The Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK), also known as the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI), is one of the most controversial and tightly structured opposition movements in modern Iranian history. While the group presents a highly polished, democratic, and secular image to Western policymakers, its internal culture and the literature it directs at critics, defectors, and political rivals tell a vastly different story. Scholars of Iranian politics, historians, and sociologists who have analyzed the MEK’s publications, internal communiqués, and public statements have frequently highlighted the group’s use of highly aggressive, vitriolic, and exclusionary language. When attacking its critics, the MEK regularly employs a polemical, highly personalized, and abusive rhetorical style—often characterized by detractors and academic observers as “low-class,” conspiratorial, and linguistically violent—which brands any dissenting voice as an agent of the Iranian regime, a traitor, or a moral degenerate.

This distinctive rhetorical style is deeply rooted in the group’s ideological evolution, which merged Marxist-Leninist dialectics with a radicalized, Shia Islamist complex. Over decades of isolation, first in Iraqi military camps under Saddam Hussein and later in closed compounds in Albania, this ideology curdled into a highly insular worldview. Within this framework, there is no room for critique; anyone who questions the leadership of Massoud and Maryam Rajavi is met not with intellectual debate, but with systematic character assassination.

Ideological Roots of the MEK’s Polemical Literature

To understand the harshness of the MEK’s literature when attacking critics, one must examine its foundational ideology. Founded in 1965 by leftist Iranian students, the MEK blended Marxist social analysis with Islam. This ideological synthesis created a binary worldview: the world was divided strictly into the forces of revolutionary progress (the MEK) and the forces of imperialism.

In his comprehensive book on the MEK’s history, titled “The Iranian Mojahedin”, historian Ervand Abrahamian explains that When the group fell out with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s governmet after the 1979 revolution and was forced into exile, this binary worldview intensified. The MEK began to view itself as the sole legitimate representative of the Iranian people. Consequently, any critic of the group was not merely expressing a differing political opinion; according to the MEK, critics were actively impeding the revolution and serving the interests of the Islamic Republic.

Academic analyses of the MEK’s texts show that this ideological rigidity manifests as a linguistic style that leaves no room for gray areas. Critics are routinely described using highly charged religious and political epithets designed to dehumanize them and strip them of political legitimacy.

Rhetorical Tropes and Vocabulary Used Against Critics

Scholars and journalists who have studied the MEK’s Persian-language publications (such as its journal Mojahed) and its various online outlets note several recurring linguistic tropes used to discredit opponents:

1. The “Regime Agent” and “Infiltrator” Label

The most common accusation leveled against any critic—whether they are Western journalists, academic researchers, or Iranian human rights activists—is that they are paid agents or spies of the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence. In MEK literature, critics are rarely addressed by their arguments; instead, they are labeled as “mozdur” (mercenary), “vabasteh” (dependent/affiliated), or “nokhaleh” (scum/infiltrator). By framing every critique as a psychological operation directed by Tehran, the MEK attempts to bypass the substance of the criticism entirely.

2. Dehumanizing and Class-Based Epithets

The MEK’s polemical literature frequently lapses into language that observers describe as vulgar or low-class. Critics and defectors are often referred to using derogatory terms such as “kha’en” (traitor), “khofash” (bat—implying they fear the light of the MEK’s truth), “kaseh-lis” (bowl-licker/sycophant), and “gorg” (wolf). This harsh, street-level vocabulary contrasts sharply with the diplomatic, human-rights-focused language the group’s political vitrine, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), uses in English-language press releases directed at Western governments.

3. Sexualized and Moral Character Assassination

For defectors (referred to in MEK literature as borideh, meaning “the severed ones”), the attacks are highly personalized and frequently target their moral and sexual integrity. In his book The Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization: A Sociological Study of a Cult, sociologist Saeed Paivandi points out that the MEK relies on public shaming to maintain internal discipline and discredit those who leave. Defectors who speak out about human rights abuses inside the organization are routinely accused in MEK literature of being morally corrupt, sexually deviant, or financially motivated by the Iranian government. This literature seeks to completely destroy the critic’s social standing within the Iranian diaspora.

The Language of Internal “Self-Criticism” and Public Denunciation

The aggressive tone directed at external critics is a direct reflection of the linguistic violence practiced within the organization. Former members of the MEK have documented the existence of mandatory daily and weekly “cleansing” or “self-criticism” sessions (known as Ghosl-e Haftegi or Weekly Bath).

In these sessions, members are forced to write down and publicly read their private thoughts, sexual desires, and doubts about the leadership. If a member’s self-criticism is deemed insufficient, other members are encouraged to shout insults, spit, and use highly abusive language to break down their psychological resistance. The vocabulary of these internal sessions—which includes terms of intense self-loathing and submission—directly bleeds into the public literature the group produces to attack external opponents. When a member defects and becomes a critic, the private confessions extracted during these internal sessions are often weaponized and published in MEK literature to paint the defector as unstable, untrustworthy, and weak.

Contrast Between Persian and English Literature

A striking feature of the MEK’s literary output is the dual nature of its rhetoric, which varies wildly depending on the target audience:

The External/Western Face: In English, French, and German publications, the NCRI and MEK employ the language of modern liberal democracy. They speak of “universal suffrage,” “gender equality,” “the abolition of the death penalty,” and “peaceful coexistence.”

The Internal/Persian Face: In Persian-language broadcasts, internal pamphlets, and sectarian websites, the language remains deeply authoritarian, aggressive, and abusive. Critics are subjected to relentless polemical attacks, characterized by conspiracy theories and vitriolic denunciations.

This linguistic dichotomy has led many analysts and foreign policy experts to warn that the MEK’s democratic rhetoric is merely a tactical facade designed to win political backing in Washington and Brussels, while its authentic internal culture remains deeply intolerant of dissent.

Mazda Parsi

References:

1. Abrahamian, Ervand. The Iranian Mojahedin.
2. Banisadr, Masoud. Masoud: Memoirs of an Iranian Rebel.
3. Paivandi, Saeed. The Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization: A Sociological Study of a Cult.
4. Singleton, Anne. Saddam’s Private Army: How Joint US-Iraqi Operations Created a Volunteer Terrorist Force.
5. Berman, Ilan. Making Sense of the MEK. American Foreign Policy Council.
6. Masters, Jonathan. Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK). Council on Foreign Relations.