Daniel Boffey, the chief reporter of the Guardian begins the report with an aggressive rap demonstration made by a Pahlavi supporter, named Mohraz in London. In his music show, this monarchist is pretending to shoot  the paramilitary organization known as Basij in Iran and the IRGC referred to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and the MEK.

Boffey asserts that the aggressive drill music made by Mohraz, is only the most public evidence of a battle being played out on the streets of London that is not between supporters and opponents of the Iranian government but instead, within the opposition.

“It is a clash that has been electrified by the hopes raised by the US and Israeli military action over the past three months, but is now posing a headache for British police, as well as being a source of anxiety for the Iranian diaspora touched by it,” The Gurdian reporter states. “Scuffles at protests against Tehran’s regime, often requiring police intervention, have been attributed to tensions between the sparring sides, raising the concerns that matters could escalate.”

The journalist refers to other “battles” taken place among Iranian opposition in exile including the Nowruz celebration. He tries to cover the opinions from both sides. Ray (Mohammad Reza) Torabi, former child soldier of the MEK is one of those interviewed by Boffey.

According to the author, Ray Torabi, 44, who lives in Cologne, was once a member of the MEK but today regards Pahlavi as a potential transitional leader in Iran. He said he recognised that there were extremists among the supporters of the shah’s son but that it was not the full story.

He told Boffey: “One thing you can differentiate between the Pahlavi crowd and the MEK crowd is because the MEK is a cult, they have complete control over their supporters, their members, and you know they’re very well organised.”

“That’s why you really don’t see the feeling falling out of line and then doing things, but on the other hand, the Pahlavi crowd, they’re not organised the same way; they’re not a cult, they’re individuals, they’re people who, a lot of them, they see Pahlavi as the only hope for Iran. There’s a group that are really extremists, and then they really worship Pahlavi. Sometimes they take it too far.”

The deep competition between the two groups who claim they want to bring peace and democracy for Iran, indicates that they are thriving to grab the opportunity to gain some more credibility among Iranian public opinion. But, it seems that both groups have lost the game.

The MEK’s five-decade record and the Pahlavi’s past monarchy have left Iranians with memoirs and experiences of violence and treason. What Massoud Rajavi literally did, Reza Pahlavi advocates for: war for Iran and bloodshed of Iranians. Iran does not need such an opposition.

Mazda Parsi

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Jonathan Feldstein is an American who immigrated to Israel in 2004.  He has a three-decade career in fundraising and marketing for Israeli foundations. He is also an author who is considered a “respected” bridge between Jews and Christians, in Israel.

His piece is actually a response to a MEK agent who claimed that the MEK has changed and is no longer repeating its terrorist past. In response, Feldstein tries to acknowledge, while reviewing the MEK’s background, that the MEK has never changed to better; has no political or social legitimacy for Iranians and that this MEK “agent” is actually selling himself to clear the bloody record of his employers.

The Zionist author, Feldstein begins the article with a question about the MEK agent and gives a comprehensive answer:

Who is the “agent” selling out for, why, and why does it matter?

The People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (MEK) is one of the most prominent and controversial Iranian opposition groups. Founded in 1965, it evolved from a student-led Marxist revolutionary movement to an exiled organization advocating for regime change in Iran. Its history is of violent confrontations, forced exile, and robust international public relations and lobbying. It’s front organization, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) seeks to pasteurize its terrorist origins and position it as a legitimate player in the broader Iranian landscape.

MEK and NCRI are one and the same, a hand-in-glove relationship. Rather than a legitimate opposition, they represent a disgruntled and isolated – and very well-funded – terrorist group. They are nothing more than wolves in different wolves’ clothes. Sadly, there are many Western leaders who are in their pockets, literally, and others like their “agent” who are on the payroll.

When one speaks of the red-green alliance, the MEK/NCRI is the embodiment of that. They blend radical Islam with Marxist revolutionary ideology. MEK always emphasized armed struggle against oppression to achieve its goals. Massoud Rajavi joined in the late 1960s and rose to its leadership after the Shah’s regime executed the founders and other leaders.

In the 1979 Islamic Revolution, MEK supported Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. It gained popularity for its anti-monarchy stance and organizational strength. But they had a fallout with “Supreme Leader” Khomeini and, after being violently put down by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard (IRGC), they turned to terror inside Iran, leading to a brutal crackdown against its members and supporters. Its leaders fled Iran to protect themselves.

Rajavi fled to Paris, establishing NCRI as part of its exiled underground network. It relocated to Iraq in 1986, allying with Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War. This, and participating in the killing of Iranians in order to carry out their terrorist goals, alienated many Iranians and fueled accusations of collaboration with arch-enemy Saddam. Still today, MEK is wildly unpopular and viewed with hatred, as treasonous, by many Iranians.

Through the 1990s and early 2000s, MEK was designated as a terrorist organization by the U.S., U.K., E.U., and Canada. But after purportedly renouncing violence in the early 2000s, with no confirmed terrorist acts for which they took credit for over a decade, the West delisted it as a terror group. These decisions were driven largely by geopolitical considerations and challenges in relocating MEK members from Iraq to Albania. After all, nobody wants a terrorist group in their backyard, so a thick coat of whitewash, a slick PR campaign, and international declarations of “reform” made them suddenly palatable. Good neighbors.

But more than actually renouncing terror, the reversal was the product of well-funded intense lobbying, and a media smoke and mirrors scheme such as that which their “agent” is involved. It bears repeating that there are no known instances of Islamic terrorist groups truly renouncing their ideology or use of terror to achieve their goals. Pigs flying and hell freezing over are appropriate metaphors.

Today, MEK/NCRI supporters worship Maryam Rajavi, Massoud’s wife. He has been missing for two decades and presumed dead. They view her words as gospel, her ten-point plan for Iran as coming from Mt. Sinai. On the surface, they claim to support a plan for Iran rooted in secular democracy, gender equality, and without nukes. But follow Iranians in Iran and in the diaspora, and you’ll more often than not find them deriding and delegitimizing MEK/NCRI and Rajavi.

Further accusations of MEK/NCRI being cultlike are echoed in the absolute uniformity of “thought” that they present, minimally, as if they are reading from the same script, to, in fact, being brainwashed.

After a personal encounter that became a heated on-air debate with one of their speakers placed by the “agent,” I confronted their “agent” when I heard about him promoting them. “I heard you’re promoting NCRI. Is that correct?” Usually, a publicist helps clients formulate the talking points. In this case, the “agent” has been indoctrinated by the client.

After he admitted it, he pedaled that they are “former” terrorists, as if singing a John Lennon anti-war song, insisting “people change.”

I had a prior professional connection with the “agent” and challenged him, “I remember exactly where I was when you called me to ask about them. Your take on who they are and what they represent is mistaken. They are misleading you and the world. You’re being used. Shame that you are placing booking terrorists over integrity.” […]

The “agent” doubled down, “Former terrorist entity. There’s a difference. People change. They (MEK/NCRI) are better than imposing a King on them for the new regime. Ninety-four million mostly-Persian citizens deserve better than a King (aka Shah). Don’t you think?”

No, sir, don’t YOU think? Clearly not. Not as long as the Marxist-Islamist checks are being cashed.

It’s ironic to defend MEK/NCRI as democratic when the Rajavi dynasty has been in control since the 1980s. Her colorful hijab, as compared to the Islamic Republic’s preferred black, suggests openness, but it’s just a ruse to make you think they want democracy, secular reforms, and gender equality

The “agent” is pushing MEK/NCRI and Maryam Rajavi as an addicted drug dealer would do to fund his own addiction. Ultimately, the future of Iran needs to be decided by Iranians. But don’t let people like their “agent” and others pull the hijab over your eyes. MEK/NCRI are not to be trusted and, yes, the Iranian people deserve better.

Taken from Jonathan Feldstein’s article in Townhall

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The MEK leaders have always claimed to own the most organized establishment to replace the Iranian government but they deny the very important fact: they are hated by the Iranian people.

Even in the dark days of bombardment of Iranian cities by US and Israel, where many civilians including children and students are killed, the MEK leaders do not express any sympathy for the victims who are their country-men.

Instead, the group’s leader Maryam Rajavi speaks of the “transitional government” and her so- ten-point plan for future of Iran of which no article is observed in the ruling of her cult of personality.

The MEK’s army, the so-called National Liberation army was Saddam Hussein’s private army in the 8 years of Iran-Iraq war. The MEK forces attacked Iranian towns killing civilians and army soldiers who were their country-men. There are many women and children among Iranian victims of the MEK regardless of the Iraqi Kurds and Shiites whom they killed in the operations that they aided Saddam to suppress the uprisings.

Considering the MEK’s violent background as a Saddam’s accomplice that betrayed its own people, the international community leaders are aware of the group’s unpopularity among Iranians inside and outside the country. Despite the West’s animosity towards Iranian nation which is clear in the military strikes against Iranian civilians, they never recognize the MEK as a viable alternative for the Islamic Republic.

Even in case of Reza Pahlavi, The US president, Donald Trump does recognize him an appropriate option because he thinks that the alleged person should be selected by the people inside Iran, let alone Maryam Rajavi and Massoud Rajavi who are widely despised by the Iranians of all political and social walks.

Mazda Parsi

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Ritter believes that the United States is using diplomacy less as a route to agreement than as a tactical tool to buy time, apply pressure, and shape the conditions for confrontation. In his remarks to the Tehran Times, he outlined what he sees as the real thinking behind U.S. and Israeli demands, warned against misreading Iran’s deterrence, and described the potentially catastrophic consequences of a war for the region in which the MEK, the monarchists and the separatist groups take part.

“The United States, on its own admission, orchestrates a currency collapse in Iran,” Scott Ritter told Tehran Times about the recent protests in Iran. “People went to the streets in legitimate protest, which the Iranian government did not violently suppress. Then that protest was hijacked by the CIA, by Mossad, with agents inside who created violence.”

Ritter believes that Israel and the U.S. are fomenting unrests to lead a regime change project in Iran besides military invasion. He explains: “So, when we bomb Iran—and I unfortunately believe that we will bomb Iran—we will be seeking to suppress the regime’s ability to respond to civil unrest. We will encourage uprisings and suppress the government’s capacity to respond. The objective, therefore, is to have the government collapse.”

According to this prominent critic of U.S. foreign policy,  this is American’s vision about Iran following a US-Israeli invasion on this nation: “you’re going to have ISIS-type trucks running through your cities, with gunmen from the Mujahedin-e Khalq and gunmen from the monarchists, who are going to run in and say, “We’re now in charge.”

Ritter believes that the Iranian government needs to capture the emotion of the Iranian nation and use it to weaponize itself, to make itself invulnerable to efforts by outside powers to divide it.

As an American, he says: “That’s what we try to do. We support the MEK, we support the monarchists, we support the Kurds, we support Azeri separatists, we support the Baluch, and we exploit economic divisions in the mainstream Iranian population. The United States, Israel, and others are looking to fracture Iran, to break it apart, to cause it to collapse from within.”

He suggests that the Iranian government and the Iranian people have to find a way to unify themselves. “If not, then we’ve just told you what we look for: the divisions, and we exploit the divisions,” he states.

Ritter has previously written on the role of the MEK as operatives of the US intelligence in Iran. In 2005, Ritter revealed that the MEK had begun receiving training from the CIA. In a 2006 interview, Ritter described the MEK as a “cult” and a “terrorist” group, accusing elements in the U.S. government of using them to destabilize Iran. Ritter has also noted that the MEK has often acted as a source of intelligence for Western and Israeli officials regarding Iranian nuclear sites.

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According to many reports, the Iranian opposition remains ideologically diverse and often fragmented. On January 27^th, Natiq Malikzada and Trevor Filseth of the National Interest also suggested that “anti-regime” sentiment in Iran comes in many flavors. They try to answer the critical question: “What’s Wrong with Iran’s Opposition?”

According to Malikzada and Filseth, the Iranian opposition groups are “divided by identity, history, borders, language, religion, class, and even what the word ‘Iran’ should mean.” They present a brief but quiet comprehensive history and analysis of Iranian opposition groups of which this is about the MEK:

The other major Iranian opposition exile movement is the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), better known in the West as the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI). It, too, is unpalatable to a majority of Iranians.

The MEK began as a movement of Iranian leftists with Islamist ideas. Under the leadership of student leader Massoud Rajavi, it carried out bombings inside Iran, first against the Shah and later against Khomeini. After the group was banned inside Iran in 1981, it struck an alliance with Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War and established military bases in Iraq that it used to launch attacks on Iranian troops. The MEK has gone to great lengths to stress that it never actually fought alongside Saddam’s forces—yet its members still fought against their own countrymen during a war for national survival, giving them a status within today’s Iran akin to that of Benedict Arnold in the United States.

For this reason, the MEK has virtually no chance to build a mass movement inside Iran. Outside Iran, the organization has gained some measure of influence, hosting prominent Western politicians at its conferences and gaining US congressional support for its “10-point plan” for a post-Islamic Republic government. However, it has also faced persistent criticism over its cult-like structure and practices. For instance, it requires that its members remain celibate, and insists that Rajavi—who has not been seen since 2003—is still alive and in hiding. (His wife, Maryam Rajavi, leads the group in his absence.) The group also carries the stigma of having been listed as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in the United States until 2012.

Owing to these controversies, the MEK has few friends across the broader opposition universe, which regards it as compromised and untrustworthy. In turn, the MEK tends to treat other opposition currents as unserious or irrelevant, proffering its own structure and messaging discipline as the only credible alternatives to the Islamic Republic. These tendencies make it virtually impossible for the group to unify with any other opposition movements—and given the MEK’s baggage, it is unclear if such unity would even be helpful to the anti-regime cause.

The post The National Interests: The MEK Has Too Many Skeletons in Its Closet appeared first on Nejat Society.

Elona Elezi, DW

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This denial is a strategic effort to rehabilitate their image and present themselves as a legitimate opposition force for a democratic Iran.

The MEK’s cooperation with Saddam Hussein involved receiving arms, cash and a miliary base in Iraq called Camp Ashraf, from which they launched attacks against Iran during the Iran-Iraq War.
They also assisted Saddam Hussein in suppressing Kurdish and Shia uprisings in Iraq in 1991, although the MEK vehemently denies it.

This historical alignment with a hostile foreign power during a devastating conflict led to their deep unpopularity inside Iran.

By denying this cooperation, the MEK leaders aim to distance themselves from these controversial actions and present a more palatable image to international audiences and potential supporters.

Documents on MEK’s alliance with Saddam Hussein

The primary documents and testimonies confirming the cooperation between the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) and Saddam Hussein include reports from the United States Department of State, declassifies intelligence documents, and testimonies from former MEK members and Iraqi officials.

Key evidence points to the MEK’s relocation to Iraq in the 1980s, their receipt of financial and military support from the Iraqi regime, and their participation in military operations alongside Iraqi forces, particularly during Iran-Iraq War and the suppression of the 1991 Iraqi uprisings.

A Specific document includes the “country Reports on Terrorism” published annually by the US State Department, which have historically detailed the MEK’s presence and activities in Iraq under Saddam Hussein’s Patronage.

Additionally declassifies intelligence assessments from various Western governments, though not always publicly available in their entirety, have corroborated these alliances.

Testimonies from former high-ranking MEK members, such as those collected by human rights organizations and independent researchers have also provided firsthand accounts of the MEK’s operational and logistical integration with Saddam’s regime.

Furthermore, statements from former Iraqi officials post-2003 have shed light on the extent of this cooperation, including the provision of arms, training, and intelligence sharing.

In the most recent court session examining the charges against 104 members of MEK as well as the organization’s nature as a legal entity, held on September 23rd, six former members of the group named Samad Eskandari, Hadi Shabani, Fathollah Eskandari, Kamand Ali Azizi, Doost Mohammad Farahi, and Foad Basri testifies about the MEK cooperation with Iraqi Baa’th regime during the Iran-Iraq War.

The impact of alliance with Saddam on Rajavi’s political career

The immediate impact of alliance with Saddam Hussein on the political career of Massoud and Maryam Rajavi was perceived as positive because they were successful in achieving some strategic goals as an armed opposition force.

Conversely, the long-term implications were detrimental, especially as Saddam’s regime was increasingly considered as invader to Iran and as an offensive regime that abused human rights of minorities, used chemical weapons against civilians.
Any leader including the Rajavis, closely associated with Saddam have been faced criticism and political fallout as his international standing deteriorated and finally his regime collapsed.

Sources:
1. Country Reports on Terrorism, US department of State
2. Reports of Human Rights Watch on the MEK, Human Rights Watch

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According to the article “The Case for Redesignating the MEK: Learning from History” from Israel Hayom, numerous surveys, independent interviews, and media coverage indicate that inside Iran, the MEK is broadly discredited.[1] Many Iranians across generations associate the group with betrayal and violence. The article also states that the people of Iran overwhelmingly do not see the MEK as a viable or legitimate alternative to the current regime.

The MEK’s history of violence and its designation as a terrorist organization by various countries for periods also contribute to the skepticism surrounding its viability. The group was involved in armed conflict and targeted assassinations before the 1979 revolution and after, leading to its inclusion on terrorist lists by the U.S., Canada, EU, UK, and Japan for various periods between 1997 and 2013. While the MEK has since renounced violence, its past actions continue to raise concerns about its commitment to democratic principles.

Furthermore, the MEK has been accused of exhibiting cult-like characteristics, which further undermines its credibility as a democratic force. Critics have described the group as exhibiting traits of a “personality cult,” with reports of authoritarian control, enforced celibacy, and mandatory ideological re-education sessions. These practices are seen as incompatible with the values of a free and democratic society. The RAND Corporation report for the US government stated that the MEK had “many of the typical characteristics of a cult, such as authoritarian control, confiscation of assets, sexual control (including mandatory divorce and celibacy), emotional isolation, forced labour, sleep deprivation, physical abuse and limited exit options,”[2]
The MEK’s internal structure and leadership also raise questions about its democratic credentials. The group’s leadership is centered around Maryam Rajavi, who is the current political leader and public face of the organization. Critics argue that the MEK’s focus on Maryam Rajavi’s “Third Option” and its insular nature do not align with the principles of a pluralistic democracy.

The article “Making Sense of the MEK” from the American Foreign Policy Council highlights the MEK’s plan for provisional rule in a half-year “transitional period” following the fall of Iran’s current government and leading to a democratic and secular Iran.[3] However, the article also notes that the group’s exclusionary nature and the distrust of other Iranian opposition elements raise questions about its ability to build a broad coalition and govern effectively.

In conclusion, the MEK’s past association with Saddam Hussein, its history of violence, its cult-like characteristics, its internal structure, all contribute to the perception that it is not a viable alternative to the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Mazda Parsi

Sources:
[1] The Case for Redesignating the MEK: Learning from History. [Israel Hayom]
https://www.israelhayom.com/2025/04/11/the-case-for-redesignating-the-mek-learning-from-history/
[2] The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq, A Policy Conundrum. [RAND]
https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG871.html
[3] Making Sense of the MEK. [American Foreign Policy Council]
https://www.afpc.org/publications/articles/making-sense-of-the-mek

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The New York Times was also one of those news outlets that analyzed the main Iranian dissident groups stating that “Amid Attacks, Iran’s Exiled Opposition Remained Divided”. The article was very similar to that of Newsweek that “As Israel Eyes Regime Change, Iran’s Opposition Is Divisive and Divided.” In these articles, Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) and Reza Pahlavi are regarded two of the main opposition groups against the Islamic Republic.

However, the MEK’s propaganda media slammed New York Times considering the article “crafted to undermine the MEK.”
Ali Safavi as a foreign affairs spokesman of the MEK is the one who is charged to write against the NY Times again. This is while what is told by the New York Times about the MEK and even about its adversary Reza Pahlavi was very similar to several other articles that has been recently published on the issue.

MEK’s Anger against NYTimes

The New York Times is generally considered a liberal-leaning newspaper. Investigative journalism is a form of journalism where reporters deeply research and expose information that is often concealed or difficult to access.
The New York Times, as the MEK’s own article states has so far published three investigative reports on the world inside the MEK in 2003, 2011 and 2020.

Although the MEK propaganda denounces these reports, they are still the most referred documents about the group, especially the one that was authored by Elizabeth Rubin in June 2003 after the US invasion to Iraq. Since then, the MEK’s grudge against the New York Times began. Perhaps the biggest media blow to the MEK was dealt by the New York Times.

Rubin titled her first-hand account of visiting Camp Ashraf Iraq, “The Cult of Rajavi.” Rubin described the life at Camp Ashraf as a “fictional world of female worker bees,” asserting the group possessed absolutely no support within Iran.
Through over 2 past decades, “The Cult of Rajavi” of Elizabeth Rubin has been one of the most reliable articles for the journalists and academics because very few journalists could enter Camp Ashraf so far.

Her next article on the MEK was published in July 2011 after the group’s well-paid lobbying campaign was enhanced to remove the group from the list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations of the State Department.

In the article titled “An Iranian Cult and its American Friends”, Elizabeth Rubin warned about the sponsorship of the US high-profiles for the MEK as a terrorist cult.

In February 2020, the history repeated itself for the MEK, another NYTimes correspondent, Partrick Kingsley, was allowed to take a tour at Ashraf 3, the MEK’s headquarters in Albania. Although the MEK made efforts to picture the gesture of a democratic group for Kingsley, he found out that something was wrong behind the scenes that the MEK had prepared for him.

He published his investigative report under the title, “Highly Secretive Iranian Rebels Are Holed Up in Albania. They Gave Us a Tour.” Kingsley stated that depending on whom you ask, the People’s Jihadists are Iran’s government-in-waiting or a duplicitous terrorist cult that forbids sexual thoughts. Thus, besides the members inside the camp, the NYTimes reporter interviewed a number of former members of the group to know “What are they doing in Albania?”

Defectors of the MEK –who were interviewed by Rubin and Kingsley “to deeply research and expose information that is often concealed or difficult to access about the MEK”—are considered as agents of the Iranian government by Ali Safavi and so are the NYTimes journalists who added their narratives to their investigative reports.

Kingley’s article was ironically ended with the express of ignorance of Ashraf residents about the whereabouts of the MEK’s disappeared leader, Massoud Rajavi. After publishing the article, Kingsley posted further information on his X account about the secretive cult-like atmosphere at Ashraf 3 where members are not allowed to speak freely.

What does the NYTimes say about the MEK now?

The NYTimes’s recent article on Iranian oppositions, including decentralized activist groups, Reza Pahlavi and Maryam Rajavi, suggests that none of these groups have the capacity to bring regime change in Iran.
In particular, about the MEK, the NYTimes cites from a university professor: “The MEK has next-to-zero popularity in Iran. In my scholarly judgment, the MEK has more supporters in Washington, than in Iran.”
And, that’s it! This was what Ali Safavi calls “intervention” while other journalists and academics state similar opinions about Iranian dissidents. The followings were extracted out of many articles and reports on the very topic:

Jacobin:
While some members of the Iranian diaspora support exiled opposition figures such as Reza Pahlavi or Maryam Rajavi, these individuals lack meaningful support within Iran and are unlikely to serve as viable alternatives to the current regime. In the absence of a unified and credible domestic opposition, alternative strategies for facilitating change must be followed.

Newsweek:
While both Pahlavi and the MeK claim to seek establishment of a secular and democratic Iran, they often criticize one another. The MeK, spawned as a leftist rebel group in 1965, has a legacy of conducting attacks during the reign of Pahlavi’s father before the Islamic Revolution, which the group initially supported.

Elnet.uk:
The NCRI is part of this rebranding, presenting a more politically palatable front for the MEK’s goal of regime change in Iran. Despite rebranding efforts, the MEK remains unpopular within Iran due to its former support for Saddam Hussein and perceived Marxist, extremist elements.

Eurasian Times:
However, in Albania, the MEK is struggling to hold on to its own members, who have begun to defect. No strategic analyst thinks that the MEK has the capacity or support within Iran to overthrow the Islamic Republic.

Abc News:
The NCRI has notable supporters among traditional Iran hawks in the U.S., with figures including former Vice President Mike Pence, former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, former national security adviser John Bolton and others having spoken at their events in recent years.
The NCRI has called for the establishment of a democratic and secular republic in Iran. The MEK — and by extension the NCRI — were recognized as terrorist organizations by the U.S. until 2012.

The Economic Times:
Apart from Pahlavi’s monarchists, the main opposition faction outside Iran is the People’s Mujahideen Organisation, also known as the MEK or MKO. A revolutionary faction in the 1970s, it lost a power struggle after the shah was toppled.
Many Iranians have not forgiven it for then siding with Iraq during the stalemated war of 1980-88 and rights groups have accused it of abuses at its camps and of cult-like behaviour, both of which it denies.

Jerusalem Post:
While some members of the Iranian diaspora support exiled opposition figures such as Reza Pahlavi or Maryam Rajavi, these individuals lack meaningful support within Iran and are unlikely to serve as viable alternatives to the current regime.
Ali Safavi has no defensible response to the arguments of the journalists about the unpopularity of the MEK among Iranians. He never denies that the MEK pays hefty sums to buy its American supporters. About the ban on marriage in the MEK he refers to an NYTimes article dated to 1996! The only frequent argument used by the MEK propaganda and namely Ali Safavi is that any journalist who criticizes the MEK is an agent of the Iranian government. The journalists of the NY Times are condemned more harshly because they have revealed more steadfast evidence about inside the MEK.

Mazda Parsi

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Although his analysis in his recent article in the Middle East Forum is not without flaws, his view on the nature of the MEK and his criticism on the performance of this treacherous and violent group, is worth to know:

Imagine talking about regime change for decades, hosting posh conferences that cost millions of dollars, paying five- and perhaps even six-figure honoraria to retired politicians, cabinet secretaries, and ministers from across the United States and Western world, all the while claiming that a veiled septuagenarian leader who never won an election and consistently polled with less than 1 percent support was Iran’s future popular leader. Then Israel strikes at Iran to end the Islamic Republic, inflicting the regime’s greatest crisis in forty-six years and… crickets. Pro-forma statements that do little and certainly do not call for meaningful regime change. That describes Iran’s Mujahedin al-Khalq (MEK, MKO).

Perhaps the MEK or its political umbrella, the National Council of Resistance of Iran, is upset. After all, despite their rhetoric of opposition, the MEK cannot erase their history. Their leadership embraced Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini prior to the Islamic Revolution and worked fist-in-glove with him until Khomeini sought to discard them alongside other allies as he consolidated control. The MEK then fled into exile and offered their services to Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, both to strike into Iran and to help Saddam’s Republican Guards suppress Iraqi Kurds. This is why ordinary Iranians despise the group.

The MEK has always been problematic

The MEK has always been problematic. It operates like a cult, its children notoriously isolated and absent from schools where they might mix with other students from outside communities. Its American proxy groups’ tax forms make little sense. This is problematic given how the MEK channels honoraria for American politicians. When not enticing American officials to endorse them, the group indoctrinates its members in anti-Americanism.

Still, it has long insisted that it was Iran’s most popular movement. It used that repeated claim as a means to block or besmirch other opposition groups or co-opt initiatives such as the referendum movement that called for a new referendum to allow Iranians to endorse or denounce Islamic Republic as form of government more than 15 years ago. The group’s leaders and officials seem more obsessed with the son of the late shah than they do with bringing down the Islamic Republic.

MEK more talk that substance

Traditionally, the MEK has claimed they so deeply penetrated the regime that they could expose intelligence no other groups could. Essentially, the MEK said they were the real deal, and other Islamic Republic dissidents and oppositionists were more talk than substance. In reality, there were red flags. A quarter-century ago, for example, the MEK put a supposed defector it identified as Ahmad Behbahani in touch with CBS’ 60 Minutes for an interview, in which Behbahani claimed he oversaw Iranian terrorism and said that Iran, not Muammar Qadhafi’s Libya, was responsible for the downing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. The alleged Behbahani made several other spectacular charges. The problem was that Behbahani was a fraud; physically, he could not have been the real suspect because the man the MEK put forward was several inches too short.

Nor was this the only MEK fraud. MEK representatives often would shop fraudulent documents around Washington; as a Pentagon desk officer, I and my colleagues intercepted several. The MEK goal seemed clear: While they claimed opposition, they hoped Bush administration hardliners who sought regime change in Iran would bite only to be subsequently discredited when the fraud was exposed.

That is not to say that the MEK does not break news. They were the first group to expose publicly the then-covert Natanz enrichment facility in 2002, and have since announced various other sites. Especially now, such announcements appear much more likely a mechanism for foreign intelligence services—most likely Israel’s and/or Saudi Arabia’s—to publicize findings without their own fingerprints.

The MEK will be exposed as frauds

With the regime teetering, the MEK is as well. The group opposed Ayatollahs Khomeini and Khamenei not because they opposed the Islamic Republic, but because the MEK wanted to be in charge of the Islamic Republic. As Iranians make their voice heard, the MEK knows they are toast. They will be exposed as frauds, and those supporting them will rightly have their judgment questioned, much like the many American academics who once embraced the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia as progressives, a phenomenon that scholar Guenter Lewy documented.

As the Islamic Republic collapses, the MEK will fade away as well—for three reasons. First, the regime no longer will need then group as its tool. Second, foreign intelligence agencies have dispensed with shadow boxing and are now at blows.

Once again, the MEK has lost its role. Finally, the Iranian people will speak and put the mutated mixture of Islamism and Marxism to bed, for as Iranians move forward, they will seek democracy.

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