Common patterns in the recruitment and deception process

One of the most important common aspects of the structure of the Epstein cult and the Rajavi cult is the use of sophisticated techniques of deception and psychological preparation to ensnare victims. In Jeffrey Epstein’s organization, victims were mainly recruited from among young girls with tempting promises of careers in the modeling industry, while in the MEK, recruitment was often carried out with promises of fighting for freedom, social justice or asylum in Europe and a better job and life to overcome personal crises. In both cases, the cult leaders initially introduce themselves as “saviors” or powerful supporters who can create a bright future for the individual. Over time, this process leads to the creation of intense emotional and financial dependence, such that the individual has no way of returning or making independent decisions.

Anya is the pseudonym of one of the women who was one of Jeffrey Epstein’s victims. In a recent interview with the BBC, she confirmed the statements of other female victims of Epstein: “I am still trying to come to terms with the fact that I was abused for years.” According to her, although she was apparently free, in reality she was trapped in restrictions and dependencies that acted like invisible chains, and she only realized this after Epstein’s death.

The female victims of Massoud Rajavi, however, did not and do not even enjoy apparent freedom. They have been imprisoned for years in closed camps of the organization in Iraq or Albania, but with Rajavi’s special values, such as the “denial of individuality and gender”, not only do they not realize their captivity, but they see themselves on the path to “perfection” and “salvation of the people.”

The victims who managed to escape the physical and mental bars of the MEK, after leaving the organizational context, managed to break away from the invisible chains and, like Batoul Soltani, Nasrin Ebrahimi, Fereshteh Hedayati, Zhina Hossein Nejad, and many others, speak of what happened to them in Rajavi’s cult of personality.

Destruction of individual autonomy

In the clinical psychology literature of cults, the destruction of individual autonomy and the right to choose is the main foundation of the dominance of cult leaders. In Epstein’s cult, victims such as “Anya” have testified that Epstein deprived them of the ability to think independently by constantly humiliating them, criticizing their physical appearance, and controlling their relationships and finances. Similarly, in Rajavi’s cult, Massoud Rajavi used meetings called “ideological revolution,” “bait,” “weekly bath,” and “current operations” and intense mental control to destroy the personal, emotional, and family attachments of members. Forced divorces, forced celibacy, separating children from parents, and imposing ideas in which the individual does not have the slightest right or will for his or her personal life are evaluated precisely in this context; a strategy whose ultimate goal is to turn people into unwilling tools serving the interests of the cult leader.

Creating all-encompassing dependency and tools of economic and social control

The victim’s attachment to the system is the main obstacle to their escape or protest. In Epstein’s organization, women lacked independent bank accounts, health insurance, or financial support, and Epstein trapped them in invisible chains with the phrase “I am your health insurance.” In Rajavi’s cult, the complete severance of members’ connections with the outside world, family, and society, as well as strict control over all their basic necessities, placed them in a position where they could not imagine any refuge outside the organization. The use of fabricated debts or embarrassing documents in Epstein’s cult to silence victims is very similar to the creation of a sense of permanent guilt and organizational accountability in the MEK. The self-criticism meetings held daily in Camp Ashraf and Ashraf 3 under the title of “Current Operation” function to create a sense of permanent shame and indebtedness to “Brother Massoud” and “Sister Maryam.”

Humiliating rituals and physical control (Salvation dance and naked dance)

One of the most obvious points of commonality between these two organizations is the use of collective and humiliating rituals to break self-respect and ensure non-disclosure. Published testimonies from Epstein’s victims, including Anya, mention cases in which women were forced to strip and dance in front of Epstein’s camera and eyes so that, as he said, “they would never be able to act against him”; because having this visual evidence turned the fear of humiliation into a tool for silence.

This method is exactly reminiscent of the phenomenon known as the “Salvation Dance” in the leadership council of the MEK, which was carried out under the management of Maryam Rajavi and under the orders of Massoud Rajavi. There, too, under the guise of fabricated ideological concepts, women members of the Leadership Council were forced to take actions that violated their privacy and human dignity and fatally cemented their emotional and organizational ties to Massoud Rajavi. In both systems, the purpose of these forced rituals is to create a point of no return for the victim, so that she feels that she has no way to protest or leave because of her participation in a humiliating and dirty act.

Finally, examining the structure of these two organizations shows that the apparent differences between an unhealthy network of financial and sexual corruption (Epstein) and an extremist political organization (Rajavi) do not prevent their deep and substantial similarities in the use of mind control tools, the exploitation of people, and especially the victimization of women.

Mazda Parsi

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This alliance emerged amid the eight-year war that Saddam’s West-backed regime imposed upon the Islamic Republic shortly after the triumphant 1979 Islamic Revolution.

As the protracted war entered its final phase, the MKO terrorists executed this major offensive operation against Iranian territory.

In a swift and devastating response, Iranian armed forces launched Operation Mersad – which translates to “Ambush” – a counteroffensive that effectively annihilated the MKO forces within a mere three days, inflicting more than 4,800 casualties upon the terrorist group and forever crushing their military ambitions. [The operation is called by the MEK Forough Javidan which means Eternal Light]

What was the strategic objective behind the attack?

Following eight years of imposed war and five years of overt and covert military collaboration between Saddam’s army and the MKO terror cult, the Iraqi dictator and his terrorist allies found themselves with no territorial gains to show for their efforts.

This frustrating reality prompted the West-backed Iraqi regime and its collaborators to fundamentally alter their strategic approach.

By mid-July 1988, both Iran and Iraq had formally accepted a United Nations resolution that effectively brought the war to a close. The front lines had calmed considerably, and the majority of Iranian forces were stationed along the border in southwestern Khuzestan province, where the most intense combat operations had been concentrated throughout the war.

Despite the ceasefire agreement, Saddam stubbornly clung to his ill-fated dream of achieving victory and implementing the so-called “regime change” in Iran. He envisioned the MKO as a Western puppet that could be installed in Tehran to replace the Islamic Republic’s leadership.

Together, the Iraqi dictator’s Ba’athist regime and the MKO leadership devised an ambitious plan for a swift, surprise invasion originating from Iran’s central-western Kermanshah province, approximately 500 kilometers north of the primary front, with the objective of penetrating deep into Iranian territory.

Their strategic goal was to reach Tehran rapidly, overthrow Iran’s leadership, and declare a new government before Iranian reinforcements could be mobilized from the southern front.

Unlike previous joint attacks conducted by the Ba’athist regime and the MKO, this offensive was specifically designed to be carried out solely by MKO terrorists. They mistakenly assumed that this approach would make the Iranian public more receptive to their presence and cause.

To execute this elaborate plan, Saddam equipped 7,500 MKO members with state-of-the-art weaponry, including 1,300 tanks and military vehicles, sophisticated anti-aircraft systems, and additional military hardware. The Iraqi dictator further promised air support and repeated bombing campaigns against western Iranian airbases to facilitate the MKO’s advance.

How did the incursion begin?

On July 22, 1988, the Ba’athist regime forces initiated the operation by launching large-scale chemical attacks against Iranian border villages situated within the planned invasion corridor. These brutal chemical strikes were designed to weaken local defenses and pave the way for the MKO’s entry into Iranian territory.

Four days later, on July 26, the Iraqi air force bombarded major airfields near Hamadan and Tabriz, which served as Iran’s key western military bases. That same day, MKO forces crossed the border, marking the beginning of their ground invasion.

Simultaneously, Iraq staged a diversionary assault near Khorramshahr in the southwest, attempting to divert Iran’s military attention and delay reinforcements to the northern front.

The MKO terrorists advanced swiftly through Qasr-e Shirin and Sarpol-e Zahab, towns that had been abandoned due to the chemical strikes. They continued their eastward advance via Road 48 in the Ravand River valley. The terrorists occupied the sparsely populated towns of Kerend-e Gharb and Eslamabad-e Gharb, pushing approximately 120 kilometers from the border. However, Tehran still lay an imposing 600 kilometers away – far beyond their reach.

Contrary to the MKO’s expectations, local residents did not welcome them as liberators. Rather, the Iranian population viewed them as foreign aggressors and collaborators with the enemy.

Local civilians fiercely resisted the MKO, even opening fire on the terrorists, demonstrating their unwavering loyalty to the Islamic Republic.

How was the invasion annihilated?

The courageous local resistance bought crucial time for Iran’s military to regroup, reorganize, and prepare a comprehensive counteroffensive against the invading MKO terrorists.

Iranian Army units under the command of General Ali Sayad Shirazi, alongside Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) and Basij forces led by General Mohsen Rezaei, were swiftly deployed to the area.

Military analysts subsequently slammed the MKO’s maneuver as tactically flawed and strategically unsound. The terrorist convoy was stretched in a vulnerable column that lacked adequate protection from flanking attacks and possessed only one rear exit, creating a tactical nightmare for the advancing forces.

On July 27, just one day into the offensive, IRGC troops blocked the road at Chaharzebar pass, successfully preventing the MKO terrorists from advancing toward Kermanshah city.

Meanwhile, Iranian forces cut off their retreat and supply lines at Hassanabad pass to the west, effectively trapping the entire MKO convoy in the narrow valley.

Iranian airbases, which had been quickly repaired after the Iraqi air raids, deployed fighter jets that relentlessly bombarded the MKO column from above. Attack helicopters targeted and destroyed armored vehicles, further decimating the terrorist forces.

Eventually, reinforcements from Khuzestan joined the battle, and these Basij and IRGC units dismantled the remainder of the MKO terrorist forces while eliminating all checkpoints the terrorists had established in the towns they had briefly occupied.

What war crimes were committed by the MKO?

Throughout the doomed offensive, the Iraqi-MKO coalition committed numerous war crimes against Iranian civilians, demonstrating their complete disregard for human life and international humanitarian law. One of the most horrific crimes was the chemical bombing of Zardeh, a village near the border in Kermanshah province.

This brutal attack, viewed as part of Saddam’s broader Al-Anfal genocidal campaign against Kurds and other populations, killed 275 civilians, including innocent children and women.

Many others suffered lasting health effects from exposure to chemical agents, with some still experiencing the consequences decades later.

In addition to the Zardeh massacre, several other villages in the region were attacked with mustard gas and nerve agents, resulting in hundreds more civilian casualties. Survivors of these attacks have experienced severe long-term health issues, including neurological disorders, various cancers, and birth defects in subsequent generations—a tragic legacy that continues to affect Iranian families.

Eslamabad-e Gharb also sustained significant destruction through Iraqi air raids and MKO shelling, which were carried out in reprisal for local resistance against the terrorist forces.

Among the most horrifying crimes committed by the MKO was their attack on the town’s hospital, where they massacred all the injured patients and medical personnel, then set their bodies ablaze in an act of unspeakable barbarism.

What were the aftermath and consequences?

Operation Mersad marked a pivotal point in the region’s contemporary history as the final battle of the eight-year imposed war. The operation shattered Saddam’s last hopes of defeating Iran militarily and demonstrated the Islamic Republic’s resilience and determination to defend its sovereignty against all aggressors.

For the MKO terror cult, the loss was catastrophic and irreparable. The operation annihilated the group’s military ambitions, demoralized their ranks, and effectively ended their role as an armed organization capable of threatening Iranian security. The group’s transformation from a military force into a political organization based abroad was accelerated by this crushing defeat.

On the eve of the aggression, MKO leader Masoud Rajavi had delivered a grandiose speech at their base, confidently predicting the capture of Tehran within 48 hours. Two days later, he faced utter failure and had to address the decimated remnants of his group, with nothing to show for their efforts.

MKO leadership subsequently offered a range of excuses for their catastrophic failure, from claims of a planned withdrawal – a narrative debunked by images of destroyed convoys and abandoned equipment – to assertions that fighters had been safely relocated to other bases, which simply did not exist.

Perhaps the most persistent myth, still perpetuated in MKO propaganda to this day, is the claim that their members were captured and mass executed by Iranian armed forces. Such narratives attempt to obscure the group’s military defeat in a campaign characterized by aggression, terrorism, and genocidal actions, and instead shift blame onto Iran for the consequences of the MKO’s own disastrous decisions.

What legal response can be taken against MKO terrorists?

The MKO’s military cooperation with the Ba’athist regime of Iraq represented a significant transformation from political opposition into armed collaboration with a foreign enemy during wartime, a serious violation of Iranian law.

Under Article 508 of Iran’s Islamic Penal Code, cooperation with hostile regimes against the Islamic Republic can result in imprisonment of one to ten years. This provision clearly applies to the MKO’s actions during Operation Mersad.

Other legal provisions may also apply to the MKO’s activities. Article 279 defines moharebeh (enmity against God and warfare against the Islamic system) in cases involving armed action intended to create fear or oppose the Islamic system, while Article 501 criminalizes the intentional disclosure of classified information in circumstances constituting espionage. The MKO’s actions fall under multiple categories of criminal offenses under Iranian law.

The operation also raised significant questions under international humanitarian law, particularly regarding prisoner-of-war protections under Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention. POW status generally requires combatants to belong to armed forces or qualifying organized resistance groups that meet specific conditions, including responsible command, recognizable insignia, openly carried weapons, and compliance with the laws of war.

The MKO’s status is therefore legitimately disputed, given its formal cooperation with Iraq, lack of clear formal affiliation with Iraqi forces, and violations against civilians, including the massacres at Zardeh and Eslamabad-e Gharb.

Article 5 of the Convention provides for competent tribunals to determine disputed status, leaving the question open for proper legal determination.

Iran also has solid grounds for domestic jurisdiction because the attack occurred on Iranian territory and was carried out largely by Iranian nationals. Historical cases involving wartime collaborators in France, Norway, Croatia, and India demonstrate that states have legitimately prosecuted nationals who fought alongside foreign enemies against their own countries.

It, therefore, presents a significant case involving wartime collaboration, national security offenses, espionage, armed rebellion, and the legal limits of combatant protections under international law.

Press TV

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This distinctive rhetorical style is deeply rooted in the group’s ideological evolution, which merged Marxist-Leninist dialectics with a radicalized, Shia Islamist complex. Over decades of isolation, first in Iraqi military camps under Saddam Hussein and later in closed compounds in Albania, this ideology curdled into a highly insular worldview. Within this framework, there is no room for critique; anyone who questions the leadership of Massoud and Maryam Rajavi is met not with intellectual debate, but with systematic character assassination.

Ideological Roots of the MEK’s Polemical Literature

To understand the harshness of the MEK’s literature when attacking critics, one must examine its foundational ideology. Founded in 1965 by leftist Iranian students, the MEK blended Marxist social analysis with Islam. This ideological synthesis created a binary worldview: the world was divided strictly into the forces of revolutionary progress (the MEK) and the forces of imperialism.

In his comprehensive book on the MEK’s history, titled “The Iranian Mojahedin”, historian Ervand Abrahamian explains that When the group fell out with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s governmet after the 1979 revolution and was forced into exile, this binary worldview intensified. The MEK began to view itself as the sole legitimate representative of the Iranian people. Consequently, any critic of the group was not merely expressing a differing political opinion; according to the MEK, critics were actively impeding the revolution and serving the interests of the Islamic Republic.

Academic analyses of the MEK’s texts show that this ideological rigidity manifests as a linguistic style that leaves no room for gray areas. Critics are routinely described using highly charged religious and political epithets designed to dehumanize them and strip them of political legitimacy.

Rhetorical Tropes and Vocabulary Used Against Critics

Scholars and journalists who have studied the MEK’s Persian-language publications (such as its journal Mojahed) and its various online outlets note several recurring linguistic tropes used to discredit opponents:

1. The “Regime Agent” and “Infiltrator” Label

The most common accusation leveled against any critic—whether they are Western journalists, academic researchers, or Iranian human rights activists—is that they are paid agents or spies of the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence. In MEK literature, critics are rarely addressed by their arguments; instead, they are labeled as “mozdur” (mercenary), “vabasteh” (dependent/affiliated), or “nokhaleh” (scum/infiltrator). By framing every critique as a psychological operation directed by Tehran, the MEK attempts to bypass the substance of the criticism entirely.

2. Dehumanizing and Class-Based Epithets

The MEK’s polemical literature frequently lapses into language that observers describe as vulgar or low-class. Critics and defectors are often referred to using derogatory terms such as “kha’en” (traitor), “khofash” (bat—implying they fear the light of the MEK’s truth), “kaseh-lis” (bowl-licker/sycophant), and “gorg” (wolf). This harsh, street-level vocabulary contrasts sharply with the diplomatic, human-rights-focused language the group’s political vitrine, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), uses in English-language press releases directed at Western governments.

3. Sexualized and Moral Character Assassination

For defectors (referred to in MEK literature as borideh, meaning “the severed ones”), the attacks are highly personalized and frequently target their moral and sexual integrity. In his book The Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization: A Sociological Study of a Cult, sociologist Saeed Paivandi points out that the MEK relies on public shaming to maintain internal discipline and discredit those who leave. Defectors who speak out about human rights abuses inside the organization are routinely accused in MEK literature of being morally corrupt, sexually deviant, or financially motivated by the Iranian government. This literature seeks to completely destroy the critic’s social standing within the Iranian diaspora.

The Language of Internal “Self-Criticism” and Public Denunciation

The aggressive tone directed at external critics is a direct reflection of the linguistic violence practiced within the organization. Former members of the MEK have documented the existence of mandatory daily and weekly “cleansing” or “self-criticism” sessions (known as Ghosl-e Haftegi or Weekly Bath).

In these sessions, members are forced to write down and publicly read their private thoughts, sexual desires, and doubts about the leadership. If a member’s self-criticism is deemed insufficient, other members are encouraged to shout insults, spit, and use highly abusive language to break down their psychological resistance. The vocabulary of these internal sessions—which includes terms of intense self-loathing and submission—directly bleeds into the public literature the group produces to attack external opponents. When a member defects and becomes a critic, the private confessions extracted during these internal sessions are often weaponized and published in MEK literature to paint the defector as unstable, untrustworthy, and weak.

Contrast Between Persian and English Literature

A striking feature of the MEK’s literary output is the dual nature of its rhetoric, which varies wildly depending on the target audience:

The External/Western Face: In English, French, and German publications, the NCRI and MEK employ the language of modern liberal democracy. They speak of “universal suffrage,” “gender equality,” “the abolition of the death penalty,” and “peaceful coexistence.”

The Internal/Persian Face: In Persian-language broadcasts, internal pamphlets, and sectarian websites, the language remains deeply authoritarian, aggressive, and abusive. Critics are subjected to relentless polemical attacks, characterized by conspiracy theories and vitriolic denunciations.

This linguistic dichotomy has led many analysts and foreign policy experts to warn that the MEK’s democratic rhetoric is merely a tactical facade designed to win political backing in Washington and Brussels, while its authentic internal culture remains deeply intolerant of dissent.

Mazda Parsi

References:

1. Abrahamian, Ervand. The Iranian Mojahedin.
2. Banisadr, Masoud. Masoud: Memoirs of an Iranian Rebel.
3. Paivandi, Saeed. The Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization: A Sociological Study of a Cult.
4. Singleton, Anne. Saddam’s Private Army: How Joint US-Iraqi Operations Created a Volunteer Terrorist Force.
5. Berman, Ilan. Making Sense of the MEK. American Foreign Policy Council.
6. Masters, Jonathan. Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK). Council on Foreign Relations.

The post The Rhetorical Style and Polemical Language of the MEK appeared first on Nejat Society.

However, for Massoud Rajavi the leader of the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), reality is always what is narrated behind the walls of Ashraf 3, not what people see with their own eyes. It is as if every time an important event happens in Iran, the group leaders jump into a fantasy contest, instead of analyzing the reality. One day they link everything to internal disputes in the government of Iran, the other day they condemn monarchists fabricating stories to convince their isolated members at their remote camp Ashraf 3, that they enjoy the support of Iranian people.

It is a bizarre tactic; when reality does not fit the MEK’s narrative, instead of correcting the narrative, they deny reality. For the Rajavis erasing the very the problem is easier than accepting the truth or solving the problem.

There are certain important questions to ask Massoud and Maryam Rajavi: If your claims are so strong and defensible, why shouldn’t the members inside Ashraf 3 see the images and films of the IRI’s late leader’s funeral? Why must there always be an “organizational lens” between their eyes and reality? Why are the MEK leaders afraid of their members’ seeing a few images and films?

Just publish a few images and leave the judgment to the audience!

Hey Mr. Rajavi,

If you still believe that the truth is in your favor, show these images to the members inside Ashraf 3! For the first time, let the truth enter the camp uncensored!

Hamid Atabay, defector of the MEK in Albania

Translated by Nejat Society

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