Following the MEK-run rally in front of the UN, Mike Pompeo claimed that “The Iranian diaspora protest on behalf of their captive brethren inside Iran”. He promoted the MEK as “The Iranian diaspora” while the group has hardly ever public base among Iranians.
The alignment of high-ranking Western political figures, such as former U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, with the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) presents a complex geopolitical paradox. On one hand, the MEK has historically possessed a deeply contested domestic standing inside Iran, largely stemming from its alignment with Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War and its rigid internal structure characterized by scholars and journalists as a cult of personality centered on leaders Massoud and Maryam Rajavi. On the other hand, it has been able to cultivate a network of prominent bipartisan American and European politicians who advocate for its cause as a viable democratic alternative to the government in Tehran.
To understand why figures like Mike Pompeo endorse the MEK despite its widely recognized lack of a grassroots public base within contemporary Iran, one must examine the convergence of aggressive anti-Iran advocacy, intelligence-sharing networks, lobbying dynamics, and a shared strategic objective centered on regime change.
Scholars of international relations and Middle Eastern politics note that the phenomenon of Western politicians supporting the MEK is largely driven by a policy vacuum regarding Iran. In authoritative geopolitical analyses, such as those found in modern political science literature examining U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, the prevailing bipartisan consensus in Washington DC following the 1979 Iranian Revolution has been the containment or ultimate overthrow of the Islamic Republic. However, successive U.S. administrations have struggled to find a unified, organized domestic opposition inside Iran capable of executing a successful transition of power.
The MEK, operating through its political wing, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), has spent decades presenting itself as the most disciplined, structured, and ready-to-govern alternative to Islamic Republic. For hawks advocating a “maximum pressure” strategy, the MEK’s polished apparatus under pro-democracy gestures offers an accessible interlocutor that speaks the language of Western liberal democracy in its public PR campaigns, regardless of its internal dictatorship under the rule of Massoud Rajavi or its violent past.[3]
Furthermore, the relationship is heavily sustained by political lobbying and financial payment. Investigative journalism and academic studies have extensively documented that prominent American figures—ranging from former mayors and retired generals to former cabinet secretaries like Mike Pompeo, Rudy Giuliani, and John Bolton—have received substantial speaking fees to attend MEK rallies in Paris, Brussels, and Washington.
While these politicians frequently frame their support around universal values of human rights, democracy, and freedom for the Iranian people, the financial incentives and the high-visibility platform provided by the NCRI create a mutually beneficial arrangement. The MEK gains invaluable political legitimacy, mainstream media visibility, and proximity to the levers of Western power, while participating politicians signal their hawkish credentials to domestic diaspora communities.
Another critical dimension is intelligence cooperation and geopolitical utility. During the height of the Cold War and the post-9/11 era, exile opposition groups frequently served as conduits for intelligence regarding target states. Although the MEK was removed from the U.S. State Department’s Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list in 2012 following an intense legal and lobbying campaign, its historical intelligence networks regarding Iran’s clandestine nuclear program and military infrastructure have historically attracted security-minded officials.[5] For the U.S., and Israel, any group committed to the violent or structural collapse of Iranian government can be viewed as a tactical asset, irrespective of its domestic popularity poll numbers inside Iran.
Finally, the rhetoric employed by figures like Mike Pompeo—framing the MEK or its affiliated diaspora gatherings as the voice of the Iranian populace—often reflects the insular nature of exile politics. Diaspora communities in the West can sometimes present monolithic desires, which political figures eager for a straightforward narrative readily amplify. Consequently, the endorsement of the MEK is less about a rigorous sociological assessment of the group’s popularity inside Iran, and more about employing a readily available, aggressive instrument designed to maintain maximum pressure on Iran.
Mazda Parsi