Nejat Society

Farman Shafabin, MEK member who committed suicide

Farman Shafabin was a member of the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) who committed self-immolation in 1999. Farman had been recruited by the MEK from one of the Kurdish families who resided in the Ramadi Camp, Iraq.

During Saddam Hussein’s rule, some Iranian Kurdish families resided in the Ramadi Camp in Iraq primarily due to the Iran-Iraq War and the subsequent unrest in Kurdistan, which led to their forced replacement across the border into Iraq. The Baathist government of Iraq relocated these Iranian Kurds to a camp in Ramadi, west of Baghdad in 1981. The location was specifically called Tash, a camp near the city of Ramadi.

MEK recruited forces from refugee camps

The MEK used to recruit forces from within the residents of Camp Tash, in particular from families suffering from poor life and economic conditions. They faced numerous interconnected challenges affecting them and their children’s health, education, housing, and overall well-being. Camp Tash housed Iranian Kurdish refugees until its closure. Due to a deteriorating security situation, including water shortages and violence, the camp’s population was relocated to safer areas in northern Iraq, particularly near Sulaymaniyah, in the mid-2000s.

Mahvash Sepehri a torturer of the MKO

Due to the harsh living conditions, lack of facilities, and uncertain future, refugee camps could have been a suitable breeding ground for groups such as the MEK. Individuals in these camps, especially young people and teenagers, may have been looking for a way to improve their situation or to find a purpose in life.

Mehri Aligholi

The MEK’s need for forces

The MEK attempted to recruit Iranian refugees in Iraq using propaganda and promises such as fighting for Iran’s freedom, a better life, and social status. These promises could have appealed to vulnerable families and young people in the camps. Farman and his sisters, Shokrieh and Sabrieh were among these victims.
During and after the Iran-Iraq War, the MEK, which was based in Iraq, sought to recruit forces to strengthen its military and political organization. Iranian refugees in Iraq, including the residents of the small city of Ramadi, were considered a potential source of recruitment.
There are numerous reports, documents, and testimonies that indicate MEK’s recruitments from among Iranian refugees in Iraq. Farman, Shokrieh and Sabrieh were recruited as child soldiers of the MEK’s so-called National Liberation Army (NLA).

Who was Farman Shafabin?

At least three former members of the MEK, Siamk Naderi, Mirbagher Sedaghi, and Maryam Sanjabi recounted the heart-breaking story of Farman Shafabin who joined the MEK in 1997 from Camp Tash.

Farman Shafabin was a young man without knowledge of the history and nature of the Cult of Rajavi, and thought that he could leave the group whenever he changed his mind. After a year or so, when he realized that the group has no exit door, he asked to leave, but like other ill-fated members who faced great hardship when they asked to leave, he was met with a flood of insults and slander. He was labeled as “traitor” by the MEK commanders and a traitor was not allowed to leave the MEK.

Farman’s only demand was to return to his family. He tried for a year to be freed, and during this time he was constantly under pressure. Manipulation meetings were organized for him to force him to back down from his demands and stay in the camp.

Farman did not know Persian because he grew up in Iraq. He spoke Kurdish. So, he was always criticized for not speaking Persian in the MEK’s headquarters, Camp Ashraf. In the last large criticism meeting that Mehri Ali Qoli, a female commander, had organized for him on this issue, she shouted at him, “Farman!… Who are you? Do you remember that your father sold your sisters in Ramadi to feed your stomach!? Now you have become a thorn in our side, and you do not obey to speak Persian?”

After this meeting, Farman went outside and poured oil on his body. He returned to the hall, lit a lighter and set himself on fire. Other comrades tried to put him out. Then, he was sent to a hospital in Baghdad but died two days later.

Following the death of Farman, a high-ranking commander held a meeting to convince other members about Farman’s fate. Mahvash Sepehri (Nasrin), the then top commander of Camp Ashraf, criticized Farman’s comrades for his death, saying, “You were not harsh enough against Farman (meaning you didn’t criticize sharply). If you had slammed him, Farman wouldn’t have spoiled himself!”

There is no information about the fate of Farman’s sisters.

December 3, 2025 0 comments

Nejat Publications

Nejat Newsletter No.131

INSIDE THIS ISSUE
1. Washington’s Double Standard on Terrorism Betrays the Spirit of Liberty
The U.S. government says its “war on terror” protects free dom. In practice, every new intervention narrows the perimeter of freedom at home. The language of confronting evil abroad has become a cover for expanding state power

2. Emotional Dependency of MEK Children on their Arms
The recruitment and use of child soldiers by any armed group is a violation of international law, including the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Child on the involvement of children in armed conflicts.

3. Albania: Cyberattacks and the dead end in the management of Camp Ashraf 3
Ashraf-3, the fortified camp of the Mojahedin-e-Khalq (MEK) in Manzë, Albania, is a “city of exiles”: approximately 40 hectares with over a hundred buildings, isolated by high walls and
checkpoints. Around 2,500 dissident refugees live there under strict internal rules, a “sect”
whose members are denied a normal family life and can only conform to the association’s uncompromising line.

4. Letter of Houshang Pour Ebrahim’s sister to the UN
I am Soghra Pour Ebrahim, the sister of Houshang Pour Ebrahim. My brother was captured by the forces of the MEK on October 16, 1987, while serving his military service in the Baneh region of Kurdistan Province, Iran. Since that time, we have had no information about his fate, whereabouts, or condition.

5. Appeal from the Family of Mehraban and Kiumars Balaei
We sincerely request your assistance in arranging a meeting with my brothers, Mehraban Balaei and Kiumars Balaei, who are currently held in Manza Camp (known as Ashraf 3) in Albania

6. Ponerology of the MEK’s Pathocracy
A detailed examination of the leadership of Massoud and Maryam Rajavi over the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) indicates that the group’s ruling system aligns with the concepts of ponerology and pathocracy.

7. About Nejat Society

To view the pdf file click here

December 3, 2025 0 comments

Mujahedin Khalq Organization as a terrorist group

Israeli Hayom: The case for redesignating the MEK, Learning from history

The Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) was previously listed as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the United States until September 2012 due to the killing of US personnel in Iran during the 1970s and its ties to former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. The US State Department’s criteria for FTO designation include being a foreign organization that engages in terrorist activity or retains the capability and intent to do so, and whose actions threaten the security of the United States.
Arguments for redesignation often point to the MEK’s past violent activities and current human rights abuses within its own ranks. Historically the MEK orchestrated terrorist attacks against the Shah’s regime that killed several Americans working in Iran in the 1970s. While the MEK denies involvement attributing these to a breakaway Marxist-leninist faction, a 2011 State Department report asserted MEK members participated in and supported the 1979 takeover of the US Embassy in Tehran.

The group also engaged in a campaign of assassinations against Iranian officials and civilians in the early 1980s including the 1981 bombing of the Islamic Republic Party headquarters killing over 70 people. During the Iran-Iraq war, the MEK sided with Saddam Hussein and participated in spying and military operations against Iran. Since then, the group has been considered as traitors by Iranians.

Irandokht Pazooki, an anti-Islamic Republic journalist of Israel Hayom believes that “the decision to remove the MEK from terrorist lists appears to have prioritized political considerations over substantive evaluation of the group’s fundamental nature and documented history.” She states that the MEK should be returned to international terrorist lists as “a necessary correction based on documented historical facts.”

Furthermore, critics and former members of the MEK have described it as exhibiting the traits of a personality cult, testifying about authoritarian control, confiscation of assets, mandatory divorce and celibacy, emotional isolation, forced labor, sleep deprivation, and physical abuse.

Human Rights Watch reported in 2005 on prison camps run by the MEK and severe human rights violations against its members, including prolonged incommunicado and solitary confinement, beatings, coerced confessions, and threats of execution. These reports should be considered as “terrorist activity” or a threat to US national security because they are alighned with the criteria for FTO designation.

Pazooki also reminds her audience of reports from Human Rights Watch and other independent observers that “have documented concerning internal practices based on interviews with former members, including allegations of enforced celibacy, forced divorces, separation of family members, and mandatory ideological re-education sessions.” She added, “When French authorities detained MEK leadership during a 2003 investigation, several supporters engaged in self-immolation in protest – events thoroughly covered by international media.”

The correspondent of Israel Hayom believes that The MEK’s delisting in 2012, “occurred despite significant unresolved questions about the organization’s violent past and without compelling evidence of genuine reform.”

The US State Department delisted the MEK in 2012, citing the group’s renunciation of violence and cooperation in closing its Iraqi military base, while still voicing concerns about mistreatments of its members. However, the decision was influenced by intensive lobbying of American lawmakers who were paid hefty sums by the MEK.

“To what extent might organizations with reported ties to the MEK – operating under different names – be engaged in political lobbying abroad, without consistently clarifying their connection to the MEK?” asks Pazooki. “This critical question remains largely unaddressed in policy discussions.”

While the Israel Hayom’s journalist wants to exploit the MEK’s redesignation as a policy against the Islamic Republic, she correctly criticizes the double standards regarding terrorism: “Redesignation would restore integrity to counter-terrorism frameworks by ensuring consistent application of standards based on factual historical records rather than political expediency. Proper designation decisions must be grounded in thorough assessment of an organization’s documented history and demonstrated actions.”

As she asserts, the call for redesignation is not based on political preferences but on widely documented history, legal records, and personal testimonies. The MEK’s legitimacy and its cult-like nature continues to contradict its alleged commitment to nonviolence and democracy.

Mazda Parsi

November 29, 2025 0 comments

Missions of Nejat Society Mujahedin Khalq Organization's Propaganda System

Propaganda and Cyber Operations of the Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK) Terrorist Group

1. Executive Summary

This report presents verified information and first-hand evidence on the propaganda methods, psychological operations and cyber activities of the terrorist organization Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK). The findings are based on the sworn testimony of Mr. Behzad Alishahi, a former member of the group, delivered during the 41st session of the public trial of 104 MEK members in Tehran on October 20, 2025. Mr. Alishahi’s statements provide a clear picture of the MEK’s coordinated media and cyber network, operating from Camp Ashraf 3 in Manëz, Albania, with financial and technical support from foreign actors.

2. Methodology

The report relies on three main sources:
– Mr. Alishahi’s official and public testimony before the Tehran court;
-Documentary and media evidence on MEK propaganda and cyber-operations activities;
– Comparative analysis of international reports, including Human Rights Watch (2005) and RAND Corporation (2009), documenting the sectarian structure and systematic human rights violations within the organization.
The data has been collected and analyzed with the aim of providing reliable material for United Nations human rights mechanisms and Special Procedures.

3. Parallel

The Mujahedin-e-Khalq Organization of Iran (MEK) was founded in 1965, fusing Islamic and Marxist ideologies. During the 1970s, it carried out many assassinations, including the assassinations of American consultants to Rockwell International and Pan American Airlines.
After the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the group attempted to infiltrate the new political structures, but soon turned to armed confrontation. In June 1981, the MEK launched a violent uprising that killed hundreds of civilians and government officials, including President Mohammad-Ali Rajai and Prime Minister Mohammad-Javad Bahonar.
During the 1980s, MEK leaders fled to France and then to Iraq, where they collaborated directly with the Saddam Hussein regime and carried out cross-border attacks on Iran. The 1988 “Forough Javidan” (Operation Eternal Light) offensive led to the deaths of many Iranian soldiers and civilians, including women and children, and is widely considered a war crime and an act of treason.

After the fall of Saddam in 2003, US forces took control of Camp Ashraf in Iraq, and members were gradually relocated to Camp Ashraf 3 in Albania. Many international sources—including HRW (2005) and RAND (2009)—have documented coercive practices within the MEK: forced divorces, gender segregation, psychological conditioning, and imprisonment of dissidents.

In the past decade, with the loss of its military capabilities, the MEK has transformed into a foreign-sponsored propaganda and cyber machine. Hundreds of its members now work full-time online from Camp Ashraf 3, creating fake accounts and coordinated content to project a positive image of the sect and a negative image of Iranian society and government.
Documented examples include: • Spreading fake news about prison conditions and human rights issues in Iran; • Fabricating staged videos of so-called “hunger strikes” or “public protests”; • Collaborating with Zionist and Western media to spread distorted narratives; • Manipulative use of “human rights” or “democracy” slogans to lure vulnerable individuals abroad.

4. Findings (Testimony of Mr. Behzad Alishahi)

a) Personal context
Mr. Alishahi stated that he was a member of the MEK from 1984 to 2002, working mainly in the media and television section. In 1994, he was arrested and tortured within the organization after expressing internal criticism, and was then forced to continue working under surveillance.
b) Evolution of media activities
• Initially, the MEK published only one magazine called Mojahed and occasionally burned copies in public to attract attention. • During its stay in Iraq, the group produced Persian-language television programs under Saddam Hussein, with the aim of discrediting Iran during the war. • After moving to France, the MEK received significant financial and technical assistance from French entities, expanding into satellite broadcasts and digital networks.
c) Cyber operations in Camp Ashraf 3
According to the witness, members of Ashraf 3 work online 24 hours a day using fake accounts on platforms such as X (Twitter), Facebook and Telegram. The main objectives are: • Cleansing the image of past crimes and violence; • Historical revisionism and distortion of facts; • Recruiting supporters under the deceptive label of “human rights” or “pro-democracy”; • Artificially amplifying popularity through coordinated hashtags such as #FreeIran and #IranProtests.
d) Cooperation with foreign media and governments
Mr. Alishahi testified that several Western and regional media outlets cooperate with the MEK, often through paid publications or political influence operations. He cited the active support of France, Germany and Israel, which often use the MEK’s media infrastructure to spread anti-Iranian disinformation.
e) Declining public influence
He further stated that since the start of public trials in Iran exposing the MEK’s crimes, the group’s credibility in Europe has declined significantly. Events that once attracted hundreds of participants in Belgium now gather only a few attendees.

5. International Legal Framework

MEK propaganda and cyber operations clearly violate international law, including: • Articles 19 and 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which prohibit incitement to hatred and violence;
• The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999); • UN Security Council Resolution 2396 (2017) on the prevention of the terrorist use of information and communication technologies; • The Budapest Convention on Cybercrime (2001), binding on European states, including Albania.
According to these instruments, any facilitation or tolerance of terrorist information operations creates state responsibility for the host state.

6. Analysis

The evidence and relevant evidence demonstrate that the MEK has evolved from an armed militant group into a structured information warfare apparatus. Today, it operates as a foreign-sponsored propaganda and intelligence agency engaged in systematic disinformation aimed at societal destabilization, delegitimization of Iranian institutions, and manipulation of international perception. Such activities constitute a form of non-state extremism and fall within the framework of international counterterrorism law.

7. Conclusions and Recommendations

Conclusions

• The MEK’s media and cyber divisions function as a coordinated information arm serving the political interests of foreign powers; • The group exploits the principle of freedom of expression in Europe to spread hate speech, falsified reports, and incitement against the Iranian nation; • The Government of Albania has an obligation to ensure that its territory is not used for terrorist cyber operations.
Recommendations
– The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Iran and the Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression should jointly investigate the MEK’s propaganda and cyber activities;
– The Government of Albania should exercise effective oversight over Camp Ashraf 3 and limit any misuse of its digital infrastructure for hostile operations;
– UN Member States should conduct transparent reviews of the financial and media networks linked to the MEK;
– The United Nations Office for Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) should study the MEK’s cyber network as a case of extreme non-state information warfare;
– The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) should examine the financial flows linked to the MEK’s online propaganda and its affiliated NGOs.

Gazeta Impakt – Translated by Nejat Society

November 23, 2025 0 comments

Mujahedin Khalq Organization as a terrorist group

Mujahedin-e Khalq| resistance or violence

The Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) claims that it has publicly stated a commitment to non-violent regime change since 2001, advocating for a democratic, secular, and non-nuclear Iran. However, reports and visual evidence, including videos attributed to their “resistance units” (Kanoonhaye Shooreshi), continue to depict activities that suggest a more complex and contradictory stance on violence. These videos often circulated on the group’s social media and channels, sometimes show individuals displaying weapons and expressing support for the MEK’s leadership and their struggle against the Islamic Republic.

Armed Resistance Units

While the MEK maintains that these “resistance units” are engaged in acts of civil disobedience and symbolic defiance, critics and some analysts interpret the imagery of armed individuals and explicit calls for overthrowing the regime as indicative of a continued belief in the efficacy of armed struggle, or at least a willingness to employ it if deemed necessary. The distinction between “resistance” and “violence” in this context remains a point of contradiction.
The perception of support for the MEK among Baluch Iranians in Sistan and Baloochestan, an area with active drug and arms trafficking is a complex issue. The region is also potentially at risk of Balooch separatists and so the MEK strategically makes efforts to exploit the existing discontent and instability in the region.

The MEK has a long history of leveraging ethnic and religious minorities within Iran to further its objectives against the Iranian government. The Sisitan and Baloochestan province, characterized but its porous borders, ethnic Balooch majority and Balooch separatists, and significant economic disparities, presents a fertile ground for such exploitation. The presence of armed group and criminal trafficking networks can also create an environment where alternative power structures, even those with violent histories like the MEK, might gain a foothold by offering protection or economic opportunities, however illicit.

Criticizing the MEK’s video that has been recently published showing some armed Balooch resistance units, Siamak Naderi, former member of the MEK writes: “The MEK published a video of Balooch smugglers who receive money under the guise of resistance units and the MEK’s Liberation Army inside Iran. These smugglers and even their literate head cannot read correctly from the text sent by the MEK from Albania and Ashraf 3. There is a ridiculous mispronunciation.”

Violent acts of “Resistance Units”

The MEK’s violent acts often involve actions such as setting fire to government buildings and religious centers. While the MEK frames these actions as acts of resistance and civil disobedience, the intentional destruction and damage of property are interpreted as violent acts and even terrorism. Such actions even if symbolic, contribute to violence.
From the perspective of the Iranian nation and many independent analysts, such acts are indeed examples of violent struggle and are considered terrorism. The historical record of the MEK’s use of violence, coupled with these actions, support this view. The scale of the MEK’s experience in acts of violence is undeniable, given its history as an armed organization.

Mazda Parsi

November 18, 2025 0 comments

Mujahedin Khalq 's Function

Ponerology of the MEK’s Pathocracy

A detailed examination of the leadership of Massoud and Maryam Rajavi over the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) indicates that the group’s ruling system aligns with the concepts of ponerology and pathocracy. Reports and documents on psychological manipulation and tyranny within the Rajavis’ ruling meet these theoretical frameworks and their application to the MEK’s documented practices.

Ponerology and Pathocracy and their Theoretical Frameworks

Ponerology, a term coined by Andrezej Lobaczewski, is the interdisciplinary study of evil, specifically focusing on the origins, development, and spread of evil on a large scale within societies and political systems. *

It posits that certain psychological deviations, particularly psychopathy, can infiltrate and ultimately dominate social structures, leading to the formation of “pathocracies”.

A pathocracy is a system of government where individuals with personality disorders, especially psychopathy, rise to positions of power and systematically impose their distorted worldview and values upon the populace. This result in a society characterized by oppression, manipulation, and systematic destruction of normal human bonds and ethical principles. [IBID]

Key characteristics of pathocracy, as described in ponerogical literature, include:

Psychopathical infiltration: individuals with psychopathic traits, such as a lack of empathy, manipulativeness, superficial charm, narcissism and a propensity of deceit, gain control of key institutions.

Systematic manipulation and propaganda: The ruling elite employs sophisticated psychological techniques to control information, distort reality and indoctrinate the population. This often involves the creation of an “us vs. them” mentality, demonization of external enemies, and the suppression of dissent.

Erosion of normal human values: Empathy, compassion, and independent thought are discouraged or punished while obedience, conformity and loyalty to the ruling ideology are highly valued.

Internal purge and terror: Dissenters or those perceived as threats to the ruling power are often subjected to severe punishment, including imprisonment, torture, or execution.

Cult of personality: leader or leaders are often deified and their pronouncement are treated as infallible.

Isolation from external reality: The group or society becomes increasingly isolated from external scrutiny and information, reinforcing the internal narrative.

The MEK: Structure and Practices

The MEK, founded in the 1960s, began as an Islamic-Marxist organization opposing the Shah of Iranand later the Islamic Republic. Its structure and internal dynamics have been the subject of extensive scrutiny, particularly regarding its leadership under Massoud and Maryam Rajavi.

Centralized leadership and ideological control

The MEK is characterized by an extremely centralized and hierarchical leadership structure, with Massoud Rajavi and later Maryam Rajavi, at its apex. Massoud Rajavi who disappeared in 2003, remains a titular leader, while Mrayam Rajavi has assumed the role of “President-elect” of the so-called “National Council of Resistance of Iran”, the MEK’s political vitrine. This leadership presented as infallible and the sole interpreter of the organization’s ideology.

The MEK’s ideology, a blend of Islam and Marxism, has evolved over time but consistently emphasizes absolute loyalty to the leadership and the revolutionary cause. Members undergo intensive ideological training and reduction sessions.

Psychological manipulation and “ideological revolution”

Numerous accounts from former MEK members and analysis by scholars describe a system of pervasive psychological manipulation within the organization particularly after the “Ideological Revolution” initiated by Massoud Rajavi in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This “revolution” aimed to purify the organization and solidify the Rajavi’s control.

Key elements of this alleged ideological revolution and the actual psychological manipulation include:

Forced divorces and celibacy: Based on the order issue by Rajavi, named “ideological revolution”, members were compelled to divorce their spouses and live in celibacy, with the stated aim of dedicating themselves entirely to the revolution and eliminating personal attachments that could compete with loyalty to the leadership. This practice is seen by critics as means to break down individual identity and foster dependence on the group.

Daily self-criticism sessions: Members are required to participate in daily sessions where they confess their “ideological shortcomings”, “sexual deviations” and “bourgeois thoughts”. These sessions, often public and humiliating, serve to reinforce conformity, suppress dissent, and expose any deviation from the prescribed ideology.

Information control and isolation: access to external media, family contact, and independent information is severely restricted. Members live in isolated camps, primarily Camp Ashraf in Iraq and then Camp Ashraf 3 in Albania where their only source of information is the MEK leadership. This creates an echo chamber where the MEK’s narrative is unchallenged.

Deification of the Rajavis: Massoud and Maryam Rajavi are presented as messianic figures, embodying the revolutionary spirit and the ultimate truth. Their pronouncements are considered sacred, and questioning the leadership is equivalent of treason.

Emotional manipulation: The MEK’s leadership exploit members’ emotional vulnerabilities, including their desire for purpose, belonging, and a better future for Iran, to secure their unwavering loyalty.

Tyranny and abuse in the MEK’s ruling system

Beyond psychological manipulation, there are numerous reports and testimonies on tyrannical practices and human rights abuses within the MEK. These include:

Physical abuse and torture: Former members have reported instances of physical abuse, including beatings, sleep deprivation, and solitary confinement, for expressing dissent or attempting to leave the organization.

Forced labor: Members are reportedly subjected to long hours of labor with little to no compensation, contributing to the organization’s self-sufficiency.

Suppression of dissent: Any form of criticism or questioning of the leadership is met with severe repercussions, leading to climate of fear and self-censorship.

Prevention of departure: Members who wish to leave the organization are often prevented from doing so, sometimes through force or intimidation, and are subjected to intense pressure to remain.

Application of ponerology and pathocracy to the MEK

When examining the MEK’s ruling system through the lens of ponerology and pathocracy, several parallels emerge.

The highly centralized and authoritarian nature of the MEK, coupled with the absolute power wielded by Massoud and Maryam Rajavi, aligns with the concept of a ruling elite that has systematically eliminated internal opposition and consolidated control. The “ideological revolution” and its associated practices, such as forced divorces, daily self-criticism, and severe information control, bear a striking resemblance to the methods described in ponerological literature for creating a compliant and ideologically uniform population. These practices can be interpreted as a deliberate effort to dismantle individual autonomy and foster complete dependence on the organization and its leaders.

The deification of the Rajavis and the suppression of any critical thought or dissent are hallmarks of a cult of personality, a common feature in pathocratic systems where the leader’s aythority is unquestionable. The use of physical abuse and the prevention of members from leaving further underscore a tyrannical environment where individual rights are systematically violated.

While it is beyond scope of this analysis to definitively diagnose individuals with psychopathy, the systemic outcomes described by former members and human rights organizations- namely, the pervasive manipulation, the erosion of normal human relationships, the suppression of empathy, and the systematic control over information and individual lives – are consistent with the characteristics of pathocracy.

The MEK’s internal environment, as depicted in critical accounts, appears to have fostered a culture where loyalty to the leadership superseded ethical considerations and individual well-being, a key indicator of pathocratic system where distorted values are imposed.

The systematic nature of these practices, their long duration and their profound impact on the lives of MEK members suggest a deliberate and sustained effort to reshape individual psycology and social dynamics within the organization to serve the interests of the ruling elite. This aligns with ponerology’s focus on the systemic nature of evil and its manifestation in political structures. The MEK’s structure, therefore exhibits many characteristics that resonate with the theoretical constructs of ponerology and pathocracy. Particularly concerning the psychological manipulation and tyrannical rule under Massoud and Maryam Rajavi.

Mazda Parsi

*Loaczewski, Andrzej. Political Ponerology: A Science on the Nature of Evil Adjusted for Political Purposes, Grande Prairie, AB, Canada : Red Pill Press, 2006.

November 15, 2025 0 comments

Albania

Albania: Cyberattacks and the dead end in the management of Camp Ashraf 3

Ashraf-3, the fortified camp of the Mojahedin-e-Khalq (MEK) in Manzë, Albania, is a “city of exiles”: approximately 40 hectares with over a hundred buildings, isolated by high walls and checkpoints. Around 2,500 dissident refugees live there under strict internal rules, a “sect” whose members are denied a normal family life and can only conform to the association’s uncompromising line.

To understand the misfortune that has befallen Albania by welcoming these refugees expelled from Iran, let’s clarify that the MEK group originated in Iran in the 1960s as a radical student group (the so-called “Marxists with bombs”), but after the Khomeynist revolution it evolved into a dogmatic, sectarian, and anti-Iranian guerrilla fanaticism. At least 17,000 people have been confirmed dead as a result of MEK terrorist attacks (scientists, politicians, academics, and ordinary Iranians). Its members, who fought against Iran alongside Saddam Hussein in the 1980-88 Iraq-Iran War, are fanatical worshipers of Masoud Rajavi—presumably dead in 2003—and his wife, Maryam. Until recently, the organization was labeled a “foreign terrorist organization” by both the United States and Iran.

After 2003, they proclaimed their renunciation of violence to become “supporters of human rights.” In 2013, the group was granted official refuge in Albania. But what is really interesting is the group’s double standards. While the Rajavi leaders preach a life of austere and revolutionary sacrifice for ordinary members, they themselves live in unbridled luxury in Paris, where they maintain a political umbrella. (Le Canard Enchaîné showed Maryam Rajavi—the group’s self-proclaimed president—and an entourage of bodyguards renting an entire spa resort in Vichy, spending €29,000 in cash on massages, mud baths, and hydrotherapy; the year before, the Rajavis had spent the same amount on travel.) Meanwhile, in Ashraf-3, ordinary members endure a rigid militarization without telephones or news, following inflexible schedules, often sleep-deprived and ill.

For over a decade, Albania has served as a refuge for Mojahedin-e-Khalq exiles. Initially a humanitarian gesture on the Albanian side, the reception of the MEK has now become a serious security concern and is effectively beyond the control of Tirana, which is appealing to its Western allies to investigate the MEK’s crimes in Ashraf-3 by searching for evidence of cyber-attacks launched from within the camp. Hosting the MEK has turned Albania into a “front line” of Iranian hostility. In July 2022, hackers paralyzed the e-Albania portal, delaying school registrations and real estate deposits: a “cyber war” for which Albania immediately severed diplomatic relations with Tehran, accusing it of these actions.

In early 2023, Albanian state prosecutors accused MEK members of secretly conducting cyberattacks and activities against the Iranian government. Months of online surveillance pointed to a vast hidden “troll factory” in Manzë. In June 2023, Albanian authorities decided to intervene, and on June 20, 2023, the “Special Police” raided Ashraf-3 on the orders of a Special Court, armed with search warrants for espionage and cybercrime. The camp sealed its entrances, and the incursion was met with fierce resistance and dozens of injuries, although the exact toll and details are unknown. However, the police seized around a hundred workstations and dozens of laptops, tablets, and drives, saving them from the MEK’s attempted destruction. The Special Prosecutor’s Office (SPAK) formally announced an investigation into “incitement to war, unlawful interception of computer data, interference with computer systems,” and related offenses: a criminal case of unprecedented severity, built on evidence discovered at Camp Ashraf-3.

In June 2025, a hacker group openly boasted of sabotaging Tirana’s municipal websites “in retaliation” for Albania’s hosting of “terrorists.” The Iranian hacker group Homeland Justice claimed to have extracted data from the city’s servers and threatened further attacks, so much so that Albania has now formally asked its NATO and EU allies to help decrypt Ashraf-3’s computers for incriminating evidence.

This spiral of hostility was predictable. Albania knew that inviting over 2,500 MEK members onto its soil would provoke Tehran. However, under intense pressure from the United States and the United Nations, Tirana ignored these warnings. The result is that the MEK camp in Ashraf-3 is now a ticking time bomb on Albanian soil, as the group’s own anti-Iranian propaganda has turned Albania into a primary target for Iranian cyber attacks. Western and Albanian analysts now claim that the MEK is “out of Albania’s control” and that Albania has reached a “strategic dead end” in managing the MEK, which has now emerged as a self-governing terrorist enclave that threatens regional security, incubating anti-Iranian propaganda and cyber warfare operations between Iran and the West. The MEK enclave of Manzë is effectively outside Albanian jurisdiction: it has its own internal police force, leadership hierarchy, and code of conduct. With evidence of illicit activity emerging, Tirana is on high alert. Roads to the camp are blocked by checkpoints. Technology agencies and police regularly scan the network perimeter, as the MEK group could hack foreign governments. Hosting the MEK has turned Albania into a target of a hostile foreign power (Iran), far beyond what Tirana could have anticipated.

The case also highlights the double standards of Western policy toward Iran. Indeed, under the guise of promoting democracy in Iran, the European Union has repeatedly praised Tirana for hosting the MEK, removed the group from its list of terrorist organizations, and prominent Western politicians have welcomed MEK leaders with open arms. Tehran, on the other hand, has consistently condemned the MEK as “sponsored terrorism,” calling Ashraf-3 an American plot. It has incited local sentiment against the Albanian authorities, creating divisions within the Albanian public. Some Albanians see the MEK as victims of Iran, while others see it as a group preaching war within its borders.

Maria Morigi of MARX21.IT

Translated from Italian to English by Nejat Society

November 12, 2025 0 comments

Mujahedin Khalq Organization members' families

Appeal from the Family of Mehraban and Kiumars Balaei

To the Representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross in Albania
To the Honorable Representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross in Albania,
Greetings and respect,
Dear sir,
I, Ghorbanali Balaei, the eldest son of my family, respectfully write to you on behalf of all my family members. We sincerely request your assistance in arranging a meeting with my brothers, Mehraban Balaei and Kiumars Balaei, who are currently held in Manza Camp (known as Ashraf 3) in Albania.
If arranging a physical meeting is not immediately possible, we urgently ask that you at least facilitate a telephone connection between us.
My family and I have been waiting for over forty years without any information about the well-being and conditions of my brothers. My brother Mehraban, who was married and father to a son, was captured during his military service. Sadly, until today, he has not been allowed to make even a single phone call to his child.
We respectfully request that—based on your humanitarian mission and legal responsibility to support victims of enforced separation and violence—you assist in restoring communication with our loved ones. We ask that they be permitted, at the very least, to make a telephone call to us.
Thank you for your attention and consideration.
With respect,
Ghorbanali Balaei
+989111848827

November 11, 2025 0 comments

Mujahedin Khalq Organization members' families

Letter of Houshang Pour Ebrahim’s sister to the UN

To: United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances
Subject: Request for Investigation into the Whereabouts of My Brother, Houshang Pour Ebrahim

Dear Members of the Committee,
My name is Soghra Pour Ebrahim, and I am the sister of Houshang Pour Ebrahim. My brother, Houshang Pour Ebrahim, was captured by the forces of the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (MEK) on October 16, 1987, while serving his mandatory military service in the Baneh region of Kurdistan Province, Iran. Since that time, we have had no information about his fate, whereabouts, or condition.

Over the years, our family has made repeated efforts through various organizations and unofficial channels to obtain any news about him, but no clear answer has ever been received. My mother and I remain waiting and hopeful for his return. Sadly, our father passed away after years of grief and uncertainty over his disappearance.

I respectfully request that the esteemed Committee to use its mandate to investigate the fate and current status of Houshang Pour Ebrahim and to inform our family of any findings.

With sincere gratitude and respect,
Soghra Pour Ebrahim

November 10, 2025 0 comments

Newer Posts

Older Posts