Page 278 – Nejat Society

Mujahedin Khalq Organization as a terrorist group

A communist terrorist group in Albania must be condemned by all friends of Iran

The Albanian based MEK could have helped Saudi funded ISIS to carry out the terrorist attack on Tehran.

ISIS has claimed responsibility for today’s deadly terrorist attack in The Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran in turn has pointed a finger at Saudi Arabia which is well known as an agitator for aggression against Iran and also a major covert supporter of ISIS and al-Qaeda.

But it is another group that historically has waged terrorist atrocities against Iran. This group is Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK) also known as the People’s Mojahedin Organisation of Iran.

The group is an expressly stated communist terrorist group whose goal ever since the Islamic Revolution of 1979 is to overthrow the government of Iran. That being said, the group is often more than willing to forgo its ideology in order to make alliances of convenience with any state or group willing to help it pursue its penultimate goal of destroying the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Throughout the 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s the group found shelter in Iraq, but the Shi’a dominated Iraqi government kicked the group out of the country in 2009.

The group then relocated to the NATO member state of Albania, a known sponsor of semi-secular Sunni terrorism in the Balkans.

The group now thrives in Albania as does ISIS. Under the radar of international scrutiny, ISIS has quietly co-opted much of the lucrative narcotics trade in Albania from local mafia lords. The result is the early stages of a perfect storm whereby Albanian political corruption and the effective Albanian mafia state are sharing the same political geography with a communist anti-Iranian terrorist group and also ISIS.

Although there is little doubt that as the Iranian Revolutionary Guard have said, Saudi has a hand in today’s tragic event, but this does not preclude the MEK from having a hand in the attack.

Concerned parties must seriously examine whether the MEK and ISIS have forged some sort of pact beneath the radar. Such a thing is entirely possible for several reasons.

First of all, ISIS has never once carried out an attack on Iranian soil and given the secure and stable nature of Iran, it almost beggars belief that they were able to do so.

Secondly, if indeed the Saudi/ISIS hand was in play and was therefore able to penetrate deeply into Iran, in Tehran no less, which is geographically far from both Iraq and Syria, it means that whoever did this had to penetrate deeply into Iranian territory before carrying out the crime. The MEK, although with difficulty, have managed to penetrate into Iran many times before and carry out terrorist atrocities. They know the internal geography of the country far more than the average ISIS commander. Furthermore, studies have shown that like ISIS, the MEK also receives funding from Saudi Arabia.

Consequently, there is every possibility that ISIS and the MEK have forged some sort of alliance or at minimum an agreement on the sharing of intelligence.

In either case, the NATO member state of Albania is guilty of harbouring and facilitating terrorism, something that Serbia has warned of for many years.

Albania is the place where the MEK, ISIS, NATO and Europe meet. If Iran wants to truly avenge this atrocity, it must focus on not only its traditional Middle Eastern enemies, but also on Albania.

By Adam Garrie ,The Duran

June 13, 2017 0 comments

Iran

Iran Unites as Tehran Struck by Middle East’s Proxy Wars

The 7 June attacks in Tehran struck at the symbolic heart of Iran’s revolutionary republic. In this Q&A, Ali Vaez, Senior Analyst for Iran, says the outrages show how the region’s proxy wars are now reaching far beyond the battlefield

How unusual are these attacks for Iran?

If this indeed was, as it claimed, an attack by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), it would constitute the first time the organisation has been able to strike Iran inside its borders. But terrorist attacks are not new to Iran. In the early years of revolutionary turmoil, the leftist-Islamist Mojahedin Khalq (MEK) resorted to violence. In the 1980s, up to 120 terrorist attacks occurred in Tehran perpetrated by MEK and other violent groups, killing hundreds of Iranian officials, including the president and prime minister in August 1981. Even the current supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, was targeted. He survived the assassination attempt, but lost full use of his right hand.

Consequently, the Islamic Republic developed a powerful counter-terrorism capacity through intelligence and security forces that, along with its paramilitary Basij militia, turned Iran into one of the most stable countries in the region – at the cost of highly repressive methods. The only exception to Iran’s successful counter-terrorism record was the assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists at the height of the standoff over Iran’s nuclear program. But those were targeted assassinations as opposed to indiscriminate terrorist attacks.

That ISIS had failed to attack Iran up until now wasn’t for lack of trying. There have been multiple reports of foiled attacks in several Iranian cities. According to Iranian officials, Iran’s intelligence agencies detected and dismantled 58 ISIS-affiliated terrorist groups in the past few years. In March 2016, the Iranian army reported killing two alleged ISIS recruits in the western province of Kermanshah. In June 2016, Iranian media reported the arrest of eighteen people who were trying to recruit new members through social media. In August that year, the Iranian intelligence minister said that authorities had prevented 1,500 young Iranians from joining ISIS. In recent months there was an uptick in its propaganda against Tehran as ISIS published a rare video in Persian in March, encouraging Iran’s Sunni minority to wage a religious war against the Shia ruling elite.

The attacks are in all likelihood linked to the extreme sectarianism of the fighting in Iraq and Syria. Iran, a Shiite Muslim power, is heavily involved in both conflicts. Salafi and Sunni Muslim groups like ISIS have long heaped vitriol on the Shiites.

In this sense, it’s not the attacks that are surprising, it’s that Iran was able to avoid one for so long. The attacks were a wake-up call for Iran’s security apparatus, but so too will they probably serve as one for jihadists, who will be encouraged to exploit Iran’s vulnerabilities.

What’s the immediate impact of this attack?

There are different voices coming out of Tehran. Some in the leadership have sought to downplay the attacks. The supreme leader said the “terrorists fumbling with fire crackers” won’t affect Iran, while the speaker of the parliament, where twelve people were killed and many were injured, called them a “trivial incident”. The Revolutionary Guards, however, have vowed revenge, drawing an unsubstantiated link between the attacks and a joint Saudi-U.S. effort to push back against Tehran’s regional policies. The minister of intelligence, however, has said it is too early to blame the Saudis. Nevertheless, the harsh rhetoric on both sides is likely to exacerbate tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia and further diminish the already slim chance of any kind of reconciliation anytime soon.

Still, I don’t see any immediate escalation of friction between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Neither the leadership in Tehran nor the one in Riyadh appears keen on a direct confrontation. Still, with increased tensions, there is higher likelihood of miscalculation on both sides. And of course, all of this fuels sectarianism in the region, which is a gift to ISIS and al-Qaeda.

What was the symbolism of the chosen targets?

The targets seem to have been chosen in order to maximise political impact rather than fatalities. The assailants targeted two key symbolic pillars of the Islamic Republic, the mausoleum of Ayatollah Khomenei, the founder of Iran’s theocratic system, and the parliament, the centre of the country’s republican tradition. Assuming that ISIS was the perpetrator, it is striking that it claimed responsibility for the attack immediately rather than wait as it usually does. This is probably because it considers the attack a rare success as it rapidly loses ground in Iraq and Syria.

What do you think the domestic impact will be?

Initially at least the attacks are likely to rally Iranians around the flag, but this could change quickly depending on two key questions: first, will anybody in Iran use the event politically, and how? Secondly, how were the perpetrators able to carry out these attacks?

President Rouhani is fresh from an election in which he received a strong mandate to deliver on his promise of de-securitising the domestic sphere. The attacks, however, could better enable the Revolutionary Guards to resist him and crack down on internal dissent. If Rouhani succeeds in quickly creating consensus around a path forward that would rectify security loopholes, while tolerating a higher degree of political pluralism, he might be able to prevent a counterproductive blame game and deeper polarisation. This could be done through the Supreme National Security Council, which comprises key civilian and military leaders and takes all key national security decisions in Iran. Given Rouhani’s extensive experience in the country’s national security establishment, he has the know-how to achieve this goal. But at this stage, it is too early to tell whether he will succeed or not.

The answer to the second question is becoming increasingly clear. According to Iranian officials, the perpetrators appear to be ISIS recruits from Iran’s Sunni majority provinces, who had fought for the group in Mosul and Raqqa. This could be used as a pretext to crack down in the country’s western, south-western, and south-eastern frontier provinces where Iran’s 5-10 per cent Sunni population lives. While there is little support for jihadists among Iran’s Sunni populations, despite their discontent with their treatment by central authorities, a government crackdown – if harsh enough and pursued long enough – is the kind of thing that could change that. The single most relevant factor in the radicalisation of jihadists is harsh government treatment. Interestingly, turnout in recent presidential elections was high in majority Sunni provinces like Sistan-Balouchestan (75 per cent) and Kurdistan (59 per cent). They both overwhelmingly (73 per cent) voted for the more pragmatic candidate, Rouhani.

What has been the reaction in the region?

Some countries like Turkey, Oman and Qatar denounced the attacks, but others like Saudi Arabia and Bahrain had a muted response. Some will see a comeuppance for a country that has freely interfered and stoked sectarianism in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon and elsewhere, until now without a backlash inside its borders. The recent attacks represent a different sort of backlash as well. Iran – like every state in the region – has pulled its punches with jihadists, including al-Qaeda, so long as their guns were turned against Iran’s enemies. But tactical relations with these groups often entail collateral damage.

What has been the reaction in the rest of the world?

The U.S. State Department condemned the attacks in strong terms; but President Trump added insult to injury by underscoring that “states that sponsor terrorism risk falling victim to the evil they promote”. On the same days as the attacks, the U.S. Congress also voted to advance sanctions legislation against Iran, particularly targeting the Revolutionary Guards. Iranian foreign minister retorted on Twitter: “Repugnant [White House] statement & Senate sanctions as Iranians counter terror backed by U.S. clients. Iranian people reject such U.S. claims of friendship”.

Following social media in Iran, I was struck by how much Washington’s insensitivity has offended the Iranian public. For years, Iran watchers were baffled by how pro-American the Iranian people remained despite having a highly anti-American government and being exposed to anti-American propaganda for nearly four decades. It appears that the Trump administration, first with its travel ban, then with hostile rhetoric and now with this statement, is succeeding where the Islamic Republic failed in the past 38 years: turning Iranians against the U.S.

For their part, the European and Asian leaders didn’t hesitate to do the right thing and condemned the attacks in Tehran no less strongly than they do attacks anywhere else. The attacks are a reminder that the effects of the region’s ongoing proxy wars are felt far beyond the battlefield. ISIS’s recent losses notwithstanding, so long as those wars and sectarian demonisation continue, we should expect more tragedies of this nature.

June 13, 2017 0 comments

Mujahedin Khalq; A proxy force

Terrorism in Tehran: Reality Confounds Rhetoric

For Americans fed a diet of rhetoric about Iran that constantly links it to the sending, not the receiving, end of terrorism—in which “the leading state sponsor of terrorism” is the adjectival phrase routinely affixed to Iran, and in which official rhetoric such as President Trump’s speech in Riyadh mashes Iran together with Sunni Islamist terrorism of the ISIS variety into one undifferentiated blob of evil—the deadly attacks today in Tehran generate much cognitive dissonance. But however disorienting this news may have been, it is true. An obviously well-planned operation struck at the heart of Iran, at its parliament and the monument to the Islamic Republic’s founder. At least a dozen people were killed and dozens more injured. The credibility of the claim of responsibility by ISIS is enhanced by the group’s posting of video footage from the attack.

For anyone looking beyond rhetoric and at reality, the attack is no surprise. Iran has been one of the staunchest and most active foes of ISIS. Probably the main reason an attack like this had not happened any earlier is the difficulty that ISIS has had in finding recruits among Iranians. Iran has, partly with its own personnel but mainly through material support of clients and allies, been a leader in combating ISIS, especially in Iraq and to a lesser extent in Syria. Many Iraqis give Iran, with good reason, the main credit for saving Baghdad from ISIS when the group was making its dramatic territorial gains in northern and western Iraq in 2014. If the United States could overcome its current hang-up about doing any business with Iran, it would find a worthwhile partner in many aspects of counterterrorism, especially as far as the fight against ISIS is concerned.

There has long been a willingness, and a necessary awareness of shared interest, on the Iranian side. In September 2001, immediately after the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington, both Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and then-President Mohamed Khatami strongly condemned the attacks. Expressions of sympathy in Iran for the American victims included candlelight vigils and observing a minute of silence by tens of thousands of people at a sporting event. Two weeks after the attack, Khatami stated, “Iran fully understands the feelings of the Americans about the attacks in New York and Washington.” Khatami correctly noted that American administrations had been at best indifferent about terrorist attacks in Iran since the revolution of 1979, but that Iranians felt differently and were expressing their sympathies accordingly.

We wait to hear from the Trump administration the kind of expression of sympathy and solidarity that commonly is offered to foreign nations that have become victims of major terrorist attacks. We should not hold our breath while waiting. The Iranians certainly aren’t. They have experienced a long history of American postures toward Iran, in the context of a common terrorist threat, that have ranged from indifference at best to door-slamming at worst. In the first few months after 9/11, Iranian officials worked cooperatively and effectively with U.S. officials to midwife a new regime in Afghanistan to replace the Taliban. The Iranians thought this could be the beginning of further cooperation against a common threat. But then the United States slammed the door shut, as George W. Bush declared an axis of evil in which Iran was lumped together with North Korea and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.

The principal perpetrator of terrorism in Iran over the past four decades has been the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), the Marxist/Islamist cult/terrorist group that prior to the revolution had claimed Americans among its victims. Thanks largely to the MEK’s activity, Iran necessarily has had much experience in countering terrorism. [Ayatollah] Khamenei lost the use of his right arm when he was injured by an MEK bomb in an assassination attempt in 1981. The U.S. handling of the MEK in recent years has seen the U.S. Government succumbing to a well-financed lobbying campaign on behalf of the group, with that campaign winning much support for the group in the U.S. Congress and the group eventually being removed from the U.S. list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations. If the crippled Khamenei exhibits some reflexive anti-U.S. sentiments, do you suppose this history has something to do with it?

Right now, on the very day of the terrorist attacks in Tehran, the United States Senate is scheduled to take its first vote on a bill that would impose still more sanctions on Iran. It appears the most immediate American response to the attacks will be sanctions on, not sympathy for, the victim.

In the months ahead, Iran may take actions outside its borders in response to the attacks. The United States, ever since 9/11, has claimed a right for itself to be ruthlessly aggressive in the name of responding to terrorism, lashing out with force while sometimes being little restrained by collateral damage or international law (not to mention its own constitutional requirements). Iran may see a need to be more aggressive in places such as Iraq or Syria in the interest of fighting back against ISIS. Will the United States grant Iran the same kind of slack it grants itself? Or, as has been customary in opposing anything Iran does and taking no account of exactly what interests are being advanced or threatened, will the Iranian responses be denounced as more “nefarious,” "malign," and “destabilizing” behavior?

By Paul R. Pillar , National Interest

June 11, 2017 0 comments

Mujahedin Khalq; A proxy force

Consequences of attacks in Tehran will be felt around the world

In targeting the Iranian parliament and the tomb of the Islamic Republic’s founder, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the terrorists who went on a lethal rampage in Tehran on Wednesday chose the two most potent symbols of the 1979 revolution.

For ordinary Tehranis, comparatively safe in recent years from such outrages, the attacks are deeply shocking.

The apparently coordinated assaults have been blamed by Iran’s hardline Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) on Saudi Arabia and, whatever the truth of the allegation, they are likely to have a big political impact far beyond Iran, stoking tensions with the US, Saudi Arabia and the Sunni Muslim monarchies of the Gulf.

Islamic State quickly claimed responsibility – if true, it would mean the militant group has finally succeeded in importing its divisive brand of random terror into the home of its principal Shia Muslim adversary.

The mausoleum where Khomeini was laid to rest almost exactly 28 years ago, on 6 June 1989, is an enormous complex dominating the skyline south of Tehran. Its cavernous halls are visited by tens of thousands of Iranians each year, who treat it as a shrine. Unlike the fortress-like Majlis (parliament) building in the centre of the city, security is light. That will change now.

For Iranians, the attack on Khomeini’s tomb is the equivalent of somebody trying to blow up the Lincoln Memorial in Washington DC. If the Isis claim of responsibility proves truthful, this will be the first time the group has successfully struck in the heart of Iran, although it has reportedly tried several times in the recent past.

Isis is at war, ideologically and militarily, with Iranian forces and allies in Syria and Iraq. In a video released in March, it vowed to “conquer Iran and restore it to the Sunni Muslim nation as it was before”. The jihadis claim that Iran’s clerical leaders, and their royal Persian predecessors, have persecuted Sunnis for centuries.

Isis has natural allies among militant groups in Iran’s restive south-eastern Sistan-Baluchistan province, which has a large Sunni population. In 2010, Sunni extremists linked to the Jundallah network killed 39 people at a mosque in the province. Minority Kurdish groups and ethnic Arabs also have a history of small-scale attacks in the north-west and south-west respectively.

Wednesday’s atrocities will be set against the backdrop of the anticipated collapse of Isis’s self-declared caliphate, as Iranian-backed Iraqi and Syrian army forces, plus US and British-backed Kurdish militias, close in on its Mosul and Raqqa strongholds.

In response to this pressure, Isis has called on its followers to take the fight to its enemies wherever they live. Recent terror attacks in Manchester, Kabul, Baghdad, Marawi in the southern Philippines and London may fit this emerging pattern of displaced activity by Isis followers.

Conservative Iranian leaders and commentators will certainly follow the IRGC’s lead and discern the hand of Saudi Arabia – and, by association, that of the US president, Donald Trump – in Wednesday’s attacks.

Well-documented covert efforts by George W Bush’s administration in the 2000s to destabilise Iran by funding militant internal opposition groups are not forgotten in Tehran. Nor is unofficial, on-off American support for the Mujahedin e-Khalq, or People’s Mujahadin of Iran, a group formerly backed by Saddam Hussein that was responsible for numerous armed attacks inside Iran.

The question now is whether Trump’s overt hostility is encouraging a repeat of past destabilisation efforts, directly or indirectly. Overturning the previous US president Barack Obama’s policy of limited engagement, Trump launched a blistering attack on Iran last month. Speaking during a visit to Riyadh, he demanded Iran’s international isolation, claiming Tehran was the world’s main exporter of “the fires of sectarian conflict and terror”.

His host, King Salman, accuses Iran of “spearheading global terrorism”. Egged on by Israel, Trump has threatened to tear up Obama’s landmark 2015 nuclear deal with Iran.

He trumpeted a big arms deal with the Saudis. And this week he threw his support behind Riyadh’s diplomatic and commercial ostracism of Qatar, which almost alone among Gulf Arab states has tried to keep on good terms with Iran. This has led regional politicians to warn of imminent war.

Iran’s leaders reject Trump’s accusations out of hand. They say Riyadh is Isis’s biggest inspiration and supporter, and point out that Iran and the US are on the same side fighting the jihadis in Iraq.

Unlike the autocratic Gulf regimes, Iran also has a quasi-democratic political system, with an elected parliament and president, that confounds the “sponsor of terrorism” image. This awkward fact seems to enrage Trump, the Saudis and Isis in equal measure.

By Simon Tisdall

June 11, 2017 0 comments

Iran Interlink Weekly Digest

Iran Interlink Weekly Digest – 192

++ Maryam Rajavi did not condemn the two terrorist attacks in Iran. Her websites have gone around the subject, condemning terrorism in general but not this event. In response to this MEK formers say that although the MEK is not capable of actually carrying out such an attack, they are involved in this kind of work. Rajavi’s reaction comes about because the MEK is part and parcel of Saudi Intelligence. Just as Rajavi could never condemn anything that Saddam Hussein did, so Rajavi cannot condemn anything the Saudis do. There is every indication therefore that Iran is correct in saying that Saudi Arabia is behind this event.

++ Several MEK formers in Albania have written open letters addressed to various officials and governments. Some write with information about how they are being mistreated – the UNHCR refuses to pay them their individual refugee allowances and pays it instead to the MEK organisation. Some write appealing to the international community to help them not be terrorists. The UNHCR action is forcing them to remain with a terrorist group.

In English:

++ A group of MEK formers in Albania writing as ‘Azadi Association’ have noted that former UN Rapporteur Ahmad Shahid intends to meet with Maryam Rajavi in Albania. They ask him to ensure that he also meets with former and current members, without the presence of MEK minders, to discover what they have to say.

++ Reza Jebelli of Payvand Rahahee Association writes an open letter to Gerard Collomb, French Interior Minister. Jebelli says that as a European citizen with long experience of MEK terrorist activity, it is his duty to warn the French government of the continued threat posed by the MEK. He highlights the MEK’s annual celebration of armed struggle in June as an example of this.

++ Various articles covering the two terrorist attacks inside Iran last week raise the possibility of MEK involvement. They identify typical hallmarks of MEK terrorist behaviour – including the use of cyanide tablets and the involvement of a female perpetrator. Although none believe that the MEK could have actually been involved directly, they propose that the MEK could have been involved in the planning, training and logistical support from their bases in Paris and Tirana.

++ Press TV reports that in the US, Republican Congressman Dana Rohrabacher expressed his “delight” at the terrorist attacks on Iran and hopes that more such aggression against Iran will follow.

June 09, 2017

June 11, 2017 0 comments

Mujahedin Khalq; A proxy force

Tehran Was Always America’s And Thus The Islamic State’s Final Destination

Several were left dead and many more injured after coordinated terror attacks on Iran’s capital of Tehran. Shootings and bombings targeted Iran’s parliament and the tomb of Ayatollah Khomeini.

According to Reuters, the so-called “Islamic State” claimed responsibility for the attack, which unfolded just days after another terror attack unfolded in London. The Islamic State also reportedly took responsibility for the violence in London, despite evidence emerging that the three suspects involved were long known to British security and intelligence agencies and were simply allowed to plot and carry out their attacks.

It is much less likely that Tehran’s government coddled terrorists – as it has been engaged for years in fighting terrorism both on its borders and in Syria amid a vicious six-year war fueled by US, European, and Persian Gulf weapons, cash, and fighters..

Armed Violence Targeting Tehran Was the Stated Goal of US Policymakers

The recent terrorist attacks in Tehran are the literal manifestation of US foreign policy. The creation of a proxy force with which to fight Iran and establishing a safe haven for it beyond Iran’s borders have been long-stated US policy. The current chaos consuming Syria and Iraq – and to a lesser extent in southeast Turkey – is a direct result of the US attempting to secure a base of operations to launch a proxy war directly against Iran.

In the 2009 Brookings Institution document titled, “Which Path to Persia? Options for a New American Strategy toward Iran,” the use of then US State Department-listed foreign terrorist organization Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK) as a proxy for instigating a full-fledged armed insurgency not unlike that which is currently unfolding in Syria was discussed in detail.

The report explicitly stated:

The United states could also attempt to promote external Iranian opposition groups, providing them with the support to turn themselves into full-fledged insurgencies and even helping them militarily defeat the forces of the clerical regime. The United states could work with groups like the Iraq-based National council of resistance of Iran (NCRI) and its military wing, the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MeK), helping the thousands of its members who, under Saddam Husayn’s regime, were armed and had conducted guerrilla and terrorist operations against the clerical regime. although the NCRI is supposedly disarmed today, that could quickly be changed.

Brookings policymakers admitted throughout the report that MEK was responsible for killing both American and Iranian military personnel, politicians, and civilians in what was clear-cut terrorism. Despite this, and admissions that MEK remained indisputably a terrorist organization, recommendations were made to de-list it from the US State Department’s Foreign Terrorist Organization registry so that more overt support could be provided to the group for armed regime change.

Based on such recommendations and intensive lobbying, the US State Department would eventually de-list MEK in 2012 and the group would receive significant backing from the US openly. This included support from many members of current US President Donald Trump’s campaign team – including Rudy Giuliani, Newt Gingrich, and John Bolton.

However, despite these efforts, MEK was not capable then or now of accomplishing the lofty goal of instigating full-fledged insurrection against Tehran, necessitating the use of other armed groups. The 2009 Brookings paper made mention of other candidates under a section titled, “Potential Ethnic Proxies,” identifying Arab and Kurdish groups as well as possible candidates for a US proxy war against Tehran.

Under a section titled, “Finding a Conduit and Safe Haven,” Brookings notes:

Of equal importance (and potential difficulty) will be finding a neighboring country willing to serve as the conduit for U.S. aid to the insurgent group, as well as to provide a safe haven where the group can train, plan, organize, heal, and resupply.

For the US proxy war on Syria, Turkey and Jordan fulfill this role. For Iran, it is clear that US efforts would have to focus on establishing conduits and safe havens from Pakistan’s southwest Balochistan province and from Kurdish-dominated regions in northern Iraq, eastern Syria, and southeastern Turkey – precisely where current upheaval is being fueled by US intervention both overtly and covertly.

Brookings noted in 2009 that:

It would be difficult to find or build an insurgency with a high likelihood of success. The existing candidates are weak and divided, and the Iranian regime is very strong relative to the potential internal and external challengers.

A group not mentioned by Brookings in 2009, but that exists in the very region the US seeks to create a conduit and safe haven for a proxy war with Iran, is the Islamic State. Despite claims that it is an independent terrorist organization propelled by black market oil sales, ransoms, and local taxes, its fighting capacity, logistical networks, and operational reach demonstrates vast state sponsorship.

The Ultimate Proxy, the Perfect Conduit and Safe Haven

The Islamic State reaching into Iran, southern Russia, and even as far as western China was not only possible, it was inevitable and the logical progression of US policy as stated by Brookings in 2009 and verifiably executed since then.

The Islamic State represents the perfect “proxy,” occupying the ideal conduit and safe haven for executing America’s proxy war against Iran and beyond. Surrounding the Islamic State’s holdings are US military bases, including those illegally constructed in eastern Syria. Were the US to wage war against Iran in the near future, it is likely these assets would all “coincidentally” coordinate against Tehran just as they are now being “coincidentally” coordinated against Damascus.

The use of terrorism, extremists, and proxies in executing US foreign policy, and the use of extremists observing the Islamic State and Al Qaeda’s brand of indoctrination was demonstrated definitively during the 1980s when the US with the assistance of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan – used Al Qaeda to expel Soviet forces from Afghanistan. This example is in fact mentioned explicitly by Brookings policymakers as a template for creating a new proxy war – this time against Iran.

For the US, there is no better stand-in for Al Qaeda than its successor the Islamic State. US policymakers have demonstrated a desire to use known terrorist organizations to wage proxy war against targeted nation-states, has previously done so in Afghanistan, and has clearly organized the geopolitical game board on all sides of Iran to facilitate its agenda laid out in 2009. With terrorists now killing people in Tehran, it is simply verification that this agenda is advancing onward.

Iran’s involvement in the Syrian conflict illustrates that Tehran is well aware of this conspiracy and is actively defending against it both within and beyond its borders. Russia is likewise an ultimate target of the proxy war in Syria and is likewise involved in resolving it in favor of stopping it there before it goes further.

China’s small but expanding role in the conflict is linked directly to the inevitability of this instability spreading to its western Xianjiang province.

While terrorism in Europe, including the recent London attack, is held up as proof that the West is “also” being targeted by the Islamic State, evidence suggests otherwise. The attacks are more likely an exercise in producing plausible deniability.

In reality, the Islamic State – like Al Qaeda before it – depends on vast, multinational state sponsorship – state sponsorship the US, Europe, and its regional allies in the Persian Gulf are providing. It is also sponsorship they can – at anytime of their choosing – expose and end. They simply choose not to in pursuit of regional and global hegemony.

The 2009 Brookings paper is a signed and dated confession of the West’s proclivity toward using terrorism as a geopolitical tool. While Western headlines insist that nations like Iran, Russia, and China jeopardize global stability, it is clear that they themselves do so in pursuit of global hegemony.

Tony Cartalucci, Bangkok-based geopolitical researcher and writer, especially for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”, where this article first appeared.

Activist Post.com

June 11, 2017 0 comments

Mujahedin Khalq; A proxy force

ISIS Attacks in Tehran Expose US-Saudi Lies About Iran

On Wednesday June 7 two groups of terrorists staged stunning attacks in Tehran, Iran. Three of the terrorists attacked the mausoleum of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the leader of the 1979 Revolution. One terrorist blew himself up, another was killed by the security forces, and a third one, apparently a woman, was arrested. At the same time, three other terrorists entered the Majles [parliament] building and took several people hostage, but were eventually killed by the security forces. Altogether, the terrorist attacks killed at least 12 innocent Iranians and injured more than 40. The Sunni terrorist group Daesh (also known as the ISIS or ISIL) took responsibility, and threatened more terrorist attacks. There are rumors in Tehran that the terrorist were Iranian Kurds recruited by Daesh.

These attacks have occurred exactly two weeks after President Donald Trump’s trip to Saudi Arabia in which he took sides with that nation and other Sunni reactionary regimes in the Persian Gulf area against Iran, and declared that Iran provides “safe harbor, financial backing, and the social standing needed for recruitment” of the terrorist, and “Iran funds, arms, and trains terrorists, militias, and other extremist groups that spread destruction and chaos across the region. For decades, Iran has fueled the fires of sectarian conflict and terror.”

This is, of course, the same man who during his campaign last year told us that the Saudis were “mouth pieces, bullies, cowards,” who were “paying ISIS.” But, milking the Saudis to the tune of over $400 billion in arms sales, weapons that will be used to kill the people of Yemen and other Muslims in the region, has its price, and the price that Trump is paying is encouraging more support for terrorism by Saudi Arabia.

Iran has long been a victim of terrorism. In the 1980s the Mujahidin-e Khalgh Organization, usually referred to as the MEK or MKO, murdered up to 17000 people in Iran. Even the United States listed the MEK as a terrorist organization for well over a decade. The Baluchi terrorist group Jundallah staged several terrorist attacks in Iran from its bases in Pakistan, killing scores of civilians. Just last month, Jaish al-Adl, another Baluchi Sunni terrorist group, attacked from Pakistan and murdered 10 Iranian border guards. Iranian-Arabs, supported by Arab regimes of the Middle East, and in particular Saudi Arabia, have carried out several terrorist attacks in the oil-rich province of Khuzestan in southwest Iran.

At the same time, Iran has been at the forefront of the struggle against radical terrorist groups. It played a pivotal role in toppling the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in the fall of 2001. Without Iran’s help, Iraq’s Capital Baghdad would have fallen to Daesh in June 2014. The war in Syria has been imposed on the Syrian people by the terrorist groups that are supported by Saudi Arabia and its allies, namely, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Turkey, and Jordan, as acknowledged even by Joe Biden at Harvard University in October 2014, and by Hillary Clinton, and Iran has been fighting Daesh there. This is while Israel supports the Jabhat al-Nusra, the al-Qaeda Syrian branch, by treating their wounded fighters in Israel and returning them to the fields.

And, yet, Trump’s national security team is virulently anti-Iran, espousing false propaganda and lies again that nation. In particular, Defense Secretary James “mad dog” Mattis has said, “Iran is not an enemy of ISIS [Daesh]; they have a lot to gain from the turmoil that ISIS creates,” and, “What is the one country in the Middle East that has not been attacked by ISIS? One. That is Iran. That is more than happenstance, I’m sure.” These statements are pure fabrication and are due to Mattis’ decades-long grudge against Iran. Israel, not Iran, is the only nation that has not been attacked by Daesh. Several plots for terrorist attacks by Daesh against Iran were discovered in the past before being carried out by them. Wednesday’s attacks by Daesh in Tehran exposed the lie propagated by Mattis. Most recently, Mattis said in Saudi Arabia, “Everywhere you look if there is trouble in the region, you find Iran,” which is another lie by the Defense Secretary. To see this, consider just the past six years, since the beginning of the Arab Spring.

Saudi Arabia’s finger prints are on every trouble sport in the Middle East. Not only did Saudi Arabia support NATO attacks on Libya, it also provided “Arab legitimacy” for it by creating the false impression that all Arabs supported the attacks. Saudi Arabia opposed the revolution in Egypt, and supported the military coup that toppled the democratically-elected government of Mohamed Morsi. Saudi Arabia invaded Bahrain in order to prevent the Shiites, who make up 75 percent of Bahrain’s population, from gaining their democratic rights and overcoming discriminations by the Sunni minority.

Saudi Arabia’s role in creating Daesh is well documented. For example, in one secret e-mail Hillary Clinton wrote, “We need to use our diplomatic and more traditional intelligence assets to bring pressure on the governments of Qatar and Saudi Arabia, which are providing clandestine financial and logistic support to Isis and other radical groups in the region.” Saudi Arabia has been bombing Yemen for over two years, committing war crimes, and Mattis and Pentagon support it. After Tunisia, Saudi Arabia provides more terrorists to Daesh than any other nation (and Iran has supplied none).

A few weeks ago, Mohammad bin Salman, Saudi Arabia’s deputy crown prince and defense minister threatened Iran with war, claiming that, “We are a primary target for the Iranian regime,” accusing Iran falsely of seeking to take over Islamic holy sites in Saudi Arabia. “We won’t wait for the battle to be in Saudi Arabia. Instead, we’ll work so that the battle is for them in Iran,” Salman added. Speaking in Paris on June 6, Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir declared that Iran must be punished “for its support of al-Qaeda,” another lie by a fascist regime that spends billions of dollars every year to support terrorism. Al-Jubeir’s memory is short, but the world’s is not: Osama bin Laden was a Saudi citizen, as were 15 of the 19 terrorists that attacked the United States on 11 September 2001. Six out of every ten terrorists that joined al-Qaeda in Iraq, the forebear of Daesh, were Saudi citizens.

Iran and Iranians do not want any war with Saudi Arabia. They just re-elected President Hassan Rouhani because they support his moderate foreign policy that had kept Iran isolated from any attack by the Sunni terrorist groups, his rapprochement with the European Union, and his efforts for lessening tension with the United States. Saudi Arabia and its allies will be fully responsible for any war the might be imposed on Iran and its people.

By Muhammad Sahimi,

June 10, 2017 0 comments

Mujahedin Khalq; A proxy force

Iran terror attack: Who gains?

In the past, I had a well-informed Israeli source who confirmed Israeli participation in assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists and explosions at missile bases. Unfortunately, this source passed away some time ago. So what I write here will be based on informed speculation.

Who gains from the rather spectacular terror attack on two of Iran’s most secure and hallowed institutions: the Majlis and Ayatollah Khomeni’s tomb? Of course, the Islamic State (IS) group, which has claimed responsibility, and with whom Iran is engaged in a vicious battle in Syria and Iraq. Nominally, that is likely the case.

But no terror group, no matter how adept could manage to organise and execute an operation of this sort. It required the help of one or more national intelligence agencies.

Those who have the most to gain and most capability are the Saudis and Israelis. Both hate the Iranians (for different reasons). Since they know they cannot yet sabotage the most important sign of Iranian reconciliation with the West– the P5+1 nuclear deal – the next best thing is a dramatic strike at the heart of Iran itself.

Handing a child to an Iranian security guard during terror attack (Fars/Omid Vahabzadeh via AP)

Not waiting for battle?

As I wrote earlier this week, Saudi Arabia’s new king and crown prince are hardliners flexing their nation’s military might in Yemen and Syria. Iran is yet another enemy they long to defeat.

For this reason, the Gulf states’ newly declared attack and siege against Qatar, a result in some measure of its moderate stance regarding Iran, is part and parcel of this hardening of relations in the region. All of which is directed from Riyadh.

More support for the claim of Saudi support, if not direct involvement, comes from a statement which the kingdom’s deputy crown prince made in early May: “We won’t wait for the battle to be in Saudi Arabia. Instead, we will work so that the battle is for them in Iran,” Salman added.

It’s more than a coincidence that just last month, Voice of Israel’s Persian service went off the air in Israel as a result of the transition to a new broadcasting model, despite the protests of veteran Israeli Persian hands like broadcaster Menashe Amir. On Wednesday, just hours after the terror attack, the Persian service (which is largely funded by the Israeli defence ministry) suddenly resumed operations. Trust me, developments like that in Israel are not accidental.

Exploiting grievances

Meir Dagan, when he was Mossad chief, told an Israeli interviewer that Israel exploited internal ethnic grievances inside Iran to foment strife and terror attacks. Thus it’s no surprise that, according to Muhammad Sahimi, the editor of Iran News & Middle East Reports, the attackers in Tehran were reported to be Iranian (Sunni) Kurds who nurse longstanding aspirations for autonomy within Iran.

The Mujahedeen-e-Khalq (MEK), a long-standing Iranian opposition group, has collaborated with the Israelis on those earlier operations. So they are likely to have played a role as well. The group retains thousands of secret supporters within Iran who would have helped smuggle arms into the country, stashed them once they arrived, located safe houses for the attackers, and helped scout out the targeted sites.

Nor can we discount the newly unleashed terror capabilities of the CIA under its new director of Iran operations, “Ayatollah” Michael D’Andrea. It’s wholly credible that since Trump cannot yet abolish the nuclear deal, that he’s chosen the next best thing: appointing a CIA leader with a “knife in his teeth” primed to shed the blood of Iranians in the streets of Iran.

In terms of who gains, let’s not forget another major beneficiary: Iran’s hardliners in the Revolutionary Guard and clerical class. Their view of the world sees enemies everywhere, especially among Sunni Muslims and the West. Now they can spin a tale of all those parties uniting in desperate measures to spill the blood of Shia martyrs. A perfect script for the conservatives.

Pouring kerosene on a bonfire

But overall, what does this attack gain for anyone involved? Mainly, it serves to unite the anti-Iran coalition. It raises the flag of the rejectionists who see Iran as the ultimate evil. It also strengthens the rejectionists in Iran and weakens the moderates led by newly-re-elected President Hassan Rouhani.

Though Ayatollah Khamenei’s hand-picked candidate lost badly in the election, the supreme leader and his conservative allies will have little trouble arguing that such violence deserves an angry and forceful response: the opposite of the position the moderates would take.

This attack sets the tone for the coming years: tit-for-tat terror attacks against Iranian and Saudi targets, part of an ongoing intra-Muslim feud that could inflame the entire region, if not the world – with the US president doing his level best to pour kerosene on the bonfire.

Those Western nations who envision a different future must unite to fight back against this approach. They must produce a moderate, conciliatory policy which eases sanctions, promotes trade and cultural engagement, and establishes a viable alternative to this bloodbath. They must act now or face the consequences. Inaction means death.

Middle East Eye

This piece originally ran on Tikun Olam.

– Richard Silverstein writes the Tikun Olam blog, devoted to exposing the excesses of the Israeli national security state. His work has appeared in Haaretz, the Forward, the Seattle Times and the Los Angeles Times. He contributed to the essay collection devoted to the 2006 Lebanon war, A Time to Speak Out (Verso) and has another essay in the upcoming collection, Israel and Palestine: Alternate Perspectives on Statehood (Rowman & Littlefield).

June 10, 2017 0 comments

Mujahedin Khalq; A proxy force

Fallout from Iran attacks spells trouble to come in wider Middle East

A week after Donald Trump stirred up tensions in the Middle East with his visit to Saudi Arabia, and just after Qatar was ostracised by several other countries for its supposed links to terrorism, a brace of terror attacks in Iran have turned up the heat even further.

In Tehran on June 7, four men attacked one of the gates of the Iranian parliament building. After opening fire on a guard, they entered the lobbies and shot a number of visitors and staff. After several hours and exchanges of gunfire, they were killed by Iranian special forces. At the same time, several attackers fired on visitors at the Mausoleum of Ayatollah Khomeini, founder of the Islamic Republic. All in all, the two events left at least 17 dead and more than 43 injured.

Iran’s Supreme Leader dismissed the attacks as “fireworks … too small to affect the will of the Iranian nation and its officials”. Sure enough, the display of unity inside Iran was immediate and powerful, with social media booming with expressions of solidarity and defiance of terror (#درکنار همیم)

We Stand Together

artwork by: @_AMiRATHAN_ #PrayForTehran #PrayForIran #wearetogether#همه_با_هميم #درکنارهمیم pic.twitter.com/E8wKTgLXdF

— ehsan (@eh_asgari) June 7, 2017

We are Together

ALWAYS AND FOREVER #IRAN#درکنارهمیم #در_کنار_همیم pic.twitter.com/VDUlNlktxQ

— خون آشامِ صورتی ⚜ (@nilooffar) June 7, 2017

The so-called Islamic State (IS) soon claimed responsibility for the attack, reiterating that “in the holy month of Ramadan the reward of killing misbelievers” – that is, the Shia Muslims who constitute the majority of Iran’s population – “is multiplied”.

If the claim of responsibility is to be believed, this isn’t the first time IS has invited its followers to exterminate Shia populations, or attacked them. In recent months, it has attacked a Shia neighbourhood in Baghdad, Iraqi Shia pilgrims near Damascus, and a 12th-century Shia mosque in Herat in Afghanistan. It also left a bomb near Shia stronghold al-Dahiyeh in south Beirut, which was found and dismantled.

The day after the attack, Iranian authorities announced that the terrorists were allegedly connected to Wahabi cells operating under the IS network in Mousul and Raqqa, and that they followed Abu Ayesheh, a high-ranking commander of IS, who had tried in August 2016 to carry out terror attacks in Iran’s religious cities. If this account is accurate, these were therefore IS’s first successful attacks in Iran proper.

That said, the attack was also sophisticated enough that it might have been beyond IS’s abilities inside Iran – and according to Iran’s own Ministry of Intelligence, the attackers were themselves Iranians. Given that IS doesn’t have a popular base inside Iran, this might point to the tactical support of the exiled revolutionary group

A stamp commemorating the victims of the MEK’s 1981 bombing.

MEK or the Baluchi separatist group Jundullah.

Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK) is an Iranian terrorist group dedicated to violently overthrowing Iran’s government and which had been expelled from the country since the early 1980s. The Obama administration removed it from the US’s list of terror groups after an intense lobbying campaign in Washington DC, but its involvement in violence is well-known in Iran. In 1981, it was blamed for planting a powerful bomb in the headquarters of the ruling Islamic Republic Party, killing dozens of leading state officials.

Then there’s the Jundullah group, a violent separatist organisation that’s previously received the backing of both Saudi Arabia and the US in the hope of undermining Iran’s domestic security and stability. In 2009, it killed 42 Revolutionary Guards, including a top general, with an explosive device in a mosque in Baluchistan.

Wedge issue

As with many terror attacks, the timing of these incidents is particularly relevant. The Revolutionary Guards’ statement after the attacks overtly connected them with Donald Trump’s visit to the Middle East, during which the US president met with his Saudi and Israeli counterparts and decried Iran for supposedly sponsoring terrorism and extremism – basically putting the country back in the George W. Bush-era “Axis of Evil” hall of shame.

This view has gained currency among several Arab countries since Trump’s election. Only a month ago, the Saudi crown prince, while ruling out any possible dialogue with Tehran, stated that the struggle for regional influence will “take place inside Iran”, implying that regime change and support for armed resistance inside Iran were cards on the table.

When the latest attacks struck, the world’s major players found themselves on two sides. The UN Secretary General, Antonio Guterres, condemned the attack and invited everyone to join forces to fight terrorism; the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Federica Mogherini, expressed solidarity with her Iranian counterpart, Mohammad Javad Zarif, and heads of state from all corners sent missives of condolence and support. Similarly, France, Italy, Germany as well as most of the countries in the Global South expressed their condolences to the Iranian authorities. The UK’s Theresa May remained silent, a sign that indicates alignment with the US-Saudi front.

In fact, the Saudi foreign minister declined to address Iran directly, while the Trump White House’s statement was predictably both pointed and tactless: “States that sponsor terrorism risk falling to the evil they promote.” Zarif, for his part, called the statement “repugnant” and claimed it was mounted by IS terrorists with US backing.

The rifts on display here are growing. On the one hand, as Iran-backed military efforts help drive IS back in Iraq and Syria, Tehran is starting to look like a logical strategic partner for the EU in its efforts against radical Islamist terrorism. But on the other hand, this is precisely the sort of cooperation that the US, Israel and Saudi Arabia are keen to curtail.

These hawkish powers look set to keep up sanctions on banking, threaten retaliation against companies willing to invest in Iran, invest in propaganda and intense lobbying, and may yet mount military operations, covert or otherwise.

Trump’s trip to Saudi Arabia yielded a proposed but unconfirmed arms deal that the president announced would amount to more than US$110 billion. Whether or not that’s true is highly disputed, but as a statement of intent, it clearly signals where Trump’s sympathies lie as far as the Middle East’s major powers are concerned.

Hence, Tehran finds itself part of the web of terror attacks that had already touched upon London, Manchester, Paris, Kabul and many other cities. But the stakes at play here risk leading to a regional confrontation with dangerous international underpinnings.

Maziyar Ghiabi, The Conversation,

Maziyar Ghiabi,Doctor in Politics at University of Oxford and Visiting Fellow at the American University of Beirut, University of Oxford

June 10, 2017 0 comments

Mujahedin Khalq; A proxy force

Revolutionary Guards blame Saudi Arabia for Tehran terror attack

Military force ratchets up tensions with Riyadh after 12 killed in Iran’s capital

Iran’s Revolutionary Guards ratcheted up the tensions with Saudi Arabia as it accused Tehran’s regional rival of involvement in Wednesday’s double terrorist attack in the capital, which left at least 13 people dead and wounded more than 50.

Gunmen and suicide bombers launched simultaneous attacks on the parliament building in Tehran and the nearby shrine of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the Islamic Republic’s founder.

The attacks were claimed by Isis, in what would be the jihadi group’s first significant strike in the Islamic Republic. However a statement from the Revolutionary Guards linked the “brutal attack” to Donald Trump’s visit last month to Riyadh, where the US president singled out Iran for fuelling “the fires of sectarian conflict and terror”.

“This terrorist act took place a week after a joint meeting between the US president and head of a reactionary regional country [Saudi Arabia] which has been a constant supporter of terrorism,” the statement said. “The fact Isis claimed responsibility proves that they [Saudi Arabia] were involved in the brutal attack.”

Speaking in Berlin, Adel Al-Jubeir, Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister, denied the accusation of involvement and said there was no evidence that his country was involved. “We condemn terrorist attacks anywhere they occur and we condemn the killing of the innocent anywhere it occurs,” Mr al-Jubeir was quoted by Reuters as saying.

Hassan Rouhani, Iran’s president, condemned the attacks, without laying the blame at the feet of Saudi Arabia. However, the accusation from the powerful Revolutionary Guards will stoke the increasingly bitter enmity between Tehran and Riyadh, which are involved in proxy wars from Syria to Yemen.

Iran’s foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, tweeted, “Terror-sponsoring despots threaten to bring the fight to our homeland. Proxies attack what their masters despise most: the seat of democracy.”

Mr Zarif seemed to be pointing at a comment last month by the Saudi deputy crown prince Mohammed bin Salman that any struggle for influence between Riyadh and Tehran would take place “inside Iran, not in Saudi Arabia”.

“We know that the aim of the Iranian regime is to reach the focal point of Muslims [Mecca] and we will not wait until the fight is inside Saudi Arabia and we will work so that the battle is on their side, inside Iran, not in Saudi Arabia,” Prince Mohammed said in a television interview.

The attacks also come at a sensitive moment in the Gulf, where a new rift opened this week pitting Qatar, with whom Tehran has ties, against Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Bahrain. The quartet on Monday severed diplomatic ties with Qatar and accused Doha of supporting terrorism.

Hamid-Reza Taraghi, a senior politician close to Tehran’s hardliners, blamed a combination of Saudi Arabia, the US, Isis and the exiled opposition group MEK for Wednesday’s attacks. “Saudi Arabia is definitely playing the leading role in these incidents, considering that its foreign ministry threatened Iran two to three days ago,” he said, referring to a call by Riyadh for Iran to be punished for supporting terrorism. He provided no evidence to support his claims.

His view was echoed by others, though they did not provide evidence either. “The fact that these two attacks took place . . . after that [Riyadh] meeting means that both the US and the Saudi regime have ordered their proxies to embark on that act,” Brigadier-General Hossein Nejat of the Revolutionary Guards told a local news agency.

Mohsen Rezaei, a former Revolutionary Guards commander, warned terrorists to expect a “tough and unforgettable” response from Iran.

Mr Trump’s administration is viewed as much more hawkish on Iran than the previous government of Barack Obama. Tehran has long accused Saudi Arabia of supporting Isis.

The assault began at 10.30am local time when three gunmen (earlier reports had said four) in women’s clothing walked into the building and began shooting. One detonated an explosive vest. All the attackers were killed after a stand-off lasting several hours, Iran’s interior ministry said.

Two further gunmen also opened fire at the Ayatollah Khomeini shrine in the Iranian capital. One was reported to have killed himself by detonating an explosive vest. Another was shot dead. Based on a video released by Isis, the attackers spoke Arabic. Brigadier-General Nejat said the nationality of the attackers was not yet clear, but an Iranian official told state television on Wednesday night that they were Iranian.

At least 13 people were killed in the two attacks, Pir-Hossein Kolivand, head of Iran’s emergency department, was quoted as saying by the official Irna news agency on Thursday.

Isis on Wednesday vowed further attacks on Iran, saying “Persia should know that the state of the caliphate will not miss an opportunity for an onslaught against them”.

Iranian officials said security forces remained on high alert.

Terrorist attacks are rare in Iran, which keeps a tight grip on domestic security. The country has largely been spared from militant attacks despite its heavy support of Shia militias in Syria and Iraq, which has increased sympathies among some of those countries’ Sunni populations for radical groups such as Isis.

If Iran steps up its fight against Isis in the wake of Wednesday’s attack, the situation in the region could become even more volatile, analysts say. Charlie Winter, senior research fellow at the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation at King’s College London, said the attack could boost Isis’s flagging morale and intensify pressure on Tehran to step up its involvement in Syria against the jihadis. “If this happens, a more intense ‘Sunni war against Shia Islam’ will pour petrol on Isis’s ideological fire,” he said.

Security analysts outside of Iran have long argued that it has not been attacked because it tolerated the presence of al-Qaeda and the movement of communications and finances through the country. But for Isis, which is not reliant on foreign financing, Iran has long been a target.

While it is difficult to gauge the extent of an Isis presence in Iran, the group has long sought to attract people from Iran’s Sunni minority. Last March, it released a 36-minute video in Persian, vowing to conquer Iran. In the video, militants used photographs of Iranian leaders for target practice, including Qassem Soleimani, commander of the Revolutionary Guards’ elite Quds force.

by: Monavar Khalaj in Tehran and Erika Solomon in Beirut

June 10, 2017 0 comments

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