Articles

National Pride of Iranians: Reject the Rajavis and their Patrons

The alignment of the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) with external military pressure against Iran represents a complex and contentious dimension of the group’s politics. While Maryam Rajavi publicly disavows foreign military invasions, critical observers and academic analyses frequently note a stark contradiction between these official diplomatic statements and the ton of the group’s media apparatus.

Historically, the MEK’s trajectory – from its anti-Western militant origins to its siding with Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war- has shaped a deeply polarizing public perception. This background fuels accusations from critics that opposition factions may tacitly or overtly welcome external geopolitical shocks or infrastructure degradation as mechanisms to weaken the ruling government in Tehran, regardless of the broader humanitarian costs or civilian casualties.

Within scholarly literature the MEK is frequently characterized as a political chameleon that tailors its messaging to match the strategic desires of international interlocutors while maintaining internal organizational dynamics described by detractors as cult-like. Consequently, when external escalations or military actions occur, the disconnect between the NCRI’s stated ten-point plan for a democratic republic and the apparent celebratory reporting of its media outlets exposes a profound strategic dilemma.

Observers argue that this dynamic heavily impairs the organization’s domestic legitimacy inside Iran, where memories of the group’s alignment with Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war remain an unforgivable grievance for the vast majority of the population, thereby complicating any genuine internal transition of power.

Moreover, the world public opinion as well as the Iranian nation admit that the US president Donald Trump has lost the battle with Iran. Simon Tissdal, a Gurdian’s commentator asserts, “Feckless and clueless, Donald Trump is lost in Iran, unable to find a way out of the disastrous war he started.” He asks a crucial question: “How often have Trump and Pete Hegseth, the Pentagon’s wildling lord of bones, hailed a bogus victory?”

Trump’s fake claims of victory against Iran are very similar to the four-decade long claims of overthrowing the Islamic republic repeated by Massoud and Maryam Rajavi. Trump claimed this week to be “winning big”. “No one believes him,” writes Tissdal. “Even as it counts the vast human and economic cost of his Persian folly, a watching world scoffs at US impotence.”

We are being pulled back into a conflict “with no clearly articulated political end state,” said Mark Hertling in The Bulwark. We can destroy more but Iran can disrupt more,” driving oil prices, attacking Arab state neighbors and straining US alliances, and drawing us “deeper into an open-ended campaign.”

Trump failed to heed a crucial warfare, said Mike Nelson in The Dispatch: “Know you enemy.” He wrongly believed the U.S. and Israel’s initial decapitation strikes would topple Iran.

This war had left Trump “adrift,” said Peter Baker in The New York Times. Facing an opponent, he can’t “bend to his will and a geopolitical conflict that cannot be won through nasty social media posts.”

As Simon Tisdall states, “Trump’s self-love, not Iran, is global enemy No 1. He’s the principal reason this war is escalating uncontrollably again. He’s a one-man weapon of mass destruction.”

Maryam Rajavi and her disappeared husband should also learn that the media controversy, focusing on one-sided narratives and even forging narratives will not conceal the crimes of “a dangerous monster” called Donald Trump. The Iranian nation who are tolerating the grieves and casualties of the war, hate the Rajavis and their Imperialist and Zionist sponsors. The Iranians’ profound sense of satisfaction and identity derived from their nation is unheard of for the MEK leaders.

Mazda Parsi

July 22, 2026 0 comments

Mujahedin Khalq Organization's Propaganda System

Italian legislators fooled by MEK’s polished presentations

Maryam Rajavi, the leader of the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) , remains one of the most polarizing figures in modern Middle Eastern politics. To understand why she has been received by democratic institutions like the Italian Parliament despite the MEK’s highly controversial, violent history and its frequent characterization as a cult, one must examine the intersection of international geopolitics, sophisticated public relations, and the shifting strategies of Western foreign policy.

The Dual Narratives around the MEK

To comprehend her reception in European legislative bodies, it is necessary to contrast the two bluntly different narratives surrounding the MEK.

On one hand, scholarly literature, independent human rights reports, and historical accounts detail a dark legacy. Founded in the 1960s as an Islamist-Marxist student militia, the MEK actively participated in the 1979 Iranian Revolution but subsequently crashed with the newly established Islamic Republic government. The group fled to Iraq and found shelter under Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War, the group took up arms against its own homeland, cementing its reputation among many Iranians as traitors. During this exile, researchers and former members document that the MEK transformed into a highly insular, authoritarian organization. Academic studies and government reports, such as those by the RAND Corporation and Human Rights Watch, have detailed severe internal abuses, including mandatory divorces, enforced celibacy, sleep deprivation, physical abuse, and the isolation of members from their families.

On the other hand, the NCRI presents Maryam Rajavi as “a champion of a secular, democratic, and non-nuclear Iran”. Her platform, encapsulated in her “Ten-Point Plan,” advocates for the separation of religion and state, gender equality, the abolition of the death penalty, and peaceful coexistence. In this narrative, the MEK is the most organized and viable opposition capable of toppling the government in Tehran.

Why do Western Politicians including the Italian Parliament Receive Maryam Rajavi?

Assessments of whether the MEK is a genuine democratic alternative or a harmful cult are highly subjective and depend heavily on diverse geopolitical perspectives. Rather than endorsing a single viewpoint, analyzing the political mechanisms reveals several key reasons why the Italian Parliament and other Western legislative bodies have hosted Rajavi:

The Strategy of “The Enemy of My Enemy”

In Western foreign policy circles, particularly among hawkish factions, the primary objective regarding Iran is the containment or overthrow of the Islamic Republic. For many politicians, the MEK’s dark history is overshadowed by its utility as an active, highly organized adversary to the Iranian government. Hosting Maryam Rajavi is often utilized by Western parliamentarians as a diplomatic lever to pressure and irritate the clerical regime in Tehran.

The Transition from Terrorists to “Democratic Partners”

The MEK was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) by the United States and European nations due to its history of violence, which included the killing of several US citizens in the 1970s and subsequent bombings inside Iran. However, following the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, the group initiated a massive, multi-million-dollar lobbying campaign. By hiring prominent former Western officials, legal experts, and public relations firms, they successfully argued that their past violence was defensive and that they had permanently renounced terrorism.

Sophisticated Lobbying and Parliamentary Structure

European parliaments, including Italy’s, operate with decentralized committee structures and multi-party coalitions. Often, invitations to speak are not extended by the parliament as a unified, official state body, but rather by specific parliamentary committees, human rights groups, or cross-party friendship associations. The NCRI has established deep relationships with individual European MPs and senators across the political spectrum by framing their struggle around universally appealing values: women’s rights, human rights, and opposition to Islamic Republic. For many busy legislators, the NCRI’s polished presentations, combined with the endorsement of high-profile international figures (such as former US cabinet members and European dignitaries), make hosting Rajavi appear to be a straightforward defense of human rights, often without a deep dive into the group’s complex and controversial history.

In Italy, the MEK’s political arm, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), has built a highly sophisticated network of contacts. Academic analyses of the MEK’s lobbying strategies demonstrate that the group does not target institutions cold; instead, they leverage relationships with sympathetic Italian parliamentarians—particularly from center-right parties like Forza Italia and the Lega, as well as centrist liberals—who sit on foreign affairs committees or are affiliated with the Foundation.

Intelligence Sharing and Political Utility

Western interest in the MEK is also sustained by the group’s intelligence-gathering capabilities inside Iran. Most notably, in 2002, the MEK exposed the existence of Iran’s nuclear facilities at Natanz and Arak. Although experts suggest this intelligence may have been passed to the MEK by foreign intelligence agencies like Israel’s Mossad, the revelation established the MEK as a valuable asset in the eyes of Western security establishments. This perceived utility encourages certain political factions to maintain open channels of communication with Rajavi.

In summary, Maryam Rajavi’s appearances before legislative bodies like the Italian Parliament are the result of a highly effective rebranding campaign, sophisticated parliamentary lobbying, and a pragmatic geopolitical environment where Western lawmakers utilize the MEK as a tool of political pressure against the Iranian government, despite the serious controversies and allegations of human rights abuses associated with the group’s past and internal practices. Associating with the group severely damages the credibility of Western nations in the eyes of ordinary Iranians.

Mazda Parsi

July 18, 2026 0 comments

MEK's abusive language against members and critics

Mujahedin Khalq Organization's Propaganda System

The Rhetorical Style and Polemical Language of the MEK

The Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK), also known as the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI), is one of the most controversial and tightly structured opposition movements in modern Iranian history. While the group presents a highly polished, democratic, and secular image to Western policymakers, its internal culture and the literature it directs at critics, defectors, and political rivals tell a vastly different story. Scholars of Iranian politics, historians, and sociologists who have analyzed the MEK’s publications, internal communiqués, and public statements have frequently highlighted the group’s use of highly aggressive, vitriolic, and exclusionary language. When attacking its critics, the MEK regularly employs a polemical, highly personalized, and abusive rhetorical style—often characterized by detractors and academic observers as “low-class,” conspiratorial, and linguistically violent—which brands any dissenting voice as an agent of the Iranian regime, a traitor, or a moral degenerate.

This distinctive rhetorical style is deeply rooted in the group’s ideological evolution, which merged Marxist-Leninist dialectics with a radicalized, Shia Islamist complex. Over decades of isolation, first in Iraqi military camps under Saddam Hussein and later in closed compounds in Albania, this ideology curdled into a highly insular worldview. Within this framework, there is no room for critique; anyone who questions the leadership of Massoud and Maryam Rajavi is met not with intellectual debate, but with systematic character assassination.

Ideological Roots of the MEK’s Polemical Literature

To understand the harshness of the MEK’s literature when attacking critics, one must examine its foundational ideology. Founded in 1965 by leftist Iranian students, the MEK blended Marxist social analysis with Islam. This ideological synthesis created a binary worldview: the world was divided strictly into the forces of revolutionary progress (the MEK) and the forces of imperialism.

In his comprehensive book on the MEK’s history, titled “The Iranian Mojahedin”, historian Ervand Abrahamian explains that When the group fell out with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s governmet after the 1979 revolution and was forced into exile, this binary worldview intensified. The MEK began to view itself as the sole legitimate representative of the Iranian people. Consequently, any critic of the group was not merely expressing a differing political opinion; according to the MEK, critics were actively impeding the revolution and serving the interests of the Islamic Republic.

Academic analyses of the MEK’s texts show that this ideological rigidity manifests as a linguistic style that leaves no room for gray areas. Critics are routinely described using highly charged religious and political epithets designed to dehumanize them and strip them of political legitimacy.

Rhetorical Tropes and Vocabulary Used Against Critics

Scholars and journalists who have studied the MEK’s Persian-language publications (such as its journal Mojahed) and its various online outlets note several recurring linguistic tropes used to discredit opponents:

The “Regime Agent” and “Infiltrator” Label

The most common accusation leveled against any critic—whether they are Western journalists, academic researchers, or Iranian human rights activists—is that they are paid agents or spies of the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence. In MEK literature, critics are rarely addressed by their arguments; instead, they are labeled as “mozdur” (mercenary), “vabasteh” (dependent/affiliated), or “nokhaleh” (scum/infiltrator). By framing every critique as a psychological operation directed by Tehran, the MEK attempts to bypass the substance of the criticism entirely.

Dehumanizing and Class-Based Epithets

The MEK’s polemical literature frequently lapses into language that observers describe as vulgar or low-class. Critics and defectors are often referred to using derogatory terms such as “kha’en” (traitor), “khofash” (bat—implying they fear the light of the MEK’s truth), “kaseh-lis” (bowl-licker/sycophant), and “gorg” (wolf). This harsh, street-level vocabulary contrasts sharply with the diplomatic, human-rights-focused language the group’s political vitrine, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), uses in English-language press releases directed at Western governments.

Sexualized and Moral Character Assassination

For defectors (referred to in MEK literature as borideh, meaning “the severed ones”), the attacks are highly personalized and frequently target their moral and sexual integrity. In his book The Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization: A Sociological Study of a Cult, sociologist Saeed Paivandi points out that the MEK relies on public shaming to maintain internal discipline and discredit those who leave. Defectors who speak out about human rights abuses inside the organization are routinely accused in MEK literature of being morally corrupt, sexually deviant, or financially motivated by the Iranian government. This literature seeks to completely destroy the critic’s social standing within the Iranian diaspora.

The Language of Internal “Self-Criticism” and Public Denunciation

The aggressive tone directed at external critics is a direct reflection of the linguistic violence practiced within the organization. Former members of the MEK have documented the existence of mandatory daily and weekly “cleansing” or “self-criticism” sessions (known as Ghosl-e Haftegi or Weekly Bath).

In these sessions, members are forced to write down and publicly read their private thoughts, sexual desires, and doubts about the leadership. If a member’s self-criticism is deemed insufficient, other members are encouraged to shout insults, spit, and use highly abusive language to break down their psychological resistance. The vocabulary of these internal sessions—which includes terms of intense self-loathing and submission—directly bleeds into the public literature the group produces to attack external opponents. When a member defects and becomes a critic, the private confessions extracted during these internal sessions are often weaponized and published in MEK literature to paint the defector as unstable, untrustworthy, and weak.

Contrast Between Persian and English Literature

A striking feature of the MEK’s literary output is the dual nature of its rhetoric, which varies wildly depending on the target audience:

The External/Western Face: In English, French, and German publications, the NCRI and MEK employ the language of modern liberal democracy. They speak of “universal suffrage,” “gender equality,” “the abolition of the death penalty,” and “peaceful coexistence.”

The Internal/Persian Face: In Persian-language broadcasts, internal pamphlets, and sectarian websites, the language remains deeply authoritarian, aggressive, and abusive. Critics are subjected to relentless polemical attacks, characterized by conspiracy theories and vitriolic denunciations.

This linguistic dichotomy has led many analysts and foreign policy experts to warn that the MEK’s democratic rhetoric is merely a tactical facade designed to win political backing in Washington and Brussels, while its authentic internal culture remains deeply intolerant of dissent.

Mazda Parsi

References:

Abrahamian, Ervand. The Iranian Mojahedin.
Banisadr, Masoud. Masoud: Memoirs of an Iranian Rebel.
Paivandi, Saeed. The Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization: A Sociological Study of a Cult.
Singleton, Anne. Saddam’s Private Army: How Joint US-Iraqi Operations Created a Volunteer Terrorist Force.
Berman, Ilan. Making Sense of the MEK. American Foreign Policy Council.
Masters, Jonathan. Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK). Council on Foreign Relations.

July 15, 2026 0 comments

Lindsey Graham, US hardliner against Iran

USA

Death of Lindsey Graham, notorious hardliner against Iran

The sudden death of Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina at the age of 71, marks the loss of one of the most influential and aggressive foreign policy hawks in modern American history. Throughout his more than three decades in Congress, Graham served as a primary architect of a strong, interventionist U.S. foreign policy. Regarding Iran he represented one of the most consistent and aggressive postures in modern American political history. Over several decades, Graham’s alignment with various Iranian opposition groups shifted from his past rhetorical and political support for the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) to his more recent embrace of Reza Pahlavi. His death removes a critical legislative driver of maximum-pressure campaigns, military strategy, and direct confrontation policies against the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Despite these shifting alliances with different anti-regime factions, Graham’s underlying objective remained entirely unchanged: the total collapse of the Islamic Republic of Iran, achieved through military intervention if necessary. To understand why Graham pursued this path, one must examine his ideological roots in the Reagan Doctrine, his deep-seated disbelief in diplomacy, his geopolitical alignment with regional allies like Israel, and his domestic political positioning.

The Ideology of Graham: The Reagan Doctrine and “Evil”

To understand Lindsey Graham’s steadfast advocacy for military confrontation with Iran, one must look to his political coming-of-age during the presidency of Ronald Reagan. In his memoir, Graham notes that he did not possess strong political convictions until Reagan assumed the presidency. He adopted a worldview that divided the geopolitical landscape into binary forces of good and evil, heavily influenced by Reagan’s framing of the Soviet Union as the “Evil Empire”.

In Graham’s view, the modern-day Islamic Republic of Iran represents the contemporary equivalent of this existential threat. Because Graham viewed the Iran as “inherently evil”, he constantly rejected the fundamental premise of diplomacy. This was his shared political view with Maryam Rajavi, the leader of the MEK who has always criticized the West for engagement in diplomacy calling it as “appeasement” with the Islamic Republic.

The Shift from the MEK to Reza Pahlavi: Tactical Opportunism

Graham’s shifting alliances with Iranian dissident groups reflect tactical opportunism in service of his unchanging goal of regime change. For years, the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), a highly organized and controversial exiled opposition group, garnered significant support from hawkish American politicians, including Graham. The MEK was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) by the United States until 2012, but it maintained a powerful lobbying apparatus in Washington, presenting itself as the viable, organized force capable of toppling the Iranian government.

However, the MEK’s history—which includes Marxist-Islamist roots, terrorist acts against Iranian civilians and authorities, and alignment with Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War—made it highly unpopular among the broader Iranian domestic population. As the prospect of domestic uprisings in Iran grew, particularly during the cost-of-living and civil rights protests of recent years, Graham and other hawks pivoted toward Reza Pahlavi, the exiled Crown Prince and son of the late Shah of Iran.

By embracing Pahlavi, Graham sought to justify his anti-Iran approach under a recognizable historical figure who could theoretically unite disparate opposition factions, while continuing to lobby for U.S. military backing to facilitate this transition. However, Reza Pahlavi’s inability to mobilize a cohesive, powerful domestic political movement is rooted in deep historical grievances, his support for military attack against Iran, organizational disfunction, and the shifting demographics of modern Iran. He is still criticized by Iranians for his ignorance of the crimes US and Israel committed in the air strikes against Iranian civilians including the school children in Minab.

Protecting Israel and the so-called Regional Order

Another primary driver of Graham’s hawkish stance was his absolute commitment to the security of Israel and the preservation of American hegemony in the Middle East. Graham has argued that allowing the Iranian government to survive, develop nuclear capabilities, or maintain its regional influence would result in a catastrophic security vacuum

By advocating for the total destruction of Iran’s military capacity, Graham believes the United States can permanently secure Israel, protect global shipping lanes (such as the critical Strait of Hormuz), and reassert American dominance.

The decline of Republican foreign policy apparatus

The impact of Lindsey Graham’s death on the hostile policies of the United States against Iran can be understood through several key geopolitical and legislative dimensions.

The immediate impact of his death is the removal of the most prominent, media-savvy legislative voice calling for direct military confrontation with Tehran. Without Graham’s constant agitation on national security panels and cable news, the political momentum for initiating direct military strikes or ground interventions against Iran is likely to decrease. While hostility toward Iran remains a bipartisan consensus in Washington, few lawmakers possess Graham’s willingness to openly champion high-risk military escalations.

Analysts have noted that Trump’s actual foreign policy often resembled a “Lindsey Graham foreign policy” more than an isolationist one, largely due to Graham’s personal access and persuasive abilities. Graham frequently spoke with Trump, advised him on national security, and pushed him to greenlight interventions and maintain crippling sanctions.

With Graham gone, the internal balance of power within the Republican foreign policy apparatus may shift away from neoconservative interventionism. This leaves a vacuum that could be filled by more isolationist or “restraint”-oriented advisors who favor decoupling from Middle Eastern conflicts to focus on domestic issues or great-power competition with China. Consequently, the Trump administration may face less internal pressure to escalate tensions with Iran into a hot war, potentially opening narrow pathways for diplomatic deterrence or containment rather than active military engagement.

Graham was also one of Israel’s most steadfast allies in Congress, viewing the security of the U.S. and Israel as entirely inseparable. His death deprives Israel of its most influential defender in the Senate at a time when American public opinion—including younger Republican voters—is gradually shifting toward skepticism regarding the level of U.S. support for Israeli military operations. Without Graham’s legislative maneuvering, the push to automatically underwrite regional military campaigns aimed at rolling back Iranian influence may face greater scrutiny and friction in Congress.

While Lindsey Graham’s death will not suddenly transform U.S.-Iran relations into a state of diplomacy, it significantly reduces the active legislative pressure for direct military escalation and weakens the political coalition supporting a “maximum pressure” campaign. His passing marks the fading of an era of highly interventionist American foreign policy, potentially paving the way for a more cautious, containment-oriented approach to Iran. Eventually, Iranian opposition groups like MEK and Monarchists will lose one of their tools to push for war, sanctions and pressure against Iranians.

Mazda Parsi

July 13, 2026 0 comments

Mujahedin Khalq Organization's Propaganda System

When Reality Does not Fit the MEK’s Narrative

Sometimes some scenes are so expressive that they no longer need a lecture or analysis. The images and videos released from the funeral of the leader of the Islamic Republic, whatever they are, have been before the eyes of millions of people. The news media reported that “huge” crowds flooded the streets of Tehran for the funeral procession of Iran’s late supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who was killed on the first day of the war with the US and Israel.

However, for Massoud Rajavi the leader of the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), reality is always what is narrated behind the walls of Ashraf 3, not what people see with their own eyes. It is as if every time an important event happens in Iran, the group leaders jump into a fantasy contest, instead of analyzing the reality. One day they link everything to internal disputes in the government of Iran, the other day they condemn monarchists fabricating stories to convince their isolated members at their remote camp Ashraf 3, that they enjoy the support of Iranian people.

It is a bizarre tactic; when reality does not fit the MEK’s narrative, instead of correcting the narrative, they deny reality. For the Rajavis erasing the very the problem is easier than accepting the truth or solving the problem.

There are certain important questions to ask Massoud and Maryam Rajavi: If your claims are so strong and defensible, why shouldn’t the members inside Ashraf 3 see the images and films of the IRI’s late leader’s funeral? Why must there always be an “organizational lens” between their eyes and reality? Why are the MEK leaders afraid of their members’ seeing a few images and films?

Just publish a few images and leave the judgment to the audience!

Hey Mr. Rajavi,

If you still believe that the truth is in your favor, show these images to the members inside Ashraf 3! For the first time, let the truth enter the camp uncensored!

Hamid Atabay, defector of the MEK in Albania

Translated by Nejat Society

July 11, 2026 0 comments

Mujahedin Khalq 's Terrorism

From Baghdad to Washington: How the MEK Aligns with Corrupt Global Politicians

The Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) is a highly controversial dissident group that was officially designated as a terrorist organization by the United States until 2012 and the European Union until 2009. Academic experts, journalists, and government intelligence reports frequently characterize the group as a cult-like organization due to its rigid internal hierarchy, mandatory devotion to its leadership, and restricted freedom for its members.

To rehabilitate its global image and gain political legitimacy, the MEK operates a multi-million-dollar international lobbying network. Rather than relying on traditional grassroots diplomacy, the group heavily relies on financial incentives—including lavish speaking fees, campaign donations, and funded travel—to secure the backing of foreign lawmakers. This transactional approach frequently attracts opportunistic political figures, many of whom have faced domestic investigations and convictions for separate financial corruption, bribery, and illegal foreign lobbying. To buy legitimacy, the group’s lobbying network includes a pattern of corrupt foreign sponsors which is extended from Baghdad to Washington.

Alia Nassif Jassim found with $15 million in cash

Alia Nassif is a former, prominent Iraqi Member of Parliament. In late June 2026, she and her son were detained in Baghdad as part of an aggressive, nationwide anti-corruption sweep led by Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi. Authorities found over 20 billion Iraqi dinars (approximately $15.5 million) and quantities of gold at her residence.

Historically, Nassif’s name has surfaced in political reporting surrounding Iraq’s interactions with the MEK. In past geopolitical contexts, particularly regarding the U.S. withdrawal and Baghdad’s evolving stance on Iranian-backed factions, observers and intelligence analysts have monitored her political alignments with the group. Following her arrest, Iraqi civil courts also ordered her to pay damages to an Interior Ministry official in late June 2026 for making defamatory media statements.

MEK’s deeply entrenched European ally

Alejo Vidal-Quadras Former European Parliament vice president and a prominent Spanish conservative leader is a vocal supporter of the Mujahedi-e Khalq. In 2013, a major investigation revealed that Vidal-Quadras’s far-right political party, Vox, was heavily financed by foreign money. Over €1 million in campaign funds was funneled to the party by Iranian dissidents which meant MEK. Vidal-Quadras later clarified that the funding was actually directed through him to launch the party.

Vidal-Quadras is one of the MEK’s most deeply entrenched European allies. He spent decades operating the Brussels-based International Committee in Search of Justice (ISJ) to lobby for the so-called National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), the MEK’s political front.

Gold Bar Bob

In the United States, Former Senator Robert “Bob” Menendez, dubbed “Gold Bar Bob,” the powerful former Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was convicted on 16 federal counts in July 2024. In January 2025, he was sentenced to 11 years in federal prison. The FBI raided his home and found hundreds of thousands of dollars in hidden cash, luxury vehicles, and over $100,000 worth of solid gold bars. He was convicted of taking these bribes to act as an illegal foreign agent for Egypt and Qatar and to protect corrupt businessmen.

Alongside his illegal dealings with other foreign governments, Menendez was a long-time, fierce Congressional advocate for the MEK. He frequently spoke at events organized by the Organization of Iranian-American Communities (OIAC)—the MEK’s primary U.S. advocacy arm—and aggressively lobbied the State Department on the group’s behalf. Due to his active political and propaganda support for the group, Iran officially placed Menendez on its terrorist sanction blacklist.

Mayor Rudy’s fat bank accounts

The former New York City Mayor and presidential advisor filed for bankruptcy following a $148 million defamation judgment regarding election interference. While his primary legal downfalls stem from election conspiracy indictments, federal investigators have repeatedly scrutinized his consulting business and opaque foreign cash flows under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).

Giuliani served as one of the MEK’s most visible, highly paid American surrogates. For years, he flew to the MEK’s headquarters in Albania and to rallies in Paris, demanding regime change alongside MEK leader Maryam Rajavi. He openly admitted to receiving lavish speaking fees from the MEK’s network, routinely pulling in tens of thousands of dollars per speech to lobby the U.S. government to legitimize the group.

Mazda Parsi

July 4, 2026 0 comments

Janez Jansa, Slovenian PM, MEK's sponsor

Mujahedin Khalq Organization as a terrorist group

Slovenian PM Janez Janša, MEK & Israel promoter

On June 23rd, the TV channel and propaganda websites of the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) proudly announced the re-election of one of their supporters in Slovenia, “Janez Janša,” as Prime Minister, and emphasized in the news that he was their “staunch” supporter. Following this news, they enthusiastically published the full text of Janša’s speech at the MEK annual program in 2025.

Right-wing populist leader Janez Janša assumed office as Prime Minister of Slovenia in early June 2026, marking the start of his fourth term. According to DW, his new coalition government immediately sparked domestic and international controversy with divisive policies, ranging from proposed domestic tax cuts to major shifts in foreign policy.

Janša’s controversial policies include his involvement with the MEK, the formerly terrorist designated cult-like group under the ruling of Massoud and Maryam Rajavi. On July 12^th, 2021, the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament (S&D Group) called for clarification on PM Janez Janša’s participation in a meeting sponsored by the MEK.

The S & D group published an announcement on their website stating that they were shocked to learn that the prime minister of Slovenia, Janez Janša, whose country is chairing the EU rotating presidency, addressed an online gathering, which was organized by the so-called National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), the MEK political vitrine.

“This anti-democratic, cult-like organization, which was on the EU terrorist list until 2009, has a long history of human rights abuses documented by organizations such as Human Rights Watch”, the announcement read.

Moreover, Tonino Picula, S&D spokesperson on foreign affairs and Jytte Guteland, S&D shadow rapporteur on Iran, made the following statement:

“Support for a group with such a violent, anti-democratic record, at the level of the prime minister of a country holding the rotating presidency of the EU, is extremely irresponsible and grave. It undermines the ongoing efforts of the EU and its High Representative Josep Borrell to revive the nuclear agreement with Iran, a key foreign-policy priority for the EU.

“We call on the EPP Group to immediately and clearly distance themselves from such destructive behavior from one of its members, and clarify whether it supports such a key EU foreign policy objective as the restoration of the nuclear agreement with Iran, or not.”

One of the first actions that the staunch supporter of Maryam Rajavi has taken is to trample on the rights of the Palestinian people. On June 28^th Slovenia Times reported that Janša has announced plans to reverse the previous government’s 2024 recognition of the State of Palestine, claiming it violated domestic law. Additionally, the government intends to relocate the Slovenian embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. If completed, Slovenia would become the first EU member state to do so.

Jerusalem is a part of the State of Palestine according to UN resolutions. That’s why, despite Israel’s requests, except for a few limited countries, the rest of the world is not willing to move its embassy to Jerusalem. In order to declare his unity with the Israel regime, which does not hesitate to commit any kind of crime against civilians and children, Janša reversed the rule of his country. This is a totally normal act by a person who ignores the five-decade long background of the MEK’s violent activities and the cult-like extremist attitudes it still maintains.

Mazda Parsi

July 1, 2026 0 comments

Maryam Rajavi

Maryam Rajavi’s Stance, Peace or Survival Tactic?

Today, Maryam Rajavi declares that she welcomes any agreement to stop the war and presents herself as a supporter of peace and tranquility for the Iranian people. But a fundamental question arises: if peace and agreement have been so important, why has the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) for decades considered every tension between Iran and the West as an opportunity to advance its political project?

This organization has built its political existence for years on crisis, sanctions, external pressure and the nuclear issue. Whenever tensions increased, it presented them as a sign of the nearness of the “collapse of the regime”. Whenever the paths of negotiation and agreement were opened, its media spoke of their failure.

Today, the situation has changed. An agreement and a reduction in tensions would deprive the organization of one of its most important political and propaganda tools. Therefore, its leaders try to present themselves as supporters of peace, in order to avoid even greater political isolation.

If peace is in the best interest of the Iranian people, why has the drumbeat of crisis been beaten for years? If war is a tragedy for the people, why was every sign of military confrontation presented as a political possibility? And if an agreement is desirable, why were policies promoted that led to the escalation of pressure and confrontation?

The problem is not that Maryam Rajavi is now talking about peace. The problem is that this stance contradicts the organization’s long history. An organization that has been nourished by crisis for decades is now trying to wear the mask of a peacemaker.

History does not lose its memory. What is presented today as “support for the agreement” looks more like an attempt to hide the fact that any lasting agreement and any reduction in tensions in the region takes away political ground from a movement that has for years linked its existence to the continuation of crises.

Hassan Shahbaz, former member of the MEK in Albania

Translated by Nejat Society

June 22, 2026 0 comments

Members of the MEK

The MEK did not allow them to visit their father

Sepideh Teimorian spoke about the ban on visiting her father after his death.

After the media of the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) announced the death of Yazdan Teimorian, a 74-year-old member of the organization, on June 15, his daughter Sepideh published a letter on her Instagram account addressed to her late father in mourning for him, revealing dark aspects of the difficult and painful experience of the Yazdani family during the years of involvement with the MEK.

The letter that Sepideh Teimorian posted on her Instagram on the occasion of the death of her father, whom she had not seen since she was ten years old, points to the trip she and her sister went on to Albania in 2017 to visit their father, but during their week-long stay in the country, the MEK leaders did not allow them to visit their father. She further writes for her late father: “It later became clear that you were not even informed of our presence. This was revealed when a social worker, during a medical visit, discussed it with you. It was recorded on video, which I only saw later.”

Sepideh Teimorian’s post on Instagram for her late father

Ali PourAhmad, a former member of the MEK, explains how the Teimorians fell apart following Yazdan’s membership in the MEK. According to him, Sahar and Sepideh are his second and third children who were smuggled from Iraq to Europe and North America in 1992, at the age of 11 and 10, along with hundreds of other MEK children. Sahar and Sepideh were taken to the Netherlands and, like other MEK children, probably wandered among MEK sympathizers, Dutch foster families, or orphanages. The family’s first child, Musa Teimorian, later left the organization. Their mother, Aghdas Adnani also left the MEK.

Sepideh Teimorian, distressed by her father’s bitter and painful fate, asks for peace after death in her post: “A peace that may have been out of reach during your lifetime.”

Mazda Parsi

June 20, 2026 0 comments

The cult of Rajavi

June 17th, 2003, a Counterproductive Event for the MEK

The self-immolations by MEK supporters in Europe in June 2003 are best understood as a mix of extreme political theater, coercive group dynamics, and leader-centered devotion. Two women – Neda Hassani in London and Sediqeh Mojaveri in Paris – died after setting themselves on fire during protests over Maryam Rajavi’s arrest in France. Rajavi had been arrested on 17 June 2003 along with many other MEK members in a French anti-terrorism operation.

European citizens where shocked to see MEK supporters set themselves ablaze as a form of protest to their leader’s arrest. This was considered by the MEK as an act of martyrdom. Since then, the two above-mentioned women are glorified as martyrs of the group and the others who were paralyzed by the fire they set on themselves, are over-valued as role models for the entire members of the group. What it suggests about the MEK?

The most striking feature is the intensity of personal loyalty to the leadership. In ordinary political movements, arrests trigger petitions, rallies, legal defense funds, or strikes. Self-immolation is something else: it suggests an environment where followers saw the leader’s detention not merely as a political setback but as an existential, sacred crisis.

That does not prove that leaders directly ordered anyone to die. But it does strongly suggest an organizational culture capable of producing self-destructive acts in defense of leadership. When members are socialized to treat obedience, sacrifice, and total commitment as moral duties, the boundary between “voluntary protest” and psychological coercion gets blurry. In case of the MEK, members had been coerced to do so according to the testimonies of former members.

Signs of a destructive cult

Therefore, many critics call the MEK cult-like. Calling a group a cult is often imprecise, but in this case, critics point to recognizable features:

-Charismatic, centralized leadership focused heavily on Massoud and Maryam Rajavi.

-Demand for total commitment, where personal identity becomes subordinate to the organization.

-Emotional absolutism, dividing the world into pure supporters and evil enemies.

-Readiness for self-sacrifice framed as proof of sincerity and loyalty.

-Suppression of internal dissent, reported by many former members over the years.

The 2003 self-immolations became one of the strongest public signs supporting that critique, because they looked less like spontaneous democratic activism and more like leader-fixated martyrdom.

Neda Hassani and Sediqeh Mojaveri

The deaths of the two women matter not just as isolated tragedies but as evidence of how vulnerable adherents can become inside highly controlling movements. Several layers are worth separating to interpret the deaths of the two women.

Individual agency: the women physically carried out the act themselves.

Organizational responsibility: if a movement creates intense pressure, glorifies sacrifice, and equates devotion with suffering, it bears moral responsibility even without issuing explicit instructions.

Symbolic messaging: self-immolation is designed to shock witnesses and force attention. In this case, it also signaled that Rajavi’s supporters understood her detention as worth dying for.

So, the deaths can be analyzed as both political communication and human exploitation.

The outcome of self-immolations for the MEK

Politically, the tactic was counterproductive outside the committed base. For sympathizers already deeply attached to the MEK, it may have reinforced solidarity. But to broader European audiences, it confirmed fears that the organization had fanatical or cultic tendencies. A movement trying to present itself as a democratic alternative usually benefits from showing discipline, public legitimacy, and respect for life. Supporting self-immolations do the opposite.

Ethically, this is hard to view as a legitimate form of protest in any positive sense. Self-immolation can sometimes be framed historically as a desperate act against overwhelming oppression. But here the trigger was the arrest of a political organization’s leader in a democratic country with legal procedures available. That makes the act look less like the “voice of the voiceless” and more like extreme leader worship under conditions of ideological control.

The key moral point is this: when people die for a leader’s prestige or freedom rather than for their own immediate survival, one should examine the structure of influence around them, not romanticize the sacrifice.

The 2003 self-immolations indicate that the MEK had, an intensely authoritarian internal culture with the power to drive followers toward lethal acts of devotion. The two deaths are best seen as tragic outcomes of manipulation, autocratic ideology, and leader-centered mobilization, not as healthy political resistance.

This event is one of the clearest cases critics use when arguing that the MEK functioned less like a normal opposition movement and more like a high-control organization built around the Rajavis, a cult of personality with a past record of acts of violence.

Mazda Parsi

June 17, 2026 0 comments

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