Massoud Khodabandeh

Richard Armey

Mojahedin ‘Information Laundering’

Open Letter to Mr Richard K, Armey about Mojahedin ‘Information Laundering’

Mr Richard K. Armey

Senior Policy Adviser

Co-Chair, Homeland Security

DLA Piper Rudnick

Gray Cary

1200 Nineteenth Street, NW

Washington, DC, 20036-2412

United States of America

December 4, 2006

Dear Sir,

I would like to draw your attention to a matter concerning the Mojahedin-é Khalq Organisation (MKO) – otherwise known as People’s Mojahedin Organisation of Iran (PMOI) disguised as National Council of Resistance (based in Paris) and National Liberation Army (based in Iraq).

The weekly Persian periodical “Mojahed”, the official organ of MKO, has reported on your role as the key figure in a three day symposium held in US Congress under the title “Iran: foreign policy challenges, solutions and democratic opposition” (Mojahed, No 823, Monday, Nov 20, 2006). The article states that you delivered a 250 page report in that meeting.

You are well aware, as a former member of the House of Representatives, of the 1994 State Department report on the Mojahedin which describes it as a terrorist group. Of course the MKO leaders, the Rajavis ignored that report at the time since they were backed by former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein and were fully relying on him. Since the collapse of the despot they have tried to find a new ally, this time in the West, but their main obstacle has been the above mentioned report. Now they desperately need to be represented by some apparently independent establishments as an acceptable opposition group and to lend it the appearance of legitimacy in order to keep the organisation going.

As a result they are now vigorously pursuing ‘information laundering’ to whitewash their dirty past. As the name suggests this is identical to money laundering, which of course the organisation has also expertly undertaken. The Mojahedin has gone to a lot of effort and expense to pass-off its own version of information about itself – which of course has been part tidied up and part fabricated – to independent, well-known highly respected bodies which will then publish it as genuine, independent and reliable researched information.

That this current campaign of ‘information laundering’ is aimed at seducing a newly Democratic Party-led Congress is too obvious even to have to mention it.

However, what is abundantly clear is that you and your establishment have become the conduit for this campaign. Perhaps you are unaware however that once you get involved in the sort of game the Mojahedin are playing, you will hardly be able to find a way out of it.

For example, long-time apologist for the Mojahedin, Professor Raymond Tanter in an interview with Al Jazeera TV has said that "America should support the Sunnis, who have a lot in common with the Iranian opposition, against Iran". Professor Tanter, as a result of his uncritical support for the Mojahedin now appears to be advocating a return to American support for the Ba’athists with the Mojahedin as centrepiece of Iraqi opposition against Iran.

In reality the Mojahedin’s campaign is both too little and too late. MKO is not, as it claims, a democratic alternative. It is neither democratic nor capable of being an alternative; as the near collapse of Camp Ashraf in Iraq amply demonstrates. You can find many victims of MKO inside and outside Iran. There are many individuals who have suffered from the activities of MKO. Human Rights Watch published a report under the title of “No Exit” last year which reveals human rights abuses inside MKO. Mr Scott Ritter begins his book under the title “Target Iran” describing the MKO and its past record.

Following is a brief list of genuine information about the Organisation’s activities during the years it conducted the process of its so-called struggle against the ruling system in Iran:

The military, financial, and political relationship between the MKO and the deposed dictator of Iraq, Saddam Hussein:

– A video tape attained after the fall of Saddam Hussein clearly reveals that the MKO leaders and principally Massoud Rajavi received huge boxes of money from the Iraqi Authorities, specifically the Security Services Chief Jaleel Tahir Habush, along with assassination orders to be carried out inside Iran.

– The National Liberation Army (the military wing of MKO based in Iraq) has been financed, trained, facilitated, armed, and supplied with intelligence and ammunition by the Iraqi Army to counter the Iranian Army throughout the war between the two countries.

– Many ex-members of the NLA have given full witness statements as to how the Organisation’s military forces entered the internal conflicts in Iraq, particularly suppressing the Kurds in the north and the Shiites in the south in 1991.

– According to many members of the Organisation arrested inside Iran, they have been trained, facilitated and helped cross the border by the Iraqi armed forces and security services to carry out assassinations and terrorist activities inside major cities in Iran.

– Many defected members have also stated that their discontented associates have been jailed, abused of their basic rights, tortured, and finally handed over to the Iraqi officials to be locked up in Abu-Ghraib prison under Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship.

– It is worth considering that apart from being in various international terrorist lists; and being hated by the vast majority of the Iranian people for their cooperation with the enemy during the war; no government has ever supported the Organisation in any form except for the Iraqi Regime under Saddam Hussein. Of course the Organisation has managed to gain the signatures of many members of parliaments in Western countries on its petitions due to their lack of knowledge of the terrorist nature and terrorist activities of MKO.

– According to many undeniable documents, the money collected in US and in Europe by the so-called charity and humanitarian institutes have been sent to Iraq (after its track has been lost by money laundry) to be used for the NLA on arms and ammunitions.

The systematic contact between the Organisation’s HQ in Paris (the establishment formed in Auvers-sur-Oise under the cover of NCR) and the NLA bases in Iraq:

– According to the DST press releases and statements as well as the French authorities’ press conferences referring to the materials found inside the Organisation’s Paris HQ, the two bases in France and Iraq have been closely and continuously linked using highly sophisticated devices.

– The documents clearly show that there is no distinction between different establishments of the Organisation and they are all run under the close leadership of the Rajavis.

– It is also clear that all activities in Western Europe and North America, including the political, publicity, and financial performance of the Organisation have been directly guided from Iraq.

Establishing fake societies and associations to cover the Organisation’s illegal financial and other acts and money laundry in Western Countries:

– On many occasions the members of the Organisation have clearly and directly been told that the money which they collected in Western Countries for ‘the cause of homeless and orphaned children’ has instead been destined to be used for arms and other expenditures of the Organisation.

– The Organisation has many institutions that do not reveal their nature or their dependence on the PMOI (MKO), but which are all directed and instructed for their activities directly by Maryam Rajavi.

– In particular, it should be noted that the MKO (PMOI), the NCR, and the NLA are alias establishments and could not and should not be dealt with separately. They all have terrorist nature which is well theorised and justified for the participants.

The internal relationship of the Organisation and its cult status:

– The self-appointed, charismatic, life leadership has unlimited power over decision making in every aspect of the Organisational affairs including the most personal matters concerning the members.

– The internal structure of the Organisation is based on absolute totalitarianism. The spiritual leadership (Rajavi) is positioned high above everyone, and cannot be criticised by anyone under any circumstances.

– The process of brainwashing, psychological coercion, and thought reform has widely been practiced inside the Organisation under the direct supervision of Massoud and Maryam Rajavi. A range of very sophisticated physiological and psychological persuasive techniques have been used to engage the followers in conspiracy and fraud as well as the most bizarre acts such as self-immolation.

– Many people have been harmed and their rights have been abused by the Organisation. Small children have been separated from their parents, families have been torn apart, and the possessions of the followers have been taken away. There are many psychological casualties still under treatment as the result of abuses inside the Organisations.

– The intimidation and harassment of critics inside (as well as outside) the Organisation has become a common habit to silence those who might expose these facts. Defectors in particular have been continuously subject to threats and personality destruction campaigns.

Getting to know Maryam Rajavi:

– Maryam Rajavi became the co-leader of the Mojahedin-é Khalq Organisation (MKO), alongside Massoud Rajavi, in 1985 and was announced the chairperson of MKO in 1989. She was appointed as Iran’s future President by the NCR on 1993 before she left Iraq for France. She returned back to Iraq again on 1995. Since the formation of the NLA in Iraq on 1986, Maryam Rajavi has been Second-in-Command of the Army after her husband Massoud Rajavi, and has personally directed many military operations against Iran during the Iran-Iraq war – though neither of the Rajavis have the military knowledge or training to qualify them for such a role.

Bearing in mind the above mentioned facts which were pointed out very briefly, it is now worth asking where one should stand on this case. Today, even the most rigorous opposition to the religious dictatorship of the Islamic Republic of Iran does not approve the methods and manners imposed by the MKO. The Iranian opposition as a whole truly believes that the Organisation’s so-called struggle has severely damaged their efforts to restore democracy and freedom in Iran.

The truth is that many offences have been committed behind the legal presence of the MKO in western countries. These could have been prevented if this case had been dealt with sooner when many defectors, who have been under enormous physical and psychological pressure from the Organisation, had warned the western authorities about the subject. Many have been harmed and suffered from the Organisation’s acts all through the world. The victims can be found everywhere both inside and outside Iran. And the international community certainly bears responsibility for this.

The Organisation claims that all its assassinations and sabotage activities had taken place inside Iran during their armed struggle against the Islamic Republic of Iran. In this way they aim to discard the terrorist charges. They argue that they have never used arms inside western countries where they have been proscribed as a terrorist group. But in reality the MKO is surely a terrorist Organisation by nature, and they do believe in using violence for their political purposes. According to their beliefs the end justifies the means. So they have no limitation, as they have shown through the years, toward committing any sort of crime to reach their goals. It should also be considered that the mastermind of the Organisation has always been situated either in Iraq or in Paris and all the terrorist activities inside Iran have been directed from these two places over the past two decades.

A great deal has been said about the crimes of the MKO and its related institutes. Now it is time for a small amount of action to be taken to show that the Western authorities have taken the matter seriously. Any person who was assassinated inside Iran, any combatant who was self-eliminated by pulling the trigger of a hand grenade or taking a cyanide pill, or any youngster who committed self-immolation are all similar victims of a notorious cultic Organisation led directly by the leadership which was based in Iraq and has now moved to France. The world’s public opinion, the many victims of the Organisation, and the Iranian Opposition want to see that this situation is dealt with justly. They want to see an end to what has been going on for years now. They are certainly extremely concerned to imagine that the MKO’s infamous crimes might be whitewashed away by misinformed but otherwise respectable people.

I find it my duty and responsibility to remind you of the nature and deeds of MKO in the past and at the present time. Below I refer to a few books and reports that offer a variety of well-documented, well-researched information and witness accounts concerning the Mojahedin Organisation.

With kind regards and many thanks for your kind attention to this matter,

Massoud Khodabandeh

Row

Name of the book

Description

Author

Translator into English

Date

Publisher

Autopsy of an ideological drift:

Analysis and background on the People’s Mojahedin Organisation of Iran

Antoine Gessler

Thomas R Forstenzer

The People’s Mojahedin of Iran:

A struggle for what

Victor Charbonnier

Thomas R Forstenzer

Patterns of Global Terrorism

US Department of State

–

2000

US Department of State

Amnesty International Report

Amnesty International

–

2002

Amnesty International

Saddam’s Private Army:

How Rajavi changed Iran’s Mojahedin from revolutionaries to an armed cult

Anne Singleton

–

2003

Iran-Interlink (UK)

Masoud:

Memoirs of an Iranian Rebel

Masoud Banisadr

–

2004

SAQI Books

No Exit:

Human Rights Abuses Inside the Mojahedin Khalq Camps

Human Rights Watch

–

2005

Human Rights Watch

From Massoud Khodabandeh, November 4, 2006

December 7, 2006 0 comment

Mujahedin Khalq 's Terrorism

Maryam Rajavi wants to import terrorists to Norway

Open Letter to Norway’s Prime Minister

To: Office of the Prime Minister

Akersget 42

PO Box 8001 Dep

0030 Oslo

Dear Jens Stoltenberg,

According to Arabic website nahrainnet.net (see the report below) Maryam Rajavi handed over to some Norwegian MPs a list of MKO members in Camp Ashraf Iraq whom she wants to be given asylum in the west.

It is remarkable that the more Maryam Rajavi comes out of her base in Auvers sur Oise and the more she meets with politicians and media, the more gaffes she gives. For this reason, we wholeheartedly welcome more such meetings and visits.

In this particular case, during her trip to Norway on the private invitation of some non Rajavi-cult members in the Norwegian parliament, Mrs Rajavi apparently handed over a list of individuals who are currently in Camp Ashraf to at least one MP.

Realising that her terrorist base Camp Ashraf will be dismantled in a matter of months if not weeks, Rajavi’s mission is now to retain her most useful, loyal cult members by bringing them to the west. She has tasked some Norwegian MPs with abusing their country’s immigration system in order to import a group of terrorists into Norway and to grant them political asylum.

Clearly, any list of valued members concocted by Maryam Rajavi certainly comprises a list of ‘most wanted’ terrorists for western governments. It is equivalent to a leading member of Hizb ut Tahrir giving a list of Osama bin Laden’s most trusted lieutenants to the UK government and asking for them to be given asylum there. The first thing the Norwegian MP should do is to hand this list not to Norway’s immigration service but to Interpol so that these individuals can be added to the list of MKO members wanted for crimes against humanity and for war crimes.

Members of Parliament should ask why Maryam Rajavi wants these particular people and not others and why she left them in Iraq in 2003 when she and around 300 others escaped the country.

The answer is straightforward if anyone is honest enough to acknowledge it. These precious members whom Rajavi is now trying to rescue from Iraq were her most ruthless repressive agents in Camp Ashraf. It is they who, for three and a half years, have imposed absolute control over the members using Rajavi’s infamous system of psychological coercion, extrajudicial punishments and a constant bombardment of lies, deception and misinformation under conditions of isolation and enslavement.

Does the west want to offer these individuals political asylum?

Yours Sincerely

Massoud Khodabandeh

Iran-Interlink.org

Norwegian Immigration Service

Interpol

November 28, 2006

Article from nahrainnet.net:

A number of press sources in Norway revealed that during her recent visit to Oslo, Maryam Rajavi held two rounds of meetings with Israeli diplomats.

There’s no word on the content of these secret meetings, which were held under tight security measures but some of observers say that Iran’s nuclear program has been possibly on the agenda.

Sources add that in her meeting with a number of Norwegian MPs, Maryam Rajavi asked parliamentarians to pave the way for accepting Iraqi-based MKO members in Norway as refugees.

Observers believe that Rajavi’s visit to Norway was conducted with the green light by the US and it seems that the US has allowed Maryam Rajavi to start efforts to win the support of European countries after they (Americans) couldn’t find a solution for the presence of this group in Iraq.

The only commonality between the US and the MKO (listed by the US as a terrorist organization) is group’s opposition to Iran’s Islamic republic.

MKO was the ally of former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. Saddam supported them by all means and gave them money, weapons and landâ€¦ and even equipped them with heavy weaponries such as tanks and artillery to conduct operations against Iranians.

Members of this organization believe in a mixture of Islam and Marxism. They are militants who were trained to work with light and heavy weapons. They have operated against Iran by wide military operation in 1988 and by assassinating Iranian religious and political figures during 90s. Members of this organization had an active role in suppressing iraqis’ Sha’banieh uprising in 1991 along with Saddam’s Republican Guards.

MKO is currently under the protection of US forces in Camp Ashraf; the protection is against possible attacks by Iraqis.

Meanwhile, there are undeniable evidences indicating continued cooperation between senior US officers and MKO members in Iraq. A representative from the group contacts US embassy in Iraq on daily basis in order to solve the problems of the group and meet their needs.

Most of MKO members speak fluently in local Arabic (of Iraq) and this helps them cover their Iranian identity from Iraqi people. As stated by Iraqi Prime Minister Mr. Nuri al-Maliki, this group interferes in Iraq’s internal affairs. In his speech on June 19, Mr. al-Maliki asked for the expulsion of MKO members from Iraq.

In a press conference at that time, Maliki said: "Mojahedin-e Khalq organization, trying to overthrow the Iranian regime, is widely interfering in Iraq’s political and social affairs."

November 30, 2006 0 comment

Bulgaria

Bulgarians to Dismantle Iranian Terrorist Group MKO in Iraq

As the United States advances steadily toward a confrontation with Iran, the fate of an Iraqi-based Iranian opposition group appears to have been sealed. It has now been confirmed that Bulgarian troops will assume control of the formerly-armed Mojahedin-e-Khalq (MKO) organization’s Ashraf camp. This move likely constitutes the final stage of removing the MKO from Iraq, a process that began with the U.S. bombing of the organization’s bases in April 2003.

The most important question is whether the dismantlement of the MKO (listed as a terrorist organization in the U.S. and Europe) in Iraq will have any impact on U.S.-Iranian relations, especially at a time when the latter is laying the foundations for a long-term confrontation with the Islamic Republic. Moreover, it is unclear whether the U.S. decision to dissolve the military component of the MKO will propel the Iranians to reciprocate with greater cooperation in the battle against al-Qaeda and other Islamic militant organizations.

Bulgarians in Ashraf

According to the Bulgarian Ministry of Defense, the mission of 154 soldiers, including 34 staff officers, will be a military-humanitarian mission and is not expected to last for more than 12 months (Xinhua, January 14). Bulgarian soldiers will travel to Iraq with their conventional equipment, including sub-machine guns, which would only be used in response to threats from outside the Ashraf camp. Ashraf is close to Khalis (in Diyala province), an area that is considered to be a stronghold of Iraqi nationalist guerrillas. Not surprisingly, U.S. forces will be deployed around Ashraf to ensure wider security, but the Bulgarians are expected to have "considerable" control over daily life inside Ashraf where several thousand aging Iranian dissidents remain in limbo.

This will be the first time that non-U.S. soldiers have been involved in dealing with the MKO in Iraq. Interestingly, the Bulgarians’ primary task is to ensure security "inside" the camp. There is little doubt this signifies a major development relating to the status of the MKO in the near future, with the camp’s complete dismantlement within 12 months a distinct possibility. After all, this is the first time coalition troops have been deployed inside Ashraf. Previously, U.S. forces have been stationed immediately outside the camp and rarely interfere in the daily routine of its inhabitants.

Gradual Dismantlement

The fact that it has taken nearly three years to decisively deal with the MKO in Iraq has led some observers to claim the group enjoys the protection of influential groups in the Pentagon and other U.S. agencies, which are anxious to use the organization as leverage against Iran. There is no evidence, however, of collusion between any agency of the U.S. government and the MKO. In fact, careful review of how the U.S. has treated the MKO since April 2003 reveals a very skillful, subtle and almost passive approach to dissolve what is a remarkably cohesive and fanatical cult-army with the least amount of resistance.

From the outset, U.S. military intelligence was concerned about the possibility of carnage and mass suicides inside Ashraf in the event of a sudden move to dissolve the camp. A senior U.S. military source, speaking anonymously, told this author in September 2005 that from the beginning of negotiations with the MKO, the leaders began to issue vague but unmistakable threats of mass suicide should any action be taken to forcibly disperse members. The seriousness of this threat became evident when several members set themselves on fire in Europe to protest the detention of Maryam Rajavi and other leaders by French counter-terrorism forces in June 2003.

By September 2003, a Temporary International Presence Facility (TIPF) was established just outside Ashraf to house the steady drip of disaffected MKO members who sought "refuge" with U.S. military police during the identification interviews. The total number of detained MKO inside Ashraf was 3,855, including 800 women. Currently just over 3,450 remain in the camp itself. Of the disaffected and dissident members who transferred to TIPF, 370 have accepted an amnesty by the Iranian government and returned to the country with the help of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Iraqi Ministry of Human Rights.

The advent of "voluntary repatriation" for disaffected members was seen as a major threat by the MKO, whose enmity toward Iran is so deep-rooted that for the past 25 years it has ordered its members and active sympathizers to sever all links with Iran. In the past, even peripheral sympathizers who traveled to Iran were shunned by the organization, fearing that its attempts to depict life inside the country as darkly as possible would be fatally undermined by such travels.

Not surprisingly, the MKO began a vociferous propaganda campaign against TIPF, telling members the U.S. was running a "mini Abu Ghraib," where men and women are tortured and the latter would even run the risk of being raped by U.S. soldiers. At a more sophisticated level, the organization projected TIPF as a bastion of Iranian intelligence, and tried to connect this to the wider reality in post-Saddam Iraq where pro-Iranian forces stand accused of exploiting the U.S. military presence to seize control of key aspects of Iraqi life. Interestingly, this kind of sweeping and banal analysis converges with the rhetoric of the nationalist insurgents in Iraq who bemoan a covert Iranian "occupation," masked by the highly-visible U.S. military presence.

Yet, the MKO’s relentless psychological warfare against TIPF and its residents was essentially driven by credible fears of a complete collapse of morale inside Ashraf. This fear was amplified by the remarkably quick process through which disaffected MKO left TIPF for Iran and then turned up in Europe to further expose the organization’s bizarre cult-like practices. It is worth noting that Amnesty International has "concerns" about conditions in the Ashraf camp, while Human Rights Watch published a report in May 2005 detailing some of the serious human rights violations practiced routinely by the MKO in the years up to 2002, based on witness statements made by former members now living in Europe (Human Rights Watch, May 2005).

In spite of, or perhaps because of, this morale remains a major problem and defections have recently increased. Four former MKO members, who returned to Iran on January 14, said depression and desperation are endemic and that members are showing a greater propensity to disobey orders and refuse to attend daily brainwashing sessions (https://www.nejatngo.org/news.php?news_id=1622, January 24). Behzad Alishahi, the most recent defector to reach Europe, told Voice of America: "if the Red Cross provides a safe haven, over 80 percent of the camp would leave and only a core of around 20 percent would remain" (Voice of America, November 13, 2005).

Endgame

An astute move to designate MKO members as protected persons in July 2004, rather than as prisoners of war—which the MKO wrongly interpreted as a favor—enabled the U.S. to diminish this small fanatical army to the point of dissolution before it hands them over to the Bulgarians, and subsequently to the Iraqis and the UN. The designation of July 2004 was an intrinsic part of a highly sophisticated policy of duping the MKO into believing it had influence with the U.S., while at the same time weakening its formidable internal command structure to the point that it can no longer control dissent inside Ashraf, let alone resist forced dismantlement.

Articles 25 and 26 of the Fourth Geneva Convention obliged the U.S. to facilitate visits to Camp Ashraf by the inhabitants’ families. Some families traveling from Iran had not seen their relatives for more than 20 years. The emotional reunions inevitably led to more disaffection, leading the MKO to complain to U.S. military authorities that Iranian intelligence was exploiting the visits to gather information and recruit disaffected members. Moreover, as telephone and e-mail contact were established with relatives, news from the outside world increasingly penetrated the camp, alerting long-term inhabitants to the depth of their estrangement.

As MKO control gradually weakened, U.S. control increased. Last summer, restrictions were imposed on the movement of MKO leaders outside Camp Ashraf who had previously enjoyed freedom of movement under escort. In the autumn, a letter was issued to every individual resident outlining their rights under the Fourth Geneva Convention and emphasizing their right to leave Iraq if they wish (Survivors’ Report, November 2005). Moreover, while U.S. forces have allowed physical conditions in Camp Ashraf to gradually degenerate, they have taken care to improve conditions in TIPF, thus creating more incentives for disaffected members to defect. Indeed, education programs, recreation facilities, paid work and the building of two new compounds indicate that the movement of greater numbers to TIPF is expected over the coming months.

It is at this point that the U.S. military in Iraq is handing Ashraf and its inhabitants to the Bulgarian military. It is expected that a small Bulgarian military force, working alongside the ICRC and UNHCR, will dismantle the remaining internal command structure of the organization. Chief of the General Staff of the Bulgarian Army General Nikola Kolev, speaking informally to journalists in Sofia, said the mission included "maintaining order and rendering assistance to the refugees living there" (Focus News, December 22, 2005). In an interview with the author on January 14, the Bulgarian Ministry of Defense admitted the unit will be armed with electroshock truncheons and other equipment designed for crowd control. The use of such equipment indicates that U.S. authorities anticipate MKO commanders will foment resistance should the Bulgarians try to forcibly remove the rank and file members.

Implications for U.S.-Iranian Relations

It is ironic that the United States is dismantling the MKO at a time when relations with Iran have reached an all-time low. While the MKO is a listed terrorist entity and is widely regarded as a bizarre cult, it is also the only organized and noteworthy opposition to the Islamic Republic. Yet, the organization has very little (if any) support inside Iran and is generally despised by Iranians, not least because of its former alliance with Saddam Hussein. Moreover, the Iranian security establishment has long let it be known it is not interested in the fate of the MKO, which it regarded as a spent force well before the 2003 war against Saddam Hussein’s regime.

It is perhaps this reality that led the U.S. to decisively deal with the MKO and remove it from Iraq. While the U.S. cannot expect to win praise from Iran and its supporters, its skillful handling of the MKO file will win it much sympathy from victims of MKO terrorism in Iran who number in the tens of thousands.

Insofar as the war on terrorism is concerned, the Iranians have always denied rumors of near-deals with the U.S. to swap senior MKO members for al-Qaeda operatives allegedly in Iranian detention. On the more credible issue of Iranian support for Hezbollah, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, it is highly unlikely that any half-hearted gesture by the U.S. would entice the Islamic Republic to end its support for organizations that it regards as central to its national security interests in the Middle East.

Find this article at:

http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369895

By Massoud Khodabandeh, Terrorism Monitor

Volume 4, Issue 3 (February 9, 2006)

February 13, 2006 0 comment

Mujahedin Khalq Organization as a terrorist group

calling for adequate protection for journalists

Open Letter to the Home Secretary, The Right Honourable Charles Clarke, MP,

calling for adequate protection for journalists reporting on the terrorist Mojahedin-e Khalq organisation.

Dear Mr Clarke,

I am writing to alert you again to the on-going activities of the terrorist Mojahedin-e Khalq (MKO or PMOI) in the United Kingdom.

My wife and I head a small pressure group based in Leeds called Iran-Interlink. For the past three years we have been engaged in publishing information about the real nature of the terrorist Mojahedin organisation as a religious/personality cult, as well as exposing the Mojahedin’s abuse of its members’ fundamental human rights. In addition, we provide a point of contact for families and friends of members of the MKO, and support victims of the organisation, which include many former members.

On November 10, we held a press conference in London with the title ‘Saddam’s links with international terrorism’. The press conference showed evidence of Massoud and Maryam Rajavi’s involvement in the violent suppression of Iraqi Kurds in the Spring of 1991. Film was also shown of Rajavi taking orders from officers of Saddam’s secret services.

Massoud and Maryam Rajavi are the self-appointed, self-styled leaders of the Mojahedin-e Khalq organisation of Iran which also uses the names National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) and National Liberation Army of Iran (NLA). It has been dubbed Saddam’s private army because the MKO enjoyed the patronage of Saddam Hussein for twenty years.

We were aware that supporters of the MKO and Massoud Rajavi would try to disrupt our press conference. As a precaution, we informed the police in advance that MKO agents might possibly perform some act of violence and intimidation in order to prevent revelations about Massoud Rajavi’s war crimes in Iraq becoming public.

The police presence was vital to prevent around twelve agents of the MKO from forcing themselves into the hotel and breaking into our meeting. Thanks to the police presence, the meeting passed off peacefully and the journalists who attended were able to watch the films and listen to the speakers.

Unfortunately, in spite of the good understanding and cooperation of the police, it was not possible to prevent one incident of intimidation in which one of the reporters was attacked by an MKO agent as she left the hotel building. The reporter, the representative of Voice of America in London, is a well known personality in the Iranian community, and as an analyst on Iranian issues has been invited to speak many times on British radio and television programs. The police immediately escorted the reporter back to the building, visibly shaken by her ordeal. The police were then obliged to call for reinforcements in order to provide security for all the organisers and participants to leave the building and travel safely to their destinations. The BBC Persian Service published a report of the incident on both its website and its radio broadcasting channel, which reported that the Mojahedin’s supporters at the meeting "insulted the journalists and called them the agents of the Iranian regime". Iran-Interlink apologises to all the participants, in particular the Voice of America and BBC reporters, who suffered this abuse at while attending our press conference.

Dear Mr Clarke,

On September 26, 2005 a letter was sent to you, signed by more than eighty affected people, issuing a warning and asking for your help. The letter was titled "MKO assassination teams activated in Europe" and a copy was sent to all European Interior Ministers. On September 29, 2005, I raised the issue again in an interview with the BBC Persian Service asking for help. The letter highlighted the danger posed by an influx of Mojahedin forces into Europe in 2003 from its terrorist training camps in Iraq. These forces have the same training as Saddam Hussein’s Republican Guard and therefore have the same capability of the Iraqi leader’s elite Fedayeen. These forces have now regrouped in Europe and have been recently activated to target critics of the Mojahedin and Massoud and Maryam Rajavi.

The MKO’s agents in the UK, who have been working overtly for Saddam Hussein’s services in Britain for the last two decades, are not unknown to your law enforcement agencies throughout the country. The organiser of the attempted intimidation on November 10, was Dowlat Nowrouzi, an agent of Massoud and Maryam Rajavi and member of Saddam’s private army, who is now working under the name of the National Council of Resistance of Iran from her office situated not far from your own office in Westminster.

Activities organised by terrorists linked with Saddam Hussein and based in London are not confined to this. Massoud Rajavi’s agents continue to misuse the democratic institutions of the UK, in particular the democratic traditions of both Houses of Parliament. They have launched and run websites in London under the names of National Council of Resistance http://www.ncr-iran.org/ and Iran-Focus http://www.iranfocus.com/. The purpose of these sites is to coordinate a campaign of character assassination and intimidation against anyone who criticises the MKO, in particular people who are involved in press conferences such as ours – including the professional reporters who attend – by labelling them as agents of the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence. The Mojahedin’s lies and slander have no limit. The names and integrity of prominent British politicians, French and British journalists and researchers and international human rights organisations have also been smeared by agents of the Mojahedin, including Dowlat Nowrouzi and her minions in the UK.

The Mojahedin-e Khalq organisation, using the name NCRI (listed as a terrorist entity in the USA as an alias for the Mojahedin), has gone to the extent of fabricating lies under the name of Mr Win Griffiths, former Member of Parliament for Bridgend, Wales. Mr Griffiths kindly arranged for my niece to obtain a visa from the Iranian Embassy in London last year so that she could visit her father – my brother Ebrahim Khodabandeh – who is in Evin prison in Iran on charges relating to smuggling for the MKO. I believe that Mr Griffiths was at that time engaged in dialogue with the Iranians for a possible reconciliation and an amnesty for the heads of the MKO. (The Iranian government has since issued an amnesty to MKO members, but not to the leaders of the group.)

Sir,

More shocking is the presence of agents this group under the protection of Lord Corbett in the House of Lords. This gentleman, whether he is aware of it or not, has appeared in the MKO’s publications under the Mojahedin’s logo of Kalashnikov and red star an average of three times a year for the past fifteen years, apparently condoning violence against the victims of this military cult. Public opinion is no doubt shocked that on the same day as the terrible London bombings on July 7, speeches by terrorist leader Maryam Rajavi were broadcast into the heart of parliament during a meeting hosted by Lord Corbett.

Dear Mr Clarke,

The free movement of the terrorist Mojahedin-e Khalq organisation in London, including running an office in Westminster in direct communication with Maryam Rajavi (currently awaiting trial in France on terrorism charges), and Mohammed Sani (currently operational head of the Mojahedin’s intelligence section for Europe based in Cologne, and one of the Mojahedin’s Fedayeen who committed self-immolation following the arrest of Maryam Rajavi in Paris in June 2003), cannot be regarded as anything less than shocking.

At a time when the whole country has been following the debate on the number of days the British police will be able to detain terror suspects, I would again ask for your intervention to instigate a meaningful investigation into the activities of the known agents and terrorists linked with Saddam Hussein’s brutal regime who are active in London under whatever assumed name or logo. As was requested by the letter of September 26 this year, please take this threat seriously before it is too late.

Although I have no doubt about the amount of information already available to the law enforcement agencies of this country, I and my friends remain at your disposal for any information relating to this matter.

I should add that while we regard the leaders of this terrorist cult with abhorrence, we at Iran-Interlink regard the ordinary followers of the Rajavi’s with the kind of sympathy which must be extended to the subjects of psychological manipulation in any cult. Iran-Interlink is willing to assist victims of Rajavi’s cult who have managed to escape it.

Yours sincerely,

Massoud Khodabandeh

Iran-Interlink

November 15, 2005

November 21, 2005 0 comment

Mujahedin Khalq; A proxy force

THE DISINTEGRATION OF MEK IN POST-SADDAM IRAQ

As the landmark Iraqi elections loom closer, the fate of a controversial and often misunderstood Iranian opposition group hangs in the balance. The formerly armed Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO) has been based in Iraq for twenty years with regime change as its exclusive cause. Not only was it a long term irritant for Iran, launching waves of terrorist attacks from across the border, it also waged a remarkably intensive “ albeit unsophisticated “ anti-Iranian propaganda campaign from major Western capitals. It was a tempting prospect for hawks in the U.S. administration, therefore, to use the MKO“ officially classified a terrorist organization by the U.S. and EU governments “ as a tool against Iran, particularly for those with regime change at the forefront of their agenda. But on the eve of the Iraqi elections, the MKO seems to be more of a liability for the U.S. than ever.

Shortly after the fall of the former Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein, the organization’s value was such that Iran offered to exchange some top al-Qaeda operatives for the MKO. But whether the U.S. administration had over-estimated the MKO’s value and wanted more, or whether there were covert plans to use the group rather than be rid of it, the offer was refused. In the immediate aftermath of the Iraq war in 2003, U.S. forces displayed a puzzlingly ambiguous attitude toward the MKO; first negotiating a ceasefire and subsequently disarming it, but then protecting the group against Iraqi revenge attacks. Even when the Iraqi Interim Governing Council (IGC) voted for the MKO’s expulsion in December 2003, the U.S. failed to comply, further fuelling Iranian suspicions over U.S. motives. [1]

Outside Iraq, the MKO’s political wing, the National Council of Resistance (NCR), found common ground with U.S. advocates for regime change in Iran. The NCR exposed intelligence on Iran’s nuclear program during last autumn’s negotiations between Iran and the EU, and supported U.S. moves to take the issue to the UN Security Council. The NCR stopped short of asking the U.S. to bomb Iran, instead claiming it could perform the task of regime change if given the right support. That would entail maintaining the MKO as an armed force in Iraq and, as a prerequisite, removing both the MKO and the NCR names from the U.S. terrorist list. While this hopelessly unrealistic approach could have been tried even six months ago, it is difficult to see how it could be implemented following an election in Iraq.

While Iran lined up with the United States to push for the January 30 elections to go ahead, the MKO struck a defiant tone, effectively adopting the same rhetoric as the neo-Baathists, Salafi Islamists and other insurgent forces that are desperate to derail the election process. But despite its vociferous criticism of the elections, the MKO has no power or mandate to influence the outcome of the electoral process. Implausibly, the organization claims a constituency of support among Iraqi Sunni Arab tribal leaders (especially in Diyala Province) which contrasts strangely with its inability to show any meaningful support inside Iran. The emergence of democratic institutions in post-war Iraq will severely undermine the MKO, as it will lend popular legitimacy to calls for their immediate expulsion. In short, the United States will not be able to ignore the wishes of the new elected government as it ignored the wishes of the unelected IGC back in December 2003.

Either the MKO will have to be expelled as already requested, or its members will face trial and punishment as cohorts of Saddam Hussein. In any case, the organization’s potential value as a U.S. bargaining chip in complex negotiations with Iran will be effectively ended by the elections. [2 ]

In any event, the notion of sending MKO members inside Iran as secret operatives tasked with undertaking espionage and sabotage operations was always a non-starter. This proposal entirely overlooks the actual state of the organization itself. The average age of the members is over 48 years, with a significant number over 50 years old. And these are people whose bodies have been ravaged by the conditions of constant military training, sleep deprivation and inadequate nutrition. Most have not set foot in Iran for nearly 24 years and would have difficulty now navigating around their own neighborhoods, let alone an unknown nuclear facility. More than this, the psychological state of the members following years of isolation and psychological coercion would not allow them to act independently or intelligently outside their immediate organizational environment “ let alone in hostile territory. In short, the U.S. covert operation would need local Iranians not burnt-out ex-patriots. In addition, the MKO has become so heavily infiltrated, and not just by the Iranians, that it is hard to see how such a plan could be even formulated without Iran becoming forewarned of it.

MKO: Still Terrorists?

In many ways, MKO behavior in the West points to quite another deal being struck with the U.S. and other Western governments. Conditions for its continued existence in any form appear to be that the MKO ditch its ideological leader, Massoud Rajavi; that it changes the strategy of armed struggle for exclusively propaganda work; and that it changes its name so that the MKO stays on the terrorist lists but members continue to work as the NCR.

The significance of these demands is that they cut right to the heart of the MKO’s existence as a coherent force. For years, Massoud Rajavi has remained invisible while his wife, Maryam, was presented as the acceptable public face of the MKO. This barely disguised deception has enabled the organization to present itself as a democratic force, despite its well known pseudo-communist origins and the cult-like characteristics it has acquired since 1985. This massive inconsistency in the MKO’s public profile and its internal dynamics, at times produce dramatic and disturbing events. For instance when Maryam Rajavi was arrested in Paris in 2003 on terrorism charges, the MKO had no other recourse but to orchestrate a series of self-immolations by members in order to terrorize the French government into releasing her.

Moreover the MKO has been deeply committed to "armed struggle" since its emergence in the 1960’s. Therefore, relinquishing the "principle" of armed struggle would seriously unsettle the organization and most likely lead to the emergence of splinter groups. Western governments need to take this into account before they consider removing the MKO from their terrorist lists.

While the U.S. has been aware of the problems presented by the MKO, it has only lately begun to address them seriously. The designation of protected status under the Fourth Geneva Convention in July 2004 constituted the first practical step the U.S. has taken to deal with the group. This allows the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to process individual members and remove them from Iraq without lifting the terrorist status of the whole organization â€“ a kind of controlled dissolution.

Almost as though they had anticipated the outcome from the start, the Iranians had, since the summer of 2003, been offering amnesty to "repentant" MKO who wanted to return to Iran. This was hugely controversial inside Iran. While the vast majority of Iranians are either ignorant or indifferent toward the exiled group, supporters of the Islamic Republic are highly sensitive to the violence inflicted by the organization on their leaders and fellow supporters, particularly in the period 1981-1984 when the MKO’s armed struggle was at its peak. In spite of this, Iranian officials pushed ahead with the offer, and since December 2004, the ICRC has voluntarily repatriated 41 individuals who have been de-briefed and then re-united with their families. No prosecutions are planned, although it is understood that repatriated members should not take part in political activity. However, the officially repatriated members constitute only a tiny number of MKO members that have returned to Iran since May 2003. According to reliable sources, more than 300 members have fled Ashraf and returned to Iran in the past 19 months. In almost all cases these members surrendered to the Iranian customs authorities on the Iran-Iraq border, who subsequently handed them over to the Ministry of Intelligence. The former members were transferred to Tehran and debriefed for two days by Iranian intelligence officers in specially designed reception centers in the Marmar and Esteghlal Hotels, before being released to their families.

But more interesting than this has been the information given by returning members about conditions in the Ashraf camp in Diyala. While U.S. forces control the camp perimeter, they have allowed the MKO to maintain its internal command structure, leaving the members under conditions of psychological coercion. It is widely believed that around 1,000 disaffected MKO members approached the U.S. army and requested to be separated from the organization, and are now apparently being held in a separate part of the camp. [3] These developments seem to suggest that the longer the MKO remain ensconced in Ashraf, the more likely it is that the organization disintegrates in the face of overwhelming internal and external pressures.

Conclusion

The downfall of Saddam Hussein effectively spelled the end for the Mojahedin-e-Khalq’s presence in Iraq armed or otherwise. While the U.S. could have made the best out of the situation by swapping MKO leaders for senior al-Qaeda members in Iranian custody, for a variety of complex reasons this "near-deal" was never implemented. The only real issue on the ground is how and when to remove the MKO from its Ashraf base. The Iraqi elections are likely to accelerate this process and thus remove a major obstacle in improving ties between Iran and the new Iraqi regime.

Whether Western governments subsequently remove the MKO from the terrorist list remains to be seen. But before any de-designation takes place, western policy makers should bear in mind that the MKO irrespective of its massive decline in recent years is still a highly sensitive issue for the Islamic Republic. Therefore de-designation runs the risk of complicating wider counter-terrorism efforts in the region not least Iran’s support for Hezbollah and Palestinian Islamic groups.

Massoud Khodabandeh is a former member of the Mojahedin-e-Khalq, and mainly served in the organization’s intelligence/security department. Khodabandeh left the Mojahedin in 1996 and currently lives in the north of England, where he works as a security consultant.

Notes:

Iraqi Television, November 5, 2003

Mehr News Agency, September 2, 2004

Nejat Association, May 17, 2004. The Nejat Association based in Tehran brings together families of MKO members currently based in the Ashraf camp in Iraq. The Association has been lobbying the ICRC and the Iranian government for the repatriation of MKO members to Iran.

TERRORISM MONITOR

June 26, 2005 0 comment

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