The presence of Ukrainian refugees at rallies organized by the MEK has been a subject of investigation by several international media outlets, including Der Spiegel and The Guardian. Analyzing this phenomenon requires looking at the tactical objectives of the organization and the vulnerabilities of the refugee population.

Tactical Motivations for the MEK

From an analytical perspective, the recruitment of individuals who are not ideologically affiliated with the MEK to attend their events serves several strategic purposes:

Projecting Popularity: The MEK faces a long-standing challenge regarding its domestic support base inside Iran. By busing in participants, they create the visual impression of a large, diverse, and international movement, which is essential for maintaining their political relevance among Western policymakers.

Optics and Legitimacy: Large, crowded rallies provide high-quality photographic and video content for the group’s media wings. This helps project an image of an “Iranian government-in-waiting” that enjoys broad popular support.

Networking: By appearing to lead a multi-national coalition of supporters, the MEK aims to gain traction with European politicians and media who may not be aware of the crowd’s composition.

Why Ukrainian Refugees Participate

The participation of refugees is generally viewed by analysts not as a sign of ideological alignment, but as a byproduct of material necessity and outreach tactics:

Economic Incentives: For refugees living in precarious conditions, the offer of free transportation, food, and occasionally small stipends provides a tangible, albeit temporary, relief.

The “Gig” Economy of Protests: Recruiters often target refugee housing centers, framing these events as “pro-democracy” rallies or simply as an opportunity for a free day trip to a major city like Paris or Berlin. Many attendees reportedly have little to no knowledge of the MEK’s history, ideology, or specific political goals.

Lack of Awareness: Due to language barriers and recent arrival in a new country, many Ukrainian refugees may be unaware of the controversial reputation associated with the MEK and its past history as formerly terrorist designated organization. They may perceive the event as a generic human rights demonstration according to the MEK’s propaganda.

Ethical and Political Implications

The practice has drawn criticism from several angles:

Exploitation of Vulnerability: Human rights observers have noted that using refugees as “rent-a-crowds” leverages their economic instability to further a political agenda they may not even support.

Misinformation: By presenting these crowds as organic supporters, the MEK creates a deceptive narrative for the Western public and political figures, potentially influencing policy decisions based on inflated metrics of support.

Reputational Damage: Investigative reports detailing these practices have further isolated the MEK from mainstream Iranian opposition groups, who often distance themselves from the MEK’s organizational tactics.

This year, the MEK is once again holding an event in Paris on 20 June 2026, branded as the “Paris Free Iran Rally.” The date marks the beginning of the group’s armed struggle against the Iranian government over four decades ago. Due to its unpopularity among Iranian diaspora, the MEK often recruits financially stimulated non-Iranians, including refugees and foreign nationals like Ukrainians, to attend rallies to create the appearance of mass Iranian support. It pays all the expenses for the trip to Paris.

The participation of Ukrainian refugees in MEK rallies is widely interpreted by experts as a logistical maneuver rather than a political movement. It allows the MEK to maintain a facade of mass-scale support while exploiting the immediate material needs of displaced persons. This trend highlights the importance of distinguishing between a group’s curated image of “popular support” and the actual popular base they command. Media  and human rights activists must take steps to inform refugees living in Europe so that the MEK does not succeed in using these people as a tool for propaganda.

Mazda Parsi

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For more than two decades, the United States has engaged in a series of military operations far from its borders. These interventions have generated mixed strategic outcomes, imposed significant fiscal burdens, and contributed to persistent instability in several regions. A recurring feature of this pattern is the elevation of partial, politicized, or externally sourced intelligence to the status of policy driver. If Washington intends to reduce the likelihood of open-ended commitments, it must reform how it evaluates threats, validates information, and calibrates the use of force.

How questionable intelligence becomes policy

In the early 2000s, the Iraq case demonstrated how quickly contestable claims can become conventional wisdom. Exiled opposition figures—most prominently Ahmed Chalabi—advanced a narrative of imminent danger centered on weapons of mass destruction. Those assertions informed high-level debate and public messaging. After the invasion, the Iraq Survey Group concluded there were no active stockpiles of WMD. The central premise that had justified war did not stand when tested. The policy correction arrived only after the commitment was made and costs were sunk.

A similar dynamic can surface when exile organizations steer attention in other theaters. In the case of Iran, the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) publicized details of undeclared nuclear facilities, prompting inspections and diplomacy. The point is not to dismiss every disclosure; rather, it is to note that actors with regime-change incentives can be accurate on a fact while simultaneously advancing escalation. Outsourcing threat assessment to such actors increases the risk that selective truths are translated into strategic overreach.

Strategic, fiscal, and societal costs

Interventions justified on weak or disputed premises tend to produce ambiguous objectives and expanding mission sets. Strategically, they can entangle the United States in state-building tasks for which there is limited local legitimacy and insufficient allied burden-sharing. Ambiguity about end-states invites incremental escalations designed to “buy time,” even as political conditions deteriorate.

The fiscal effects are substantial. Expenditures associated with expeditionary operations do not end when combat ends; they continue through veteran care, equipment recapitalization, and interest on wartime borrowing. Opportunity costs compound the problem. Resources allocated to sustain distant missions are resources unavailable for modernizing infrastructure, strengthening public health, or improving educational outcomes.

There are societal costs that are less visible in budget documents. Repeated deployments impose strain on service members and families. Public confidence erodes when official justifications are later revised or withdrawn. Credibility—often cited as a reason to act—can be damaged by acting on claims that do not withstand scrutiny.

The role of media and oversight

A resilient policy process relies on institutional “speed bumps”: adversarial analysis within the intelligence community, rigorous congressional oversight, and journalistic scrutiny that distinguishes between assertion and evidence. When the policy timetable compresses and dissenting views are relegated to annexes, the probability of error rises.
Several reforms are straightforward. Intelligence products that inform potential uses of force should state confidence levels and key gaps up front. Red-team reviews should test core assumptions and explore disconfirming evidence. Where classified material shapes debate, unclassified summaries should be produced to permit informed public discussion without compromising sources and methods. In parallel, Congress should restore regular order on war powers and insist on clearly defined objectives, metrics, and reporting.

Case evidence: Iraq’s WMD narrative and Iran’s nuclear file

The Iraq WMD narrative moved from allegation to orthodoxy with unusual speed. Post-invasion findings did not validate the pre-war premise, yet the conflict—and its regional effects—could not simply be unwound. The lesson is not that intelligence is unnecessary; it is that confidence must be earned, not assumed.
In Iran’s nuclear file, disclosures regarding facilities at Natanz and Arak catalyzed inspections and negotiations. That sequence shows the value of verifiable facts and formal channels. It also demonstrates the danger of allowing externally driven narratives to leapfrog verification and dictate strategy. Facts may recommend engagement, monitoring, and diplomacy; they do not in themselves mandate coercion or promise favorable political outcomes. Intelligence should inform policy; it should not substitute for it.

A framework for restraint

Restraint is a strategic method, not an abdication. A practical framework would include four elements.

First, raise the evidentiary bar. Claims with the potential to move the United States closer to the use of force should meet heightened standards: multiple independent sources, explicit confidence statements, and adversarial testing. Assertions originating from actors with regime-change agendas should trigger automatic skepticism.

Second, prioritize diplomacy and burden-sharing. Where facts are disputed and escalation pathways are short, verification and dialogue should precede coercive steps. When coercive tools are used, they should be nested within clear political aims, realistic timelines, and allied participation.

Third, legislate limits and accountability. Any authorization for the use of military force should include sunsets, defined objectives, and regular reporting. If missions expand or conditions change materially, mandates should be revisited rather than allowed to drift.

Fourth, price the long term. Decision-makers should see the full lifecycle cost of operations—immediate outlays, long-term obligations, and financing costs—alongside domestic trade-offs. Transparent pricing improves choices and aligns policy with public consent.

Why this matters now

Large-scale occupations have receded, but the risk of miscalculation has not. Limited strikes, proxy engagements, special operations, and cyber activity each carry escalation potential. The information environment is faster and noisier than it was two decades ago, making it easier for motivated actors to inject claims that align with prevailing anxieties. Process discipline—asking what is known, what is assumed, and what the exit looks like—reduces the likelihood of avoidable error. It does not preclude necessary action; it ensures that action serves defined ends.

There is also a credibility dimension. Partners and adversaries alike track whether Washington binds the use of force to evidence and strategy or to momentum and rhetoric. A posture that privileges verification and diplomacy while maintaining capable deterrent power is more likely to produce durable outcomes than one that equates resolve with speed.

Conclusion

Strength is not the number of fronts on which the United States can fight simultaneously. It is the capacity to decide when force is necessary and when it is not. The experience of Iraq’s absent WMD and the externally driven narratives surrounding Iran’s nuclear program argue for a higher threshold before military options are placed on the table. By elevating evidentiary standards, empowering oversight, and privileging diplomacy and burden-sharing, Washington can protect American lives and resources while offering partners a steadier basis for cooperation. Endless wars are not inevitable. They are the foreseeable result of choices about evidence, incentives, and oversight—choices that can be improved.

Jenny Williams – Modern Diplomacy 
Jenny Williams is an independent American journalist and writer focusing on foreign policy, human rights and conflict. She aims to bring clarity to complex security debates and to foreground the domestic consequences of overseas engagement. Contact: jennywilliams9696[at]gmail.com | Twitter: @Jenny9Williams

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Rudy Giuliani attended the recent MEK gathering in Italy and, as usual, the MEK paid the high costs of his business class trip, accommodation, and his speaking fee for a few-minute speech on behalf of the group. He was intoxicated by the interview with MEK media, and after years of scandal, he found himself in the spotlight. That was why in another tweet he boasted that he had been interviewing about Maryam Rajavi all day!

Ghazal Modirian, an Iranian investigative journalist, described Giuliani as “one of the most vociferous and ridiculous advocates of the MEK” and advised her audience not to take him seriously. According to the journalist’s research from published US government sources, estimates show that Rudy Giuliani has received about $1.9 million from the MEK since 2011 for speeches, meetings, and political support.

At a MEK gathering in Italy, Rudy Giuliani made the ridiculous claim: “I want the FBI to investigate Reza Pahlavi’s connection to the IRGC.”

According to Modirian, in real life, Rudy Giuliani is extremely afraid of the FBI because he personally has cases in the security agency that are still under investigation. Modirian summarized the content of Giuliani’s police files, charges, crimes, punishments, and political and social consequences for him in the following statements:

-He has been under intense scrutiny by the FBI in recent years and has several active cases and investigations underway against him.
-He has been named in several federal cases as a criminal accomplice and suspect.
-There are currently nine lawsuits against Giuliani in civil courts seeking large damages.
-He is facing sexual harassment lawsuits, including one from his former assistant (Noel Dunphy).
-He has been convicted of civil contempt several times for continuing to defame after a court order.
-In July 2024, his New York law license was revoked for spreading lies about election fraud and violating professional ethics.
-He was also disbarred from practicing law in Washington, D.C. in September 2024.
-He can no longer legally practice law in the major states of the United States.
-Courts and professional bodies have found him to lack moral integrity and to have committed professional fraud.
-His credibility has been lost even among legal conservatives.
-He has been ostracized from the media and official circles.
-Has been ridiculed for his bizarre behavior and conspiracy theories.
-Recently, he has made headlines again for his racist remarks in interviews and has received harsh criticism.

Giuliani, who once held the title of mayor of the United States, is now considered a loner and an outcast even among Republicans. Giuliani’s precarious situation and his desperate need for money from the Mojahedin justify his pitiful behavior.

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As expected, the leaders of the MEK, as one of the opposition groups, are delighted with these fantasies. The sect’s disappeared leader, Massoud Rajavi, expresses his enthusiasm for Israel’s attacks on his compatriots in a new message every day. But whether the MEK really has a place in this equation is a question that an Indian journalist has addressed in the Eurasia Times.

Prakash Nanda, who seems to have a good understanding of Iranian society and the conditions of the Iranian opposition, first poses the question: “Will the Iranians respond to Netanyahu’s request?” and he himself answers: “Given the history of recent unsuccessful attempts to change the regime in Tehran, it is very difficult to answer this question.”

By enumerating and examining the oppositions existing in these conditions, the author of this article also addresses the situation of the MEK organization and provides a relatively comprehensive analysis of this group:
The People’s Mujahideen, also known as the Mojahedin-e-Khalq (MEK) or People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI), is primarily based in exile. It began in the 1960s as an Islamist-Marxist student militia, which played a decisive role in helping to topple the Shah during the 1979 Iranian revolution.

Anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist, and anti-American, MEK fighters had killed scores of the Shah’s police in often suicidal street battles during the 1970s. The group targeted US-owned hotels, airlines, and oil companies, and was responsible for the deaths of six Americans in Iran.

“Death to America by blood and bonfire on the lips of every Muslim is the cry of the Iranian people,” went one of its most famous songs. “May America be annihilated.”

Such attacks helped pave the way for the return of the exiled Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, but he quickly identified the MEK as a serious threat to his plan to turn Iran into an Islamic republic under the control of the clergy.
The well-armed middle-class guerrillas, although popular among religious students and intellectuals, proved to be no match for Khomeini’s organization and ruthlessness.

Khomeini used the security services, the courts, and the media to choke off the MEK’s political support and then crush it entirely. After it fought back, killing more than 70 senior leaders of the Islamic Republic – including the president and Iran’s chief justice – in audacious bomb attacks, Khomeini ordered a violent crackdown on MEK members and sympathizers. The survivors fled the country.

For almost two decades, under their embittered leader Massoud Rajavi, the MEK staged attacks against civilian and military targets across the border in Iran and helped Saddam suppress his own domestic enemies. But after siding with Saddam, who indiscriminately bombed Iranian cities and routinely used chemical weapons in a war that cost a million lives, the MEK lost nearly all the support it had retained inside Iran.

After the US invasion of Iraq, the MEK launched a lavish lobbying campaign to reverse its designation as a terrorist organization, despite reports implicating the group in assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists in 2012.
In 2009, the UK delisted the MEK as a terror group. The Obama administration removed the group from the US terror list in 2012, and later helped negotiate its relocation to Albania.

However, in Albania, the MEK is struggling to hold on to its own members, who have begun to defect. No strategic analyst thinks that the MEK has the capacity or support within Iran to overthrow the Islamic Republic.

After examining the Pahlavis and the Green Movement as two other options to replace the Islamic Republic, Prakash Nanda concludes that none of the three groups seem to have the power or support to overthrow the government.

For this to happen, the journalist believes, Israel would have to be in a position to win the war against Iran decisively and without any compromise, something that cannot be assured in the absence of American support and endorsement.

He also acknowledges that the Iranian military is still strong enough to push Israel back, as seen in its missile counterattacks on Israeli cities on June 14 that passed through its powerful Iron Domes. In addition, he believes that there is a possibility that the Israeli attacks will unite all Iranians against this government.

If we assume the above analysis is correct and the latter possibility comes to pass, then the MEK is the only group that will not unite with any other Iranian of any ideology. They remain on the Israeli front.

Mazda Parsi

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This article delves deep into the terrorist attack of Mehr 5, 1360, the implications of this act of violence, and the broader political and historical context surrounding it. By analyzing the causes, the nature of the attack, and its aftermath, we will uncover how this tragic event shaped the Iranian political landscape and revealed the true face of the MEK’s terror-driven agenda.

The Mujahideen-e Khalq Organization (MEK) was initially established in the 1960s as a Marxist-Islamist opposition group against the Pahlavi regime, aiming to overthrow the Shah of Iran. During the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the MEK was part of the broader revolutionary movement that played a significant role in the ousting of the Shah. However, despite their initial alignment with the revolutionaries, the group quickly became disillusioned with the direction the new Islamic Republic of Iran was taking under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini

The Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK), also known as the People’s Mujahedin of Iran, is an organization that has been involved in various activities in Iran since its founding in the 1960s. Originally formed as an Islamic and leftist group opposing the Shah’s regime, the MEK has since taken on multiple roles, including that of a dissident group and a designated terrorist organization by some countries, especially in the United States and Iran. In examining the MEK’s activities, it becomes clear that their operations are characterized by a series of political, militant, and terrorist actions aimed at destabilizing the Iranian government.

Initially, the MEK was involved in various protests against the Shah and sought an eclectic ideology that blended Marxist and Islamic principles. After the Islamic Revolution in 1979, the group initially welcomed the political changes but quickly found itself at odds with the new regime led by Ayatollah Khomeini. This shift led to a violent suppression of the MEK, resulting in thousands of their members being arrested, imprisoned, or executed. In response, the MEK adopted a more militant stance and conducted attacks against government officials and security forces.

Throughout the 1980s, the MEK intensified its militant activities, including acts of terrorism within Iran. The group was responsible for numerous assassinations targeting Iranian officials, marking a significant chapter in the narrative of violence associated with dissident movements in the region. The MEK’s strategic decision to resort to violence stemmed from the perception that peaceful protest would not yield any results under a repressive regime. As a result, their operations became increasingly radicalized, culminating in a series of high-profile attacks.

The MEK’s most notorious operation in the 1980s was Operation Eternal Light in 1988, which aimed to overthrow the Iranian government. This operation was disastrous for the MEK, leading to significant casualties and a loss of military capability. Following that operation, the group regrouped and moved its base to Iraq, where it received support from Saddam Hussein’s regime. This relocation marked a turning point in the MEK’s history, as it became a tool of the Iraqi government against Iran during the Iran-Iraq War.

By stationing itself in Iraq, the MEK operated in a state of limbo, engaged in military operations against Iran while simultaneously enduring internal struggles regarding its ideological direction and leadership. The MEK established a quasi-military structure in Iraq, enabling it to launch cross-border attacks into Iran. This military aspect solidified its reputation as a terrorist organization among government officials in Iran, who accused it of receiving foreign backing for its activities.
As the international landscape evolved, the MEK found itself increasingly isolated. Although it had once enjoyed some support from Western nations during the Cold War as a counterforce to the Islamic Republic, post-9/11 geopolitics shifted dramatically against groups that were perceived as terrorist organizations. The MEK’s operatives were involved in assassinations and bombings, reinforcing their designation as a terrorist group by Iran and partly contributing to their complex relationship with nations like the United States and European countries.

The MEK’s most notorious operation in the 1980s was Operation Eternal Light in 1988, which aimed to overthrow the Iranian government. This operation was disastrous for the MEK, leading to significant casualties and a loss of military capability. Following that operation, the group regrouped and moved its base to Iraq, where it received support from Saddam Hussein’s regime. This relocation marked a turning point in the MEK’s history, as it became a tool of the Iraqi government against Iran during the Iran-Iraq War.

The U.S. State Department designated the MEK as a terrorist organization in 1997, a label that significantly impacted its ability to operate internationally. However, the designation did not stop the MEK from engaging in various forms of activism, including lobbying and public relations efforts aimed at rehabilitating its image. The group claimed to pursue a peaceful transition to democracy in Iran while simultaneously continuing its militant agenda. Over the years, various high-profile politicians and former officials have endorsed the MEK, creating a controversial discourse surrounding its place in Iranian opposition politics.

The MEK has also been implicated in numerous human rights violations and was often criticized for its authoritarian internal governance. Reports have highlighted the cult-like nature of its structures, with strict regulations governing members’ lives and loyalty to the organization’s leadership, particularly to its founder, Massoud Rajavi. The group’s insistence on loyalty above all else effectively stifled dissent within its ranks, further breeding a toxic environment that has led to accusations of brainwashing and coercion.

In recent years, the MEK has sought to reestablish itself as a legitimate opposition force against the Iranian regime. It has aimed to attract a younger demographic within Iran by highlighting its historical opposition to the regime and presenting itself as a pro-democracy alternative. The organization has utilized social media and modern communication platforms to disseminate its message, trying to present a more palatable image to both the Iranian people and the international community.

Despite its efforts to rehabilitate its image, the MEK remains controversial. Many in Iran view it with disdain, largely due to its history of collaboration with Saddam Hussein and its designation as a terrorist organization. Furthermore, the group’s actions have often been perceived as serving foreign interests rather than the genuine aspirations of the Iranian population. This perception complicates its position and raises questions about its legitimacy as a resistance movement.

The MEK’s funding and resource acquisition strategies have also raised eyebrows. It has been reported that the group has relied on donations from sympathizers, affluent expatriates, and even some foreign governments. However, its reliance on external support has led to allegations that it operates more as a mercenary force than a dedicated political movement, undermining its claims of being a unifying force for democratic change in Iran.

As the Iranian regime continues to face challenges, including widespread discontent among the populace over economic and social issues, the MEK’s activities are likely to be scrutinized more closely. The group may attempt to exploit any civil unrest as an opportunity to reassert itself. However, its long history of violence and terrorism makes it a contentious figure in any discourse about Iranian political change.

The situation is further complicated by geopolitical factors, including tensions between Iran and the United States, as well as regional challenges. As long as these tensions persist, the MEK may continue to position itself as a viable option for external intervention, but it risks remaining a marginal player due to its controversial legacy and the heavy baggage of its past.

In summary, the narrative surrounding the MEK is complex and multifaceted. Its evolution from a revolutionary movement to a designated terrorist organization illustrates the shifting dynamics of Iranian politics and the unresolved tensions that persist within the country. The MEK’s historical context and its current activities can serve as a lens through which one can understand broader themes of dissent, authoritarianism, and the quest for identity in contemporary Iran.

Ultimately, the question remains whether the MEK can successfully transition from its legacy of violence to a platform for meaningful political change. Developing a strategy rooted in grassroots support and an understanding of the socio-political landscape in Iran may provide the group with a chance to redefine its role. However, as history has shown, transforming a reputation built on decades of violence into one of solidarity and democracy will be a monumental challenge for the organization

By Rayanworld.com

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Zaynab Malakouti Khah is an Iranian researchers at UNESCO Chair for Human Rights, Peace and Democracy of Shahid Beheshti University. She graduated from Iran in 2012 with a First-Class in Law and obtained an LLM in International Human Rights Law at the University of Reading, UK. She has published several articles and a book on human rights, international law, Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Financing.

In September 2018, her article titled “Iran: Sponsoring or Combating Terrorism?” was published by Studies in Conflict and Terrorism journal. In a part of the article under the subtitle “Iran as a victim of terrorist attacks”, the author presents a fairly comprehensive and independent outlook on the MEK. The following is that part proceeded by its references:

Iran as a victim of terrorist attacks
Dissident nationalist terrorism

Following the Islamic Revolution of 1979, various groups opposed Ayatollah Khomeini. The leading opposition group was the Mojahedin-e-Khalq (MEK), with a background in Marxist and Islamist interpretations. The MEK survived the test of time and developed into the most disciplined armed organization opposing the Islamic Republic.23 The MEK was established in 1965 in opposition to the Shah and the United States. It targeted U.S. civilians and military personnel, supporting the U.S. embassy hostage-taking in Tehran.24 Following the 1979 Revolution, although the MEK first endorsed Ayatollah Khomeini, they later attempted to overthrow the government but failed and fled to Paris and then Iraq.25 Members of MEK sought refuge in Camp Ashraf near the Iran–Iraq border and were financially and militarily supported by the regime of Saddam Hussein, the former leader of Iraq. From 1980 to 2003 (when MEK’s weapons were confiscated by the U.S. intervention mission in Iraq),26 they carried out several terrorist attacks in both Iran and on Iranian interests in other countries.27 Selected attacks by the MEK included the bombing of the Islamic Republic Party Headquarters (1981), which led to the death of approximately seventy high-ranking officials; attacks on diplomats (1987 and 1994); an explosion in the Imam Reza Mausoleum (1989); attacks on thirteen Iranian embassies around the world (1992); the Presidential Palace; the Defense Ministry and military bases (2000);and a motor attack on the Supreme Court and other governmental buildings (2001).28

In retaliation, the MEK’s members were executed in prison,29 the total execution toll is difficult to estimate[..]. The MEK had been designated as a terrorist group by the United States,33 United Kingdom,34 and European Union (EU). However, it was removed from their blacklists in 2012, 2008, and 2009, respectively, due to the curtailment of terrorist activities.35 Iran condemned the delisting of the MEK and highlighted the Western double standards on terrorism.36 The Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, condemned the U.S. methods of separating “good” and “bad” terrorists, asserting that this “shows terrorism is bad if terrorists are not America’s servants, but if terrorists become America’s servants, then they are not bad.”37 The supporters of the MEK still believe that the organization is capable of replacing the current regime,38 and it continues to have some powerful Western supporters.39 Regardless of the U.S. and the Western support for the MEK, 40 as a group that carried out terrorist activities, it does not have widespread public backing in Iran. They have killed dozens of civilians, and a Human Rights Watch report indicates violations of human rights inside the organization, ranging from detention of its members who wish to leave the organization to torture. 41

References:
23. Ervand Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,1989), 1.
24. Ibid., 126.
25. Ibid., 216–219.
26. Andrew T. H. Tan, The Politics of Terrorism (London: Routledge, 2006), 187.
27. Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin, 221; Saeed Hakimiha, “siyasat-i Jinayi Iran darQibal-i Mubarizih ba Tirurism,” Majalih-i siyasat-i Difayi 19, no. 76 (2011): 77; Anthony H. Cordesman and Adam G. Seitz, Iranian Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Birth of a Regional Nuclear Arms Race? (Washington, DC: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2009), 326–327.
28. Jeremiah Goulka et al., eds., The Mujahedin-e-Khalq in Iraq: A Policy Conundrum (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009), 80–89.
29 Amnesty International Organisation, “Iran: Violation of Human Rights 1987–1990.” https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/200000/mde130211990e (accessed 12 September 217).
30 Reza Afshari, Human Rights in Iran: The Abuse of Cultural Relativism (Philadelphia: University Pennsylvania Press, 2001), 114.
31 Ibid., 48–57.
32 Amnesty International Organisation, “Iran: Violation of Human Rights 1987–1990.”
33 People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran v. Department of State and Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State, 01-1465; 01-1476; United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 9 May 2003; National Council of Resistance of Iran v. Department of State and Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State, No. 01-1480; United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 9 July 2004.
34 Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) order 2—1 SI 2001/1261, and Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Lord Alton of Liverpool and Others [2008] EWCA Civ 443, United Kingdom: Court of Appeal (England and Wales), 7 May 2008.
35 In 2012, the MEK was delisted from the U.S. terrorist list due to the confirmed absence of terrorist activities by the group. U.S. Department of State, “Delisting of the Mujahedin-e Khalq,” Department of State, 28 September 2012. www.state.gov/j/ct/ris/other/des/266607.htm (accessed 9 July 2017). Britain’s Court of Appeal ordered the government to revoke the terrorist designation, because from 2001 no military activity had been carried out by the MEK. (Secretary of State for the Home Department v Lord Alton of Liverpool [2008] EWCA Civ 443). There followed the Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) Order 2008, SI 2008\ 1645. In 2009, the EU removed the MEK from the terror list because of the lack of two conditions for being a terrorist group, including “serious and reliable evidence or clue” (Article 1(4) of the Common Position 2001/931/CFSP), and “committing, or attempting to commit, practicing in or facilitating the commission of any act of terrorism” (Article 2(3) of the Regulation 2580/2001).
36 “Iran Condemns US for Double Standards Over MEK Terror De-Listing,” The Guardian, 29 September 2012. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/29/iran-condemns-us-mek-terror-delisting (accessed 12 September 2017).
37 Gawdat Bahgat, “United States-Iranian Relations: The Terrorism Challenge,” Parameters 38, no. 4 (2008): 102.
38 Keith Crane, Rollie Lal, and Jeffrey Martini, Iran’s Political Demographic and Economic Vulnerabilities (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008), 28.
39 See: R (Lord Carlile) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] UKSC 60.
40 People Mojahedin Organisation of Iran, “Grand Gathering of the Iranian Opposition in Paris,” 30 June 2018, http://english.mojahedin.org/i/grand-gathering-the-iranian-opposition-paris-2018 (accessed 1 July 2018).
41. Human Rights Watch, “No Exit: Human Rights Abuses Inside the Mojahedin-e Khalq Camps,” Human Right Watch, 2005. https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/mena/iran0505/iran0505.pdf (accessed 13 July 2017); and “U.S. Terrorism Report: MEK and Jundallah,” Iran Primer, 23 August 2011. http://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2011/aug/23/us-terrorism-report-mek-and-jundallah (accessed 11 August 2017)

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The ambitious project, by all accounts and based on available evidence, has failed disastrously.

Many political pundits in the West were taken by surprise after the Albanian police announced a search operation at the Ashraf-3 camp late last month, which eventually ended the clandestine nine-year relationship between the Albanian government and Mujahedin-e-Khalq Organization (MKO).

All these years, Albanian authorities sought to justify the presence of the MKO camp in Tirana, fulfilled all their demands, rejected Iranian criticism, and even persecuted Iranian defectors from the camp.

Albanian authorities have raided a camp for members of the exiled Iranian opposition group Mujahedeen-e-Khalq to seize 150 computer devices allegedly linked to prohibited political activities

On June 20, the situation changed dramatically. Dozens of Albanian police officers arrived at the MKO camp on the order of the country’s judiciary, confiscated 150 computers and sealed 17 buildings while prohibiting future illegal political activities of the notorious terror cult.

Residents of the terror camp responded violently, trying to block the passage of police vehicles and physically attacking the policemen. At least 15 officers and 100 residents were injured in ensuing clashes, and one notorious MKO commander was killed under mysterious circumstances.

More than a week later, Albanian police entered the Ashraf-3 again and security forces were deployed at the camp’s entrance, controlling all vehicles entering and leaving the site.

After the police operations, Albania’s Prime Minister Edi Rama said the group must leave the country if it wants to use Albanian soil as a platform for its illegal political operations against Iran, adding that his country has no intention of being at war with the Islamic Republic.

Iranian officials welcomed the operations against the terror cult, with foreign ministry spokesman Nasser Kan’ani insisting that the MKO will always remain a threat to the security of its host countries and expressing hope that Albania would make up for its mistake of hosting the group.

Iran’s intelligence ministry described the anti-MKO operations in Albania as a step forward in bilateral relations between the two countries, adding that it is seriously pursuing terrorists beyond Iran’s borders, following a string of successful operations that led to the arrest of MKO-affiliated terrorists.

The statement also noted that the intelligence ministry has repeatedly warned Albanian and European security services about the MKO’s terrorist activities, particularly from its Ashraf-3 base in Tirana.

World’s largest troll factory

The notorious MKO terrorist camp was established in 2013 near Manze, a town some 30 km northwest of Albania’s capital Tirana, at the request of the US government.

Before moving to Albania, thousands of MKO members stayed in two camps in Iraq for decades, starting in the 1980s when they were welcomed by then-Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein.

The two allies fought together in the imposed eight-year war on Iran and genocidal campaigns against Iraqi minorities. In the war, as well as during the Islamic Revolution, the MKO used terrorism as a tool against the Iranian nation and was responsible for the death of at least 17,000 Iranians.

Although the post-2003 Iraqi government designated the MKO as a terrorist group, its camps enjoyed US military protection during the occupation of the Arab country, since Washington saw MKO terrorists as an asset for various proxy anti-Iranian activities.

Thousands of indoctrinated MKO members may sound like a valuable asset against Iran, but MKO watchers argue that they are all veterans, mostly born in the 1950s, and practically unfit for military and intelligence field operations in today’s time.

On the other hand, knowledge of the Persian language, indoctrination and lifelong commitment to the cult makes them ideal tools for psychological warfare in cyberspace.

Camp Ashraf-3 was installed in 2013 for such activities, according to those who have followed the group.

With an infrastructure twice the size of the US Pentagon and an estimated 1,000 to 3,000 employees, Ashraf-3 is without a doubt the largest troll factory ever. In other words, a troll mega-factory.

As evidenced by defectors’ statements and previous media investigations, the main function of this secret camp is to harm Iran’s reputation in the eyes of the international audience, portraying it as an unstable or even failed state, with huge disaffected masses.

The Die Zeit investigation revealed that at least 40 children and young people, who had come to Germany
Influencing public opinion is carried out primarily on Twitter, Facebook, Instagram and other widely used social networks, on popular newspaper comment sections, and elsewhere.

The cult also operates several media outlets, either openly pro-MKO or disguised as human rights activism, which distribute misinformation and distorted interpretations of various daily events in Iran.

Close dalliance with anti-Iranian propaganda outlets such as Iran International or other Persian-language media is well-documented, with both sides frequently using each other as a source for fake news.

Also, non-media activities are focused mostly on the online recruitment of operatives inside Iran who would assist them in field terrorist activities, in exchange for promised rich monetary rewards and subsequent transfer to Western countries.

Social media activities

MKO’s propaganda activities go far beyond politics, with thousands of trolls on duty round-the-clock, closely following popular Iran-related keywords and plaguing all political and apolitical posts.

One notable case that illustrates their activities is the attack on Raffaele Mauriello, an Italian professor living in Iran, only because he posted a series of nice-looking photos from Tehran cafes on Twitter to show the interesting lives of his compatriots in Iran.

Within only a few minutes, a gang of aggressive trolls appeared, obviously attracted by the keyword “Tehran,” heaping attacks, insults, threats and accusations that he is a government mercenary.

Their goal was to show the global audience that nothing related to Iran, from politics and religion to ordinary life and public space, can be clean, beautiful or normal, nor any way different from the negative images forced by the Western mass media.

Regardless of all the sophistication of the propaganda methods and the denial of using them in the MKO official statements, their campaign did not pass without problems and multiple exposures.

MKO defectors from Ashraf-3 revealed in 2019 that Heshmat Alavi, a self-proclaimed human rights activist who has given interviews to several popular Western outlets and is active on Twitter with a blue tick, is actually a non-existent person whose Twitter account is maintained by MKO members.

Malicious activities have also been confirmed by social networks themselves, such as Facebook, which shut down hundreds of fake accounts in 2021 and confirmed that it was a troll factory from the same location in Albania. In other words, from camp Ashraf-3.

In October 2021, the German weekly Die Zeit published an investigative report on the MKO.

Wikipedia activities

Failures are also recorded outside social media networks, e.g. on popular websites like Wikipedia, where technical staff in June blocked multiple accounts (nicknamed Fad Ariff, Iraniangal777, etc.) due to years of coordinated and sophisticated abuse, as per an investigation carried out by the Press TV website.

Although the terrorist cult was not mentioned by name in the technical analysis, in the editing history of those accounts it is clearly evident that their sole purpose was to whitewash the MKO terror cult’s crimes, as well as to inflame topics related to the recent foreign-backed riots in Iran.

This was done by a swarm of reverts and harassment of other editors, by removing Iranian and scholarly sources, and by forcing anti-Iran media and MKO-paid Western politicians’ statements for references.

The openly available page statistics of the main article about the MKO terror cult testify that the three problematic accounts are among the top ten most active in the page’s editorial history.

It also reveals that the article has been opened over a quarter of a million times, which makes it probably the most visited online info page on the subject.

Thematic focus, technical evidence, familiarity with the Persian language and editorial habits such as increased activity in the mornings in Central European Time (a pattern already exposed by Facebook), strongly suggest that it is again the MKO troll factory.

MKO’s Paris rally

At the beginning of July, when mass protests against the Emmanuel Macron government were raging in France, the annual MKO rally was held in Paris, another manifestation of their manipulative activities.

This event included hall speeches by the MKO leadership, anti-Iranian politicians from the Neocon-Zionist milieu, paid speakers from various countries, as well as a final group photographed in front of a crowd of MKO flag-waving people on the street.

The purpose of the event was to create the false illusion of massive international and popular support for the MKO terror cult, although most of the speakers were actually paid former politicians without any current roles, while the audience also consisted mainly of rent-a-crowd non-Iranians.

The official audience scenes were filmed in a truly totalitarian fashion, with a handful of real MKO members seated in the front rows and on the two sides, and the non-Iranian majority seated in the middle, thus creating a false impression of “all-Iranian” support for the rally.

Iran condemns France for hosting a meeting of the Mujahedin-e-Khalq Organization (MKO) terror group.
The rally was useful in reminding real Iranians worldwide of how enduring the Neocon-Zionist hatred is, how cheap European politicians are, and that the moral values of both groups of people are at the level of an ordinary terrorist, according to MKO watchers.

Among the speakers were notorious American warmongers John Bolton, Mike Pence, Mike Pompeo and Joseph Lieberman, former Canadian ministers John Baird and Stephen Harper, former British PM Elizabeth Truss, and former French foreign minister Bernard Kouchner, among others.

Some new faces from countries that did not participate before were also seen at the meeting, namely Kira Rudyk and Alyona Shkrum from the Parliament of Ukraine, as well as Nagif Hamzayev and Razi Nurullayev from the Parliament of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

The presence of two Azerbaijani lawmakers sends a message that representatives of the highest political bodies in Baku are ready to openly participate in pro-terrorist activities against neighboring Iran.

At the same time, one key detail missing in the media coverage is that this year there was no one from the Arab states of the Persian Gulf and that this event was completely ignored in their media.

This year’s rally in the French capital, therefore, differed from the previous ones, when individuals from Arab countries would engage in anti-Iran rhetoric, and their media would report about it.

Neighboring Arab governments have never officially endorsed the MKO, but there are reports that radical wealthy figures were involved in the financing of the anti-Iran terror group.

This year, amid the regional diplomacy drive, those investors seem to have changed the course.

Already dead, but unburied

The raid on the Ashraf-3 camp in Tirana caused an irreversible mutual distrust between the MKO and the Albanian authorities, with Tirana forcibly restricting their activities and publicly announcing it to the whole world, including the group’s Western sponsors.

Albania knows the difference between simple trolling and hacking attacks and is aware that using its internet infrastructure for cyber attacks is tantamount to using its soil for an unprovoked military attack.

Top Iranian general says the fate of the MKO terrorist group should serve as a lesson to those enjoying the backing of the Iran’s enemies.
Allowing a cyber attack to be carried out implies embarking on an adventure against a country that is among the top five cyber powers, and such potential conflict is something that its vulnerable tech infrastructure and modest economic capabilities are ill-equipped to handle.

By acknowledging the MKO terror cult’s dangerous plans and exposing its violent resistance to the Albanian police, Tirana also indirectly confirmed Iran’s long-standing warnings that the terrorist cult poses a threat to their national security as well.

By hosting the MKO camp on its soil, Albania expected US political and financial benefits, along with Iranian verbal condemnations, but apparently is not willing to suffer losses for such a concession.

The hysterical reaction to the police operation points to the state of despair in the camp. The previous feeling of invincibility, with unlimited US protection and opulent funding, has been shattered to pieces.

The former sponsors of the cult, evident from the absence of representatives of the Arab states of the Persian Gulf at the Paris rally, no longer see optimism and are turning their backs on the failed project.

The construction and maintenance of the town-like camp Ashraf 3, with 34 hectares of infrastructure, expensive technology and thousands of residents, was a very expensive project with poor results.

Although the largest, it is also the most unsuccessful troll factory ever, with zero success in desired political changes. Terrorist recruitment in Iran has also had poor results.

The average age in the camp of around 70 years does not inspire optimism for the future either, since there is no possibility of replacing already expiring members with new ones.

While all other worldwide troll factories resemble typical office jobs, Ashraf-3 is a gulag-like place that requires self-isolation from family and the entire outside world, as well as a lifelong commitment.

As revealed by those who lived and survived the cult, there are no employment contracts, bank accounts, savings, vacations, advancements, or quits, so no interested new employees either.

Based on witness testimonies and a recent turn of events, the Ashraf-3 megaproject will soon become a mega-cemetery and a mega-monument to failed anti-Iranian policies of the West.

By Ivan Kesic

The post Dead but not buried: How MKO terror cult lost ground, slipped into abyss appeared first on Nejat Society.

In May 2022, Mike Pompeo, who had until just the year before been US secretary of state, addressed a meeting of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), the umbrella organisation largely seen as a front for the Iranian opposition group People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (MEK).

Speaking in front of thousands of MEK supporters, the man who had arguably been the world’s most powerful diplomat hailed the group’s leader Maryam Rajavi as “president-elect” of Iran.
“Under her leadership, the National Council of Resistance of Iran is laying the groundwork for a free, sovereign and democratic republic in Iran,” Pompeo said. “We must continue to support the Iranian people as they fight for a freer and more democratic Iran in any way we can.”
Just over a year later, the group’s fortunes appear to have nosedived.

On Tuesday morning, Albanian counter-terrorism police raided the MEK’s base, which has been in the west of the Balkan country since it moved out of Iraq in 2003.

According to the group, an MEK member named Ali Mostashari was killed as police moved to seize devices and equipment belonging to the group.

Albanian police denied any responsibility for the death and said they were enforcing a court order that came after the country’s interior ministry accused the MEK of refusing to abide by a 2014 agreement allowing them to remain in the country “for humanitarian purposes alone”.

Scenes from the savage attack against #Ashraf3 by Albanian security forces on June 20.#AshrafAttackpic.twitter.com/RVwI1OGjUf
— People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK) (@Mojahedineng) June 21, 2023

“Unfortunately, this group has not adhered to these commitments, breaching the agreement,” said the ministry in a statement, saying the MEK had engaged in “political” activity while in Albania.
Although police did not elaborate on the reasons for the raid, local media reported that the group was suspected of orchestrating cyberattacks against foreign institutions. They also said one man had died of a suspected cardiac arrest during the raid.

The raid, which the NCRI said came at the “behest” of the Iranian government, comes just days after a planned rally by the group was banned for the first time in Paris as a result of what French police said was a likelihood to “generate disturbances to public order” as well as the risk of terror attacks.

‘State-within-a-state’

The MEK’s fortunes have fluctuated since its founding in 1965. Originally espousing an unorthodox mix of Islamism and Marxism, following the 1979 Islamic Revolution – which the group supported – it eventually became a sworn enemy of the Islamic Republic.

During the 1980s, it conducted a series of deadly bombing campaigns aimed at destabilising the nascent state and threw its weight behind Saddam Hussein in the Iran-Iraq war. In retaliation, the Islamic Republic executed thousands of the opposition group’s members.

Between 1997 and 2012, the MEK was classified as a terrorist organisation by the US State Department, but its help in providing evidence of Iran’s nuclear ambitions and its ability to mobilise large numbers of heavily disciplined supporters allowed the group to become arguably the most visible opposition organisation in the diaspora.

As much as opponents of the Islamic Republic have lauded the group, its uncompromising stance – combined with accusations of brainwashing and cult-like behaviour among members – has made the MEK an unreliable ally, something not helped by the general consensus that the group has little to no support inside Iran.

It was no surprise therefore that its activities – which include massive online troll farms and harassment campaigns against politicians and campaigners seen as not being sufficiently against the Islamic Republic – might eventually provoke a backlash.

“The MEK have always been a state within a state for the countries that harbour them, and even if they function as a spy network of sorts for the United States, I think at a certain point the amount of clandestine wheeling and dealing that they do from this secretive compound has become more work to deal with than it is worth, especially when it’s Albania that has had to be the proxy to give them safe harbour all these years,” Seamus Malekafzali, an Iranian-American freelance journalist who writes on Middle East issues, told MEE.

Following the raid, the US State Department issued a statement in which it said it backed the Albanian police’s actions and said that it “doesn’t see MEK as a viable democratic opposition movement that is representative of Iranian people”, adding that it continued to have “serious concerns about MEK as an organisation, including allegations of abuse committed against its own members”.

Although relations between the US and MEK have never been overt, previous American administrations have rarely been so frank in their assessment of the group.

It is also unlikely, said Malekafzali, to be a coincidence that the MEK’s ailing fortunes have come in the wake of a thawing of ties between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which for many years had been accused of providing support to the group.
“My intuition is that the Saudi-Iran rapprochement is what really sealed the deal here,” he said.

“The signal that was given off after the failure of the Mahsa Amini protests and now this huge diplomatic breakthrough is that the Islamic Republic will be around for a while yet.”

Middle East Eye contacted the US State Department for comment, but had received no response at time of publication.
MEE also contacted the MEK and NCRI for comment, but also received no response.

By Alex MacDonald – middleeasteye.net

The post Iranian opposition group; MEK has few friends following Albanian police raid appeared first on Nejat Society.

As a contributor to the Washington Examiner’s Beltway Confidential blog and a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, Michael Rubin has previously authored several articles on the MEK, its violent history and its well-funded lobbying campaign among the US’s corrupt politicians. He starts his article suggesting, “The Mujahedin-e-Khalq Organization (MKO) is a barometer of Washington corruption.”

Rubin gives a brief of the MEK’s background:
“While the group describes itself as dedicated to freedom in Iran, it is anything but. Its roots lie in a combination of Islamism and Marxism. In the run-up to the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the group both allied with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and conducted terrorism against Americans and American companies.
“[Ayatollah]Khomeini back-stabbed his MKO allies. In an episode their spokesman buries and the MKO purges from their website, the group allied itself with Saddam Hussein, killing not only regime officials but also Kurdish dissidents and ordinary Iranians.”

Iranians march for freedom and democracy, not for a cult whose leader still veils and who runs the organization as an autocracy

According to Rubin, the MEK has not changed and today it has nothing to do with the Iranians’ aspirations for freedom and democracy:
“Today, they are not much better: The ongoing Iranian revolution shows the emptiness of previous MKO claims. Iranians march for freedom and democracy, not for a cult whose leader still veils and who runs the organization as an autocracy.”
Criticizing the American politicians who receive MEK’s hefty amounts of dollars, he warns them about the MEK’s unpopularity among the Iranian public opinion:
“Some American politicians may feel they do no harm by taking MKO cash in exchange for peppering a short gala speech with MKO talking points, but they are wrong. Endorsing the MKO is a gift to the Islamic Republic. It plays into the ayatollahs’ propaganda that the West hates Iranians rather than respects them. The MKO, of course, rejects such reality. They embrace the big lie. MKO spokesmen claim popularity and grass roots support, and castigate anyone who criticizes them as part of some broad pro-Islamic Republic conspiracy, no matter how ridiculous.”

MKO Terrorist Group Hires Top US Lobbying Firm BGR

Regarding the MEK’s lavish propaganda campaigns in the West, Rubin calls for investigations on the group’s financial resources. “While their galas are glitzy and seek to project an aura of popularity, their finances are opaque,” he writes.

He continues:
“If the MKO truly was anything more than a political Ponzi scheme, they would open their books to audit. They would explain the murky origins of the money they channel through shell organizations to gain the endorsement of American and European politicians. They would explain how Maryam Rajavi lives a life of luxury, as apparently do the few prominent spokesmen whom the group allows to speak to outsiders.

Every non-profit in the U.S. must file tax returns and explain their income and spending. The MKO and its subsidiaries may not be non-profits, nor is its headquarters in the U.S., but there is no reason the group cannot voluntarily provide the minimum information expected and provided by thousands of American nonprofits.
At the very least, Alireza Jafarzadeh, who often acts as the group’s mouthpiece in the U.S., might release his tax returns just as American politicians do. It would be telling if he lives in luxury while many MKO members live in group homes and apparently donate the vast majority of their earnings to the group.
The reality, of course, is that the MKO will make every excuse not to open their books. They will bluster, but they will never hire a neutral auditor to confirm the legitimacy of their organization. To do so would be to expose the image they seek to project as an illusion carefully crafted for greedy or naïve outsiders.”

He asks the US American and European politicians to “steer clear of the MKO, and redirect any money offered by the group to the protesters actually fighting for freedom in Iran rather than simply seeking to profit from it.”

The post Michael Rubin: MEK is anything but dedicated to freedom appeared first on Nejat Society.

The answer short answer is: “Yes, they are” but the explanation is crucial because it will clarify many other facts on the group through its history.

Traitor to its own country

The MEK’s leader, Massoud Rajavi took Saddam Hussein’s side during the Iran-Iraq war, a war the Iranian did not initiate and which ended up killing millions of their brothers and sisters in the most horrific way. Rajavi thought Saddam would win and opportunistically presented his cult-like group as the opposition in the hope that once defeated, he could play a role in the new, enslaved, Iran.

After the end of the war, the MEK leaders betrayed Iran again and again. They launched the deadly “Forough Javidan” operation against their own countrymen in which a large number of both sides were killed.
Since then and during the nuclear deal they have always been in line with sanctions against Iran. The Rajavis and their mates are absolutely traitors to their people and country. ALL Iranians including nationalists, religious, educated, uneducated, men, women, EVERYBODY detests them.

Maryam Rajavi tries to represent a misleading flag for progress to a few young inexperienced Iranians who do not know that she is on the payroll of the CIA and Saudi Arabia. However, the majority of the Iranian public realize that the MEK are the worst traitors that Iran has ever seen in its history.
Hell is too nice of a place for Maryam and Massoud Rajavi and what they did to the Iranians is unforgivable. Massoud Rajavi and his cult of personality, the MEK, have committed many crimes against Iran. Examples include:

Massacring Iranian civilians during the 1970s and 1980s
Betraying Iran and fighting for Iraq, and participating in cross border operations against Iran, as Saddam’s private army, during the Iran-Iraq War.
Sending their agents to assassinate Iranian nuclear scientists under the order of Israel’s Mossad
Making speeches against Iran in front of American and international leaders; encouraging them to pressure the Iranian nation by imposing sanctions
Holding PR media events with well-paid Western warmongers who lead aggressive policies against Iran, such as John Bolton, Mike Pompeo and Mike Pence
Organizing troll farms on Twitter and other social media, with MEK bots posing as ordinary Iranian civilians, and tweeting hashtags demanding for increased economic sanctions and military invasion on Iran, and worse, claiming that most Iranians support and appreciate sanctions

Traitor to its own members

In brief, the MEK is undoubtedly a traitor to Iran. However, it is a traitor to its own members too. Reports on human rights abuses currently committed in the MEK’s headquarters in Tirana, Albania, indicate that the rank and file of the group are today the main victims of treason. The group authorities even betrayed their own members who dedicated their entire life to the group’s cause. Members of the MEK are deprived from the most basic human rights.
Today, the MEK is extremely unpopular among Iranians. It is hated by both pro-Iranian govt people and anti-Iranian govt people. Basically, everyone in Iran hates them. The Iranians still haven’t forgotten about it and probably never will. Thus, the group is not regarded as threat to the Iranian community but it is a substantial threat to its own members. The international community and the Albanian government should be aware of the violation of human rights taken place against the MEK members –better said hostages. The human rights bodies should take necessary actions to stop Massoud and Maryam Rajavi’s betrayal against their own members.

Mazda Parsi

The post A critical question on the MEK: Is it a traitor? appeared first on Nejat Society.