If Washington intends to reduce the likelihood of open-ended commitments, it must reform how it evaluates threats, validates information, and calibrates the use of force.
For more than two decades, the United States has engaged in a series of military operations far from its borders. These interventions have generated mixed strategic outcomes, imposed significant fiscal burdens, and contributed to persistent instability in several regions. A recurring feature of this pattern is the elevation of partial, politicized, or externally sourced intelligence to the status of policy driver. If Washington intends to reduce the likelihood of open-ended commitments, it must reform how it evaluates threats, validates information, and calibrates the use of force.
How questionable intelligence becomes policy
In the early 2000s, the Iraq case demonstrated how quickly contestable claims can become conventional wisdom. Exiled opposition figures—most prominently Ahmed Chalabi—advanced a narrative of imminent danger centered on weapons of mass destruction. Those assertions informed high-level debate and public messaging. After the invasion, the Iraq Survey Group concluded there were no active stockpiles of WMD. The central premise that had justified war did not stand when tested. The policy correction arrived only after the commitment was made and costs were sunk.
A similar dynamic can surface when exile organizations steer attention in other theaters. In the case of Iran, the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) publicized details of undeclared nuclear facilities, prompting inspections and diplomacy. The point is not to dismiss every disclosure; rather, it is to note that actors with regime-change incentives can be accurate on a fact while simultaneously advancing escalation. Outsourcing threat assessment to such actors increases the risk that selective truths are translated into strategic overreach.
Strategic, fiscal, and societal costs
Interventions justified on weak or disputed premises tend to produce ambiguous objectives and expanding mission sets. Strategically, they can entangle the United States in state-building tasks for which there is limited local legitimacy and insufficient allied burden-sharing. Ambiguity about end-states invites incremental escalations designed to “buy time,” even as political conditions deteriorate.
The fiscal effects are substantial. Expenditures associated with expeditionary operations do not end when combat ends; they continue through veteran care, equipment recapitalization, and interest on wartime borrowing. Opportunity costs compound the problem. Resources allocated to sustain distant missions are resources unavailable for modernizing infrastructure, strengthening public health, or improving educational outcomes.
There are societal costs that are less visible in budget documents. Repeated deployments impose strain on service members and families. Public confidence erodes when official justifications are later revised or withdrawn. Credibility—often cited as a reason to act—can be damaged by acting on claims that do not withstand scrutiny.
The role of media and oversight
A resilient policy process relies on institutional “speed bumps”: adversarial analysis within the intelligence community, rigorous congressional oversight, and journalistic scrutiny that distinguishes between assertion and evidence. When the policy timetable compresses and dissenting views are relegated to annexes, the probability of error rises.
Several reforms are straightforward. Intelligence products that inform potential uses of force should state confidence levels and key gaps up front. Red-team reviews should test core assumptions and explore disconfirming evidence. Where classified material shapes debate, unclassified summaries should be produced to permit informed public discussion without compromising sources and methods. In parallel, Congress should restore regular order on war powers and insist on clearly defined objectives, metrics, and reporting.
Case evidence: Iraq’s WMD narrative and Iran’s nuclear file
The Iraq WMD narrative moved from allegation to orthodoxy with unusual speed. Post-invasion findings did not validate the pre-war premise, yet the conflict—and its regional effects—could not simply be unwound. The lesson is not that intelligence is unnecessary; it is that confidence must be earned, not assumed.
In Iran’s nuclear file, disclosures regarding facilities at Natanz and Arak catalyzed inspections and negotiations. That sequence shows the value of verifiable facts and formal channels. It also demonstrates the danger of allowing externally driven narratives to leapfrog verification and dictate strategy. Facts may recommend engagement, monitoring, and diplomacy; they do not in themselves mandate coercion or promise favorable political outcomes. Intelligence should inform policy; it should not substitute for it.
A framework for restraint
Restraint is a strategic method, not an abdication. A practical framework would include four elements.
First, raise the evidentiary bar. Claims with the potential to move the United States closer to the use of force should meet heightened standards: multiple independent sources, explicit confidence statements, and adversarial testing. Assertions originating from actors with regime-change agendas should trigger automatic skepticism.
Second, prioritize diplomacy and burden-sharing. Where facts are disputed and escalation pathways are short, verification and dialogue should precede coercive steps. When coercive tools are used, they should be nested within clear political aims, realistic timelines, and allied participation.
Third, legislate limits and accountability. Any authorization for the use of military force should include sunsets, defined objectives, and regular reporting. If missions expand or conditions change materially, mandates should be revisited rather than allowed to drift.
Fourth, price the long term. Decision-makers should see the full lifecycle cost of operations—immediate outlays, long-term obligations, and financing costs—alongside domestic trade-offs. Transparent pricing improves choices and aligns policy with public consent.
Why this matters now
Large-scale occupations have receded, but the risk of miscalculation has not. Limited strikes, proxy engagements, special operations, and cyber activity each carry escalation potential. The information environment is faster and noisier than it was two decades ago, making it easier for motivated actors to inject claims that align with prevailing anxieties. Process discipline—asking what is known, what is assumed, and what the exit looks like—reduces the likelihood of avoidable error. It does not preclude necessary action; it ensures that action serves defined ends.
There is also a credibility dimension. Partners and adversaries alike track whether Washington binds the use of force to evidence and strategy or to momentum and rhetoric. A posture that privileges verification and diplomacy while maintaining capable deterrent power is more likely to produce durable outcomes than one that equates resolve with speed.
Conclusion
Strength is not the number of fronts on which the United States can fight simultaneously. It is the capacity to decide when force is necessary and when it is not. The experience of Iraq’s absent WMD and the externally driven narratives surrounding Iran’s nuclear program argue for a higher threshold before military options are placed on the table. By elevating evidentiary standards, empowering oversight, and privileging diplomacy and burden-sharing, Washington can protect American lives and resources while offering partners a steadier basis for cooperation. Endless wars are not inevitable. They are the foreseeable result of choices about evidence, incentives, and oversight—choices that can be improved.
Jenny Williams – Modern Diplomacy
Jenny Williams is an independent American journalist and writer focusing on foreign policy, human rights and conflict. She aims to bring clarity to complex security debates and to foreground the domestic consequences of overseas engagement. Contact: jennywilliams9696[at]gmail.com | Twitter: @Jenny9Williams
