{"id":9958,"date":"2019-06-27T10:43:37","date_gmt":"2019-06-27T06:13:37","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.nejatngo.org\/en\/?p=9958"},"modified":"2021-01-21T19:27:49","modified_gmt":"2021-01-21T15:57:49","slug":"reason-behind-the-international-community-lack-of-trust-on-trump","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.nejatngo.org\/en\/posts\/9958","title":{"rendered":"Reason behind the international community lack of trust on Trump"},"content":{"rendered":"

Crisis of Trust\u200a\u2014\u200aTrump Tries to Lead on Iran, But Few Follow
\nThe president cannot form an international coalition, weakening America\u2019s position<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Last week, two commercial tankers were attacked in the Gulf of Oman, near the Strait of Hormuz, a narrow waterway through which about 20% of the world\u2019s oil passes. United States officials, including President Trump and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, quickly blamed Iran. When pressed for evidence, the U.S. released a video of Iranians on a small boat removing what appears to be an unexploded limpet mine from one of the tankers.
\nMajor U.S. allies, such as Germany and Japan, were skeptical and said so in public. Yutaka Katada, the Japanese owner of one of the tankers, said the ship was attacked by a flying object, not a mine. U.K. Foreign Minister Jeremy Hunt said his country is \u201calmost certain\u201d Iran was behind the attacks, but instead of condemning the Iranians or calling for freedom of the seas, he urged \u201call sides to de-escalate.\u201d The European Union offered a similar message.
\nEurope and Japan probably suspect Iran too, even if they doubt Trump and Pompeo\u2019s statements. Their publicly-expressed skepticism and calls for restraint from all sides sends a signal. They do not want to join Trump\u2019s \u201cmaximum pressure\u201d campaign, they do not want conflict, and if the situation escalates to war, America will be alone.
\nThat\u2019s Trump\u2019s fault.<\/p>\n

Reasonable Doubt<\/strong>
\nDonald Trump is not the only reason one might question an American accusation. An accidental explosion on the USS Maine, blamed on Spain, helped lead to the Spanish-American War. False claims about a North Vietnamese attack in the Gulf of Tonkin led to escalation in Vietnam. More recently, the United States justified invading Iraq with inaccurate accusations about nuclear and biological weapons.
\nBut none of this prevented George W. Bush or Barack Obama from leading a global coalition to pressure Iran. Escalating sanctions, authorized by Security Counsel resolutions, had support from the U.K., E.U., Russia, China, Japan, India, and others. That effort culminated in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which traded sanctions relief for most of Iran\u2019s enriched uranium\u200a\u2014\u200ai.e. bomb fuel\u200a\u2014\u200aand their capacity to create more, moving the country further away from a nuclear weapon.
\nIn May 2018, Trump withdrew from the JCPOA, even though the International Atomic Energy Agency certified that Iran was upholding its end of the bargain\u200a\u2014\u200aan assessment shared by U.S. and allied intelligence. The U.S. imposed sanctions, going against the wishes of every other party to the deal, including NATO allies U.K., France, and Germany.
\nAs a result, everyone outside of the United States blames Trump for the current Iran situation (except for Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Israel, Iran\u2019s regional rivals). But the president\u2019s inability to build an international anti-Iran coalition stems from more than just disagreement over the JCPOA.<\/p>\n

It\u2019s About Trust<\/strong>
\nFreedom of the seas is an international right. Threats to it merit an international response. But the country that usually leads such an effort is the United States, and the U.S. is suffering a crisis of trust.
\nFew trust that the Trump administration will be honest with them, consider their interests, or move the situation in a productive direction, so they don\u2019t want to line up behind America now. While the Iraq war plays a role, a lot is specific to this presidency.
\nIn his first trip abroad, Trump gave a speech in Saudi Arabia, delighting his hosts by inaccurately blaming Iran for most terrorism. He publicly backed the Saudi-led diplomatic isolation of Qatar\u200a\u2014\u200anow in its third year\u200a\u2014\u200aeven though Qatar hosts America\u2019s largest Middle East airbase. He repeatedly lied about the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi to cover for Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS). His son-in-law\/adviser Jared Kushner took an unannounced trip to Riyadh in October 2017, reportedly giving MBS intelligence on influential Saudis the Crown Prince later arrested in a power grab.
\nThis is different than previous presidents, and makes American allies less confident the United States will do the right thing when it comes to Saudi Arabia\u2019s main rival.
\nIn Syria, Trump oversaw the successful conclusion of the campaign to retake territory from ISIS, and then in December 2018 issued a surprise order to withdraw. Quickly leaving would abandon the Syrian Democratic Forces, America\u2019s local partners, and risk increasing instability. Trump\u2019s order prompted resignations from Secretary of Defense James Mattis and special envoy to the anti-ISIS coalition Brett McGurk, who were arguably the administration\u2019s two most credible officials on Middle East issues. Later, the president partially reversed course, agreeing to leave half the force in Syria.<\/p>\n

The officials currently at the forefront of Iran policy\u200a\u2014\u200aSecretary Pompeo and National Security Advisor John Bolton\u200a\u2014\u200ahave advocated regime change for years. Bolton has openly backed the MEK, an Iranian dissident group, which the U.S. designated a foreign terrorist organization from 1997\u20132012<\/strong>. The MEK recently got caught running a fake Iranian activist persona online, who got articles published in Forbes, the Hill, the Daily Caller, the Federalist and other U.S. outlets.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

On May 31, a suicide bomber attacked a U.S. convoy in Kabul, Afghanistan and the Taliban took responsibility. But two weeks later, Pompeo called it one \u201cin a series of attacks instigated by the Islamic Republic of Iran and its surrogates against American and allied interests.\u201d The Secretary has not presented any evidence, and almost no one shares his assessment.
\nThis doesn\u2019t mean Pompeo\u2019s accusation that Iran was behind the tanker attacks is false. Iran is one of the few actors with access, and may have wanted to signal that it can disrupt shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. But that\u2019s not the only possibility, and Pompeo\u2019s boy-who-cried-Iran routine makes him a poor messenger.<\/p>\n

The Uncertainty Isn\u2019t Helping<\/strong>
\nCompounding the problem of the administration\u2019s credibility, it\u2019s not clear what the U.S. wants.
\nIs America after regime change, hoping the sanctions will collapse the government or spark a revolution? Is pressure supposed to antagonize Iran into an action that justifies a military response? Or is it designed to bring Iran to the negotiating table, ideally with new concessions?
\nAnd with the tanker attacks, is the U.S. aiming for freedom of the seas? In that case, a smart approach would involve coordinated international condemnation, a Security Counsel resolution, and perhaps an offer to provide military escorts for merchant vessels near the Strait of Hormuz. But if the U.S. aims to frighten Iran into concessions, or is looking for an excuse to bomb, there\u2019s value in ratcheting up tensions.
\nRepublican Senator Tom Cotton of the Armed Services Committee called for \u201ca retaliatory military strike against the Islamic Republic of Iran.\u201d New York Times columnist Bret Stephens said the U.S. should threaten to sink Iran\u2019s navy. Both advocate regime change, but argue these threats would deter Iran from further attacks on shipping.<\/p>\n

Where the Trump administration falls is less certain<\/strong>.
\nIn May 2018, Pompeo issued twelve demands, including ending support for Hezbollah, withdrawing from Syria, and leaving Iraq alone. Essentially, the secretary told Iran to abandon its foreign policy interests\u200a\u2014\u200aa degree of capitulation to which no country would agree, except after losing a major war. This week Pompeo said the U.S. doesn\u2019t want war, but considering his pre-administration calls for regime change and his absolutist demands, he probably wouldn\u2019t mind it.
\nActing Secretary of Defense Pat Shanahan also said the U.S. doesn\u2019t want war with Iran, but he just resigned over accusations that he punched his wife, leaving civilian military leadership in flux.
\nMixed messages combined with poor credibility undermines strategies of deterrence and coercion. If the Iranians don\u2019t know where the U.S. draws the line, and what will happen if they cross it, then they\u2019re less likely to be deterred. If Iran doesn\u2019t know what non-absolutist concessions the U.S. would accept, then it\u2019s less likely to be open to negotiations.<\/p>\n

What About the President?<\/strong>
\nTrump seems like he might want a deal. In July 2018, the president publicly floated the idea of meeting without preconditions. This month, Trump asked Shinzo Abe to convey an openness to negotiations when the Japanese prime minister traveled to Tehran.
\nAfter the tanker attacks, the president struck a different tone from his senior staffers. \u201cSo far, it\u2019s been very minor,\u201d Trump said in an interview with Time, downplaying the possibility of a military response, but \u201cI would certainly go [to war] over nuclear weapons.\u201d This sounds like something out of a gangster movie: how about I let the little thing slide and then you and I have a talk about the big thing?
\nAnd it suggests an under-appreciated possibility: Trump might be following the same strategy he used with North Korea. In that case, we\u2019re currently in the \u201cfire and fury\u201d stage, with sanctions and threats. Trump might be trying to get to the Singapore summit stage, where he gets a photo op and something he can call a deal to tout back home.
\nSome theorize that Trump would like a war to distract from domestic problems or create a rally-around-the-flag effect to help his re-election. But I don\u2019t think the president who ordered withdrawal from Syria, refrained from attacking Venezuela, and sings Kim Jong-un\u2019s praises is eager for war. And he has little trouble creating distractions.
\nWars are messy. Expensive. Trump is willing to use force against terrorists and insurgents in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Somalia, who have little ability to respond. But with governments, which can resist and retaliate, he sticks to threats, hoping that bullying will work.
\nMilitary action could go wrong and hurt his electoral chances. A chunk of Trump\u2019s base is isolationist and wouldn\u2019t like it, much as they denounced limited missile strikes against Syria in April 2018.
\nBut this situation is different from North Korea. Iran does not have nuclear weapons, and may worry that it has to establish deterrence by demonstrating the ability to impose costs, such as by disrupting global oil markets. North Korea is boxed in by China, Russia, South Korea, and Japan, while Iran is involved in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, and Gaza. And Iran has domestic politics.
\nIt\u2019s not a democracy, but it\u2019s not built around one man like North Korea. Iran has factions competing for influence, and when Trump broke the JCPOA, the faction that\u2019s open to negotiations lost ground to the one that said America can\u2019t be trusted. Iran rejected Trump\u2019s offer to meet, and the government has domestic political incentives to stand firm, even as sanctions create pressure to come to the table.
\nThis week, Iran announced it will resume some uranium enrichment activities banned under the JCPOA. It\u2019s not surprising, since the U.S. reneged on its commitments first, but it\u2019s still a sign that Iran plans to escalate. However, whether they\u2019re trying to generate leverage for negotiation, deter American action, or increase the chances of conflict isn\u2019t clear.
\nThe most worrisome part is not that Trump personally wants war. It\u2019s that without unified global pressure Iran won\u2019t back down, the sanctions will achieve little besides suffering, and Trump won\u2019t get an agreement he can take credit for. And then people with the president\u2019s ear\u200a\u2014\u200afrom Bolton and Pompeo to the Saudis and Israelis\u200a\u2014\u200awill tell him he has no choice but to bomb because otherwise he\u2019ll look weak.
\nThen what?<\/strong><\/p>\n

Nicholas Grossman, arcdigital.media<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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