Mujahedin Khalq Organization as a terrorist group

TRC Terrorist Group Profile-MEK

TRC Terrorist Group Profile – Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK or MKO)

This group was formed in the 1960s by the college-educated children of wealthy Iranian merchants. Their purpose in organizing was to counter what they perceived as excessive Western influence in the Shah`s regime and to bring the nation more in line with their philosophical blend of Marxism and Islam. At a point early in the 1970`s, the MEK concluded that violence was the only way to bring about change in Iran. Since then, the MEK has developed into the largest and most active armed Iranian dissident group. Its history is studded with anti-Western and anti-Iranian activity, continuing with recent attacks on the interests of the regime in Iran and abroad. During the 1970s the MEK staged terrorist attacks inside Iran to destabilize and embarrass the Shah`s regime; the group killed several U.S. military personnel and civilians working on defense projects in Tehran.

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human rights watch
Human Rights Abuse in the MEK

No Exit – HRW’s Report

Summary The Mojahedin Khalq Organization (MKO) is an armed Iranian opposition group that was formed in 1965. An urban guerrilla group fighting against the government of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, it was an active participant in the anti-monarchy struggle that resulted in the 1979 Iranian revolution.

After the revolution, the MKO expanded its organizational infrastructure and recruited many new members. However it was excluded from participating in power sharing arrangements, and the new revolutionary government under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini forced it underground after it instigated an armed uprising against the government in June 1981. The majority of its top cadres went into exile in France. In France, the MKO continued its active opposition to Iran’s government. In 1986, under pressure from the French authorities, the MKO relocated to Iraq. There it established a number of military camps under the banner of the National Liberation Army and maintained an armed presence inside Iraq until the fall of Saddam Hussein’s government in 2003.

During the Iran-Iraq war, the MKO fighters made regular incursions into Iranian territory and fought against Iranian government forces. After the end of Iran-Iraq war, the group’s armed activities decreased substantially as Saddam Hussein’s government curtailed the MKO’s ability to launch attacks inside Iranian territory.

The fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in April 2003 put an end to Iraqi financial and logistical support of the MKO. The MKO fighters remained neutral during the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. After the occupation of Iraq, the U.S. military disarmed the MKO fighters and confined them inside their main camp known as Camp Ashraf.2 U.S. military sources told Human Rights Watch that as of March 10, 2005, there were 3,534 MKO members inside Camp Ashraf.3

Some MKO fighters took advantage of an amnesty offer by the Iranian government. Since October 2004, 273 MKO members have returned to Iran.4 The U.S. military has recognized the MKO fighters in Iraq as Protected Persons under the Geneva Conventions.5 Their fate remains uncertain; the Iraqi government and the U.S. military appear not to have reached a decision regarding their future.

During Saddam Hussein’s last year in power, some Iranians held in Abu Ghraib prison were repatriated to Iran in exchange for Iraqi prisoners of war (POWs). These were dissident members of the MKO who had been sent by the organization for “safekeeping” in Abu Ghraib.6 The release of these prisoners in 2002-2003 provided a direct window into conditions inside the MKO camps that was previously inaccessible to the outside world. 

Human Rights Watch interviewed five of these former MKO members who were held in Abu Ghraib prison. Their testimonies, together with testimonies collected from seven other former MKO members, paint a grim picture of how the organization treated its members, particularly those who held dissenting opinions or expressed an intent to leave the organization.

The former MKO members reported abuses ranging from detention and persecution of ordinary members wishing to leave the organization, to lengthy solitary confinements, severe beatings, and torture of dissident members. The MKO held political dissidents in its internal prisons during the 1990s and later turned over many of them to Iraqi authorities, who held them in Abu Ghraib. In one case, Mohammad Hussein Sobhani was held in solitary confinement for eight-and-a-half years inside the MKO camps, from September 1992 to January 2001.

The witnesses reported two cases of deaths under interrogation. Three dissident members—Abbas Sadeghinejad, Ali Ghashghavi, and Alireza Mir Asgari—witnessed the death of a fellow dissident, Parviz Ahmadi, inside their prison cell in Camp Ashraf. Abbas Sadeghinejad told Human Rights Watch that he also witnessed the death of another prisoner, Ghorbanali Torabi, after Torabi was returned from an interrogation session to a prison cell that he shared with Sadeghinejad.

The MKO’s leadership consists of the husband and wife team of Masoud and Maryam Rajavi. Their marriage in 1985 was hailed by the organization as the beginning of a permanent “ideological revolution.”7 Various phases of this “revolution” include: divorce by decree of married couples, regular writings of self-criticism reports, renunciation of sexuality, and absolute mental and physical dedication to the leadership.8 The level of devotion expected of members was in stark display in 2003 when the French police arrested Maryam Rajavi in Paris. In protest, ten MKO members and sympathizers set themselves on fire in various European cities; two of them subsequently died.9 Former members cite the implementation of the “ideological revolution” as a major source of the psychological and physical abuses committed against the group’s members.

At present, the MKO is listed as a terrorist organization by the U.S. State Department and several European governments. The MKO’s leadership is engaged in an extensive campaign aimed at winning support from Western politicians in order to have the designation of a terrorist organization removed.

To view the full report click here

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Mujahedin Khalq Organization as a terrorist group

Current List of Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations as of 2003

3/7/2004

1. Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)

2. Abu Sayyaf Group

3. Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade

4. Armed Islamic Group (GIA)

5. Asbat al-Ansar

6. Aum Shinrikyo

7. Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)

8. Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA)

9. Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group)HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement)

10. Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM)

11. Hizballah (Party of God)

12. Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)

13. Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) (Army of Mohammed)

14. Jemaah Islamiya organization (JI)

15. al-Jihad (Egyptian Islamic Jihad)

16. Kahane Chai (Kach)

17. Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) a.k.a. Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy

18. Congress (KADEK)Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LT) (Army of the Righteous)

19. Lashkar i Jhangvi

20. Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)

21. Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK)

22. National Liberation Army (ELN)

23. Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)

24. Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)

25. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)

26. PFLP-General Command (PFLP-GC)

27. al-Qa’ida

28. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)

29. Revolutionary Nuclei (formerly ELA)

30. Revolutionary Organization 17 November

31. Revolutionary People’s Liberation Army/Front (DHKP/C)Salafist Group for  32. Call and Combat (GSPC)

33. Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso, SL)

34. United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)

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Iran

Alen Cheuvalrias interviewed Mr. Banisadr- Part one

–         How did you become the president of Islamic Republic?

–         As well as Mr. Khomeini, I was exiled in France. In that period, I composed a document which became the official speech of the revolution: in that document, I believed in reconciliating the principal tendencies of that time; the islamists, Marxists and liberals.

–         What do you mean by liberals?

–         I mean the ones who believe in the liberty of economy based on the independence. I arrived in Iran by the time Mr. Khomeini arrived, on February first, 1979. He introduced me as a fighter and defendant against Marxists and Mujahedin and Masud Rajavi. Now I had been changed too much through Iran evolutions, to expand my ideas of liberty. While electing constitutional council, in August, I was elected for the second position, after Mr. Taleqani. In January 1980, the Iranians elected me as the president of Islamic republic of Iran, by 75 percent of the votes.

( I was surprised of the title “Mr.”before the names of religious leaders of Iran. Besides if most of Iranian politicmen enjoy good electoral diaries and Bani Sadr is not an exception, it is due to Mr. Khomeini’s support and Bani Sadr forget to mention that his permanence in regime of Iran, was indebted to Mr. Khomeini’s confirmation. During that period of revolution, most Iranians supported everybody who was exiled by former regime and its rivals. Nobody could being elected by people and receive a high position unless he enjoyed this option. But I don’t want to reconstruct the Iran revolution here.

Since I and all my colleagues , in our profession, enjoy a sort of “journalistic license” to search for the truth and have an advantage of being rude to the highest officials, I questioned the former president of Iran on his personal consideration about his legitimacy and popularity. )

–         Did you have relations with Mujahedin previously?

–         No. it was a long later ,that Masud Rajavi contacted with me. When I arrived in Iran, I suggested him to dispute ideologically but he didn’t accept.

–         Why?

–         I guess he didn’t consider himself enough powerful to defend his ideas or to present a satisfactory dispute.

–         Once, you were the president of Iran, your relation with Imam Khomeini became strained very soon. You also objected with Rajaee the prime minister elected by the parliament. Did you have contacts with MEK before the manifestation of Khordad 30th (June 20th, 1981) and your discharge by the parliament on June 21st?

–         After coup d’etat against the president, I fled to some friend of Mr. Darush Forouhar, the director of the party of Iranian people. There, Masud Rajavi’s messengers came to visit me 

(I couldn’t restrain myself from thinking about Darush Forouhar. In 1995 while my trip to Iran, I had visited him. He was an ardent man, with pointed moustache, who, energetically, defended the national inheritance of his country. In November 1998, he and his wife Parvaneh were assassinated in their house. I missed my mind presence for a few seconds, but Bani Sadr was going on:

–         “A day after the June 28th bombing at Islamic Republic Party, Masud Rajavi’s men returned to me. I told them that I wanted to write a statement to reveal this terrorist action. They assured me that they had no interference in this one.

–         Who talked to you?

–         Maryam Rajavi’s brother, Mahmoud Azdanloo and Abbas Davali, they suggested to take me to one of their secret houses to provide my security. I accepted

(I didn’t say anything. Dispute was useless. But Samad Nazari [one of the defectors of MEK], in Sari, talked about  some relation between MEK and Bani Sadr before his dismissal.)

Bani Sadr continued:

–         I found myself in a one- storey building with four bedrooms and a bathroom. When needed, we used a secret exit to escape. I found out that Ashraf, Rajavi’s wife, was also hiding in that house.

–         You mean his first wife who was killed later?

–         Yes. One day, Rajavi came talked to me. He suggested to leave Iran with him. Firstly, I told him:”I’m the president of Iran and I have duties. If people participate in the next presidential election, I will stay. Otherwise I will leave my country with you.”  On 24th of July, 2.5 million people of the 40 million population, all over Iran voted. Therefore I said to Rajavi :” Now, we can go”. In Paris, after landing at the airport, I told a BBC reporter:” I left Iran to reveal the organized relation between Khomeini and militarism…”

–         Did you ask Rajavi for a guaranty?

–         Before leaving Iran, we signed a contract. It was based on three principals: political pluralism, individuals’ liberty and national independence. I had presented detailed explanation for each of these principals

(While saying these words, the phone range, BaniSadr went out of my sight for a few seconds.

The images of their flee, were parading in front of my eyes. Regarding to his connection with Rajavi, on July 28th, they  were presented in disguise at Tehran military airport. They took refuge in a fuel transport plane which was used for preparation of F14 in Iran Air Force. Clonelle Behzad Moezi was the commander of this section. He was Shah’s private pilot who was degraded by the revolution and he found it despising. The airplane changes its official direction in sky and crossed Iranian border and flew toward France.

      As soon as they arrived, they were granted political refugee status. During  those days, Francois Mitterand was ruling French fate. With no doubt, his wife, Danielle has played a part to make this decision. She was famous for her support of anybody who claimed Marxism. The fleeing ones, under protection of French authorities were settled in ” Auver sur d’Oise”. Rajavi had played his role well. Two days later, he established NCR (National Council of Resistance) of which one of the columns was BaniSadr due to his situation as the former president of Iran. Among the members of the council, there were also some independent personalities who opposed to Khomeini’s regime including Doctor Mansour Farhang, Bahman Niroumand, Mehdi Khan Baba , Doctor Naser Pakdaman. )

I had a question in my mind. when Bani Sadr came back, I asked him: “wasn’t it a risk to leave your country without knowing what is waiting for you and to fall yourself in trouble ?”

(His eyes hesitated behind his glasses. )

–         I had to accept the risk, just like a religious duty. You hope to success but you know the possibility of defeat. I said to Rajavi:”I didn’t sign any contract with Khomeini, because he was a religious leader. He should have undertaken his commitment but he didn’t. About you, I know your ideology is based on achieving power and establishing an absolute system. If you change this ideology for a better direction, freedom is the best direction. Therefore your organization is useful for the democracy in Iran. Otherwise, I will denounce everything.

–         However, you cooperated with him for three years

–         Actually, two years and a few months

–         On March 24, 1973, you separated from him officially. Although your daughter had married Masud. Here, we see the influence of a contract, the same as what was a custom among Feudal masters about their children’s marriage. What was the concept of this marriage?  

–         My daughter, Firouzeh, decided to sign  this contract. I was against due to many reasons. Besides, I don’t believe in mixing politics with personal relationship. I know how Rajavi acts. He talks so much, until he sees his listener, dispensed with his own idea, and tired of challenge, and finally he gets her agreement. At last I explained to my daughter that we would test Masud and we don’t know if he would engage his commitments. My daughter told that she wanted to renew this agreement with Masud. So I had to draw in her horn and respect her independence.

–         When did they get  married?

–         I’m a little confused about the dates. It must be a month before our separation. A few months after his first wife, Ashraf’s death.

I remember that I mentioned this to him, but he said:” Imam Ali got married immediately after his wife, Fatemeh’s death”. There were a few days left to Nowrouz. Therefore it was a short time before March 21st, 1982.

(To find out the dates, Bani Sadr talked to his assistant for a few words . I called the event to my mind. Masud Rajavi left his wife Ashraf Rabiee behind and fled from Iran. She was killed in an armed struggle against Iran security forces, with Musa Khiabani on February 8th , 1982. Musa Khiabani was the chief of Mujahedin in Iran. Masud had recently missed his wife and were planning for a new marriage.)

Bani Sadr resumed talking: You can write the date of the marriage March 1982.

–         When did they divorce?

–         In the late 1984.

–         Why?

–         One night, Firouzeh called me while crying and said :”Masud wants to take me to Iraq with himself. If I don’t go, he will divorce me. What shall I do?” I answered her:” you can decide yourself but if you want to undertake your engagement, you should divorce “. And so she did.

–         So their contacts with Iraq were started a little before their divorce.

–         Not at all. These contacts were much older. Every thing started in the early 1983. The same issue was the reason of our separation. 

Extrated from the book: Burned Alive

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Former members of the MEK

14 MKO Defectors Return Home

After the return of a number of former MKO members from Iraq to Iran during past few months, another group of 14 former MKO veterans- who had been under the supervision and protection of US forces- have returned to their countries with the cooperation of International Red Cross.

When anti-Iranian propagandas of terrorist MKO and other opposition groups faded and these people found the truth, they returned by their own will.

At the time being, Islamic Republic has issued pardon for them and the best and safest way for saving them is Iran.

It’s notable that 250 former members have returned to Iran since February.

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Maryam Rajavi

Maryam Rajavi prosecuted over human rights violations

Former Members Prosecute Rajavi
Former members of Mojahedin-e Khalq organization take action against the leaders of this organization in France.
According to Le Parisien, Massoud Khodabandeh, Karim Haqqi Moni, Massoud Tayebi and Jamshid Tahmasebi-four former members of MKO-have accused MKO leaders of violating human rights and freedoms as well as torturing and endangering the lives of other people.
About their complaint in French Judiciary, Le Parisien wrote: “Maryam Rajavi and her husband allow themselves to interfere in the private lives of the members and break their marital relations.”
This paper notes that these four men were former members of MKO, adding: “The leaders of this organization have issued execution order for Tayebi and Haqqi to prevent them from leaving the organization but they have been able to escape to Europe and get political asylum from Netherlands government.”
According to Le Parisien, Khodabandeh was Rajavi’s bodyguard. When he decided to leave MKO, they injected narcotics into his body and Tahmasebi was under heavy mental tortures.
Le Parisien quotes French security service: “this organization never allowed its members to open an account. It has been listed as a terrorist organization by the US and EU.”

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Former members of the MEK

Memories of Ali Moradi

 Ali Moradi had been a sergeant in the Iranian army at the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war. He was captured early on and spent nine years as a POW in Ramadi camp. He was among a group of Iranian POWs recruited into the Mojahedin shortly after the ceasefire by promises of marriage and  paid work. This is an extract from a longer interview conducted after his return to Iran. After Maryam returned to Iraq in 1997 the Rajavis imposed more radical changes to combat what Maryam called our bourgeois mind-set. Under the new rules, a gender apartheid was introduced so that men and women were physically separated. Now there were only all male units and all female units both of which had 3 or 4 women commanders. All were completely separate. A man and woman were no longer allowed to be alone in the same room. We were not allowed to speak to women unless authorized for work purposes. In the autumn of 2002 when the US stepped up its threats against Iraq, Massoud and Maryam held a meeting for all the combatants. They analyzed that in 2005 the Khatami government would be toppled by a popular uprising and we must ready ourselves for a final operation.

Just about everybody had questions at that point. What would we do if the Americans attack us? The answer came, ‘We will attack Iran’ with everything we have’, said Massoud.

Now I have to say that most members don’t actually expect to die, but Massoud Rajavi boasted that we would go like Ashura (marking the martyrdom of Imam Hossein with his followers). This was the Black Phase and it was clearly a suicide mission for the whole organization.

The next news we had from the leadership was that Mohammad Mohaddessin had written to the UK Foreign Office and the US Department of State and had announced our neutrality.

In another meeting, Rajavi read a message to us which said that the US and UK had agreed not to attack our camps. Within a month two of our camps had been attacked by the coalition forces and around fifty combatants had been killed. According to Rajavi’s orders the NLA should now launch its final all-out attack on Iran. But they did not move. Most people, I can say 95% of people felt devastated then. Everyone had the same thoughts in their minds. ‘I gave my life to this struggle, what has happened to my aims now?’

Worse was to come when Hossein Abrishamchi, (brother of Mehdi Abrishamchi who is subject to the French judicial investigation into the MEK’s terrorist activities in France) and Mojgan Parsii (nominal head of the MEK in Iraq) negotiated first a ceasefire then total disarmament with General Ordinero of the US army. Within a week the MEK’s armour and weapons was collected and the US surrounded Camp Ashraf to where all the MEK’s combatants were rounded up and sent. (A cache of weapons had been hidden by the MEK, but US air forces soon discovered it.) Again, the combatants felt devastated. Everyone began questioning what had happened to the organization, what was the future, what about the aims I had given my life to, what about the overthrow of the regime. Remember too that at this point we still had no idea that around 250 leading members had escaped Iraq and fled to Europe, including Maryam Rajavi.

In the chaos which followed the US and coalition invasion of Iraq, the combatants enjoyed a little freedom, and we began to talk and discuss the event and the possible outcome for the organization. After the American forces rounded everyone up into Camp Ashraf they began to interview everyone. The first interview was to establish the name, origin and other basic information so that an ID card could be issued. The second interviews were held to collect DNA information from each resident of the camp. The third interviews were held by representatives of the US Department of State. They were asking everyone for information. One thing that we were asked in every interview was ‘where is Massoud Rajavi’, it was a question for all of us as much as for the Americans. In the third interview we were asked where we would like to go once we left Iraq. The MEK had told everyone to answer that they want to stay in Iraq, but most people disregarded this and insisted they wanted to go to another country. The MEK had told everyone that if you go to Iran they will torture you and hang you and that you can’t go to Europe because they won’t accept you. In spite of this, during the first interviews around 115 asked directly for help from the US forces to get out of the camp. These were taken to the North of the camp where the US army had it barracks.

To date, over 600 MEK resident of Camp Ashraf have taken refuge with the US forces in the North camp. From these, over 250 have been repatriated to Iran and the others remain. The only reason it had been possible for these people to escape to the North camp was because MEK commanders do not have guns and cannot stop them.

People want to leave, but they are afraid of the unknown. They don’t have any real information. No one has told them where they can go, that they have alternatives. The Mojahedin told us that it would not allow the Red Cross to visit our camp.

Hossein Madani told me personally that ‘we have tried everything we can, including lobbying them intensively in Switzerland, so they will not come to our camp’. It was a deliberate policy to prevent people from asking to leave. But I had a PoW card from the Red Cross, so I was able to go to the North camp and ask for refuge with the Americans. I had nothing left to keep me there. I had no family, I had lost my aims, and worst of all was the deception of the MKO which I could now clearly see.

I would say that right now around sixty to eighty percent of the people in the camp are dissatisfied and would leave if they could. The conditions inside Camp Ashraf are really severe. The control over the members has become even more rigid after the protected persons status was given.

You are not allowed to talk to one another. If two people get together and start talking, suddenly someone will pop up and start interrogating them and accusing them, ‘what are you talking about, you are undermining the leader …’ There is no news from the outside world. We have no real information and now I know that all the news they gave us about Iran is wrong. I mean ALL of it. In the camp if anyone expresses any questions about anything they are taken into a group of about twenty people who talk to that one person to convince them. They have confiscated everyone’s documents too to make it hard to get out. The US army haven’t been very helpful either. In the north camp they told us they had to make sure people wouldn’t be a terrorist threat if they go to Europe, but how do you want to prove that. But people still escape, and the MKO commanders have no guns so they can’t stop them. I know several of the top people have run away; Said Jamali, Khalil Ramazanpour and Alireza Ahad are all in the North camp. Davoud Baghervand came back with my group and is now in Iran.

I think that everyone in the MKO has questions about their future, even the leaders. Many want to leave but they have nowhere to go. Around 80% of those who had the courage to leave did so after they had been visited by their families. That’s why the MKO is so afraid to let the families in the camp.

When it comes to the point that they can’t deny a family visit, they take you aside and

have an intensive meeting to prepare you. I met with Fereshte Yegahni for one and a half hours before a visit from my brother. She told me, ‘your brother will tell you lies. The Iranian government has sent him. Be very careful as this is a political activity by the regime. Don’t see him as your brother, you must believe that you are talking to the regime. Don’t cry, and don’t let him persuade you to leave.’ This was unacceptable to me. I saw my brother and shortly after that

meeting I went to the North camp, determined to get home. I wrote to Colonel Georgis and the Red Cross and told them I want to leave and go back to Iran. Conditions in the North camp are very difficult, they gave us non-halal meat, pig meat, and there is no air conditioning. In every twenty four hours we have to line up five times on parade. We weren’t able to have contact with our families because the Americans told us that letters would be censored by the country receiving them, which in our case was Iran, so people were afraid to write, though we did get letters. When I finally got to go home I remember looking down from the airplane window as we took off, at the flat ground of Iraq. When we flew over the border and I saw the mountains of Iran with the snow on them, I was so happy I just wanted to jump

straight out of the plane and land in the snow of my homeland. At the airport in Tehran I expected hostility, but people came forward to greet us and welcomed us warmly. For two days I was really fearful. I thought this had just been for propaganda. But as the kindness continued for five and six days, only then did I believe it. I am now home with my  family. I have had no problems since I came back to Iran. They have tried to help us here as much as possible. But in the end I have wasted years of my life with that organization. I have no wife, no children, I have no job and no wealth.

I have nothing. And now I know I lost all my life for the selfish ambition of one man. When I was in Camp Ashraf everyone in the camp was asking the same question ‘Where is Massoud Rajavi?’ The last time I saw him was the day before the US invasion of Iraq. He has not been seen or heard from since that time. That’s over two years. For his followers at all levels of the MEK hierarchy, this has become the major issue. When anyone asks, Rajavi’s commanders say it’s for security reasons. But no one accepts that. A leader should be at the front of his forces, not run away at the first sign of danger. Rajavi always boasted ‘I am the leader and I am the first in line for sacrifice’. But the combatants are now comparing him with Sattar Khan, Mirza Kuchik Khan, Mousa Khiabani and other rebel leaders who died fighting alongside their forces. Rajavi’s commanders say his disappearance is for security reasons, but no one has

 

 

 

any doubt that Rajavi has just run away to save his own skin. People in the camp feel totally betrayed. This has been the worst betrayal, no one can trust anything anymore. Morale is so low in the camp that that even if Rajavi should reappear before them tomorrow, the vast majority of forces in Ashraf Camp will refuse to follow him. Everyone now has questions only about their own future.

Our forces returned to the garrison and were disarmed. The US forces freed the people of Iraq and for a while we kind of felt saved too. The atmosphere in the camp opened up a little and we had some freedom. At this time a lot of people abandoned the garrison and went to the US camp and didn’t return.

Soon after the disarmament the organization closed the atmosphere again.

Even though they didn’t have guns, the commanders kept the organization intact using Rajavi’s methods of fear and intimidation. We all saw how we had lost everything, our whole struggle had come to nothing and morale was very low.

The most important thing that happened during these two years has been the visits of families. The organization was severely opposed to contact with our families. Even a phone call was not allowed. I tricked them and said I would ring my family and ask for money – the organization is always desperate to get money. I called my brother and he  convinced me to come home. The organization described the family visits as an emotional war. They said our families had been sent by the regime to destroy us. They told us the Iranian Intelligence Ministry had motivated our families to come to Iraq. For this reason, many people were afraid to speak to their own families.

One of the things that gave us courage to leave and go to the American camp was that we had been given recognition

as people. I’m not talking about the protected persons status, I mean that the Americans interviewed us and wrote down our names and gave us an identity. Now we could not just disappear. In the beginning the Americans were not good with us, but after the protected persons status their relations with us improved. When we went for interviews the MKO told us, ‘don’t tell the US that you want to leave, defend the MKO in front of the Americans.’ But in our hearts we all wanted to leave. A month after the protected persons status was granted, the MKO set about destroying all its documents. Particularly those relating to the relations with the Iraqis and with the US. We destroyed all our military schedules and destroyed the books and songs which were against the USA.

 

 

 

More than anything else, Massoud Rajavi’s disappearance destroyed morale in the organization. We were all thinking that if he’s the leader why has he left. We felt betrayed. We watched the video of Ebrahim Zakeri’s [Rajavi’s former head of MKO intelligence] funeral in Paris. We showed no reaction, but in our hearts we were all stunned to see the organization’s top people all there in Paris. They had all run away.

Rumours started that Massoud must also be hiding in Europe. No one knew what to think, but no one dared discuss it. Only, everyone knows in all our hearts that the organization is finished. When the families started coming to visit, the MKO told us they are the representatives of imperialism and we must destroy them. The families became our new enemy rather than the Islamic Republic. They told us stories about the US camp. They said the Americans had killed two of our people and thrown the bodies away. They said they would make us immoral if we went there. People stay because of this. And because they don’t have any place to go. The Americans said we had four options, to stay in Iraq, to go to Iran, to apply for asylum in another country or to leave through international organizations.

We were always asking, ‘where are the international organizations, where is the Red Cross?’ But the MKO wouldn’t let them come into the camp. They told us we have to stay there. They tried to make the members forget about the other three options.

Even so, the men have the courage to escape now the leaders don’t have guns. They can apply to leave and go to the north camp. But the situation for women is desperate beyond description. In the time I was there I only saw three women who had dared to come to the north camp. That’s out of over six hundred people. What they told us was really shocking. Even these women who escaped did so believing that they would be raped by the Americans when they got to the north camp. That’s how bad things are. The younger women are controlled by the older women and they are under observation all the time. There is strict gender separation in Camp Ashraf. Men and women are not allowed to speak to one another. They have separate vehicles. Let me tell you how absurd and at the same time shocking this is.

When they want to put petrol in their vehicles the men and women have separate times. The men go between 8 and 9 am. Then there is a gap of twenty minutes before the women can visit the petrol pumps from 9.20 to 10.20 am. The  reason for the gap is so there is absolutely no possibility that men and women meet one another at the station. That is how the situation is.

The Mojahedin really has two faces. In spite of all their external propaganda, the situation of women in the organization is really worse than anything you can imagine. I saw Maryam Rajavi in the last Women’s Day celebration. She released a symbolic white dove. In my mind when I imagine her, I see this dove in one hand and her other hand is like a claw grasping my neck and viciously strangling me. In the end, Rajavi crossed the boundary and tortured his own people. He killed and tortured his own people and he exploited women. I can never forgive him for this.

 Survivors’ Report  May 2005

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Mujahedin Khalq 's Function

Faded hopes for Iranian exiles

Engulfed by various crises, and reeling from a Human Rights Watch report that branded it a serious abuser of human rights, the Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MEK) still insists on touting itself as a credible alternative to the ruling political system in Iran. Its relentless propaganda notwithstanding, there is now every sign that the MEK will disintegrate some time in the next five years.

For the past two decades the MEK had based its strategy on a carefully constructed three-tier approach encompassing a political coalition (in the form of the National Council of Resistance), a disciplined political organization at the heart of this coalition (ie, the MEK) and an armed force in Iraq (the so-called National Liberation Army). But rather than reflecting actual capabilities, this three-tier strategy was essentially propaganda and designed to consolidate the MEK’s position as the leading enemy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This illusion worked well just as long as Saddam Hussein remained in power in Iraq. It is for good reason then that MEK observers identified the March 2003 US invasion as the biggest strategic setback in the organization’s 40-year history.

The contention here is straightforward: deprived of its armed wing and its ideological leader, unable to organize effectively in the West due to its terrorist designation and with events in Iran developing on a trajectory that is least favorable to MEK designs (the big turnout in last Friday’s presidential election is one example of this), the MEK is faced with several fundamental crises that it cannot overcome. The only realistic scenario (and indeed solution as far as some of the more progressive forces in the MEK are concerned) is the dissolution of the organization as presently conceived.

The ‘third’ way

Since the ouster of Saddam, the MEK has discovered "peaceful" politics. Previously insistent that the only roadmap to regime change in Iran was through an invasion of the country by its 3,000-strong force based in Camp Ashraf, in Iraq’s Diyala province, the MEK had to revise this overly ambitious strategy after its forces capitulated to the American military and surrendered their arms.

The MEK’s "third" way is refreshingly simple to the point of bewilderment. The only effective way of forcing change in Iran, according to the organization’s spokesmen, is neither through war and an American invasion, nor compromising with the Islamic republic, but in empowering the Iranian opposition (ie, the MEK).

There are several fundamental problems with this reductive argument, not least because an American "war" against Iran is unlikely, and what the MEK terms "compromise" with the ruling regime is mired in ambiguity. Aside from this basic observation, the whole notion that the MEK can affect anything in Iran (let alone overthrow the Islamic republic) is no longer taken seriously by anyone. MEK spokesmen claim that if the organization was removed from US State Department and European Union terrorism lists, it would be in a position to effectively challenge the ruling regime. The problem with this argument is that before 1997 the MEK was not only not on any terrorist lists, but it also enjoyed the whole-hearted support of Saddam and could use Iraqi territory as it wished, and even in those highly favorable circumstances it could not advance its agenda even by a millimeter.

To advance this latest "third" way approach, the MEK has made some minor and cosmetic changes to its organization and tactics. Most importantly, the organization has resorted to establishing pressure groups and consultancies in North America. These organizations are run by veteran MEK members, and their primary function is to establish and manage relations with neo-conservative organizations and interests in the US.

The heads of these effectively fake organizations also contribute opinion pieces to sympathetic US dailies and publications, promoting the "third" way and the so-called Iranian resistance. Arguably the most well-known consultancy is Near East Policy Research Inc, which, according to a website that investigates MEK lobbying in the US [1], was established in May 2003 by Ali Safavi, a well-known and veteran MEK member. Another well-known MEK member, Ali Reza Jaafarzadeh (who was previously the MEK’s official representative in the US) is currently working for the Fox News network as a Middle East analyst.

This latest MEK initiative has all the trappings of the MEK’s previous ambitious and failed programs and is unlikely to amount to anything in the long term. Its biggest success so far has been to mobilize neo-conservative support for the "third" way. At the forefront of this support is the Iran Policy Committee (IPC), an organization made up mostly of retired military officers with impeccable neo-conservative credentials. The IPC published a white paper, outlining US policy options for Iran, in February. Although mostly a clumsy report written by non-experts, this white paper was remarkable for its whole-hearted support of the MEK.

The best way to understand the MEK’s "third" way is to place it in a continuum of failed strategies in the past. The MEK’s "first" way of gaining power in post-revolutionary Iran was to start a serious terrorist campaign in June 1981. The leaders of the organization had grossly overestimated their strength and conversely underestimated the determination of the Islamic republic to put down armed challenges. The result was the complete elimination of the MEK network inside Iran, to the extent that by late 1983 the MEK had no serious presence in the country. The failure of this "first" way led to desperate measures, which culminated in an alliance with Saddam, the invader of Iran.

The MEK’s entry into Iraq led to the creation of a conventional, albeit very small, armed force along the Iran-Iraq border. The "second" way envisioned capturing power through an invasion of Iran backed by Iraqi air cover. This crazy strategy was taken to its mindless extreme in July 1988, when the MEK army launched operation "eternal light" and invaded Iran from the central border regions. Not surprisingly, the small MEK force was destroyed by Iranian forces after the Iraqis backed off from providing prolonged air cover. The MEK admitted losing more than 1,200 fighters in the operation, but the true figure was nearer to 2,000.

The end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988 might have heralded the end of the "second" way had it not been for Saddam’s wish to keep the MEK both as a strategic trump card against Iran and an internal security tool within Iraq. This ensured that the strategy of toppling the Islamic republic through an armed invasion was not abandoned, until the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003 put an end to the MEK’s tried, tested and failed plans. This paved the way for the concoction of a "third" – and most probably final – MEK strategy of overthrowing the post-revolutionary order in Iran.

An organization in crisis

The MEK knows better than anyone else that the "third" way is a non-starter. Firstly, the organization has no presence inside Iran and little credibility with Iranians outside the country. At best, the organization is simply dismissed as decrepit and irrelevant, while a majority of Iranians regard its members as eccentric traitors who fought alongside their enemies in the Iran-Iraq war. The MEK also knows better than anyone else that it cannot gain recognition from the US government. It is not just because the MEK is the only Iranian organization that has murdered Americans and publicly boasted about it, but also because the US government is well aware of the checkered history, authoritarianism, limitations and hopeless future of this quixotic organization.

The MEK’s "third" way is simply a tactic to buy time and prepare the organization psychologically for the inevitable expulsion of its remaining members from Iraq. In the final scheme of things, the "third" way is designed to prevent the organization from disintegrating, but it is unlikely to work.

Essentially, four factors drive the dynamics of organizational disintegration. First and foremost the loss of its armed wing and the effective end of the "armed struggle" is profoundly unsettling for the MEK. The entire organizational ethos and world view of the MEK revolves around "armed struggle" and the romanticism and cult of martyrdom that surrounds it. All its slogans, insignia, flags and imagery are woven around this theme. Indeed, one of the main reasons that the MEK came into conflict with the Islamic republic was the organization’s insistence that it maintain its own armed militia in the country. Moreover, the whole-hearted and obsessive attachment to political violence was a factor in the US State Department’s decision to add and maintain the MEK on its terrorist list.

Secondly, the disappearance of Massoud Rajavi, the ideological and spiritual leader of the MEK, deprives the organization of effective long-term leadership. Rajavi went into hiding the very day that Saddam abandoned Baghdad to American invaders, and not a word has been heard from him since. Whether or not he physically survives in the decisive months and years ahead is beside the point, for the fact is that he is now politically dead and cannot be revived.

As critics of the organization have been quick to point out, any leader who decides to go into hiding at a time when his organization is experiencing its most stressful period since its inception cannot expect to be rehabilitated. Rajavi has gone into hiding for good reasons, since the disasters that have engulfed the MEK in recent years have largely been a result of his decisions and style of leadership. But Rajavi’s incompetent leadership notwithstanding, his loss is a big blow to the organization. Above all else it completely undermines its elaborate and complex ideology. To put it simply, the MEK believes that it is at the forefront of human evolution, and that its ideological leader, Rajavi, stands at the very peak of historical evolution. The fatal damage that the loss of this so-called ideological leader inflicts on the MEK’s eccentric world view is self-evident.

Thirdly, the MEK cannot resettle effectively in the West. The group’s highly centralized and disciplined organization means that it needs a discrete territorial base from which to operate. The vast Ashraf camp in Iraq’s Diyala province was ideal for the MEK and its loss cannot be over-estimated. Following the downfall of Saddam, the MEK tried to relocate most of its people and resources to its European headquarters in the Parisian suburb of Auvers-Sur-Oise, but these plans were foiled on June 17, 2003, when French counterterrorism agents stormed into the sleepy village and detained more than 165 MEK members, including Maryam Rajavi.

Finally, political developments inside Iran have made it increasingly difficult for even the most hardcore of MEK members to believe that regime change is a realistic scenario. The MEK has consistently misread political developments in Iran for the past quarter century, partly because it has not had a presence inside the country. For instance, Rajavi, the disappeared ideological leader, was for three years telling his organization that the Islamic republic would collapse before the end of Mohammad Khatami’s first term as president in June 2001. This wildly optimistic assessment turned out to be yet another example of wishful thinking on the part of the overly pretentious Rajavi.

This month’s closely contested presidential election and the surprises it has thrown up – Mahmud Ahmadinejad – indicates, first and foremost, that the reformist discourse of making major changes to the country’s political institutions has been eclipsed by more parochial and practical concerns with social justice and the nature and scope of economic development. Therefore, if the reformist program (which is inherently loyal to the Islamic republic and seeks to gradually reform it from within) is increasingly dismissed as irrelevant, groups that advocate the overthrow of the Islamic republic in its entirety are clearly beyond the pale as far as the vast majority of Iranians are concerned.

The factors outlined above encompass core features of the MEK and go to the very heart of this organization as a coherent and viable entity. The fact that all these characteristics have not just been undermined, but simply eliminated from the equation, speaks volumes about the existential crisis that has engulfed the MEK. In fact, there are already signs that the organization’s remarkable discipline is breaking down. Sources inside the British, Dutch and Canadian sections of the MEK speak of a sharp decline in the morale of supporters and a tendency by some peripheral elements in the organization to speak to other Iranian organizations. A few years ago, this would have been unthinkable, since the MEK bans any interaction with members of groups and organizations that are not under its influence.

In the event of disintegration, at least two distinct groups will emerge from the carcass of the MEK. Veteran member Mehdi Abrishamchi (long considered Massoud Rajavi’s right-hand man and the former husband of Maryam Rajavi, who divorced her so Massoud could launch his so-called ideological revolution) will most likely emerge as a leader of a breakaway faction. Abrishamchi will likely attract those MEK elements who want to go back to the roots of their organization, before Massoud Rajavi transformed them into an isolated cult. Veteran member Mohsen Rezai (better known as "Habib") might constitute another pole of leadership. Known as a pragmatist and realist, Rezai could attract the more talented members of the organization, especially those who currently perform political and diplomatic tasks. Maryam Rajavi is unlikely to emerge as a leader of any sorts since she derives all her legitimacy from Massoud. One of the arrangements that followed the MEK’s ideological revolution in 1985 was that Massoud would be the "ideology" while Maryam would perform executive tasks.

The above scenario is clearly speculative, but in all likelihood factions motivated by the aforementioned agendas will emerge from the carcass of the MEK. The point to be made is that the MEK – despite all its faults – has 40 years of history behind it and to expect it to disappear entirely is unrealistic. Although the MEK is the oldest Iranian political group of modern times, the disintegration of the organization in its current form has been long overdue. Various factors have converged to ensure its survival to this point, of which the most important was the patronage of Saddam. And in the final analysis, whatever emerges from the carcass of the MEK, the greatest legacy of its demise will be the final and definitive repudiation of terrorism as a legitimate tool in Iranian politics.

Mahan Abedin  –  June 29, 2005

"Mahan Abedin is the editor of Terrorism Monitor, which is published by the Jamestown Foundation, a non-profit organization specializing in research and analysis on conflict and instability in Eurasia. The views expressed here are his own."

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