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Iraqi Authorities' stance on the MEK

MKO Presence Illegal: Iraqi Interior Minister

In a meeting with his Iranian counterpart, Iraqi interior minister Javad Bulani pointed to the terrorist records of the MKO and said that it’s presence in Iraq was illegal.

According to IRNA, Javad Bulani stressed that, "The continuation of MKO’s presence in Iraq can create, besides security problems, obstacles in the way of expanding ties with the Islamic Republic."

According to him, Iraqi government seeks the expulsion of the group and doesn’t like the ties between two sides be influenced by the presence of this group in Iraq.

"In the new Iraq, there’s no place for groups that can have negative impacts on relations with neighboring countries," he said.

"The two countries should be careful in preserving the security of their borders and to achieve that the two sides have already taken good steps," he added.

In the meeting, Hassan Kazemi Qomi, Iranian ambassador to Iraq invited his Iraqi counterpart to visit his country.

According to IRNA, quoting an Iraqi security officer, the conference of "Discussing the Role of Terrorist Groups in Destabilizing Operations against Iraqis" was held last weekend in Iraq.

 

IRNA – 2007/02/13

     

February 15, 2007 0 comments
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The Ideology of the MEK

February 8, A New Phase to Encounter People

A notable date in Mojahedin Khalq’s history is 20 June 1981 which marks a turning point in developing a good understanding of the group’s ideological, political and strategic nature that build the fundamental premise of its challenge with the Islamic Republic. The importance of the chapter lies in the fact that in spite of Rajavi’s insistence to justify his decision, declaring armed struggle, as a strategic and well calculated move, Mojahedin not only suffered an overall loss of organizational competency, but also generated a temporal hurdle in Iran’s prime leap towards democracy.

It cost Mojahedin a big price to come to believe that it was actually impossible to overthrow the created Islamic system in a short-run process as the group had anticipated. Successive blows over the body of the organization both was leading it to the precipice of a complete termination and challenging the adopted strategy of establishing a phase of armed struggle. Hardly could Mojahedin give an explicit explanation of the factors evolving so challenging a decision, a fact that has remained unanswered to the time. However, now nearly three decades after the initiation of the phase, Mojahedin admit that it was not a sound decision and consider it as a barren move. Bijan Nyabati, a left member of NCRI, talking on the move as unproductive states:

The strategy of developing a national-wide armed move came to be nothing but undermining the position of a great social movement to that of a limited militia struggle with no perspective.*

It has also come to be the cause of a widespread disagreement among the insiders and the detachments of many as well as fostering dispute with other active oppositions.

The crushing blows the organization received during the early months following the armed move phase made irreparable cracks in its structure. Among all the blows struck, the 8 February blow was one of the most crushing ones. Talking on the strategic importance of the event, Bijan Nyabati says:

Martyrdom of the commander [Musa Khyabani] was the first strategic blow over the armed resistance. From that point on, the regime took an offensive posture while Mojahedin maintained a defensive shelter.

The killing of nearly 20 team-commanders of Mojahedin including Musa Khyabani and Ashraf Rabiee after Rajavi’s escape to France brought Mojahedin’s blind assassinations into a sudden halt. Regardless of the force loss, the operation teams inside Iran suffered a great trauma and lost a big portion of their operational potentialities. On the other hand, the tactic of urban guerilla warfare as the leading axis of the armed struggle move was facing a challenge:

And finally, the blow that bereaved Mojahedin, and not only them, for ever was that strategic one struck on 8 February 1982 that put an end to the accuracy of urban guerilla warfare!

Nyabaty refers to the event as a dead-end to the armed strategy that proves to have initially been a foul and which was followed by other received strikes. He explains:

The last blow struck on Mojahedin on the first August 1982 was merely military. Martyrdom of the commander Syavash Seifi characterizes the blow to be a military strike. Thus, the urban guerilla warfare that had faced a dead-end on 8 February 1982, reaches its climax.

The 8 February incident makes Mojahedin desperately withdraw its ranking commanders from Iran to plan a new tactic:

To break the dead-end, Mojahedin, for the moment stressing on the armed struggle policy, adopt a fundamentally tactical change. By withdrawing the remnants of its commanders and ranks out of the soil dominated by the enemy, the tactic of conduct from the outside is adopted.

The aim was to reorganize the commanders to retaliate the 8 February strike. There is an exception; the armed operation mainly aimed at the regime’s authorities shifts to target civil elements alleged to be the regime’s agents.

Massoud Rajavi, besides reviewing various strategic lines, insists on a widespread armed struggle with the difference that, from a tactical point, the aim shifts from the authoritative elements to the believed agents among the people. That is to say, to cut off the finger-points of the suppression in the society in a new turn of tactic. It was a hallmark in the sense of being an easy target for the operation teams.

The result of this turn of tactic was tragic and it is estimated that more than ten thousand civilians were the victims of Mojahedin’s atrocious blind terrorist operations and bombings.

Although a shattering blow, the 8 February strike opened Mojahedin’s eyes on the truth that the people, caught in Mojahedin’s propelled atmosphere of disorder and terror, not only despised them but also confronted them. Mojahedin attempted to trouble the society and inject terror to paralyze the security system of the regime so as to continue the line of assassinating the key authorities with the assistance of their infiltrated agents. But, seeing people in the front of the regime, Mojahedin shifted to target the “finger-points”, a Mojahedin idiomatic expression meaning ordinary people. Besides being easy targets, people could at least lose the trust in the regime and react in the way Mojahedin could take advantage of. These are the reasons that before approval of the ruling system’s legitimacy, advocates Mojahedin’s deprivation of a sound theoretic and political insight to develop a realistic analysis of social context.

The adopted tactic of conducting urban guerilla warfare in exile means that Mojahedin are convinced that people have to be disregarded in their campaign calculations. People were replaced by other supporting apparatus like Iraq that provided them with all forms of geographical, political, military, and financial backings. Consequently, a new transformation was evolved and a new definition of friends and enemies developed.

 

*All quotes are extracts from Bijan Nyabati’s “A distinct look at Mojahedin’s internal revolution”

 

Bahar Irani – February 13, 2007

February 15, 2007 0 comments
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Mujahedin Khalq Organization's Propaganda System

So Discredited A Ruling

"When the European court issued a ruling on this case, the MKO was on the terrorist list of the EU and the court, of course, complained that enough reasons for designating the group. However, the legal obstacles are being resolved now in order to keep this group on the list," French Foreign Ministry spokesman Jean-Baptiste Mattei said on the issue of lifting restrictions of MKO properties.

He added that, "We agree that the group should remain on the list. There was a legal problem which is being dealt with and the group will remain on the terrorist list".

Following these comments on the terrorist gang of Rajavi, the remnants of the cult issued a statement and said:

1. This position ignores the ruling of the court in whole and mocks the ruling of law, which is the backbone of democracy.

2. Illegal insistence on keeping the MKO on terror list is a gift to the mullahs’ regime that’s trying to disrupt the process of the court. This is another aspect of the policy of compromising with mullahs, which will advance to the point where religious fascists get to one or two nuclear bombs.

3. The stance of French Foreign Ministry indicates that it has decided, in contradiction with the decision of the court, to put the MKO on the list of terrorist organization without giving a chance of fair hearing to the MKO.*

In the 1st article of this statement, Mojahedin-e Khalq, admitting how discredited the ruling of First Instance Court is, tries to resort to the ruling as a strong and credible one while it has been proved that the ruling has neither led to the MKO’s exit from terror list nor to the lifting of bans on its properties.

In the 2nd article that is inspired by the deceiving policies of Rajavi, the MKO tries to link itself to the issue of Iran and its nuclear program and convince the public opinion that the West has no way except choosing between the MKO and Iran.

Given this, it should be said that Western politicians are familiar with MKO’s tactics and won’t allow them to use opportunities.

This, of course, doesn’t mean that the MKO won’t be used as a means against Iran but it indicates that there’s a good understanding of MKO’s position in Iran’s political scene. As the Western officials have repeatedly declared, there’s no need for this group to be taken off the terror list….

More importantly and regarding what has been said in the 3rd article, Mojahedin who have been in European countries for 25 years and claim of having ties with senior officials, journalists, Parliamentarians and …are now asking for a fair hearing!

This only means that all claims by the criminal gang of Rajavi have been invalid and discredited so that after 25 years they are seeking fair hearing.

 

Irandidban –  2007/02/13

February 15, 2007 0 comments
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USA

How Not to Handle the Facts

How Not to Handle the Facts: Max Boot’s Pretzel Logic on Iran

Editor’s note: Los Angeles Times columnist Max Boot argued in an Oct. 25 column, “How to Handle Iran,” that America should aim to topple the Iranian government with cash infusions to guerrilla groups and, perhaps, with American military force. Boot is considered by many to be the “respectable” face of neo-conservatism. A senior fellow for national security studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and former editorial editor for The Wall Street Journal, he nimbly straddles the mainstream and neocon universes.

There are so many things wrong with Max Boot’s Los Angeles Times column, “How to Handle Iran,” one hardly knows where to begin.

But these “soft” measures aren’t the real deal anyway as far as Boot is concerned, as his column eventually makes clear. Washington needs to consider the option, he writes, “of going beyond peaceful measures to foment change.” Though ruling out an outright invasion, he advocates doing “to Iran what the Iranians are doing to us in Iraq,” that is, “funneling weapons and money to militias that are killing our soldiers.” Among the militias to which he advocates funneling weapons and money is the Mujahedin Khalq (MEK), an outfit Boot himself calls a “leftist political cult.” “Leftist” is euphemistic: The MEK is in fact a Stalinist political cult.

Boot mentions that the MEK “mounted attacks on Iran in the 1980s and 1990s from bases in Iraq,” but conveniently fails to mention that it was funded, supported and given cover throughout that period by Saddam Hussein himself. He also fails to mention that this group is on the State Department’s official list of terrorist organizations. (Several of Boot’s fellow neoconservatives have been campaigning for the MEK to be removed from that list, thus far unsuccessfully.)

It appears not to have occurred to Boot, or to the Mujahedin Khalq’s other conservative supporters, to find out what Iran’s human rights activists and democratic dissidents think of this “cult.” Not surprisingly, the MEK is held in near-universal disdain by those dissidents, precisely because it is a cult, a terrorist body and Stalinist in ideology—that is, undemocratic to the core. Either this contradiction hasn’t occurred to Boot or, worse, it simply doesn’t matter to him.

Likewise with what Boot calls “the only serious option left” when all is said and done: airstrikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities. What does Boot make of the fact that, without exception, every human rights activist and democratic dissident in Iran is categorically opposed to U.S. airstrikes on their country? Does this “inconvenient” fact simply not factor into Boot’s equation, or is it something that must be pushed aside in his calculus?

Whichever the case, Boot can’t have it both ways. Either he fancies himself a supporter of Iran’s democratic dissidents, in which case he has to confront the gaping discrepancies between his positions and theirs (on military strikes, on the MEK, on U.S. funding and on other issues), or he should drop the pretense of representing the views of Iran’s dissidents and frame his position in more honest terms.

As it turns out, Iran’s democratic dissidents have already solved this question for us, by making it clear that they want nothing to do with Boot’s neoconservative agenda. Boot and his fellow travelers would be well served to think through the implications of that fact.

 

Oct 31, 2006 – Truthdig -By Danny Postel and Nader Hashemi

 

 

[Danny Postel is senior editor of openDemocracy (http://www.opendemocracy.net/home/index.jsp) and the author of the forthcoming “Reading ‘Legitimation Crisis’ in Tehran: Iran and the Future of Liberalism” (Prickly Paradigm Press, December). Nader Hashemi is an Andrew W. Mellon postdoctoral fellow in the department of political science at Northwestern University and the author of a forthcoming book on Iran and democracy.]

February 14, 2007 0 comments
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The Ideology of the MEK

An Autopsy of the Ideological Media in Mojahedin Cult (2)

A remarkable complementary task in applying the news as working propaganda instruments is employment of the sponsored or paid newspapers, especially those circulated in Iraq. At the present, a number of Iraqi newspapers are directly and indirectly supported by MKO. The papers publish selected or exclusive news reports which in turn serve as sources of reference for MKO propaganda machine. That is to say, a single piece of news is repeated again and again with the difference that each time it is quoted from a different paper with a deliberate display of the front page. As an evidence of MKO’s trick of reporting news more than once but from different angles, Rassul Mohammadnejad, an ex-member, stated:

I remember the years when I was with Mojahedin in Iraq. One of the issues of my falling-out was why we announced a single move as many and even as hundreds. For instance, we launched a small operation ourselves but we saw that the media coverage of the same operation demonstrated as if many teams at different time ad places had carried out many operations. We knew well that they developed many phases of a single operation as fully accomplished operations to pose as a potential force capable of planning many operations every day.*

This news making method is actually applied in all other programs such as interviews, meetings, and so. We see that a matter and event of significance becomes the subject matter of many programs for the extent of many days and each time presented as if a fresh subject.

At times, the airing of the news projects the group’s strategy. In none of the aired reports concerning the US – Iran dispute over the nuclear file you may end up with a peaceful conclusion. The audiences regularly encounter an escalated tension on the horizon. No promising diplomatic and peaceful solution to the file is ever anticipated and the attempts are made to fan the existing dispute to reach a stalemate where the sole outlet would a military option.

In the case of Saddam’s execution, the reports are prepared so crafty that you come to believe that no body consents his hanging and that the executioners have to be prosecuted. Saddam’s being exonerated of all charges might depict a positive effect on the minds that the group’s past collaboration wit the dictator revolved on an axis of goodwill. Thus, when a dictator can be made into a hero, the terrorists can also be taken as pro-democrats.

Mojahedin are fond of being mentioned in the media for whatever cause, even if they are referred to as mercenaries and spies. Although revelation of Iran’s nuclear programs might be considered as an act of espionage rather than a political campaign, they recurrently and in any occasion advert to be the first to have disclosed the veiled activities.

Of course, many aired and published reports of events from inside Iran are merely distorted and exaggerated news and reports. A commonplace gathering of people before state-run or NGO offices is publicized as a big demonstration of dissidents and advocates of Mojahedin in Iran. The national and traditional events and celebrations, especially when the youths swarm into the streets, are reported as rebellions against the regime. Even in the case of quoting Iranian authorities, parts of speeches and comments are left out and are paraphrased so new subjects are formed to maneuver on.

 

To learn for yourself, have a look over Mojahedin’s TV programs and publications.

 

Omid Pouya – February 7, 2007

February 13, 2007 0 comments
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The MEK Expulsion from Iraq

Time to Expel MKO From Iraq

Following the downfall of former regime, new Iraqi officials should expel the MKO from Iraq.

During Saddam’s rule, this group acted as its army and he used them to pressurize Tehran. Following the ouster of former regime, the group is playing the same role for the Bush administration. The US government also wants to use this group as a political leverage against Iran as well as in bloody clashes inside Iraq.

Danger is not limited to this. It has become more dangerous. This organization has returned to its previous status and there is coordination between the members of MKO and remnants of former regime so that with the lobby of MKO in Europe, orphans of former regime have gone to the EU.

Now the question is "why the MKO members, who have good ties with some MPs and are able to link terrorist Baathists to the EU, can’t get permanent refugee status for the members in Iraq? Since their presence in Iraq is illegal and unacceptable, and with respect to the fact that the presence of the group causes many political problems, their stay in Iraq is no longer bearable.

The sympathy of former regime supporters for the group and asking for their presence in Iraq, makes their presence in Iraq more suspicious and dangerous, particularly when Baathists and Wahabis relentlessly talk about the dangers of Iranians and Iraqi Safawis, with MKO blaming Iran for the deaths of Sunnis as if the members of the MKO are neither Iranians nor Safawis!

Isn’t it true that Baathists’ sympathy for the MKO and their requests for the group’s presence in Iraq are enough evidences on the old cooperation and coordination between the group and extremist Baathists and other terrorists?

Therefore, Iraqi government should take necessary measures to expel the MKO from Iraq so that they could freely go to the countries they like.

 

Mehdi Ghassem/Sautaliraq – 2007/02/08

February 13, 2007 0 comments
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Mujahedin Khalq 's Function

The Plots of Cult against Iraqi Government

Issuing a statement in Paris under the name of NCRI, the terrorist group of Mojahedin-e Khalq expressed deep concern over the decision of Iraqi government to expel the group from Iraq.

This follows the failure of a plot by the agents of the group against those Iraqi officials and authorities who have asked for the expulsion.

Last week, the agents of this terrorist group published a list of names (of Iraqi political figures, reporters, officials and MPs) and accused them of receiving money from Iran and claimed that they were Iran’s agents!

The terrorist MKO thought it could intensify US’s confrontation with Iran and pave the way for a big attack on Shiite figures and MPs. However, this failed and no one paid attention as if all sides in Iraq have all understood the fact that it was only a tactic to help the survival of the group.

Following this failure, the second phase of plot began and they claimed that, following Hakim and Abdulmahdi’s visit to Iran, parliament voting on the expulsion of the group was planned.

These conflicting claims (conflicting because on one hand they claimed that Hakim and Abdulmahdi have been tasked by Tehran to expel the MKO and on the other hand say that the bill will be put to voting in Iraqi parliament before winter vacations!) prove how concerned the group is about the determination of Iraqi government.

The MKO knows well that only a few unpopular pro-Baath individuals or groups in the parliament will support the group and therefore they try to convince the public opinion that the voting has been a task by Tehran. The fact is that, by such claims they only show that their previous claims on having popular support in Iraq were all lies.

What’s clear is that the illegal presence of the group in Iraq has been possible with the help of American-British warmongers. Without such help, the group wasn’t able to stay in Iraq for even one day.

The presence of the group after the fall of Saddam on one hand is limited to efforts for interfering in Iraq’s internal affairs in order to preserve its stats and on the other hand it has not succeeded in satisfying industrial and manual needs of the occupiers.

It’s clear that in such situation, the decision of Iraqi government is right and since the MKO is dependent on Iraq the leaders of the group try to impose themselves on the country.

 

Irandidban –  2007/02/08

February 13, 2007 0 comments
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Mujahedin Khalq 's Function

Scandal in Presenting Fake Evidence

Websites linked to the terrorist group of MKO, along with its satellite TV channel, published the news of Moahmmed Dayinee’s interview with Al-Jazeera news channel and claimed of an unprecedented revelation on Iran’s interferences in Iraq!

Mohammed Dayinee, a member of Iraqi parliament, accused Shiite members of Parliament and introduced them as Iranians.

Trying to prove his claims by raising a stink, Dayinee said Mr. Ramahi, a Shiite member of parliament, was an Iranian!

He even went further and claimed that Ahmed Chalabi was Iranian and to prove his lies he said he’s a photo of Chalabi showing him in Iran being welcomed by Revolutionary Guards!

However, the worst part of his lies were expressed when he showed pictures which had nothing to do with Iraq. One of these pictures, also published earlier by the MKO, shows former Iranian president Mohammed Khatami visiting Ebrat museum in Tehran beside a model of a man being tortured by Savak agents (this photo had been taken by Mr. Abtahi)

He also displayed some photos as the proof for Iran’s interference in Iraq.

It should be noted that in the latest common plot of MKO-Baath supporters, Iraqi Shiites has been introduced as Iranians or the ones who are paid by Iran. Therefore, MKO websites widely covered Dayinee’s lies.

 

Iran didban, February 10, 2007

 

February 13, 2007 0 comments
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Mujahedin Khalq; A proxy force

MKO, Ready to Serve Americans

US ‘using opposition group to track Iranian influence networks in Iraq’

Baghdad: Camp Ashraf which is occupied by the Iraq-based Iranian opposition group the Mujahedine Khalq Organisation (MKO) is sited more than 260km north of Baghdad.

This group resettled in Iraq in 1987 during the rule of Saddam Hussain. After Saddam was ousted in 2003, the US army gave protection to this camp which remains today.

The Iraqi coalition government headed by Shiite Ebrahim Al Jaafari and Nouri Al Maliki decided to expel MKO members from Iraq and close Camp Ashraf. However, none of these decisions have been implemented.

In this camp and in other Iraqi cities, there are between 4,000 and 5,000 MKO members and their families, with identities issued by the United Nations and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to facilitate their mobility inside Iraq.

Jalal Al Din Al Sagheer, a prominent figure in the Shiite coalition, has accused MKO members of supporting terrorist groups affiliated to the former regime.

Prohibits

He told Gulf News: "There is an Iraqi constitution which prohibits using the Iraqi territory to launch a series of cross-border attacks against neighbouring countries and we are committed to this position."

Leaders of Camp Ashraf move with heavy US forces’ protection inside Baghdad and other Iraqi cities. During visits of Iraqi officials to Tehran and their Iranian counterparts to Baghdad, the MKO group file was at the top of bilateral talks. It was said that Iran wants a settlement with Iraqis to end the MKO file in return for full security cooperation that guarantees stopping the infiltration of terrorist elements into Iraq from the Iranian borders.

Lubaid Abbawi, the undersecretary of the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, told Gulf News: "The MKO file must move fully to the responsibility of the Iraqi government and must not be a political agenda used by different politicians or parties."

In the light of American-Iranian conflict in Iraq and in the region it is unlikely that the American forces will submit Camp Ashraf to Al Maliki.

According to some leaks from Baghdad, Americans have begun to form special groups comprising MKO members to assist them to track Iranian intelligence networks in Iraqi cities, as well as to provide the US intelligence with a huge amount of information from inside Iran, especially with the escalation of the Iranian nuclear file. These measures came just after the launch of the new US strategy set by President George W Bush, which included reducing the Iranian influence in Iraq.

A MKO report published recently in Germany referred by name to more than 31,000 Iraqi agents working for the Iranian intelligence. This indicates that the next phase will witness greater convergence between the MKO and the American forces in Iraq.

Hadi Al Ameri, leader of the Badr Organisation of the Shiite Supreme Council, has accused the MKO of training terrorist elements and working to destabilise Iraq. Al Ameri affirmed the coming period will witness the exile of this Iranian opposition group from Iraqi territories.

The Al Maliki government works to exclude Iraq from any Iranian-American influence conflict and to ensure Iraq does not turn into an arena for settling accounts between the two countries.

The MKO group in Iraq has established political relations with prominent Shiite religious leaders who oppose the political process, the Mahmoud Al Hasani group in Karbala and the Jawad Al Khalisi group in Kadhimiya city, Baghdad.

Basil Adas/Gulf News/Jan. 31

February 13, 2007 0 comments
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USA

MKO and Iranian Chalabis

Spiegel Magazine has published an article, "The Second Iraq", in which discusses the issue of US’s support for Iranian opposition group, the MKO, to confront the Islamic Republic.

Rockefeller, the head of Senate’s Intelligence Committee, has recently expressed concern over the possibility of US’s action against Iran and the repetition of Iraqi story.

Pointing to Bush’s order to US forces in Iraq to shoot Iranian and Syrian agents in Iraq, Pentagon’s emphasis that Iranian agents were behind the deaths of 5 US forces in Karbala and the departure of second US aircraft carrier to the region, Spiegel writes that despite all these, the White House denies any effort to overthrow the rule of Mullahs.

Spiegel also points to Iran’s denial of interference in Iraq and that the US has delayed presentation of documents on Iranian involvement in Iraqis unrest, which were to be presented on last Thursday.

According to Spiegel, what’s more alarming here is the presence of a group of Iranian opposition in the State Department, the White House and Pentagon’s Iran office. This group claims to have documents on Iran’s nuclear activities in Arak.

Other claims of the group includes having documents on the role of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps in Najaf, secret documents from a group of physicists showing Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s efforts to acquire nuclear bomb and …

The group also claims to have a list of 30000 Iraqi politicians, army and police working for Iran.

Iranian Chalabis are Coming!

Iranian Chalabis are a source of intelligence whose accuracy is not known. This group includes people like Amir Abbas Fakhravar. He introduces himself as a leader of Student’s Independent Movement who has been tortured in prison.

Spiegel refers to his visit to the US senate and his meeting with James Woosely, the former head of CIA, and a number of senior Pentagon officials.

Although Fakhravar doesn’t like to be compared to Chalabi, Spiegel says they have both a common friend: Richard Perle, well-known conservative and one of Iraq war planners.

Spiegel also writes about the budget the Bush administration has allocated to regime change in Iran. In Dubail, London and Frankfurt, US experts on Iran are looking for revolutionary people like Fakhravar.

"It seems that Bush administration has also another plan: that if it can’t stop the production of nuclear bomb by Tehran, it should be careful not to allow the Mullahs get it," Spiegel writes.

Prominent political figures like James Baker and Henry Kissinger have warned the Bush administration that it should stop such supports because working on people like Fakhravar prevents making deal with Iran.

"Meanwhile, who’s this smart guy (Fakhravar)?" Spiegel asks.

The rumors in Washington indicate that he was an ordinary wrongdoer who accidentally met the students in Evin prison. Mr. Vali Nasr, Professor of Political Sciences and a prominent Iranian expert, says comments of Fakhravar are "sheer lies" and that nobody knows him.

However, Fakhravar is not the only reservist of the US, Alireza Jafarzadeh is another one.

According to Spiegel, Jafarzadeh is busy holding interview with Fox News Channel and has recently published his book "the threat of Iran".

During a controversial press conference in August 2002, Jafarzadeh revealed the uranium enrichment facilities in Natanz.

On the issue of MKO to which Jafarzadeh belongs, Spiegel refers to thousands of its members living in Camp Ashraf near Baghdad after US invasion and that they are ready to help US forces.

Terrorist Allies in the War on Terror?

In response to this question, Jafarzadeh laughs and says they enjoy unimaginable level of support.

They have also provided many details about Iranian agents’ interferences in Iraq.

In a press conference, Jafarzadeh claimed that Revolutionary Guards Corps distributes millions of dollars among Shiite paramilitaries in the border region of Shalamcheh.

They have also claimed that Iran uses the trucks, carrying materials for reconstruction of holy cities of Iraq, to transfer weapons; however, this has not been confirmed by any other sources.

"US’s bitter experience in Iraq should prevent American people from being convinced of the necessity of another war. However, in this issue, the US is influenced by MKO," the Spiegel writes.

Also citing an article in Congressional Quarterly, Spiegel says that Pentagon uses MKO members in Camp Ashraf for setting air targets in Iran.

It’s been said that these people are given new identities so that Washington can claim easily that they have never been terrorists.

According to Spiegel, there’s big difference between current time and when Iraq was attacked: unlike the previous time during which the American media showed sympathy with occupying Iraq, this time there’s no agreement.

Last Thursday, NY Times wrote that Bush can go to another war if he’s not careful and that he could bring a disaster to his country if the Congress doesn’t stop him.

 

Radio Farda – 2007/02/07

February 8, 2007 0 comments
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