the condition of accepting the MEK in Albania with the agreement of the UNHCR was that they do not have political activities.

Apparently, the MEK want to fill the void of their political activities in Albania by showing anti-Iranian films with sensitive subjects, which have not received much attention at the international level.

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“Before my departure we used to talk a lot, “Nabi writes. “Malik said he wanted to leave the group but he didn’t know how he would be able to do that.”

According to Nabi, Malik had two problems. One was his fear of the outside world and the second was his involvement in the clashes of Camp Ashraf.
Nabi tried to convince him that the world outside the MKO is not a problem but he could not help him with his concerns on his presence in the clashes in Camp Ashraf. Malik was concerned about all the information he had about the last days in Camp Ashraf.

“After my escape from the MKO, Malik could not tolerate the group anymore,” Nabi states. “He asked to leave the group but in response he was jailed in a quarantine and then he was physically eliminated by the MKO leaders.”

Malik’s death was declared by the MKO news media as he was drowned in the irrigation channel after he got into it to help a comrade who was at risk of drowning. “Malik was a professional swimmer.” Nabi wonders. ”it’s not logical that he was drowned after he rescued another person!”

The post Latest testimony on the murder of an MKO member appeared first on Nejat Society.

Nurmorad is from Andimeshk; a county in Khuzestan province, Iran. During the Iranian 1997 revolution, Nurmorad was a sympathizer of the Mujahedin-e Khalq group. After the revolution he was tricked into moving to MKO camps in Iraq. From then on his family have had no contact with him.

Nurmorad brother says:” we haven’t had any contact with Nurmorad since he left Iran. Hearing that my brother is moved to Albania, we got happy. We are hopefully looking forward to hear from him.

The post Four decades, no contact appeared first on Nejat Society.

Open letter to Canadian Senate. Sharham Golestaneh, high ranking member of Mojahedin Khalq terrorist Organisation in your buildings.

To the Canadian Senate.

The Honourable George J. Furey Q.C., Speaker of the Senate

Dear Sir,

We have been informed that a long-term agent of the Mojahedin Khalq Organisation (aka Rajavi cult, Saddam’s Private Army, MKO, MEK, NCRI), by the name of Mr Shahram Golestaneh has been tasked to infiltrate and influence the political establishments of Canada, including the Senate, to serve the terrorist organisation’s purposes and goals.

The Mojahedin Khalq has a known track record and is considered both as a dangerous cult and as a terrorist organisation by practically all the free world (including the US, EU, UK and Canada).

That is why Shahram Golestaneh has been ordered to hide his membership of this notorious cult, which after the fall of their last benefactor Saddam Hussain, is now working alongside the terrorist groups which incorporate the remains of the Saddam regime in Iraq and Syria, including ISIS. Shahram Golestaneh is now portraying himself as the head of a made-up organisation called the Iran Democratic Association.

Having said that, Shahram Golestaneh does not hide his full membership of the MEK when he needs to. On February 8, 2014 he gave a speech in the presence of the cult leader Maryam Rajavi in Paris pledging full loyalty to the cult. He bends over backwards to support the ideology, strategy and the tactics used by Saddam’s Private Army during and after the fall of the dictatorship in Iraq.

Evidence and documents attaching this man to the notorious terrorist organisation are not hard to find. We have attached some examples for your information.

Dear Senator,

We are a number of former members of the Mojahedin Khalq Organisation. We testify that Shahram Golestaneh is a high-ranking active member of this organisation who is hiding his true face behind the Iran Democratic Association in Canada. Many of us have worked alongside this man in the MEK and know him personally.

Thank you for your kind attention to this matter.

A group of former MEK members,Faryad Azadi,

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