Regarding the claims made by the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) regarding the activities of “insurgent cells”, or “resistance units” (Kanoon-haye Shooreshi in Persian) in Iran, the group’s media outlets typically display vague or indistinct images. They attribute reports of arson attacks at various locations across Iranian cities to these cells. Yet, such activities are nowhere to be found in official Persian or non-Persian language media, on social media, or in daily conversations of ordinary citizens.

As claimed by the MEK propaganda, most “insurgent cells” are active in the province of Sistan and Baluchestan, particularly in the city of Zahedan. This raises the question: why is the activity of these insurgent cells most concentrated in Zahedan? In other words, how do MEK operatives manage to target Baluch youth and persuade them to pose for photographs featuring slogans associated with Maryam or Massoud Rajavi? Perhaps a more precise question is: could the presence of Baluch separatist groups—such as Jaish al-Adl, now operating under the new name “Front of People’s Fighters” (Jebhe-ye Mobarezin-e Mardomi in Persain)—be the primary reason?

Examining the relationship between the MEK and armed Baluch separatist groups—such as Jundullah and Jaish al-Adl—constitutes a complex issue within the realms of national security of Iran. To better understand this subject, one must closely examine historical precedents, shared interests, and the geopolitical and security shifts occurring in Iran’s border regions, particularly in Sistan and Baluchestan province.

Following its expulsion from Iraq and subsequent relocation to a base in Tirana, Albania, the MEK sought to re-establish its presence inside Iran by forming structures known as “insurgent cells”. However, as previously noted, the coverage of these cells is largely confined to the MEK-run media outlets; there is no tangible or concrete evidence of their existence on the ground, nor are they reflected in independent media or on social networks. In this context, the concentration of many of the alleged activities—attributed to the “insurgent cells”—within Sistan and Baluchestan (specifically the city of Zahedan) stems from the group’s efforts to recruit members in volatile, peripheral border regions.

Historical Roots of the MEK’s Relations with Armed Groups in Iranian border provinces

The contemporary political history of Iran demonstrates that, over the past decades, the MEK has spared no security or military means in its efforts to strike at the ruling political structure. During the group’s presence in Iraq (in the 1980s and 1990s), it maintained extensive ties with various intelligence services and local armed groups—including Kurdish and Arab separatist factions along Iran’s western borders, as well as Baluch separatist groups along its eastern borders.

Following the emergence of armed Salafi groups in southeastern Iran—such as Jundullah, led by Abdolmalek Rigi, in the 2000s, and subsequently Jaish al-Adl—security analysis and documents have acknowledged the existence of communication channels between these entities. Although the MEK has clear ideological differences with the Baluch groups—ranging from its historical, eclectic “Marxist-Islamic” ideology and its current, ostensibly democratic-leaning platform, to the Jihadi-Salafism of the Baluch factions—and while a deep, formal strategic alliance between them appears unlikely, their shared objective—the overthrow of the Islamic Republic—has fostered a degree of tactical overlap and mutual exploitation.

There are several reasons why Sistan and Baluchestan—and specifically Zahedan—have been identified as a purported hub for the activities of the MEK mercenaries. Due to its vast area, extensive shared borders with Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the presence of human and drug trafficking networks, the province of Sistan and Baluchestan has a high degree of security vulnerability. This characteristic creates a favorable environment for concealment, the movement of armed operatives, and clandestine activities.

Furthermore, the MEK seeks to exploit existing social fissures and the grievances of minority groups, positioning itself as a champion of minority rights. The dissemination of biased reports regarding these regions via the group’s propaganda machine represents an attempt to co-opt local and civil protests for its own agenda.

Moreover, in a region continually prone to instability—owing to the presence of terrorist groups like Jaish al-Adl and frequent border clashes—the MEK attempts to attribute acts of violence or minor arson incidents to its so-called “insurgent cells”. By doing so, it leverages the prevailing climate of insecurity to exaggerate its own capabilities.

Structural Commonalities and Similar Background

Both entities—MEK and Jaish al-Adl—have histories marked by acts of violence, bombings, and armed or suicide operations targeting Iranian citizens and security forces. While Jundullah and Jaish al-Adl are rooted in Salafi ideology and ethnic separatism, and the MEK operates as a totalitarian, cult-like structure with a history of assassinating thousands of Iranians, both employ the same tactics within the broader framework of a “hybrid war” against Iran: the use of terrorism, psychological warfare, and the exaggeration of hollow achievements in the digital space.

Ultimately, the lack of any genuine resonance of these so-called “insurgent cells” among the general public or within independent media suggests that the MEK’s claims are primarily intended for internal consumption—aimed at strengthening the morale of members remaining at Camp Ashraf 3 in Albania and securing foreign financial support. Furthermore, the MEK’s purported connection to volatile regions like Zahedan represents an opportunistic attempt to exploit security-related tensions in that province for its own ends.

Mazda Parsi