1. Executive Summary
This report presents verified information and first-hand evidence on the propaganda methods, psychological operations and cyber activities of the terrorist organization Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK). The findings are based on the sworn testimony of Mr. Behzad Alishahi, a former member of the group, delivered during the 41st session of the public trial of 104 MEK members in Tehran on October 20, 2025. Mr. Alishahi’s statements provide a clear picture of the MEK’s coordinated media and cyber network, operating from Camp Ashraf 3 in Manëz, Albania, with financial and technical support from foreign actors.
2. Methodology
The report relies on three main sources:
– Mr. Alishahi’s official and public testimony before the Tehran court;
-Documentary and media evidence on MEK propaganda and cyber-operations activities;
– Comparative analysis of international reports, including Human Rights Watch (2005) and RAND Corporation (2009), documenting the sectarian structure and systematic human rights violations within the organization.
The data has been collected and analyzed with the aim of providing reliable material for United Nations human rights mechanisms and Special Procedures.
3. Parallel
The Mujahedin-e-Khalq Organization of Iran (MEK) was founded in 1965, fusing Islamic and Marxist ideologies. During the 1970s, it carried out many assassinations, including the assassinations of American consultants to Rockwell International and Pan American Airlines.
After the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the group attempted to infiltrate the new political structures, but soon turned to armed confrontation. In June 1981, the MEK launched a violent uprising that killed hundreds of civilians and government officials, including President Mohammad-Ali Rajai and Prime Minister Mohammad-Javad Bahonar.
During the 1980s, MEK leaders fled to France and then to Iraq, where they collaborated directly with the Saddam Hussein regime and carried out cross-border attacks on Iran. The 1988 “Forough Javidan” (Operation Eternal Light) offensive led to the deaths of many Iranian soldiers and civilians, including women and children, and is widely considered a war crime and an act of treason.
After the fall of Saddam in 2003, US forces took control of Camp Ashraf in Iraq, and members were gradually relocated to Camp Ashraf 3 in Albania. Many international sources—including HRW (2005) and RAND (2009)—have documented coercive practices within the MEK: forced divorces, gender segregation, psychological conditioning, and imprisonment of dissidents.
In the past decade, with the loss of its military capabilities, the MEK has transformed into a foreign-sponsored propaganda and cyber machine. Hundreds of its members now work full-time online from Camp Ashraf 3, creating fake accounts and coordinated content to project a positive image of the sect and a negative image of Iranian society and government.
Documented examples include: • Spreading fake news about prison conditions and human rights issues in Iran; • Fabricating staged videos of so-called “hunger strikes” or “public protests”; • Collaborating with Zionist and Western media to spread distorted narratives; • Manipulative use of “human rights” or “democracy” slogans to lure vulnerable individuals abroad.
4. Findings (Testimony of Mr. Behzad Alishahi)
a) Personal context
Mr. Alishahi stated that he was a member of the MEK from 1984 to 2002, working mainly in the media and television section. In 1994, he was arrested and tortured within the organization after expressing internal criticism, and was then forced to continue working under surveillance.
b) Evolution of media activities
• Initially, the MEK published only one magazine called Mojahed and occasionally burned copies in public to attract attention. • During its stay in Iraq, the group produced Persian-language television programs under Saddam Hussein, with the aim of discrediting Iran during the war. • After moving to France, the MEK received significant financial and technical assistance from French entities, expanding into satellite broadcasts and digital networks.
c) Cyber operations in Camp Ashraf 3
According to the witness, members of Ashraf 3 work online 24 hours a day using fake accounts on platforms such as X (Twitter), Facebook and Telegram. The main objectives are: • Cleansing the image of past crimes and violence; • Historical revisionism and distortion of facts; • Recruiting supporters under the deceptive label of “human rights” or “pro-democracy”; • Artificially amplifying popularity through coordinated hashtags such as #FreeIran and #IranProtests.
d) Cooperation with foreign media and governments
Mr. Alishahi testified that several Western and regional media outlets cooperate with the MEK, often through paid publications or political influence operations. He cited the active support of France, Germany and Israel, which often use the MEK’s media infrastructure to spread anti-Iranian disinformation.
e) Declining public influence
He further stated that since the start of public trials in Iran exposing the MEK’s crimes, the group’s credibility in Europe has declined significantly. Events that once attracted hundreds of participants in Belgium now gather only a few attendees.
5. International Legal Framework
MEK propaganda and cyber operations clearly violate international law, including: • Articles 19 and 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which prohibit incitement to hatred and violence;
• The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999); • UN Security Council Resolution 2396 (2017) on the prevention of the terrorist use of information and communication technologies; • The Budapest Convention on Cybercrime (2001), binding on European states, including Albania.
According to these instruments, any facilitation or tolerance of terrorist information operations creates state responsibility for the host state.
6. Analysis
The evidence and relevant evidence demonstrate that the MEK has evolved from an armed militant group into a structured information warfare apparatus. Today, it operates as a foreign-sponsored propaganda and intelligence agency engaged in systematic disinformation aimed at societal destabilization, delegitimization of Iranian institutions, and manipulation of international perception. Such activities constitute a form of non-state extremism and fall within the framework of international counterterrorism law.
7. Conclusions and Recommendations
Conclusions
• The MEK’s media and cyber divisions function as a coordinated information arm serving the political interests of foreign powers; • The group exploits the principle of freedom of expression in Europe to spread hate speech, falsified reports, and incitement against the Iranian nation; • The Government of Albania has an obligation to ensure that its territory is not used for terrorist cyber operations.
Recommendations
– The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Iran and the Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression should jointly investigate the MEK’s propaganda and cyber activities;
– The Government of Albania should exercise effective oversight over Camp Ashraf 3 and limit any misuse of its digital infrastructure for hostile operations;
– UN Member States should conduct transparent reviews of the financial and media networks linked to the MEK;
– The United Nations Office for Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) should study the MEK’s cyber network as a case of extreme non-state information warfare;
– The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) should examine the financial flows linked to the MEK’s online propaganda and its affiliated NGOs.
Gazeta Impakt – Translated by Nejat Society
