Page 5 – Nejat Society

Mujahedin Khalq Organization as a terrorist group

MEK’s sponsors must acknowledge Iranian rejection of the group

In January 2026, the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), actively report on Iran claiming a role in ongoing nationwide protests across the country.
The ongoing nationwide protests which were initially sparked by economic woes began in late December 2025/early January 2026. The MEK-affiliated media are constantly publishing reports, including claims that “Resistance Units” are operating within Iran.

According to numerous sources, public perception is that the MEK has little domestic legitimacy in Iran and is widely viewed across the Iranian political spectrum as a “traitorous cult”. The popular slogans chanted by demonstrators indicate that the MEK is widely rejected by them. No one in the streets of Iran chants pro-MEK slogans.

However, the MEK’s mercenaries in Iran, called “resistance units”, are skillful exploiters of legitimate grievances in order to incite violence, and fabricate information to project a fake image of their popularity for their ranks escalating confrontation between true protesters and the government forces.
During three decades of multi-million dollar lobbying in the West, the MEK has been successful to sell itself as a viable alternative for the Iranian government to some Western politicians. The paid sponsors of the MEK in the West fail to align with the political realities inside Iran. According to Mali Rezaei of the abc.net this reinforces “a sense that international actors neither understand nor prioritize Iranian society itself.”

“By treating groups like the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) as representative of the broad Iranian opposition, despite the group’s widespread unpopularity inside Iran due to its wartime collaboration with Saddam Hussein and perceived political opportunism, external actors have further distorted international understandings of dissent,” Rezaei writes. “For many Iranians, this has reinforced the belief that foreign governments continue to misrepresent or override the genuine aspirations emerging from within the country.”

Shabnam Assadollahi, the Canadian human rights advocate and freelance journalist of Iranian origin, writes about the MEK’s unpopularity on the Times of Israel warning the west to “stop playing games with Iran” because “the MEK does not speak for Iranians.”
She also explains that the MEK is widely despised across Iran’s political spectrum, viewed as a traitorous cult, not a credible opposition and finally rejected in public protests.

Legitimizing the MEK undermines democratic values and supporting the group contradicts commitments to democracy, human rights and freedom. This “positions Western governments against the clearly expressed will of the Iranian people”, asserts Assadollahi.

This blogger of the Times of Israel lists the MEK’s terrorist record, cult-like authoritarianism and opportunistic alliances as factors that make it notorious for Iranian public opinion. According to her, Iranian protesters explicitly reject MEK terrorists, separatism and foreign-engineered political projects. And, this reflects their political maturity and historical awareness.

Rezaei and Assadollahi like many other western-based Iranian journalists believe that western states should correct their perception of the Iranians’ aspirations. They must terminate any engagement with the MEK and its affiliated groups like the so-called National Council of Resistance (NCR). Ending participation in MEK events, rallies, and conferences, western politicians should prohibit official endorsements or symbolic legitimization of the group.

In order to get the trust of the Iranian public, Western high profiles should acknowledge the Iranian rejection of the MEK and other extremist separatist groups and respect Iran’s territorial integrity and national unity.

Mazda Parsi

January 12, 2026 0 comments

Mujahedin Khalq Organization as a terrorist group

Preserving the authenticity of protests, rejecting the violence of the MEK

In a year that witnessed unprecedented US and Israeli attacks on Iran, Western economic sanctions against Iran, and the weakening of Iran’s regional partners, it is not surprising that prices have risen and uncontrolled inflation, has led to discontent and protests across the country.

However, civil protests and demands for the rights of the Iranian people have always been tainted by violent actions by external agents. At the forefront of these violent actors is the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), which, in organizing its activities inside Iran, hires a number of mercenaries ready to commit violence at such times.

In political terms, there is a semantic distinction between “protest” and “violence/riot.” However, in practice, Iran’s internal discontent has always been accompanied by the intervention of elements of the MEK and some other violent groups, and signals of external intervention, such as tweets from Western leaders, have blurred the line between protest and riot. The result of these interventions is chaos and violence that deadlocks popular demands and weakens the possibility of transparent protest action.

It is surprising that the MEK and other Western violent and interventionist groups call this disruption of civil protests “support for the protesters.”

What is the solution?

To prevent the MEK from exploiting the popular protests in Iran and marginalizing the main demands, the Iranian people must focus on their domestic and legitimate demands while maintaining their independence and non-dependence on any foreign group, organization, or government, and reject any violence or incitement to chaos. This approach will help preserve the authenticity of the protests and prevent them from becoming a tool for the goals of groups like the MEK.

People should prevent the protests from being abstracted by clearly defining their demands and insisting on them. Not supporting the slogans and violent actions of the MEK will help maintain the independent identity of the protests.

Raising public awareness about the nature, history, and goals of the MEK organization is very effective in this regard. To prevent falling into the trap of Maryam Rajavi’s deceptive and seemingly democratic and secular slogans, it is necessary to take a deep and careful look at the internal and esoteric reality of the Cult of Rajavi.

First and foremost, former members of the MEK and the victims of this cult-like extremist group, shoulder the burden of this duty. Second, researchers, journalists, and social activists, and ultimately all truth-loving and fair citizens must enlighten their audience about the truth of the MEK.

In addition to paying attention to the physical and violent presence of MEK mercenaries on the streets and in order to reject the violence of the MEK agents, careful observation of cyberspace and media literacy are very important in identifying the MEK forces in their Albanian troll farm, Ashraf 3.

Mazda Parsi

January 7, 2026 0 comments

Mujahedin Khalq Organization as a terrorist group

A Criterion for Proving the Violent Nature of the MEK

The French word “pratique” is frequently used by the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) propaganda machine. Pratique means action or practice, as opposed to theory or opinion. In fact, pratique is the practical experience of a theory. In the case of the MEK, the term pratique means the tactical application of their ideology through their so-called “resistance units” that operate inside Iran. This discrepancy between the group’s public “democratic” image and its documented and historical violent actions is a focal point of disagreement among observers.

The MEK-run media call the violent actions of the resistance units as “revolutionary pratique,” which is based on Massoud Rajavi’s “revolutionary theory.” The MEK’s apologists define their violent behavior as “practicing revolutionary theory,” because according to the MEK propaganda, “the criterion for measuring the validity and correctness of all theories and opinions is the scene of action.”

The leaders of the MEK claim that “in the mutual influence of thought and action, in order to change many of the “objectivities” that appear rigid and unchangeable, every unit of theoretical training must be practiced and experienced on the stage and on the street by revolutionary forces.”

Are these claims, which openly state the fact that the MEK continues to insist on the theory of armed struggle, which it has believed in since its establishment, and in many cases, the resistance units even emphasize it in their campaigns by holding weapons in their hands. The MEK explicitly consider non-violence as a “deviant path”?

Despite the daily publication of images of firings and violent attacks on government and public buildings in Iran on their TV channel and social media, the leaders and supporters of the MEK use justifications to deny that their violence stems from their strategic frameworks.

Rebranding the MEK as “legitimate resistance”

The MEK and its political front present their pratiques not as terrorism but as legitimate resistance to the Iranian government. According to their narrative, “rebellion against the established order” is permissible.
They claim that they do not target civilians and that they target symbols of repression, such as government buildings, IRGC bases, or religious institutions associated with the government. In practice, however, there is no distinction between the two, and in many cases civilians have been harmed or injured in the process. What is certain is that the Iranian public has never welcomed the violent, tension and chaos created by the MEK.

The MEK lost its popular base in Iran from the early years of the 1979 revolution due to violent behavior, the killing of civilians, and collaboration with the aggressor Saddam Hussein. This festering wound was never healed because MEK agents, even in the form of resistance units, have always been a reminder of violence.

According to the media reports of the very MEK, on the occasion of Red Wednesday, 2025 (Chashanbeh Soori), the mercenaries of the MEK blew up dozens of IRGC and Basij centers and judicial institutions in “1,800 revolutionary pratiques in 106 cities and 43 regions in Tehran.”

Although the MEK propaganda machine tries to present the resistance units as emerging from the public, according to numerous documents and reports, these people who are willing to put Massoud Rajavi’s theories into practice on the streets of Iran with their faces covered are just a few deceived mercenaries who carry out the orders of the MEK commanders in exchange for money. The result of all these activities is neither similar to “resistance” nor has a tinge of “legitimacy”.
Violence under the cover of “democratic secularism” through media filtering

Since the removal of the MEK from the list of foreign terrorist organizations by the United States in 2012, the group has prioritized a narrative of democratic secularism to garner Western political support. They claim to have abandoned terrorism in favor of “Maryam Rajavi’s 10-point plan” for a democratic Iran.

To this end, they have resorted to very careful media filtering. In the Western media, they emphasize human rights exhibitions and rallies in European capitals (e.g., Berlin, Paris, Zurich). Violent “operations” are often presented to Persian-speaking audiences as evidence of an “internal uprising” rather than organized popular strikes.

On the other hand, MEK supporters often dismiss reports of violence as Iranian government propaganda intended to discredit the group. False flag claims are also made in this attitude. When violent acts result in civilian deaths or a strong public backlash, supporters often claim that the Iranian government itself carried out these actions to discredit the MEK.
Under Iranian law, when members are punished for the crime of “violence,” the MEK leadership describes these legal actions as “barbaric crimes” and “genocide,” shifting the focus from the act itself to the government’s response. In this case, the violent actions of MEK operatives disappear in the propaganda frenzy against “capital penalty”.

“Resistance” vs. “Violence”

In the MEK media, the term pratique is used to describe “patriotic duty.” The MEK defines burning a government building as a symbolic act of liberation (revolutionary pratique) rather than a violent act. This allows them to maintain an ideology based on “overthrow” while outwardly supporting “peaceful democratic change.” This contradiction between the inner and outer is striking in the realities inside Camp Ashraf 3 as an undemocratic and anti-women structure, and in Maryam Rajavi’s rhetoric as a proponent of democracy and women’s rights.

Despite these denials, international institutions and critics continue to view the MEK’s guerrilla warfare record, terrorist acts against military and civilian personnel, and its current resistance units as evidence of the MEK’s enduring commitment to armed struggle. The revolutionary pratiques of the MEK are completely consistent with its theoretical and practical nature, which has not fundamentally changed over the past half century.

Mazda Parsi

December 31, 2025 0 comments

Mujahedin Khalq Organization as a terrorist group

Rebranding, too Difficult for the MEK

While the Mujahedin-e Khalg (MEK) has been widely attempting to rebrand itself, particularly through extensive lobbying efforts and propaganda campaigns, the historical record of its actions, including its past designation as a terrorist organization by several states and its controversial internal structure, continues to be a significant impediment to a full image rehabilitation.

The group’s violent attacks against Iranian civilians and authorities, its past alliance with Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war and reports on human rights abuses within its own ranks, are frequently cited by critics and remain a major obstacle to gaining widespread legitimacy inside and outside Iran.

In December 2025, the primary activities of the MEK, in the West have focused on propaganda, cyber operations, political lobbying, and human rights campaigns. The group is active online from its base in Albania and via its political wing, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), with specific recent reports of continued activity in Western countries.

Key activities of the MEK in the last weeks of 2025 include:
Online and Propaganda Activities: A significant portion of MEK activity involves round-the-clock online operations from locations like Camp Ashraf 3 in Albania. These activities, often utilizing fake accounts on platforms like X (Twitter) and Facebook, are designed to cleanse the group’s image, spread anti-Iranian government disinformation, and artificially amplify their popularity using hashtags such as #FreeIran and #IranProtests.

Political Lobbying and Media Influence: The NCRI continues to engage in lobbying efforts in Western political circles, particularly in the US and Europe. This involves leveraging connections with Western politicians paying them hefty sums to speak at events and advocate for their cause. Maryam Rajavi, the group’s propaganda figure has frequently showed up in the rented halls of Western governments. The goal is to position the MEK/NCRI as a viable, democratic alternative to the current Iranian government.

Human Rights Campaigns together with violent pratiques: The organization and its supporters have claimed to be involved in campaigns focusing on human rights in Iran. The pratiques of the MEK’s so-called “resistance units” were focused on human rights slogans. However, violent actions like burning governmental buildings are very typical pratiques of the so-called units.

The MEK’s strategy of downplaying or cleansing its violent past and the activities of its Western lobbies widely circulated on its current media output is a clear attempt to present a more palatable image to international audience. However, this selective presentation does not erase extensive documentation and testimonies regarding its history. For example, reports from international bodies like Human Rights Watch and various academic studies have detailed the MEK’s cult-like characteristics, including enforced celibacy isolation from the outside world and a severe psychological manipulation of its members.

Furthermore, despite being removed from the US State Department list of foreign terrorist Organizations in September 2012, and similar delistings in European Union, the reasons for these removals were often cited as political expediency rather than a fundamental change in the group’s nature or a full exoneration of its past actions.

Critics argue that the MEK’s substantial financial resources, often attributed to donations and lobbying and speaking fees, enable its sophisticated propaganda machine, but this does not fundamentally alter the perception of its historical trajectory.
The group’s continued existence as a highly centralized and secretive organization, with an enormous background of violence, and an unchanged leadership for decades, further fuels skepticism about its genuine transformation into a democratic political entity.
Mazda Parsi

December 27, 2025 0 comments

The cult of Rajavi

The black box of the torture camps of the MEK

Javad Ahmadi, known as “Dr. Vahid,” is a physician who, after taking the medical oath, spent a large part of his life serving at in the health facilities in the headquarters of Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK).

It seems that in the violent history of the MEK, which includes imprisonment, interrogation, and torture, Dr. Vahid, given his expertise, is a unique repository of secrets. He is actually a black box for the Rajavi’s system, particularly during the 1990s, at Camp Ashraf, Iraq.

According to the testimonies of many defected members, Dr. Vahid not only did not prioritize the treatment of MEK members, but also fully cooperated with the organization’s leaders in covering up many of the murders that occurred within the organization.

Ignoring torture and beatings

Reza Gooran, former member of the MEK was imprisoned, interrogated and tortured by the MEK commanders because he had criticized the leaders. After enduring long interrogations, beatings, and extreme hunger in solitary confinement, Reza Goran was taken to Camp Ashraf’s infirmary where he begged Dr. Vahid to stop the torturers, but he remained silent. Goran writes: “As far as I know and have heard, Dr. Vahid was completely obedient to the leaders of the MEK and did whatever they dictated to him, without any ifs or buts.”

Hassan Moradi, another former member MEK, believes that Dr. Vahid is one of those who know many secrets about the conditions prevailing in the MEK. According to him, “many of those who were tortured or died under torture eventually ended up in infirmary, and Dr. Vahid was responsible for processing and issuing death certificates.”

Issuing fake death certificates

Hassan Moradi recalls: “I remember in 1971, Nasser Mohammadi Deljo in the 37th Division, while on guard duty at night, had put a gun to his heart and shot himself. The next day, his body was taken to a cemetery in the city of Khalis and buried. One of the forces who went to his burial later told me that they had told the Iraqi officer that he had fallen asleep while on guard duty and that the shooting had been unintentional. The death certificate, which Dr. Vahid had prepared and signed, stated that the shooting had been unintentional.”

One of those who died under torture by the MEK interrogators was Ghorban Ali Torabi. Several of Torabi’s cellmates witnessed his harrowing death. The official testimony of these witnesses was first published in the 2005 Human Rights Watch report titled “No Exit,” but Ghorban Ali’s son, Mohammad Reza Torabi, a former child soldier of the MEK, only learned of his father’s murder by the MEK interrogators when he left the organization 18 years later and gained access to the free world. He was informed by other defectors of the group.

After leaving the MEK, Mohammad Reza Torabi (Ray Torabi) began his activities on social media and among other defectors to pursue the murder of his father, whom he had not seen since childhood. Along the way, he obtained more information about his father’s death. Among the messages he received, a sender wrote about Dr. Vahid’s role in the disappearance of his father’s body: “Mohammad Reza, I must inform you with great regret that your beloved father was martyred under torture in Ashraf Prison. And your father was buried in the Al-Karkh cemetery near the former Badi’zadegan camp, in an unidentified plot, and only a number was placed above his grave. In addition, about twelve people are buried in that cemetery. I swear to God to witness and testify that it is the truth and that a few people know this. Mokhtar Jannet, Majid Alemian, Nariman and Adel, and Dr. Vahid know about it.”

Also, in the 27th session of the trial of the leaders of the MEK held in Tehran in last February, Issa Azadeh, a former member, told the judge about the torture of members inside the MEK headquarters. “If someone committed suicide or was killed under torture, the most trustworthy and reliable person in the organization for filming was Javad Ghadiri,” he testified. “Dr. Vahid was also responsible for issuing burial permits for the killed and tortured.”

Medical Negligence

Seyed Javad Ahmadi Alvanabadi, now in Albania at the Ashraf 3 camp, continues to serve as a confidential doctor devoted to Maryam and Massoud Rajavi. Members who have left the MEK in recent years, in Albania speak of Dr. Vahid’s shortcomings in medical care and treatment of members.
According to them, he and his colleagues simply ignore people’s health problems to prevent members from leaving the camp in better words to prevent their escape. Ali Zamani, a member of Nejat Society Albania who has left the group for a few years, says the following about Dr. Vahid: “In Albania, I was sick. In the MEK’s health center, Dr. Vahid and several doctors said that if you get a surgery, you will get worse. They misled me. The specialist I went to said that I would be treated with surgery, but the group’s doctors scared me that there would be complications.”

Mazda Parsi

December 24, 2025 0 comments

Zhina (Zeinab) Hosseinnejad, a former child soldier of the MEK

The cult of Rajavi

Pregnancy was taboo in the MEK

Zhina (Zeinab) Hosseinnejad, a former child soldier of the MEK who spent her childhood and youth in the organization. Although she is now a staunch opponent of the Islamic Republic, she tries to inform Iranian public opinion about the nature of the destructive MEK cult by occasionally publishing accounts of her experience as a member of the group.

Zhina is one of the former child soldiers of the MEK who testified against the MEK in the Hamburg court in Amin Gol Maryami’s case. She was also interviewed by some journalists and filmmakers in Europe. This is her account on gender separation inside the MEK camps that she has recently published on the Facebook in Persian:
In 1995, I was about seventeen years old when I was discharged from the reception unit at Camp Ashraf and transferred to army units. At that time, army divisions and centers were mixed, only the workrooms, dormitories, sports, the distance between dining tables, and the rows of chairs in classrooms and meetings were gender-segregated.
After a while, perhaps only a few months, all the women were called to the Badi Zadeh camp near Baghdad for an important meeting. The meeting was held by one of the high-ranking officials named Nasrin (Mahvash Sepehri). She told everyone: “A woman has betrayed the ideological revolution. She had an affair with a man. They were seen behind a car. She was arrested and she will be soon punished.”

Then she lectured for hours and days against male-female relationships. And she made all the women write down their thoughts and confess that if they even thought about someone in their minds; this was considered a form of betrayal and they had to confess.
Out of curiosity, I was looking for someone who was absent and probably the same absentee was under punishment. When I noticed the absence of a woman, I secretly asked my comrades and some of them confirmed that it was her. She had been missing for a long time. Even when the meetings were over and we returned to Camp Ashraf, she was not there. She was probably a prisoner.

Gender segregation laws

When we returned, they imposed new regulations called “Revolutionary Laws,” such as the followings:
– Women were prohibited from leaving the center alone
– Talking to men alone was prohibited
– Men and women were prohibited from riding in the same car
– Men were prohibited from smoking in front of women
– Laughing loudly and joking was prohibited
Meetings between men and women who were relatives and acquaintances were also considered anti-value and had to be determined from higher ranks based on necessities, such as illness, etc. I may have forgotten some other rules.

Walls raised between men and women of Ashraf

After a while, about a few months later, we were called again to a larger meeting, in which the center and the special women’s division were announced to everyone as “a progress” and a celebration was held in this regard.
After that, separate centers and headquarters for women were established, which were a long desert distance from the men. Only a few older women who were officials and their offices remained in the men’s centers. No young women were allowed to stay in the men’s headquarters.

From then on, we could only see men from a distance once or twice a year, during major ceremonies such as Nowruz and Eid al-Fitr. During meetings known as “To’meh”, anyone who kept even a memento of their former lover or fiancé, or had the slightest emotional relationship with another woman, was severely tried. The description of those days needs too many details.

After that, all the men of Ashraf were transferred to border camps, such as Basra in southern Iraq, Kut and Jalula, etc., except for a few sick old men and a few elderly repairmen. All the protection of the great Ashraf was the responsibility of women. No birds flew and the silence of the desert was noisy.

We did not see a single man for a long time. No longer could a girl secretly make eye contact with her lover from a distance even once a year during ceremonies– to be filled with energy from that. Therefore, emotional relationships between women with each other became many, and trials and forced separations even between some women became intense.

In 2003, after the end of the American invasion to Iraq and the fall of Saddam, the men returned tired and wounded from the border camps, some had been killed, some had escaped and surrendered to American camps. Weapons and tanks were surrendered to them in the siege of the American army. Therefore, from now on, artistic, political and cultural ceremonies increased.

Some women, who were now older and more specialized, were transferred to the headquarters and were in the same headquarters with the men. Again, a few secret relationships between men and women occurred, which made the authorities regret very much. All female members were sent to women’s units again.

One of the most famous trials of that time was the trial of “Marjan Akbarian”, which led to her heartbreaking suicide. I previously published her photo in the Ashraf guidance boarding school when we were little.

Rebellion and madness

Sometimes a woman would rebel or go crazy, for example, she would run away from the women’s quarters at night with a backpack and go to the men’s quarters, take off her hijab and shout: “Catch me if you can!”
Or a woman who had fallen in love with another woman or had a forbidden friendship and emotional relationship. They were tried and one of them was dragged on the ground befire the eyes of everyone, and she would shout: “Finally, one day the whole of Ashraf will rebel against you.”

The leaders told members that they were psychotic. I remember three women in particular whose faces were unusually puffy and who had become strangely quiet and calm, and were not as rebellious as before. Later I found out that they were being injected with drugs.

Secret trials were also held in a cell, where people were imprisoned and forced to confess and repent. And if someone tried to escape, they were severely beaten. By the time we reached Camp Liberty next to Baghdad airport, although the imprisonment and beatings had decreased due to the UN’s visit to the camp. But for example, there was a woman who was not allowed to leave the women’s headquarters and was assigned to guard shifts, and even with a visa and under the supervision of other women, she was not allowed to leave, except in a medical emergency with a senior commander.

I inquired about this during those days and found out that she was secretly writing letters to a man among the bricks and blocks of the camp. When we arrived in Albania, along with other more serious criticisms and protests, I asked one of the officials about her, whether writing letters was a sufficient reason to imprison her in the headquarters? She replied: “Did you forget Camp Ashraf, what worse trials such betrayals had? We only gave her such a lenient trial because of the UN visit.” Another official replied to me: “If she had become pregnant, who would have responded? It starts with a letter and ends with pregnancy, and we had an example.”

I was shocked by this answer. I had never heard of it. Even the word “pregnancy” was taboo, and no one was allowed to use this word, let alone have it happen in her body. I had no other answer or question. Because my brain was not yet ready for words. My lips fell silent… and there I learned for the first time that one of the women who had been tried in Ashraf for a serious love affair was pregnant. She committed suicide after the trial.

December 22, 2025 0 comments

Mujahedin Khalq Organization's Propaganda System

MEPs who lack awareness about the MEK’s nature

Maryam Rajavi, leader of the Mujahedin-e Khalq, MEK, frequently addresses the European Parliament to advocate for “regime change” in Iran, allegedly calling for international support for the Iranian people’s struggle against the Iranian government, emphasizing human rights, women’s rights, and offering the so-called National Council of Resistance of Iran’s (NCRI) plan for “a democratic, secular republic”. However, the European Parliament’s stance on the MEK is not supportive.
While the MEK has been delisted as a terrorist organization by the European Union, individual members of the European Parliament (MEPs) have at times, engaged with the group and its leader, Maryam Rajavi. This engagement does not necessarily reflect an official endorsement by the entire Parliament.

A few MEPs who have expressed support for the MEK, view them as a viable opposition to the current Iranian government, while others have raised concerns about the group’s past and present human rights record and cult-like practices.

Active, well-funded MEK lobby

The reasons for individual MEPs meeting Maryam Rajavi despite reports and documents of human rights abuses inside her group, are varied. They can include a view on the MEK’s potential to bring about regime change in Iran, a desire to engage with all opposition groups regardless of their notorious background, and/ or a lack of awareness or acceptance of the criticisms leveled against the organization.

The MEK has actively lobbied European politicians and institutions, presenting itself as a democratic alternative to the Iranian government. This lobbying effort has included inviting MEPs to their events and to their headquarters in France and Albania. The MEK’s lobbying and public relation activities often involves compensating individuals for their participation in events, writing in media and advocacy.

Critics including former members and human rights organizations have consistently accused the MEK of sever human rights abuses, including psychological and physical torture, forced divorces and isolation from the outside world within their camps.

MEK’s extensive and well-funded lobbying efforts in the US government have been several times verified by independent media. A large number of newspapers and media outlets published investigated and documented reports and analysis indicating that various American politicians have received heavy payments and honoraria for speaking at the MEK events. One of the most comprehensive reports was published by the New York Times in 2011 and subsequently updated, detailing how the MEK, while still on the US State Department’s list of foreign terrorist organizations, paid prominent American figures substantial sums to speak at their conferences and rallies. These payments ranged from $10000 to $50000 or more per appearance. Rudy Giulliani, John Bolton, Newt Gingrich, Howard Dean and Tom Ridge are the key figures frequently cited in the reports.

Financial temptation of MEPs

The nature of the efforts in European Parliament has typically included expenses related to events, travel, luxurious flight and accommodation and public relations. Individuals like Struan Stevenson, the former Scottish MEP, is one of the prominent and consistent advocates of the MEK. He is Maryam Rajavi’s is constant companion in the European Parliament. Critics and some media outlets widely believe that he receives financial remuneration or other benefits for his support, given the professional nature and frequency of his engagements.

Through its various front organizations, the MEK has indeed spent significant amounts of money on lobbying activities in Europe and the United States. Actually, the group uses its considerable financial sources to influence politicians. Their activities are designed to raise the group’s profile, propagate its narrative, and garner political support.

The lavishness of the MEK-run events and the high fees paid to prominent speakers to speak on behalf of the group, indicate the financial power of the group’s lobbying apparatus. Opacity of the MEK’s financial resources and its political funding and lobbying also highlights the group’s invalidity in its financial interactions. The MEPs who welcome Maryam Rajavi in the halls of the parliament must be aware of that they put their reputation at risk by supporting a formerly-designated terrorist group with a violent, undemocratic history and human rights abuses within its camps in Iraq, France and Albania.

Mazda Parsi

December 20, 2025 0 comments

The cult of Rajavi

Why did Massoud Rajavi enforce divorces in the MEK?

The MEK leaders have never publicly offered a detailed explanation for why they enforced divorces among their members or why Massoud Rajavi “married” a large number of female members beyond ideological justifications. Actually, they just deny such an enforcement in their system. However, former members and analysts have provided interpretations for these actions. The analysis on the Massoud Rajavi’s immoral leadership over the MEK often links it to his so-called “ideological revolution”.

Ideological Revolution and Absolute Loyalty

The forced divorces and subsequent marriages to Massoud Rajavi are widely understood by former members and observers as a mechanism to enforce absolute loyalty and devotion to Rajavi himself, rather than to spouses or family.

According to the testimonies of former members, Rajavi argued that familial ties and romantic relationships were distractions that diverted members’ focus and loyalty away from the organization and its cause –and leaders. By eliminating these personal bonds, he aimed to create a monolithic, single-minded force entirely dedicated to his leadership and the group cause.

Elimination of Rival Loyalties

“Ideological revolution” was designed to dismantle any potential rival loyalties that could challenge Rajavi’s authority. Spouses, children, and personal relationships wear seen as potential sources of dissent or divided allegiances. Forcing divorces and separating families was a way to sever these ties and ensure that Rajavi was the sole object of devotion.

Control and Manipulation

Critics argue that these practices were a form of extreme psychological manipulation and control. By isolating members from their families and personal relationships, Rajavi could exert greater influence over their thoughts and actions. The “marriages” to Rajavi, as described by former members, further cemented this control, creating a direct, personal and often coercive bond between female members and the leader.

Symbolic and Actual Power Consolidation

The marriages to Massoud Rajavi are not conventional marriages but rather a symbolic and actual consolidation of power. Former members describe these as a form of sexual exploitation and a means to assert Rajavi’s ultimate authority over the female members, framing it as an “ideological union”.
This also served to elevate Rajavi to a quasi-divine status within the organization, where he was seen as the ultimate figure of devotion and the “husband” of all female members.

Suppression of Dissent

The strict ideological framework and the dismantling of personal relationships also served to suppress any potential dissent. Members who questioned these practices and expressed reluctance faced severe pressure, public self-criticism sessions, and potential ostracization.
In summary, while the MEK leadership maintains silence or denial regarding the specifies of these practices, external analysis and testimonies from former members consistently point to these actions as integral to Massoud Rajavi’s strategy for absolute control, loyalty, and the consolidation of his personal power within the organization.

December 15, 2025 0 comments

Massoud Rajavi

Massoud Rajavi and widespread sexual abuse of female members

Massoud Rajavi, the disappeared leader of the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), has been accused of widespread sexual abuse of female members within his group, including forced divorces and sexual exploitation.

There are reports and testimonies that describe a systematic pattern of abuse under Rajavi’s leadership, where women were forced to divorce their husbands and were subjected to sexual submission to Rajavi himself.

Former female members such as Batoul Soltani, Zahra Moini, have provided testimonies detailing about abuses, including forced sexual acts and manipulation of women into “marrying” Rajavi.

Soltani testified in various documentaries and investigative reports that Rajavi had hundreds of “wives” within Camp Ashraf, Iraq, as many as the number of members of the MEK’s so-called Elite Council that consisted only female members.

The Elite Council is the symbol of women hegemony in the MEK’s system. The Council is a source of pride for the group.
According to the testimonies of Batoul Soltani and Zahra Moini, Maryam Rajavi, the MEK’s so-called President Elect and Massoud’s wife was involved in facilitating these “marriages” and threatening women who resisted. Batoul Soltani underwent the forced marriage ceremony called “Salvation Dance” which was actually a nude dancing, wedding party. After dancing nude with Masoud Rajavi, dozens of members of the Elite Council got married to him.

Additionally, some female defectors like Zahra Mirbagheri and Fereshteh Hedayati stated that at least one hundred of the MEK’s female members underwent forced hysterectomies without consent, which was retrospectively justified as sign of loyalty to the leader.

These practices were part of a broader “ideological revolution” initiated by Rajavi, which included banning marriage, enforcing mandatory “eternal” divorce, and separating children from their parents, often sending them abroad.

The MEK has consistently denied these allegations attributing them to “mullahs’ propaganda” but it has never explained why its leaders forced their members to divorce their spouses and why Massoud Rajavi married members of the Elite Council.

Mazda Parsi

December 10, 2025 0 comments

The cult of Rajavi

Farman Shafabin, MEK member who committed suicide

Farman Shafabin was a member of the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) who committed self-immolation in 1999. Farman had been recruited by the MEK from one of the Kurdish families who resided in the Ramadi Camp, Iraq.

During Saddam Hussein’s rule, some Iranian Kurdish families resided in the Ramadi Camp in Iraq primarily due to the Iran-Iraq War and the subsequent unrest in Kurdistan, which led to their forced replacement across the border into Iraq. The Baathist government of Iraq relocated these Iranian Kurds to a camp in Ramadi, west of Baghdad in 1981. The location was specifically called Tash, a camp near the city of Ramadi.

MEK recruited forces from refugee camps

The MEK used to recruit forces from within the residents of Camp Tash, in particular from families suffering from poor life and economic conditions. They faced numerous interconnected challenges affecting them and their children’s health, education, housing, and overall well-being. Camp Tash housed Iranian Kurdish refugees until its closure. Due to a deteriorating security situation, including water shortages and violence, the camp’s population was relocated to safer areas in northern Iraq, particularly near Sulaymaniyah, in the mid-2000s.

Mahvash Sepehri a torturer of the MKO

Due to the harsh living conditions, lack of facilities, and uncertain future, refugee camps could have been a suitable breeding ground for groups such as the MEK. Individuals in these camps, especially young people and teenagers, may have been looking for a way to improve their situation or to find a purpose in life.

Mehri Aligholi

The MEK’s need for forces

The MEK attempted to recruit Iranian refugees in Iraq using propaganda and promises such as fighting for Iran’s freedom, a better life, and social status. These promises could have appealed to vulnerable families and young people in the camps. Farman and his sisters, Shokrieh and Sabrieh were among these victims.
During and after the Iran-Iraq War, the MEK, which was based in Iraq, sought to recruit forces to strengthen its military and political organization. Iranian refugees in Iraq, including the residents of the small city of Ramadi, were considered a potential source of recruitment.
There are numerous reports, documents, and testimonies that indicate MEK’s recruitments from among Iranian refugees in Iraq. Farman, Shokrieh and Sabrieh were recruited as child soldiers of the MEK’s so-called National Liberation Army (NLA).

Who was Farman Shafabin?

At least three former members of the MEK, Siamk Naderi, Mirbagher Sedaghi, and Maryam Sanjabi recounted the heart-breaking story of Farman Shafabin who joined the MEK in 1997 from Camp Tash.

Farman Shafabin was a young man without knowledge of the history and nature of the Cult of Rajavi, and thought that he could leave the group whenever he changed his mind. After a year or so, when he realized that the group has no exit door, he asked to leave, but like other ill-fated members who faced great hardship when they asked to leave, he was met with a flood of insults and slander. He was labeled as “traitor” by the MEK commanders and a traitor was not allowed to leave the MEK.

Farman’s only demand was to return to his family. He tried for a year to be freed, and during this time he was constantly under pressure. Manipulation meetings were organized for him to force him to back down from his demands and stay in the camp.

Farman did not know Persian because he grew up in Iraq. He spoke Kurdish. So, he was always criticized for not speaking Persian in the MEK’s headquarters, Camp Ashraf. In the last large criticism meeting that Mehri Ali Qoli, a female commander, had organized for him on this issue, she shouted at him, “Farman!… Who are you? Do you remember that your father sold your sisters in Ramadi to feed your stomach!? Now you have become a thorn in our side, and you do not obey to speak Persian?”

After this meeting, Farman went outside and poured oil on his body. He returned to the hall, lit a lighter and set himself on fire. Other comrades tried to put him out. Then, he was sent to a hospital in Baghdad but died two days later.

Following the death of Farman, a high-ranking commander held a meeting to convince other members about Farman’s fate. Mahvash Sepehri (Nasrin), the then top commander of Camp Ashraf, criticized Farman’s comrades for his death, saying, “You were not harsh enough against Farman (meaning you didn’t criticize sharply). If you had slammed him, Farman wouldn’t have spoiled himself!”

There is no information about the fate of Farman’s sisters.

December 3, 2025 0 comments

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