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Former members of the MEK

The names of the returnees

Following the return news of two other defectors of Rajavi’s cult who were staying in US Camp and returned to Iran by IRC cooperation;

Here we state the names:

1-     Mohammad Reza Chovari

2-     Fath Allah Aghaiee

When the two defectors arrived Iran, through an interview declared that a large number of members in the cult are seeking a way to escape from the camp and separate from Rajavi’s cult since the depression atmosphere and suffering treatment rule the camp.

February 25, 2006 0 comments
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USA

SECRETARY RICE: MKO, Awful Terrorists

In a roundtable with Arab Print Journalists:

QUESTION: (Inaudible). Madame Secretary, you — a few days ago, you asked for $75 million from Congress to be spent on Iran for democratic changes. What aspect of it — you know, I saw in the papers — you know, it was saying part of this money goes to creation of opposition, as well, in Iran. Could you elaborate on that?

And also, if I may add to these questions, the Iranians are saying, you know, if the U.S. is seriously trying to bring the regime change, for instance, in Iran, how can — be seriously talk — you know, with the rest — these two questions?

SECRETARY RICE:…So, when we say that we will support democracy in Iran, it’s no different than our view of supporting democracy any place else in the world. But it also says that — you said, are we trying to create opposition. I think there is opposition in Iran and the question is, are they going to have a voice. Opposition ought to have a voice. And it’s not opposition that the United States creates; it’s opposition that the Iranian people themselves expressed and we just want to see them have a means to express it.

QUESTION: In the same context, you know, do you consider the Mojahedin Organization as an opposition, for instance, or as a terrorist group or —

SECRETARY RICE: MEK?

QUESTION: Mojahedin, yes.

SECRETARY RICE: MEK? No, MEK is listed as a terrorist group. They were involved in some pretty awful and bloody incidents, including — involving American citizens.

QUESTION: It’s Americans?

SECRETARY RICE: Yes. So, MEK, we do not have dealings with, but there are many voices of opposition in Iran. You know, the sad thing is that people say, "Well, Iran is further along than fill in the blank states." But Iran is going in the reverse direction. It’s going in the wrong direction, because a few years ago, there was a Majlis where voices of opposition were actually heard, where people felt that they could speak up. But that has now been all but silenced and so, there is opposition in Iran that is not associated with terrorism. And I think we have an obligation to try to give voice to that opposition.

QUESTION: Thank you.

US State Department

http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/61545.htm

February 23, 2006 0 comments
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Former members of the MEK

Two defectors of Rajavi’s cult repatriated

Nejat Society Reporter “ Mehr Abad Airport Tehran

Two defectors of Rajavi’s Cult returned, being under pressure since long ago could join American camp and by cooperation of IRC they returned to their homeland and welcomed .

February 23, 2006 0 comments
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Hojat Zamani

Terrorist or Victim?!

With a little consideration, one can clearly see how happy is the terrorist MKO of possible execution of Hojjat Zamani, one of its members. At the current situation, MKO needed to introduce this as a sign for the importance of its espionage activities in the referral of Iran’s case to UN Security Council. However, the reality is that this event, which has been only reported by the MKO and its accuracy is doubted, has nothing to do with nuclear issues.

Hojjat Zamani and two of his brothers were among the people who were deployed to Iran- because of stupid plans of Rajavi to disrupt social order in Iran after the presidential elections in 1997, which led to the presidency of Seyed Mohammed Khatami- to conduct terrorist operations, attract the so-called global attention toward the MKO and overthrow the reformists, as Rajavi said.

After joining the MKO, Hojjat passed terrorist courses and in his first terrorist operation in the June of 1998, he detonated a strong bomb in Tehran’s Revolutionary Prosecution Office that killed 4 people including an Armenian Iranian (William Wigen); many others were injured in the event.

Terrorist MKO claimed responsibility for this terrorist act in a statement released on June 2, 1998:

"At around 2:00 pm Tehran time, Revolutionary Prosecution Office in downtown Tehran was destroyed by military teams of Mojahedin… ambulances could be heard in the region until hours after the explosion… before that, operational teams of the MKO left the place unhurt."

He was later in 2001 deployed to Tehran again to conduct mortaring operation, and he was arrested after his operations.

After he was arrested, there were wide range efforts to help him (by trying to get the consent of complainants) and the MKO has even pointed to this fact in its statement, released yesterday:

"In the summer of 2004, Hojjat had been sentenced to 4 times execution by the 6th chamber of unjustice reactionary court of so-called Islamic Revolution. Then, in early 2005, a chamber of Supreme Court, comprised of Mohseni Ezhei and Nabi Raji, sentenced him to two times execution and paying a full fine."

From legal point of view, this can happen only if the two complainants of the case agree to withdraw their complaints.

Anyway, the Mojahedin could make a criminal terrorist out of a rural teacher; a terrorist who didn’t care about the blood of people and the one the MKO took advantage of his blood. This is the brief fate for those trapped by the terrorist MKO; what should they be called, Terrorist or Victim?

Irandidban

 

February 21, 2006 0 comments
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Iraq

MKO, A Threat Against Iraq

What is of primary importance for us, as Iraqis, is the interest of our nation and we should not lose our way. Past and present experiences prove that the Mojahedin-e Khalq organization is like a blade at the hands of occupiers against innocent Iraqis. We witnessed the brutality of this treacherous organization during Iraqis’ Intifadah (uprising) in 1991. Members of this organization were pioneers in suppressing our nation. Former senior Iraqi officials counted on this group. MKO had a strategic place in security and intelligence issues.

After the fall of Saddam and his partners, most of the leaders of this group fled to Europe but currently, the members of this group plan terrorist operations inside Iraq and support such operations logistically and financially.

Mojahedin-e Khalq organization is a burden for Iraqis. The organization of hypocrites (MKO), under full protection of US tanks in military Camp of Ashraf in Iraq, receives the orders directly from the US army. The leaders and officials of this organization are in practical coordination with those Sunni tribes leaders who disagree with the current political process. The camp of this organization has become a workshop for preparing bombed cars; this camp is used for targeting mosques, kindergartens, hospitals, schools and crowded markets.

Therefore, we ask the Iraqi government, National Assembly and political parties and movements to take an immediate tough stance on expelling the terrorist treacherous group of Mojahedin-e Khalq from Iraq. Our country has suffered enough from this organization and we can’t see more destruction and terrorist operations anymore. We are free in our country. No more deals on the pure blood of Iraqis and their wealth.

You Iraqis, raise your voice to denounce all plots against our country. No one should be allowed to undermine our honor and we should be able to determine the future of our own country. The wealth of Iraq is today an opportunity for parties and organizations and some groups victimize Iraqis to get to their own goals; they do it to serve their own political ambitions.

Hassan Alzameli/Sotaliraq

http://www.sotaliraq.com/articles-iraq/nieuws.php?id=26163

February 21, 2006 0 comments
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Mujahedin Khalq Organization as a terrorist group

United States Court of Appeals verdict on NCRI

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested to notifythe Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be made before the bound volumes go to press.

 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

 

Argued April 2, 2004                                                      Decided July 9, 2004

 

No. 01-1480

 

NATIONAL COUNCIL OF RESISTANCE OF IRAN,

PETITIONER

 

v.

 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND

COLIN L. POWELL, SECRETARY OF STATE,

RESPONDENTS

 

On Petition for Review of Orders of the

Department of State

 

Paul F. Enzinna argued the cause and filed the briefs forpetitioner. Martin D. Minsker entered an appearance.

Douglas Letter, Litigation Counsel, U.S. Department ofJustice, argued the cause for respondents. With him on thebrief was Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General.

Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs outof time.  

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Before: HENDERSON, GARLAND, and ROBERTS, CircuitJudges.Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROBERTS.ROBERTS, Circuit Judge: This is the fourth in a series ofrelated cases concerning the biennial designations by theSecretary of State of the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization(MEK)1and its aliases as a foreign terrorist organization(FTO). See People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep’t ofState, 182 F.3d 17 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (PMOI I); NationalCouncil of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192(D.C. Cir. 2001) (NCRI); People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v.Dep’t of State, 327 F.3d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (PMOI II); seegenerally 8 U.S.C. § 1189. In 1999, and again in 2001, theNational Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) was deter-mined by the Secretary of State to be an alias of MEK andwas accordingly also designated an FTO. See 1999 Designa-tion, 64 Fed. Reg. at 55,112; 2001 Redesignation, 66 Fed.Reg. at 51,089. In May 2003, after a remand to cure certaindue process deficiencies, see NCRI, 251 F.3d at 208–09, theSecretary decided to leave in place the 1999 and 2001 desig-1The Mojahedin-e Khalq translates into English as People’sMojahedin. [AR268] The Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK)is known in English as the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran(PMOI). Our prior decisions have variously referred to the Moja-hedin-e Khalq as MEK, People’s Mojahedin of Iran, and PMOI.Compare PMOI I, 182 F.3d at 20 (‘‘the People’s Mojahedin Organi-zation of Iran — the MEK, for short’’), with NCRI, 251 F.3d at 197(‘‘petitioner People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (‘PMOI’)’’).To limit confusion, wherever possible we will use the terms Mojahe-din-e Khalq and MEK, and, except in case names, not the termsPeople’s Mojahedin or PMOI. We adopt this convention because itis the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization that the Secretary hasdesignated as a foreign terrorist organization. See Designation ofForeign Terrorist Organizations, 62 Fed. Reg. 52,650 (Oct. 8, 1997)(1997 Designation); Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organiza-tions, 64 Fed. Reg. 55,112 (Oct. 8, 1999) (1999 Designation); Redes-ignation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 66 Fed. Reg. 51,088,51,089 (Oct. 5, 2001) (2001 Redesignation); Redesignation of For-eign Terrorist Organizations, 68 Fed. Reg. 56,860, 56,861 (Oct. 2,2003) (2003 Redesignation). ——————————————————————————– Page 3

nations of NCRI as an FTO. NCRI now again petitions forreview. After reviewing NCRI’s arguments, the entirety ofthe administrative record, and certain classified materialsappended to that record, we conclude that the Secretary’slatest designation complied with the governing statute and allconstitutional requirements. We therefore deny the petitionfor review.I.The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of1996 (AEDPA) empowers the Secretary of State to designatean entity as an FTO whenever the Secretary determines that(1) the entity is foreign; (2) it engages in terrorist activity;and (3) the terrorist activity threatens the security of theUnited States or its nationals. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1). Adesignation as an FTO persists for two years, after which theSecretary may redesignate the entity as an FTO for a suc-ceeding two-year period upon finding that the statutory cir-cumstances still exist. Id. § 1189(a)(4)(B).An FTO designation visits serious consequences on theaffected organization: The Secretary of the Treasury mayrequire financial institutions to freeze any assets of the FTO,id. § 1189(a)(2)(C); the members and representatives of theFTO become ineligible to enter the United States, id.§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(IV), (V); and anyone who knowingly pro-vides ‘‘material support or resources’’ to the FTO — includingany donation of money — may be prosecuted and imprisonedfor up to fifteen years, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1). The mani-fest purpose of these provisions is to deny terrorist organiza-tions support — financial or otherwise — in and from theUnited States. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-383, at 43–45 (1995)(House Report on AEDPA’s primary predecessor bill).Despite these serious consequences of designation, thegoverning statute affords suspect entities only ‘‘truncated’’participation in the administrative process leading to thedesignation and ‘‘quite limited’’ judicial review after the fact.NCRI, 251 F.3d at 196. As we noted in PMOI I, ‘‘unlike therun-of-the-mill administrative proceeding,’’ ‘‘there is [under ——————————————————————————– Page 4  

AEDPA] no adversary hearing, no presentation of whatcourts and agencies think of as evidence, [and] no advancenotice to the entity affected by the Secretary’s internaldeliberations.’’ 182 F.3d at 19. Once the Secretary hasdesignated an entity an FTO, the statute directs us to ‘‘holdunlawful and set aside a designation’’ only if we find it to be:(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or oth-erwise not in accordance with law;(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, orimmunity;(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limi-tation, or short of statutory right;(D) lacking substantial support in the administrative rec-ord taken as a whole or in classified information submit-ted to the court [ex parte and in camera], or(E) not in accord with the procedures required by law.8 U.S.C. § 1189(b)(3). Although the statute permits thiscourt to base its review either ‘‘solely upon the administrativerecord’’ ‘‘taken as a whole,’’ or as supplemented by anyclassified information submitted by the Secretary, the Actmakes no provision for the disclosure of that classified materi-al to the designated entity. See id. § 1189(b)(2), (3)(D); seegenerally 28 C.F.R. pt. 17 (governing access to classifiednational security information).In 1997, and every two years since, the Secretary hasdesignated MEK an FTO. See 1997 Designation, 62 Fed.Reg. at 52,650; 1999 Designation, 64 Fed. Reg. at 55,112;2001 Redesignation, 66 Fed. Reg. at 51,089; 2003 Redesig-nation, 68 Fed. Reg. at 56,861. Starting in 1999, the Secre-tary added NCRI to the list of designated FTOs, havingconcluded that NCRI was an alias of MEK. See 1999 Desig-nation, 64 Fed. Reg. at 55,112 (‘‘I hereby designate TTT thefollowing organization as a foreign terrorist organization: TTTMujahedin-e Khalq Organization TTT also known as NationalCouncil of Resistance, also known as NCR.’’). NCRI now, forthe second time, seeks review of that designation. In NCRI’sprevious challenge — brought jointly with MEK — we con- ——————————————————————————– Page 5

cluded that both the 1999 designation of MEK as an FTO andthe designation of NCRI as an alias of MEK satisfied therequirements of the statute. Specifically concerning NCRI,we held — based on the record then presented to us by theSecretary — that the Secretary’s conclusion that NCRI wasan alias of MEK ‘‘does not lack substantial support and TTT isneither arbitrary, capricious, nor otherwise not in accordancewith law.’’ NCRI, 251 F.3d at 199.As a constitutional matter, however, we determined thatthe procedures afforded by the statute and employed by theSecretary in arriving at those designations violated bothorganizations’ due process rights. See id. at 208–09. We didnot vacate the Secretary’s designation as to either MEK orNCRI, but remanded to the Secretary with instructions thateach entity be afforded the opportunity to: (1) respond to anypart of the Secretary’s administrative record that is notclassified material; (2) file evidence on its own behalf; and (3)be meaningfully heard by the Secretary. Id. at 210.Both MEK and NCRI availed themselves of these opportu-nities. NCRI submitted voluminous materials that purportedto demonstrate that it was sufficiently independent of MEKthat it could not be considered an alias of that organization.On September 24, 2001, the State Department informed MEKand NCRI that the Secretary had decided to leave the 1999designation of MEK in place but that ‘‘no such determinationregarding the NCRI as an alias of the MEK is possible atthis time.’’ Letter of Ambassador Francis X. Taylor, Coordi-nator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Dep’t of State, at 2 (Sept.24, 2001). This was shortly followed, on October 5, 2001, bythe Secretary’s redesignation of both MEK as an FTO andNCRI as an alias of MEK. See 2001 Redesignation, 66 Fed.Reg. at 51,089. At that time, the State Department assuredNCRI that although ‘‘the present situation TTT requires con-tinued designation of [NCRI] as an alias of MEK for now,’’upon the completion of review of NCRI’s submissions, ‘‘theSecretary will make a de novo determination in light of theentire record, including the material you have submitted.’’ ——————————————————————————– Page 6

Letter of Ambassador Francis X. Taylor, Coordinator forCounterterrorism, U.S. Dep’t of State, at 1 (Oct. 5, 2001).Nearly a year later, the State Department provided forNCRI’s review additional materials obtained by the FBI inthe course of ‘‘its long-running investigation of the MEK andNCRI.’’ Letter of Ambassador Francis X. Taylor, Coordina-tor for Counterterrorism, U.S. Dep’t of State, at 1 (Sept. 4,2002). Within two months, NCRI submitted its response.See Letter of Paul F. Enzinna, Esq. (Nov. 1, 2002). In May2003, the State Department completed its review process and,on May 24, the Secretary decided to leave in place the 1999and 2001 ‘‘designations of the National Council of Resistance(NCR) and the National Council of Resistance of Iran(NCRI) as foreign terrorist organization aliases of the Muja-hedin-e Khalq (MEK).’’ Action Mem. from William Pope &William H. Taft, IV to the Secretary of State, at 3 (May 22,2003) (Action Mem.). NCRI now petitions for review of thislatest decision.II.NCRI’s primary argument is that the Secretary’s conclu-sion that NCRI is an alias of MEK lacks substantial supportin the administrative record. NCRI insists that it is anumbrella organization of Iranian dissident persons and groupsof which MEK is only a single member, no more powerfulthan any other. In addressing this contention, we begin withour earlier holding in this action. In NCRI, we concluded —based on the record then presented to us — that the Secre-tary’s designation of NCRI as an alias of MEK ‘‘does not lacksubstantial support and TTT is neither arbitrary, capricious,nor otherwise not in accordance with law.’’ 251 F.3d at 199.Although that decision is obviously not determinative of thequestion before us today — we are now reviewing a recordthat has since been supplemented both by the Governmentand NCRI — its holding must nevertheless inform our deci-sion here. Logically, NCRI’s challenge can succeed only ifthe new record materials establish its independence fromMEK so that we can no longer affirm that ‘‘the Secretary, on ——————————————————————————– Page 7

the face of things, had enough information before [him] tocome to the conclusion’’ that NCRI is an alias of MEK. Id.Having reviewed the supplemented administrative record as awhole and the classified information appended to it, we con-clude that NCRI has not met this burden.To explain our decision, we must first review what itmeans — in the very particular context of AEDPA — for oneorganization to be an alias of another. On its previousappeal, NCRI argued that the Secretary lacked authorityunder AEDPA to designate an entity an FTO based on afinding that it was an alias of another designated FTO. Seeid. at 200. We rejected that contention, finding that thegrant of authority to designate FTOs ‘‘implies the authorityto so designate an entity that commits the necessary terroristacts under some other name.’’ Id. In so doing, we used amathematics metaphor — specifically, the transitive proper-ty — to describe the alias concept: ‘‘Logically, indeed mathe-matically, if A equals B and B equals C, it follows that Aequals C. If the NCRI is the [MEK], and if the [MEK] is aforeign terrorist organization, then the NCRI is a foreignterrorist organization also.’’ Id.; see also id. (‘‘If the Secre-tary has the power to work those dire consequences on anentity calling itself ‘Organization A,’ the Secretary must beable to work the same consequences on the same entity whileit calls itself ‘Organization B.’ ’’). Seizing upon our earlierinvocation of the transitive property, NCRI now argues thatthe administrative record does not demonstrate that ‘‘Aequals B’’ — that is, that NCRI equals MEK — and there-fore NCRI cannot be an alias of MEK. Indeed, NCRIrightly points out that even the State Department acknowl-edges that NCRI and MEK are not ‘‘one and the same.’’ SeePet. Reply Br. 4–6.Implicit in NCRI’s argument, however, is a mistaken as-sumption that the alias concept, under AEDPA, is boundedby the transitive property. This reads too much into ourmathematical metaphor in NCRI. See Berkey v. Third Ave.Ry. Co., 244 N.Y. 84, 94 (1926) (Cardozo, J.) (‘‘Metaphors inlaw are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices toliberate thought, they end often by enslaving it.’’). While it is ——————————————————————————– Page 8

certainly correct to use the term alias to describe scenarioswhere a single entity is known by more than one name — forinstance, Mojahedin-e Khalq is an alias for People’s Mojahe-din, two names for the same organization, one Farsi, theother English — nothing in AEDPA or any more general ruleof logic or language requires that the application of the aliasconcept be strictly limited to such circumstances.To the contrary, our citation in NCRI to First NationalCity Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462U.S. 611 (1983), indicates that we intended the alias conceptto have a sweep beyond the transitive. In that case, whichconcerned a suit brought by Banco Para El Comercio Exteri-or (BPECE) against First National City Bank for perform-ance under a letter of credit, the Supreme Court held thatFirst National could counterclaim for setoff of the value of itsassets that had been seized and nationalized by the Cubangovernment, notwithstanding the fact that BPECE had beenestablished by the Cuban government as a juridical entityseparate from the government. See id. at 623–34. Acknowl-edging a presumption that ‘‘government instrumentalities es-tablished as juridical entities distinct and independent fromtheir sovereign should normally be treated as such,’’ id. at626–27, the Court nevertheless concluded that the normallyseparate juridical status had to be set aside where the Cubangovernment was the real party in interest behind BPECE’sletter of credit claim, id. at 632. The Court, in reaching itsconclusion, looked to ordinary principles of agency law, notingthat ‘‘where a corporate entity is so extensively controlled byits owner that a relationship of principal and agent is created,we have held that one may be held liable for the actions of theother.’’ Id. at 629 (citing NLRB v. Deena Artware, Inc., 361U.S. 398, 402–04 (1960)). We think those same ordinaryprinciples of agency law are fairly encompassed by the aliasconcept under AEDPA. When one entity so dominates andcontrols another that they must be considered principal andagent, it is appropriate, under AEDPA, to look past theirseparate juridical identities and to treat them as aliases.The inclusion of these fundamental precepts of agency lawwithin AEDPA’s alias concept is entirely consistent with — ——————————————————————————– Page 9

indeed, necessary to — the effective pursuit of the statute’sobjective of denying support in and from the United States toterrorist organizations. Just as it is silly to suppose ‘‘thatCongress empowered the Secretary to designate a terroristorganization TTT only for such periods of time as it took suchorganization to give itself a new name, and then let it happilyresume the same status it would have enjoyed had it neverbeen designated,’’ NCRI, 251 F.3d at 200, so too it is implau-sible to think that Congress permitted the Secretary todesignate an FTO to cut off its support in and from theUnited States, but did not authorize the Secretary to preventthat FTO from marshaling all the same support via juridicallyseparate agents subject to its control. For instance, underNCRI’s conception, the Government could designate XYZorganization as an FTO in an effort to block United Statessupport to that organization, but could not, without a separateFTO designation, ban the transfer of material support toXYZ’s fundraising affiliate, FTO Fundraiser, Inc. Thecrabbed view of alias status advanced by NCRI is at war notonly with the antiterrorism objective of AEDPA, but commonsense as well.We need not plumb all the complexities of agency law todetermine when an agent, under AEDPA, is the alias of itsprincipal. It is sufficient for our purposes to note that therequisite relationship for alias status is established at leastwhen one organization so dominates and controls another thatthe latter can no longer be considered meaningfully indepen-dent from the former. See, e.g., NLRB v. Deena Artware,Inc., 361 U.S. 398, 403 (1960) (‘‘ ‘Dominion may be so com-plete, interference so obtrusive, that by the general rules ofagency the parent will be a principal and the subsidiary anagent.’ ’’) (quoting Berkey, 244 N.Y. at 95); Casino ReadyMix, Inc. v. NLRB, 321 F.3d 1190, 1196 (D.C. Cir. 2003)(‘‘ ‘agent’ is one who agrees to act ‘subject to [a principal’s]control’ ’’) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1, cmt.a (1958)); cf. Transamerica Leasing, Inc. v. La Republica deVenezuela, 200 F.3d 843, 848 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (‘‘A sovereign isamenable to suit based upon the actions of an instrumentalityit dominates because the sovereign and the instrumentality ——————————————————————————– Page 10

are in those circumstances not meaningfully distinct entities;they act as one.’’).We thus frame our inquiry here as whether ‘‘the Secretary,on the face of things, had enough information before [him] tocome to the conclusion’’ that NCRI was dominated andcontrolled by MEK. PMOI I, 182 F.3d at 25. Based on ourreview of the entire administrative record and the classifiedmaterials appended thereto, we find that the Secretary didhave an adequate basis for his conclusion. While our deter-mination is buttressed by classified information provided tous on an ex parte and in camera basis — the contents ofwhich we cannot discuss — the voluminous unclassified mate-rials contained in the administrative record by themselvesand by a comfortable margin provide sufficient support forthe Secretary’s conclusion, given the standard of review. Itwould serve little purpose to catalogue all the material in theadministrative record supporting the conclusion that NCRI isdominated and controlled by MEK, but we will set out belowa few of the pieces of information we found to be mostcompelling. As we do so, it bears repeating that AEDPAdoes not permit us, in exercising our limited judicial review,to make any ‘‘judgment whatsoever regarding whether thematerial before the Secretary is or is not true,’’ but allows usto inquire only whether the Secretary ‘‘had enough informa-tion before [him] to come to the conclusion’’ that NCRI isdominated and controlled by MEK. Id.After an extensive investigation of MEK and NCRI, theFBI reported to the State Department that ‘‘[i]t is theunanimous view of the FBI personnel who are involved in andfamiliar with the FBI’s investigation of the [MEK] that theNCRI is not a separate organization, but is instead, and hasbeen, an integral part of the MEK at all relevant times.’’Letter of Charles Frahm, Section Chief, International Terror-ism Operations Section II, at 1 (Aug. 28, 2002). Contrary toNCRI’s portrayal of itself as an umbrella organization, ofwhich the MEK was just one member, the FBI concludedthat it is NCRI that is ‘‘the political branch’’ of the MEK. Id.Attach. at 1. ——————————————————————————– Page 11

 

This conclusion was based in large part on evidence gath-ered from the search — executed in December 2001 pursuantto a valid warrant — of a house in Falls Church, Virginiaapparently used as office space by both NCRI and MEK.There, the FBI discovered NCRI and MEK materials ‘‘com-mingled together, and not separated,’’ including bank records,signed blank checks, MEK propaganda, NCRI publications,travel documents, and letterhead which listed the sameFrench address for each organization. Id. Attach. at 2–4.Crucially, among the recovered documents was a schematicbreakdown of the ‘‘Iranian Resistance,’’ which describedNCRI as ‘‘The Political Branch’’ of the movement. Id. at Tab6.Additionally, earlier investigations of MEK and NCRI hadrevealed that the two organizations shared an essentiallyunitary leadership structure. The overall head of MEK,Massoud Rajavi, also leads NCRI. And Rajavi’s wife, Mar-yam Rajavi, was selected by NCRI to be Iran’s President-in-Exile. Id. Attach. at 2; see also id. Attach. at 4 (‘‘Theleadership of [MEK] and NCRI is intermixed, and the enti-ties operate in a day-to-day way as a single unit.’’). Thesefacts corroborated the FBI’s earlier conclusion prior to the2001 designation of NCRI as an FTO that ‘‘the NCR/NCRI isin fact controlled by and inseparable from the MEK.’’ Decl.of Agent Michael Rolince (quoted in Action Mem., Tab 2 at11).The State Department acknowledged that ‘‘NCRI has sub-mitted numerous affidavits purporting to show that it is notcontrolled by the MEK and is not an MEK front,’’ and evencredited some of NCRI’s ‘‘subsidiary points.’’ Action Mem.,Tab 2 at 12, 9. The agency, however, concluded that ‘‘theevidence developed by the FBI is convincingly to the con-trary.’’ Id. Tab 2 at 12. It may be true that the StateDepartment relied very heavily on the conclusions of thecounterterrorism experts of the FBI. As noted above,though, under the narrow powers of judicial review Congresshas accorded to us under AEDPA, it is emphatically not ourprovince to second-guess the Secretary’s judgment as towhich affidavits to credit and upon whose conclusions to rely. ——————————————————————————– Page 12  

We are to judge only whether the ‘‘support’’ marshaled forthe Secretary’s designation was ‘‘substantial.’’ 8 U.S.C.§ 1189(b)(3)(D). We conclude that the support for the Secre-tary’s conclusion that NCRI was dominated and controlledby, and thus was an alias of, MEK was indeed substantial,and we therefore reject NCRI’s statutory challenge to itsdesignation as an FTO.III.This leaves only NCRI’s constitutional challenges to certainprocedures employed in making that designation. Specifical-ly, NCRI argues that due process requires that (1) it beprovided access to any classified materials that the Secretaryrelied upon in making the designation, and (2) it have anadversary hearing before the agency at which it could con-front witnesses against it. Both these arguments are fore-closed by our earlier decisions in NCRI and PMOI II. See251 F.3d at 208–09; 327 F.3d at 1242–43. ConcerningNCRI’s claim that it is entitled to review classified materials,in NCRI we wrote that the government ‘‘need not disclose theclassified information to be presented in camera and ex parteto the court under the statute.’’ 251 F.3d at 208. In PMOIII, addressing the same claim, this time brought by MEK, wewere even more emphatic: ‘‘We reject this contentionTTTTWe already decided in [NCRI] that due process required thedisclosure of only the unclassified portions of the administra-tive record.’’ 327 F.3d at 1242. PMOI II also disposes ofNCRI’s claim for an adversary hearing. There, we held thatNCRI established the constitutional baseline for fair processand, the Government having complied with those commandson remand, that ‘‘nothing further is due.’’ Id. at 1243. Wereach the same conclusion with regard to NCRI.The petition for review is denied.

FAS

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February 21, 2006 0 comments
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Human Rights Abuse in the MEK

Statement on Responses to HRW Report on Abuses by the MKO

In May 2005, Human Rights Watch issued a report on alleged human rights abuses committed by an Iranian opposition group, the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO/MEK),1 inside its military camps in Iraq from 1991 to February 2003, prior to the fall of Saddam Hussein’s government. The report, No Exit: Human Rights Abuses Inside the MKO Camps, detailed allegations by twelve former members of the MKO who told Human Rights Watch of a range of physical and psychological abuses they had suffered and witnessed.2 In addition, the report made use of the published memoir of the MKO’s former chief diplomatic representative in Europe and North America, Masoud Banisadr.3

Following publication of this Human Rights Watch report, individuals associated with the MKO and others, in communications to Human Rights Watch as well as publicly on Web sites connected with the MKO, raised objections to the findings of the report. We have investigated with care the criticisms we received concerning the substance and methodology of the report, and find those criticisms to be unwarranted.

A number of critics of the report claimed that Human Rights Watch was calling on the United States, Canada, and the European Union not to remove the MKO from their respective lists of groups identified as perpetrating or advocating acts of terrorism, in the face of a campaign by the MKO to have itself removed from such lists. Human Rights Watch in fact at no point, either in the report or in responses to media and other queries, took any position whatsoever on whether the MKO should be on such lists or removed from them. Rather, we did no more than report what we believed to be credible testimonies alleging serious abuses perpetrated by MKO officials against dissident members of the group, including prolonged deprivation of liberty and torture.

A group known as Friends of a Free Iran (FOFI), comprising four Members of the European Parliament – Alejo Vidal Quadras, Paulo Casaca, Andre Brie, and Struan Stevenson – presented the most extensive of the critiques of the No Exit report on September 21, 2005.4 The FOFI document disputed the testimonies and challenged the credibility of the witnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch, saying, among other things, that their allegations were “widely believed to be orchestrated by Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence.”5 The MKO has similarly alleged that Human Rights Watch’s witnesses, and dissident former members generally, are in fact agents of Iranian intelligence. Neither FOFI nor any of the other critics of the Human Rights Watch report have provided any credible evidence to support this charge.

The FOFI document followed a five-day visit by a delegation of FOFI members to the MKO’s main base in Iraq, Camp Ashraf, in July 2005. The FOFI delegation reportedly interviewed 19 MKO members inside Camp Ashraf. According to the FOFI document, these present MKO members disputed testimonies given by the former MKO members to Human Rights Watch. The FOFI delegation did

not interview any of the individuals who gave testimonies to Human Rights

Watch.

Because Human Rights Watch places a high premium on the accuracy of our reporting and public statements, the organization took these allegations seriously. We went back to our sources to review and reevaluate the credibility of their allegations.In October 2005 Human Rights Watch researchers met in person with all twelve witnesses quoted in the No Exit report. The researchers conducted interviews lasting several hours with each witness, individually and privately. All interviews were conducted in Germany and the Netherlands, where the witnesses now live.

All of the witnesses recounted in extensive detail their experiences inside the MKO camps from the 1991-2003 period, and how MKO officials subjected them to various forms of physical and psychological abuses once they made known their wishes to leave the organization. Human Rights Watch researchers questioned the witnesses at great length about the circumstances under which these abuses allegedly took place. The researchers also asked the witnesses to respond to the specific issues raised in the FOFI document with regard to their testimonies. The witnesses provided detailed and credible responses to these challenges that were consistent with their earlier testimony as recounted in No Exit and are detailed in the appendix to this statement.

The only piece of information that emerged during these detailed face-to-face interviews that differed from the account in No Exit concerned the period of Mohammad Hussein Sobhani’s detention by the MKO. In No Exit, Human Rights Watch reported that MKO officials had held Sobhani in solitary confinement for eight-and-a-half years, from September 1992 to January 2001. The FOFI document stated that “upon his own request, he [Sobhani] lived in an apartment furnished with all living commodities of a comfortable life. Despite PMOI’s insistence that he must leave the organization, he was not willing to do so…”6

In his testimony in October 2005, Sobhani told Human Rights Watch that MKO officials held him continuously in solitary confinement from September 1992 until February 1998 inside Camp Ashraf, a period of five-and-a-half years. He said that in February 1998 the MKO leadership offered to transfer him to a better location and then to facilitate his transfer to Europe, where his daughter was living. Subsequently, the MKO moved Sobhani to another MKO camp near Baghdad, called Camp Parsian. He said he stayed there until June 1999, under circumstances that he described as “house arrest.” He said he was free to leave his apartment in Camp Parsian but could not leave the camp unless accompanied by MKO guards, and could not leave for Europe. In June 1999, during a visit to Baghdad, he escaped and attempted to reach the United Nations office there. He was captured by the Iraqi police and turned over to MKO officials. From June 1999 until January 2001, Sobhani said, the MKO again held him in a prison inside Camp Ashraf, once again in solitary confinement. In January 2001, the MKO transferred Sobhani to Iraqi custody. The Iraqi authorities imprisoned him in Abu Ghraib until January 21, 2002.7

As reported by the witnesses interviewed for No Exit, the MKO transferred scores of dissident members from MKO detention into Iraqi custody. Iraqi authorities then incarcerated the men in Abu Ghraib prison. Five of the twelve individuals interviewed by Human Rights Watch for No Exit said theyended up in Abu Ghraib as a result of such transfers, and they told Human Rights Watch that former MKO members were being held there when they arrived. The FOFI document fails to address the MKO’s transfer of the

dissidents to Iraqi custody or their subsequent detention in Abu Ghraib.

The FOFI document also raised two other objections to the Human Rights Watch report. Firstly, the FOFI document questioned Human Rights Watch’s methodology of conducting interviews with witnesses by phone. Human Rights Watch, like other organizations that conduct research and report on current affairs, sometimes relies on telephone interviews to gather information. Telephone interviews are a recognized and appropriate method of information gathering. Human Rights Watch has no reason to believe that any of the witnesses misidentified or (misrepresented) themselves in any way whatsoever. They reaffirmed their credibility in face to face interviews in October 2005.

Secondly, the FOFI document challenged Human Rights Watch’s report by stating that, during their visit to Camp Ashraf, the FOFI delegation did not find any indications of abuse or ill-treatment of MKO members. The Human Rights Watch report, as was made clear in that text, covered allegations of abuse inside the MKO camps prior to the overthrow of the government of Saddam Hussein in April 2003. The testimonies by witnesses who recounted allegations of detention and physical abuse cover the period from 1991 to February 2003. After the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003, U.S. forces interviewed MKO members inside the MKO camps. The U.S. military set up a separate camp for those members who indicated that they wished to leave the organization. At least 300 members (out of a total of nearly 4000) chose to leave the organization. The Human Rights Watch report did not include any testimonies or allegations of witnesses as to whether there were ongoing abuses inside Camp Ashraf after the invasion of Iraq. Thus, the findings of FOFI with respect to current conditions in the MKO camp have no relevance to the Human Rights Watch report of testimonies about conditions in the camp from 1991 to February 2003.

Appendix

MKO members inside Camp Ashraf who the FOFI delegation interviewed disputed certain statements by the witnesses whose accounts appeared in the Human Rights Watch report. Human Rights Watch researchers questioned the witnesses at length concerning the allegations contained in the FOFI document.

Their responses, in the view of Human Rights Watch, confirm the credibility and reliability of their original testimonies in No Exit. The Human Rights Watch report contained allegations by witnesses that two MKO members, Ghorbanali Torabi and Parviz Ahmadi, died as a result of abuse suffered in MKO detention. The FOFI document challenged these testimonies.

With regard to Ghorbanali Torabi’s death, the FOFI delegation interviewed two MKO members in Camp Ashraf who disputed these testimonies. These two MKO members, Zahra Seraj, Torabi’s wife, and Masoume Torabi, Torabi’s sister, told the FOFI delegation that he had died of a heart attack, and not as a result of beatings at the hands of MKO officials. Neither of them claimed to have been present when he died. According to a communication to Human Rights Watch from Lord Avebury, who said he had interviewed Masouma Torabi by telephone on June 13, 2005, “Masouma saw Ghorbanali a week before he died.”8

Human Rights Watch again questioned Abbas Sedeghinejad, one of Human Right Watch’s original sources on these events, about Torabi’s death. Abbas Sadeghinejad confirmed his earlier testimony, based on his experience of sharing a prison cell with Torabi.9 He again told Human Rights Watch that late one night, after Torabi had been taken out of the cell for two days, two men carried Torabi back to the cell, threw him inside, and locked the cell again. Torabi, Sadeghinejad said, was not breathing and his face showed signs of severe beating. He said that other cellmates examined Torabi more closely and believed that he had suffered broken bones. Sadeghinejad acknowledged that Torabi may have died of a heart attack, but maintained that the MKO had severely beaten Torabi, apparently during interrogation.

Alireza Mir Asgari corroborated the fact of Torabi’s detention and ill-treatment at the hands of the MKO, based on his own direct experience. Mir Asgari told Human Rights Watch that the MKO also detained him at the time Torabi was detained. He said that he knew Torabi well as a child in Iran, and that Torabi had recruited him in Tehran at the age of seventeen to join the MKO ranks in Iraq. Mir Asgari told Human Rights Watch that during his detention in 1995, he encountered Torabi face-to-face during an interrogation session. He said that the interrogators questioned them both about Torabi’s motivation for recruiting Mir Asgari to the MKO camps in Iraq and accused them of working for the Iranian government. Mir Asgari said that when he met Torabi during this interrogation, Torabi’s body showed signs of beatings and physical abuse.10

Mir Asgari told Human Rights Watch that when he raised the subject of Torabi’s

death with MKO leader Massoud Rajavi, Rajavi alternately responded that Torabi had committed suicide and that Mir Asgari and other prisoners had themselves killed Torabi because they suspected him of being an informant. He said Rajavi at no point claimed that Torabi had died from a heart attack.

Concerning the death of Parviz Ahmadi, the FOFI delegation reported that Hossein Roboubi, an MKO member, told them that Ahmadi died during a military operation inside Iran.11 In its report, Human Rights Watch cited the MKO’s claim that Ahmadi was killed by Iranian agents.12 Human Rights Watch also presented the testimony of three witnesses, Abbas Sadeghinejad, Ali Ghashghavi, and Alireza Mir Asgari, who said that they had shared a prison cell with Ahmadi and saw him die inside the prison after prison guards returned him from an interrogation session. During Human Rights Watch’s face-to-face interviews in October 2005, each of these witnesses gave separate, detailed, and consistent accounts of their recollection regarding Ahmadi’s death. These testimonies were consistent with their earlier statements as published in the No Exit report.13

The FOFI document contains an interview with Hassan Ezati in Camp Ashraf. Hassan Ezati is the father of Yasser Ezati one of the witnesses quoted in the Human Rights Watch report. Hassan Ezati reportedly told the FOFI delegation that “Yasser having left Camp Ashraf went directly to the Iranian Embassy in Baghdad.”14 When asked about this statement, Yasser Ezati strongly denied it. He said that he first went to the German Embassy in Baghdad because he had lived in Germany before moving to Iraq. He told Human Rights Watch that because the German Embassy was closed at the time, his only options were either to return to Camp Ashraf or to go to Iran. He said he was desperate not to return to Camp Ashraf because he had waited for so many years to find the opportunity to leave. He decided to risk returning to Iran for lack of any alternative. He told Human Rights

Watch that he went to the Iranian border on his own. Yasser Ezati said that during his stay in Iran, the Iranian local police arrested him three times for “moral offenses.” Yasser decided that because he had never lived in Iran previously he could not stay there and left for Germany.15

The FOFI document contains an interview with Leila Ghanbari, an MKO member in Camp Ashraf who disputed the testimonies of Habib Khorrami, Tahereh Eskandari, and Mohammad Reza Eskandari in Human Rights Watch’s report. Tahereh Eskandari and Habib Khorrami are sister and brother. Tahereh and Mohammad Reza Eskandari are married. Leila Ghanbari is the former wife of Habib Khorrami and had left Iran for Iraq with Khorrami and Tahereh Eskandari in 1988. The Human Rights Watch report quoted the Eskandaris as saying: “The organization had taken our passports and identification documents upon our arrival in the [MKO] camp [in Iraq]. When we expressed our intention to leave, they never returned our documents. We were held in detention centers in Iskan as well as other locations.” Leila Ghanbari disputed this statement, telling the FOFI delegation: “In one place they say my passport was taken from me. Let me tell you that I laughed at this claim… What passport? They were escapees!”16 The FOFI authors state that MKO officials “said both Mohammad Reza Eskandari and Tahereh Eskandari crossed the border from Iran to Iraq and they never had passports to begin with.”17

Human Rights Watch questioned Mohammad Reza Eskandari, Tahereh Eskandari, and Habib Khorrami separately regarding these allegations by Leila Ghanbari and the unnamed MKO officials. The Eskandaris and Khorrami separately told Human Rights Watch that Tahereh Eskandari, Habib Khorrami, and Leila Ghanbari left Iran together in March 1988 to go to Iraq, crossing the Turkish border and using their passports to do so. They said the MKO confiscated their passports and never returned them. Mohammad Reza Eskandari was the only member of this family who escaped Iran without a passport across the Iraqi border. All three also noted in separate individual interviews that Leila Ghanbari was pregnant when she left Iran for Turkey, and that her and Habib Khorrami’s son was born in Turkey. Habib Khorrami,

Ghanbari’s former husband and the boy’s father, showed Human Rights Watch a copy of their son’s birth certificate issued in Istanbul in April 1994 and stating the date of birth as June 13, 1988.

Leila Ghanbari also disputed the statements by these witnesses that the MKO had confined them in various MKO detention centers. Mohammad Reza Eskandari, Tahereh Eskandari, and Habib Khorrami, in separate face-to-face interviews again provided Human Rights Watch with detailed and consistent accounts of their confinement in various MKO detention centers.18

——————————————————————————–

[1] Alsoknown as People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI).

[2] http://hrw.org/backgrounder/mena/iran0505/index.htm

[3] MasoudBanisadr, Memoirs of an Iranian Rebel (London: Saqi Books, 2004).

[4] Thereport was presented on September 21 at a meeting in Brussels sponsored by theFOFI, according to a September 23 press release on the website of the NationalCouncil of Resistance of Iran, an MKO-related group The text of the FOFIdocument later became available on the same website: http://ncr-iran.org/images/stories/advertising/ep%20report-with%20cover.pdf Many of the points raised in the FOFI document also were raised separately incorrespondence addressed to Human Rights Watch by Lars Rise, a member of theNorwegian Parliament, and two members of the U.K. House of Lords, Lord EricAvebury and Lord Gordon Slynn.

[5] FOFI document, pg. 6.

[6] FOFI document, pg. 65.

[7] HumanRights Watch interview with Mohammad Hussein Sobhani, Germany, October 4, 2005.

[8] LordAvebury email to Human Rights Watch, June 15, 2005.

[9] HumanRights Watch interview with Abbas Sedeghinejad, Germany, October 2, 2005.

[10] HumanRights Watch interview with Alireza Mir Asgari, Germany, October 2, 2005.

[11] FOFIdocument, pgs. 60-62.

[12] http://hrw.org/backgrounder/mena/iran0505/4.htm#_Toc103593132:: “… the MKO’s publication Mojahed of March 2, 1998, lists Parviz Ahmadias an MKO ‘martyr’ killed by Iranian intelligence agents.”

[13] HumanRights Watch interview with Abbas Sedeghinejad, Germany, October 2, 2005. HumanRights Watch interview with Alireza Mir Asgari, Germany, October 2, 2005. HumanRights Watch interview with Ali Ghashghavi, Germany, October 3, 2005. Theirtestimonies regarding Ahmadi’s death appeared in No Exit, Pgs. 16-17.

[14] FOFIdocument, p. 69.

[15] HumanRights Watch interview with Yasser Ezati, Germany, October 3, 2005.

[16] FOFI document, p. 78.

[17] FOFI document, p. 78.

[18] HumanRights Watch interview with Tahereh Eskandari, The Netherlands, October 6,2005. Human Rights Watch interview with Mohammad Reza eskandari, TheNetherlands, October 6, 2005. Human Rights Watch interview with Habib Khorrami,The Netherlands, October 6, 2005.

http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/02/15/iran12678.htm

   

February 21, 2006 0 comments
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Mujahedin Khalq; A proxy force

Opposition a stick against Tehran?

It has been variously described as a cult and the only significant Iranian resistance movement. The People’s Mujahedeen is listed as a terrorist organization in Europe and the United States, yet the group continues to stage rallies and court lawmakers on both sides of the Atlantic.

The U.S. military that bombed its Iraq-based armed wing two years ago now protects its camp north of Baghdad, where its members have been granted Geneva Convention refugee status. And in France, where the People’s Mujahedeen established its political headquarters in the 1980s, it regularly hosts press conferences in Paris to level fresh charges about Tehran’s alleged nuclear weapons program.

Now, as the standoff continues over Iran’s nuclear enrichment activities, some suggest the People’s Mujahedeen could play another role: As one of the few sticks available to Western governments — short of U.N. sanctions — to prod Tehran into compliance.

"I think the way we have treated the Mujahedeen has not been very intelligent," said Yves Bonnet, a former head of France’s internal DST intelligence service, and author of a book on Iranian politics. "Instead of making the Tehran regime worried by supporting an opposition movement they fear, we’re trying to sterilize the Mujahedeen. And in doing so, we’re playing into the arms of their adversaries — the Iranian government."

Such a view is hardly universal. Critics argue that supporting the People’s Mujahedeen grants legitimacy to a disreputable organization, dogged by allegations of human rights abuses and undemocratic behavior.

Other analysts point to a bad precedent: Bogus information on Saddam Hussein’s nuclear weapons program provided by Iraqi opposition groups. "I think we need to view what the Mujahedeen is saying with some very healthy skepticism," said Bob Ayers, a terrorism expert at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London. Still others suggest that using the Mujahedeen to pressure Tehran would have only limited effect.

For its part, the Mujahedeen has spared no effort to clean up its reputation. It organizes periodic rallies — including one in front of the White House Thursday — to get off the U.S. and European terrorist lists, and to promote itself as a democratic alternative to the Mullah’s regime.

Based in the picturesque Paris suburb of Auvers-sur-Oise, the Mujahedeen’s political wing — known formally as the National Council of Resistance of Iran — has a formidable public relations machine. It publishes a slick magazine peppered with articles about the Western lawmakers and Iranians who support it.

"The Iranian community abroad is a microcosm of the Iranian community in Iran," said 53-year-old Ali Safavi, a member of the Mujahedeen’s foreign affairs committee, in an interview in Paris. He claims the vast majority of those politically active in the Iranian diaspora support the group.

"If there were an election held tomorrow in Iran under U.N. auspices — free of rigging and fraud and all parties could participate — I think our movement would by far gain the most number of votes," Safavi added.

Many scoff at such claims.

"They’ve managed to convince more than a few unsuspecting members of the European parliament and U.S. congressmen and women that they are a legitimate democratic opposition group," said Karim Sadjadpour, an expert on Iran at the International Crisis Group in Washington, DC, echoing the view of a number of experts. "But in reality, anybody who has been to Iran in the last 10 years would tell you they have little, if any, support on the streets."

There was a time, however, when the Mujahedeen enjoyed considerable support on the Iranian streets. Founded in 1965 by Iranian students bent on toppling Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the group briefly allied itself with the 1979 Islamic Revolution. But the Mujahedeen, which mixed Islam with Marxist philosophy, soon fell afoul of Iran’s new theocratic government.

In 1981, after several of its leaders were executed, the group moved to an unsettled exile in France. When Paris began forging diplomatic ties with Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini in 1986, it expelled the Mujahedeen’s charismatic leader, Massoud Rajavi.

Rajavi moved to Iraq, where Saddam gave him shelter and millions of dollars in funding. He established the group’s military wing there, launching terrorist attacks across the border in Iran, and targeting Iranian interests overseas.

In 2003 — as French authorities again appeared to be seeking closer ties with Tehran — police raided the Mujahedeen’s sprawling compound in Auvers-sur-Oise, arresting 160 people on allegations of funding terrorist activities. Among those detained were Rajavi’s wife Maryam, who heads the group’s political wing.

But today, Maryam Rajavi meets freely with French and other European politicians, and reportedly enjoys police protection whenever she leaves her home. A French judicial investigation putters on — to save face, Mujahedeen members say, for lack of incriminating evidence.

Treatment of the Mujahedeen by other Western governments also appears pegged to shifting diplomatic relations with Tehran. In 1997, the Clinton administration classified the Mujahedeen’s armed and political factions as terrorist organizations — reportedly to score points with former Iranian president Mohammad Khatami. In 2002, the European Union put the group’s armed branch on its terrorist list.

Today, however, some U.S. and European lawmakers are lobbying for the Mujahedeen to be treated as a credible weapon against Tehran. "We should use them for information on what’s going on inside Iran," said Congressman Tom Tancredo (R-Colorado), who supports lifting the group’s terrorist designation. "They’re willing to do what’s necessary to bring the regime down, and we could take advantage of that."

Supporters say the Mujahedeen could be used in providing intelligence information on Iran’s nuclear program. That may be one reason, according to reports, why the U.S. military shifted from bombing to guarding the Mujahedeen’s camp in Iraq. Indeed, the group’s allegations three years ago about an Iranian enrichment facility in Nantanz were "on the mark," said a diplomat close to the International Atomic Energy Agency, in Vienna.

But the group’s subsequent nuclear disclosures have been of dubious value, the diplomat added, speaking on background. "The IAEA certainly doesn’t rely on them as a credible or regular source of information," she said, "even though it does read and check them out."

More worrying, perhaps, is the organization’s reputation. The Mujahedeen has long been described as a personality cult revolving around its leaders, the Rajavis. Men and women at the Iraq camp sleep separately and are barred from marrying. Last year, Human Rights Watch published a report accusing the Mujahedeen of torturing and preventing some of its dissenting members from leaving the camp, during Saddam’s time.

Some U.S. soldiers and European lawmakers say they have found no evidence of past abuse there. And the group argues former members interviewed by Human Rights Watch are on the payroll of Iran’s intelligence service. But critics like Ervand Abrahamian, author of a 1989 book on the Mujahedeen, says that is its standard response to damaging allegations.

"It would be a sign of desperation if Washington resorted to the Mujahedeen as an instrument against the Iranian regime," added Abrahamian, a Middle East history professor at Baruch College, in New York. "I can’t imagine anyone more discredited in Iran than the Mujahedeen."

ELIZABETH BRYANT/UPI/Feb.7/Paris

February 19, 2006 0 comments
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UK

Maryam Rajavi’s gaffe sabotages MKO’s House of Lords push

Thursday February 9, 2006. In a debate on Iran, several members of the House spoke about the immediate problems concerning Iran, and British policy toward that country. But the main thrust of the debate was to lobby for the de-proscription of the MKO from the UK’s list of terrorist entities.

In reviewing their arguments, those who spoke in favour of the MKO could readily be accused of reading by rote from the MKO’s own propaganda material.

As usual, the MKO’s supporters portrayed it as democratic, defenders of human rights, active inside Iran, non-terrorist and the only opposition group of any note. All of which are easily refutable with evidence already in the public domain.

It appears that the MKO’s supporters in the House of Lords are woefully ignorant as to the true nature of that organisation and in particular its leaders.

However this ignorance is not a unique phenomenon, it is also endemic among the neoconservatives’ of the US Government.

Fortunately some members are not ignorant of the Mojahedin. Lord Phillips of Sudbury was able to bring real knowledge to the debate when he said:

"I should remind those who want to bring back the PMOI, give it support and let it loose that it was harboured, supported and sustained by Saddam Hussein scarcely the most benign of patrons. The idea that we could do that and encourage regime change in a way that will really bring about that for which we devoutly hope a fully democratic Iran in which human rights are fully respected is pie in the sky and a dangerous illusion."

Toward the end of the three hour debate, the MKO’s supporters became desperate for any mention of the MKO. Unwilling to leave Maryam Rajavi empty handed, Lord Taverne interjected:

"My Lords, the time allocated for the noble Lord’s speech is running to an end. I hope that he will not ignore the point made by many speakers about the de-proscription of the PMOI."

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Lord Triesman) replied:

"My Lords, I have not the smallest intention of doing so. I shall turn to that point immediately.

"It is clear that there is a range of concerns, and I hope that that will not turn into uncritical enthusiasm for groups opposed to the Iranian regime, particularly those calling for the repeal of proscription currently in place. The MeK, or the PMOI, now tends to describe itself as a democratic party working for human rights, but there has been a history of involvement in terrorism. I have looked at the balance of the information available. In 2001 there were two armed attacks for which it accepted responsibility. It was accused of a further armed attack in June 2002, about which it has said nothing.

"Let me bring us right up to date. In an interview with the LA Times in February this year, Maryam Rajavi was asked whether the use of violence was a PMOI option now and answered,

"The tactics and methods have been imposed not by us, but by the mullahs".

"Some may say that that is ambiguous rather than direct, but noble Lords have provided interesting information about the new disposition of these groups—as they have described it. I am willing to look at this group in particular. Fundamentally, of course, the whole of the question would need to be put to the review commission, although there are regular reviews. That is in the hands of the group itself. If it has things to say about a non-violent trajectory, that must be the way in which it carries it forward."

Iran-Interlink, February 9, 2006

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199900/ldhansrd/pdvn/lds06/text/60209-04.htm#60209-04_head2

February 13, 2006 0 comments
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Mujahedin Khalq Organization as a terrorist group

Terrorism, Weapon to Achieve Political Goals

There have been reports on MKO’s unofficials stance on renouncing armed struggle strategy. Some time ago, we also heard news on passivism of non-Mojahed members of NCRI. These sign may be related. We even heard that putting NCRI’s name on terror lists has been intensified. Since the NCRI was the only cover for the MKO, they decided to renounce armed struggle to be able to get out of defensive position.

For 24 years, MKO used terrorism as a means for getting to its political aims. They used it as a strategy that had no alternative. During 24 years, they blocked all other opposition groups; they delayed the victory of opposition group for 10 years by following the line of terror and suppression in Iraq.

Mojahedin, in the years when their armed strategy went to its peak, tried to legitimize armed battle through their non-Mojahed members; this was how they used it to serve their political goals.

Whenever they wanted to prove its strength and power, MKO conducted a series of terrorist operations inside Iran; then, they introduced it as their own popular base. This was, in fact, one of their repetitious methods. Many innocent people were killed in these operations of Rajavi, but he used them for his own political aims.

Theblackfile.com

February 13, 2006 0 comments
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