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Why Mojahedin Shun Manifesting Contents of Its Ideological Revolution? (1)

The ideological revolution within MKO seems to be the organization’s greatest theoretical and political approach to the time. Of its great importance, Mojahedin believe that it is hardly possible to grasp all aspects and merits of this internal revolution even years after its nascence. In their opinion,

the change is considered to be the lost-ring of Mojahedin through its four-decade long initiation. Talking of its importance, Mehdi Abrishamchi states:

If you see that we could advance to this standing, before being the outcome of political tactics and vigilance, organizational or military potentialities, or anything else, it refers to the main chapters of the ideological choices all adopted under the leadership of Massoud. [1]

Also, in accentuating the importance of the ideological revolution he adds:

The ideological issue is the issue of existence of a revolutionary organization, that of being or not to be. If in the theological philosophy of the theologians the issue of God is the crux of existence, for a revolutionary organization, too, the issue of ideology is a matter of existence. The existence of an organization and its how-to be is sourced out of its ideology. [2]

It should be added that MKO and its insiders’ emphasis on the importance of the ideological revolution is cantered on internal relations. So far, none of the internal meetings of the organization discussing the revolution’s paragraphs has ever been revealed for the world outside. Also, Mojahedin never publicize reports on the ideological divorces which is the main key into such an internal change. On inevitable occasions, Mojahedin equivocally consent to such an ideological phenomenon but advert it to be the outcome of the insiders’ individual will rather than an organizational command.

Ali Safavi, a political member of MKO who has registered to set himself afire at the order of Massoud Rajavi the leader of the organization, in a documentary made by BBC on MKO claims that the propaganda over the ideological revolution is a product of the Islamic Republic’s propaganda machine. But, in response to the reporter’s question that if the insiders were obliged to divorce says:

– Never, each member of Mojahedin on his own will decided to relinquish the marriage life, of course, the married ones.

In response to the question that if all decided to divorce their wife he says:

– Yes, all of them.

The reporter amazed by such answers asked:

– Donâ€™t you think that it is illogical that hundreds of members on their own will decide to divorce their wives?

And Ali Safavi says definitely:

– No, not at all. [3]

He meant to say it was logical altogether. The double-edged answers indicate that Mojahedin dodge to mirror information on their claimed historical and ruling change. The question is why Mojahedin shun delineating the principles and contents of such a great revolution that they believe to be the securer of the organization’s existence.

The media generally function for any establishment to implant its thought and political approaches. In other words, they are potential means at the service of the political organizations to recruit new members. There is a question here that why Mojahedin, in spite of getting advantage of this potentiality, withhold its application to transmit their greatest political and ideological approach? No doubt, political organizations for some security measures stop communicating some of their internal information to the world. Can it be also the same with MKO that considers its ideological revolution as the no-pass red line? If so, then it can no longer be considered an internal and ideological evolution because it can never turn into the red lines.

From its very initiation, any reference to the ideological revolution outside of the organization is limited to the title with no further explanation. Really, why the organization refuses to unveil it for the world? Regardless of any viewpoint considering the contents of the ideological revolution, its very cover up is the them for the discussion, an occurrence that concerns the destiny of Mojahedin and , in some respects, that of the coming generation.

Notes

[1]. Mehdi Abrishamchi’s speech on the ideological revolution within the organization made for a community of sympathizers in France. Published in 1995, Taleqani Publications, pp. 24-25.

[2]. Ibid, 18.

[3]. BBC interview with Ali Safavi on MKO.

Mojahedin.ws – Bahar Irani – March 23, 2007

April 3, 2007 0 comments

Mujahedin Khalq Organization

The Mujahideen-e Khalq: From Revolutionaries to Terrorists

On Mehr 5, 1360 (September 27, 1981), Tehran experienced one of the most devastating and organized terrorist acts in its modern history. This calculated attack was orchestrated by the Mujahideen-e Khalq (MEK), a militant group that once claimed to fight for the freedom of the Iranian people but had turned its back on the very principles it proclaimed to uphold. The incident was marked by chaos, bloodshed, and violence, as the MEK armed forces executed a coordinated assault in the heart of Iran’s capital, wreaking havoc across several key areas of the city, including the streets of Taleghani, Vali Asr, Jumhuri, and around Hafez Bridge.

This article delves deep into the terrorist attack of Mehr 5, 1360, the implications of this act of violence, and the broader political and historical context surrounding it. By analyzing the causes, the nature of the attack, and its aftermath, we will uncover how this tragic event shaped the Iranian political landscape and revealed the true face of the MEK’s terror-driven agenda.

The Mujahideen-e Khalq Organization (MEK) was initially established in the 1960s as a Marxist-Islamist opposition group against the Pahlavi regime, aiming to overthrow the Shah of Iran. During the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the MEK was part of the broader revolutionary movement that played a significant role in the ousting of the Shah. However, despite their initial alignment with the revolutionaries, the group quickly became disillusioned with the direction the new Islamic Republic of Iran was taking under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini

The Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK), also known as the People’s Mujahedin of Iran, is an organization that has been involved in various activities in Iran since its founding in the 1960s. Originally formed as an Islamic and leftist group opposing the Shah’s regime, the MEK has since taken on multiple roles, including that of a dissident group and a designated terrorist organization by some countries, especially in the United States and Iran. In examining the MEK’s activities, it becomes clear that their operations are characterized by a series of political, militant, and terrorist actions aimed at destabilizing the Iranian government.

Initially, the MEK was involved in various protests against the Shah and sought an eclectic ideology that blended Marxist and Islamic principles. After the Islamic Revolution in 1979, the group initially welcomed the political changes but quickly found itself at odds with the new regime led by Ayatollah Khomeini. This shift led to a violent suppression of the MEK, resulting in thousands of their members being arrested, imprisoned, or executed. In response, the MEK adopted a more militant stance and conducted attacks against government officials and security forces.

Throughout the 1980s, the MEK intensified its militant activities, including acts of terrorism within Iran. The group was responsible for numerous assassinations targeting Iranian officials, marking a significant chapter in the narrative of violence associated with dissident movements in the region. The MEK’s strategic decision to resort to violence stemmed from the perception that peaceful protest would not yield any results under a repressive regime. As a result, their operations became increasingly radicalized, culminating in a series of high-profile attacks.

The MEK’s most notorious operation in the 1980s was Operation Eternal Light in 1988, which aimed to overthrow the Iranian government. This operation was disastrous for the MEK, leading to significant casualties and a loss of military capability. Following that operation, the group regrouped and moved its base to Iraq, where it received support from Saddam Hussein’s regime. This relocation marked a turning point in the MEK’s history, as it became a tool of the Iraqi government against Iran during the Iran-Iraq War.

By stationing itself in Iraq, the MEK operated in a state of limbo, engaged in military operations against Iran while simultaneously enduring internal struggles regarding its ideological direction and leadership. The MEK established a quasi-military structure in Iraq, enabling it to launch cross-border attacks into Iran. This military aspect solidified its reputation as a terrorist organization among government officials in Iran, who accused it of receiving foreign backing for its activities.
As the international landscape evolved, the MEK found itself increasingly isolated. Although it had once enjoyed some support from Western nations during the Cold War as a counterforce to the Islamic Republic, post-9/11 geopolitics shifted dramatically against groups that were perceived as terrorist organizations. The MEK’s operatives were involved in assassinations and bombings, reinforcing their designation as a terrorist group by Iran and partly contributing to their complex relationship with nations like the United States and European countries.

The U.S. State Department designated the MEK as a terrorist organization in 1997, a label that significantly impacted its ability to operate internationally. However, the designation did not stop the MEK from engaging in various forms of activism, including lobbying and public relations efforts aimed at rehabilitating its image. The group claimed to pursue a peaceful transition to democracy in Iran while simultaneously continuing its militant agenda. Over the years, various high-profile politicians and former officials have endorsed the MEK, creating a controversial discourse surrounding its place in Iranian opposition politics.

The MEK has also been implicated in numerous human rights violations and was often criticized for its authoritarian internal governance. Reports have highlighted the cult-like nature of its structures, with strict regulations governing members’ lives and loyalty to the organization’s leadership, particularly to its founder, Massoud Rajavi. The group’s insistence on loyalty above all else effectively stifled dissent within its ranks, further breeding a toxic environment that has led to accusations of brainwashing and coercion.

In recent years, the MEK has sought to reestablish itself as a legitimate opposition force against the Iranian regime. It has aimed to attract a younger demographic within Iran by highlighting its historical opposition to the regime and presenting itself as a pro-democracy alternative. The organization has utilized social media and modern communication platforms to disseminate its message, trying to present a more palatable image to both the Iranian people and the international community.

Despite its efforts to rehabilitate its image, the MEK remains controversial. Many in Iran view it with disdain, largely due to its history of collaboration with Saddam Hussein and its designation as a terrorist organization. Furthermore, the group’s actions have often been perceived as serving foreign interests rather than the genuine aspirations of the Iranian population. This perception complicates its position and raises questions about its legitimacy as a resistance movement.

The MEK’s funding and resource acquisition strategies have also raised eyebrows. It has been reported that the group has relied on donations from sympathizers, affluent expatriates, and even some foreign governments. However, its reliance on external support has led to allegations that it operates more as a mercenary force than a dedicated political movement, undermining its claims of being a unifying force for democratic change in Iran.

As the Iranian regime continues to face challenges, including widespread discontent among the populace over economic and social issues, the MEK’s activities are likely to be scrutinized more closely. The group may attempt to exploit any civil unrest as an opportunity to reassert itself. However, its long history of violence and terrorism makes it a contentious figure in any discourse about Iranian political change.

The situation is further complicated by geopolitical factors, including tensions between Iran and the United States, as well as regional challenges. As long as these tensions persist, the MEK may continue to position itself as a viable option for external intervention, but it risks remaining a marginal player due to its controversial legacy and the heavy baggage of its past.

In summary, the narrative surrounding the MEK is complex and multifaceted. Its evolution from a revolutionary movement to a designated terrorist organization illustrates the shifting dynamics of Iranian politics and the unresolved tensions that persist within the country. The MEK’s historical context and its current activities can serve as a lens through which one can understand broader themes of dissent, authoritarianism, and the quest for identity in contemporary Iran.

Ultimately, the question remains whether the MEK can successfully transition from its legacy of violence to a platform for meaningful political change. Developing a strategy rooted in grassroots support and an understanding of the socio-political landscape in Iran may provide the group with a chance to redefine its role. However, as history has shown, transforming a reputation built on decades of violence into one of solidarity and democracy will be a monumental challenge for the organization

By Rayanworld.com

October 5, 2024 0 comments

Mujahedin Khalq; A proxy force

Revolutionary Guards blame Saudi Arabia for Tehran terror attack

Military force ratchets up tensions with Riyadh after 12 killed in Iran’s capital

Iran’s Revolutionary Guards ratcheted up the tensions with Saudi Arabia as it accused Tehran’s regional rival of involvement in Wednesday’s double terrorist attack in the capital, which left at least 13 people dead and wounded more than 50.

Gunmen and suicide bombers launched simultaneous attacks on the parliament building in Tehran and the nearby shrine of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the Islamic Republic’s founder.

The attacks were claimed by Isis, in what would be the jihadi group’s first significant strike in the Islamic Republic. However a statement from the Revolutionary Guards linked the “brutal attack” to Donald Trump’s visit last month to Riyadh, where the US president singled out Iran for fuelling “the fires of sectarian conflict and terror”.

“This terrorist act took place a week after a joint meeting between the US president and head of a reactionary regional country [Saudi Arabia] which has been a constant supporter of terrorism,” the statement said. “The fact Isis claimed responsibility proves that they [Saudi Arabia] were involved in the brutal attack.”

Speaking in Berlin, Adel Al-Jubeir, Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister, denied the accusation of involvement and said there was no evidence that his country was involved. “We condemn terrorist attacks anywhere they occur and we condemn the killing of the innocent anywhere it occurs,” Mr al-Jubeir was quoted by Reuters as saying.

Hassan Rouhani, Iran’s president, condemned the attacks, without laying the blame at the feet of Saudi Arabia. However, the accusation from the powerful Revolutionary Guards will stoke the increasingly bitter enmity between Tehran and Riyadh, which are involved in proxy wars from Syria to Yemen.

Iran’s foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, tweeted, “Terror-sponsoring despots threaten to bring the fight to our homeland. Proxies attack what their masters despise most: the seat of democracy.”

Mr Zarif seemed to be pointing at a comment last month by the Saudi deputy crown prince Mohammed bin Salman that any struggle for influence between Riyadh and Tehran would take place “inside Iran, not in Saudi Arabia”.

“We know that the aim of the Iranian regime is to reach the focal point of Muslims [Mecca] and we will not wait until the fight is inside Saudi Arabia and we will work so that the battle is on their side, inside Iran, not in Saudi Arabia,” Prince Mohammed said in a television interview.

The attacks also come at a sensitive moment in the Gulf, where a new rift opened this week pitting Qatar, with whom Tehran has ties, against Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Bahrain. The quartet on Monday severed diplomatic ties with Qatar and accused Doha of supporting terrorism.

Hamid-Reza Taraghi, a senior politician close to Tehran’s hardliners, blamed a combination of Saudi Arabia, the US, Isis and the exiled opposition group MEK for Wednesday’s attacks. “Saudi Arabia is definitely playing the leading role in these incidents, considering that its foreign ministry threatened Iran two to three days ago,” he said, referring to a call by Riyadh for Iran to be punished for supporting terrorism. He provided no evidence to support his claims.

His view was echoed by others, though they did not provide evidence either. “The fact that these two attacks took place . . . after that [Riyadh] meeting means that both the US and the Saudi regime have ordered their proxies to embark on that act,” Brigadier-General Hossein Nejat of the Revolutionary Guards told a local news agency.

Mohsen Rezaei, a former Revolutionary Guards commander, warned terrorists to expect a “tough and unforgettable” response from Iran.

Mr Trump’s administration is viewed as much more hawkish on Iran than the previous government of Barack Obama. Tehran has long accused Saudi Arabia of supporting Isis.

The assault began at 10.30am local time when three gunmen (earlier reports had said four) in women’s clothing walked into the building and began shooting. One detonated an explosive vest. All the attackers were killed after a stand-off lasting several hours, Iran’s interior ministry said.

Two further gunmen also opened fire at the Ayatollah Khomeini shrine in the Iranian capital. One was reported to have killed himself by detonating an explosive vest. Another was shot dead. Based on a video released by Isis, the attackers spoke Arabic. Brigadier-General Nejat said the nationality of the attackers was not yet clear, but an Iranian official told state television on Wednesday night that they were Iranian.

At least 13 people were killed in the two attacks, Pir-Hossein Kolivand, head of Iran’s emergency department, was quoted as saying by the official Irna news agency on Thursday.

Isis on Wednesday vowed further attacks on Iran, saying “Persia should know that the state of the caliphate will not miss an opportunity for an onslaught against them”.

Iranian officials said security forces remained on high alert.

Terrorist attacks are rare in Iran, which keeps a tight grip on domestic security. The country has largely been spared from militant attacks despite its heavy support of Shia militias in Syria and Iraq, which has increased sympathies among some of those countries’ Sunni populations for radical groups such as Isis.

If Iran steps up its fight against Isis in the wake of Wednesday’s attack, the situation in the region could become even more volatile, analysts say. Charlie Winter, senior research fellow at the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation at King’s College London, said the attack could boost Isis’s flagging morale and intensify pressure on Tehran to step up its involvement in Syria against the jihadis. “If this happens, a more intense ‘Sunni war against Shia Islam’ will pour petrol on Isis’s ideological fire,” he said.

Security analysts outside of Iran have long argued that it has not been attacked because it tolerated the presence of al-Qaeda and the movement of communications and finances through the country. But for Isis, which is not reliant on foreign financing, Iran has long been a target.

Members of Iranian forces during attack on the Iranian parliament in central Tehran © Reuters

While it is difficult to gauge the extent of an Isis presence in Iran, the group has long sought to attract people from Iran’s Sunni minority. Last March, it released a 36-minute video in Persian, vowing to conquer Iran. In the video, militants used photographs of Iranian leaders for target practice, including Qassem Soleimani, commander of the Revolutionary Guards’ elite Quds force.

by: Monavar Khalaj in Tehran and Erika Solomon in Beirut

June 10, 2017 0 comments

The Ideology of the MEK

MKO Armed Warfare, an Ideological Necessity

Mojahedin-e Khalq strategy of armed struggle that constitutes its organizational infrastructure from its very formation has now confronted the organization with a new challenge in spite of its widespread propaganda to convince the West it has made revisions. Although the challenge has failed to break the deadlock over Mojahedin’s proceeding with its revolutionary diplomacy in the outside world, the strategy is the main factor that stabilizes the group’s internal relations especially within Camp Ashraf. That is to say, for the outsiders the organization displays the dual policy of abandoning militarism and armed activities; for the insiders it is a strategically unquestionable principle.

That is a contradiction pervading MKO and, of course, the group has not resolved to convince the Westerners to have adopted a different attitude. It seems that MKO gets much advantage out of an equivocal attitude. In many occasions, MKO has admitted the necessity of armed struggle as an ideological necessity that constitutes the violent ontology of MKO. Definitely stated in the State Department’s report presented to Congress on the People’s Mojahedin of Iran in 1994, MKO developed an eclectic ideological blend of Islam and Marxism that dictated both a war of armed struggle and a war of propaganda to achieve political power.

They [Mojahedin] established an organization dedicated to armed struggle. As they explained in a 1974 newspaper article, "We had to ask ourselves the question, "What is to be done?" Our answer was straightforward: ‘Armed Struggle.,"(1) Commitment to this strategic principle has defined the history of the Mojahedin, from the group’s formal establishment in 1965 until today…. The MKO’s embrace of armed struggle flows from the group’s ideology. Its conceptual framework was painstakingly developed through years of study and discourse and aggressively disseminated throughout Tehran.

Being so fervently devoted to a violent strategy, MKO should undergo a complete ideological cleansing before renunciation of terrorism and militarism. But first it has to be investigated that is it possible by any means to change an ideology that institutes infrastructure of an organization?

During the past two decades, majority of MKO’s propaganda and published documents strongly advocate the strategic importance of the adopted tactic of armed warfare following the organization’s first mass movement on 20 June in 1981; the turning point that was broadly being propagated at the time and which was supposed to speed up the inevitable collapse of the regime. In his first series of speeches delivered on the first anniversary of the phase Khordad 30th (20 June 1981), Massoud Rajavi talked about the influential role of MKO’s ideology on the event:

A one-year review of implacable struggle indicates that it is a widespread, organized struggle and resistance matchless in Iranian history. It is not a merely review of political, military, strategic and tactical issues. All of them together, as different organs of body, constitute a cohesive essence that is Mojahedin’s ideology; they all remarkably signify this truth.*

In Rajavi’s analysis of the year-long armed struggle, you come across issues focusing on the inevitability and necessity of armed struggle and violent acts. Rajavi is in no way sceptical about the adopted strategy of armed struggle and is critical of anybody who may oppose the strategy:
All the nonsense woven against the armed struggle during this one year is loathsome and even ludicrous to listen to for those who are in close contact with reality.

In fact, the telling reality Rajavi points out is that armed struggle is the spirit of the organization without which it cannot survive:

In essence, we owe our existence and survival before anything to the widespread armed combat of the Iranian Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization.

There are much more evidences found in MKO’s ideological sources that implicitly and explicitly denounce abandoning the strategy of armed warfare adopted by Mojahedin and consider any made criticism and disapproval as definitely illegitimate. Those who are familiar with the group’s dual nature consider MKO’s claimed renunciation of militarism nothing beyond a tactic of duplicity.

Since MKO’s resort to armed combat and militarism is an internalized ideological principle, its renunciation also needs a similar process of ideological revision. If MKO is standing resolute to abandon terrorism as it claims, at least a review of its previously adopted resolutions will imply the earnestness of its decision. Renunciation of terrorism and militarism, although MKO has refrained to denounce publicly, first needs a through ideological polish, something MKO has dodged to go through at least up to now. MKO should explain how commitment to an ideological necessity can possibly be deserted while the ideology itself remains intact.

*All Rajavi’s quotes are from Mojahedin’s published A one-year review of the armed struggle

June 22, 2010 0 comments

Massoud Rajavi

Totalitarian Ideological leader of MKO

If political objectives are determined in accordance with true requirements of the society, they can simply play their role in the way to achieve human rights, freedom and the ideal democracy. The investigation of MKO’s objectives, ideas, functions and political positions, clearly show that the group’s ideological leader is a totalitarian, fascist one.

The manner a political group evaluates its political goals, will justify the existence or non-existence of the group.

Therefore, the gang of Rajavi who has been engaged in terrorist acts, armed struggle policy and suicide operations, for more than three decades – to achieve power in Iran – will have no fate except removal from international political scene although they have never had a significant role.

The final objective of terrorist cult of MKO is the absolute sovereignty on human beings and the accomplishment of Rajavi’s middle-aged ideas under the cover of religion and democracy.

The investigation of MKO’s objectives, ideas, functions and political positions, clearly show that the group’s ideological leader is a totalitarian, fascist one.

The totalitarian, fascist approach of the leader is obviously represented in the internal relations of the group. Camp Ashraf, as the ideological and strategic container of MKO is the concrete symbol of totalitarianism in MKO style where the worst terrorist, manipulative approaches are performed.

The testimonies of a lot of defectors of the cult reveal physical and psychological torture of dissident members, solitary confinement, and suppression of emotional and sexual needs in the name of ideological revolution.

The mind control system which includes manipulation meetings and brainwashing sessions (Cult jargons) helps the ideological leader relate all aspects of the lives of Ashraf residents to their so-called armed struggle and terrorist strategy. When a group of individuals are isolated in a Camp in desert, under a mind control system behind physical and mental bars, for three decades and the relations are organized on the basis of an ill-minded leader’s thoughts, totalitarianism is definitely achieved. It is obvious that opposing such a horrifying system is not simply feasible.

In a totalitarian system, one can except any kind of behavior such as terror act, suicide, homicide, hunger strike … since the people in the system are some humiliated individuals without free will. They are very useful victims for their leader.

Doubtlessly, in the age of democratic evolutions, cults like MKO and Al-Qaida that prepare violent terrorist agents to accomplish their ambitious goals, will never succeed in running their ideas. The historical experiences prove the declining way of such cults as an unchangeable tradition.

By Arash Rezaiee

September 16, 2009 0 comments

The Ideology of the MEK

Rajavi’s ideological purges

Besides approaches applied by Rajavi to purge qualified, old veterans while in Pahlavi’s jails, he devised whatever plots afterward to exclude the remnants of MKO’s early central cadre and intimates of Hanifnejad. Soon after the victory of Iranian revolution, they criticized Rajavi for his egotistic, ambitious, and totalitarian ideals in a statement issued in an Iranian newspaper, Keyhan. Instead of giving a convincing answer to the criticisms, Rajavi took a hostile stance and asserted that they were no longer MKO members while he had introduced them as the official representatives of the organization abroad a few weeks before. Finally, they published a book entitled “The process of separation” and therein they openly declared their separation from the organization and Rajavi. In this regard, Mohammad Mehdi Jafari states:

As far as I remember, I think in 1981, Mr. Raisi Toosi and his friends detached MKO and even wrote some articles in Keyhan paper disclosing the feats done by the organization and then published a book entitled “The process of separation”. 1

He further refers to ungenerous attitudes of Rajavi in expelling a particular group of three, as they were close comrades of Hanifnejad, from MKO:

The way organization dealt with those three and Reza in particular was very ungenerous. The organization even claimed that he has never been a fighter and that he had been studying in the Europe in years before the victory of the revolution while Reza Raisi Toosi was one of the early founders of MKO. Keyhan paper referred to this issue, too; yet it was denied by Mojahedin officially. Reza and his friends were among those who bravely stood against those members that perverted from Islam in the Europe and issued a long and detailed statement on it. 2

In this regard, Anne singleton, a European member of MKO who had contact with them in the Europe introduces Raisi as follows:

Reza Raisi was one of the close friends of Mohammad Hanif-Nezhad. He had been in close contact with the Mojahedin since its inception and had escaped from Iran when they were being attacked in the early 70s. He took up residence in London, studying a PhD. in politics. Then, about two years before the 1979 revolution, Raisi started an organisation named Committee in Support of the Mojahedin. 3

Jafari also expounds on Rajavi’s mischievous adoption of the same tactics for the removal of other early members of the organization including Meisami and Mohammad Gorgani, who were experienced veterans of the organization and would criticized Rajavi’s totalitarianism and egocentrism:

I was not in prison but I heard the news that the organization had boycotted people like the engineer Meisami and Mohammad Gorgani because they had adopted a clear position toward ideological deviation and drift to Marxism and opposed to “peaceful coexistence” of the rival sides and believed in self-criticism. But the imprisoned rankings like Massoud Rajavi and Musa Khiabani did not concurred with any criticism and moved on their own way although they bragged of observing criticisms. 4

As it was mentioned before, these mechanisms were common in all phases of Rajavi’s hegemony over the organization. Parviz Yaqoubi, one of the earliest members, as well as Saeed Shahsavandi, a member of the organization’s central cadre up to late 1985, are other victims of Rajavi’s inflexibility in his views who were expelled or Rajavi claimed their expulsion despite their voluntary separation from the organization. Anne singleton refers to Parviz Yaqoubi and writes:

Parviz Yaqoubi, a member of the former Central Committee, was in Paris and married to Ashraf Rajavi’s (nee Rabii) sister. He refused to accept the marriage and Ideological Revolution and refused also to keep quiet about his objections. He was put on trial in a court, which Rajavi concocted and headed, and was condemned. He was ‘convicted’ for not taking the side of the revolution, but rather taking the side of Khomeini. Masoud in this court on one occasion refused to accept that Yaqoubi has the normal rights of a court and said this is not a court rather it is a learning session for others to listen and take note. Of course, only selected people were present. Yaqoubi was placed under severe hardship. He was isolated, his financial support from the organisation was cut and he was evicted from his home as an example to others. 5

In fact, the ideological revolution of Rajavi can be considered the final phase of extending his political purges in MKO. Expelling Ali Zarkesh, his trial and sentencing to execution, his exile to Camp Ashraf, and plotting his death in the operation Eternal Light (Forouq-e Javidan) is another instance of Rajavi’s misusing power to eliminate all members who were much more qualified than him. Also, there are a great number of MKO members who were killed after the declaration of the ideological revolution due to their disagreement and criticism. However, their exact number is unknown but a handful of them have been mentioned in Human Rights Watch report or have been referred to by eyewitnesses.

Still much remains untold of methods applied by Rajavi to purge the dissidents as well as the parameters and factors paving the way for him to achieve his egocentric objectives which have to be investigated in depth. It is up to conscience of readers to judge if these cruel acts have been deliberately planed and put into practice or regarded as common errors of Rajavi, something far beyond reality. However, the fact is that according to many early members like Meisami, things could be different if Rajavi had assumed a peaceful mannerism, goodwill, tolerance, and sincerity.

Still there are people who believe Rajavi’s grave errors can be compensated if he will resign and let more qualified people accede to the leadership. It really requires honesty and courage, which Rajavi lacks, to sacrifice oneself for the legitimate causes of a political organization and apologize for the errors made before an authorized court regardless of personal and organizational prejudices.

Resources:

1. Dr. Mohammad Mehdi Jafari’s interview with Seyed Qasem Yahosseini, MKO from inside, Negah-e Emrooz publication, 2002, p.48.

2. ibid, p.78.

3. Singleton, Anne, Saddam’s private army, Iran-Interlink, 2003.

4. Dr. Mohammad Mehdi Jafari’s interview with Seyed Qasem Yahosseini, MKO from inside, Negah-e Emrouz publication, 2002, p.84.

5. Singleton, Anne, Saddam’s private army, Iran-Interlink, 2003.

March 26, 2009 0 comments

Massoud Rajavi

Rajavi, the ideological symbol of his cult

In MKO, the terms Rajavi and ideology are not distinguishable and are actually identical. Despite all disputes on the factor of ideology and its function in social issues, the main blunder of Rajavi is that he hews not to the organizational principles and ideology of MKO; rather he has made an attempt to replace the ideology with himself representing the ideology and the one in the focus of attention. Rajavi has manipulated MKO ideology for justifying his wrongdoings and cultic behaviors imposed on the members under his command a number of which can be enumerated as self-immolation, conducting terrorist attacks, Machiavellian relations, procuring a god-like status, undermining religious norms and values, spying for alien powers, threatening the dissidents and plotting their physical annihilation, assuming an authoritarian leadership and many more.

In fact, ideology has turned out to be an instrument at the hands of Rajavi in order to seize political power, oppose dissidents in an act of retaliation, and justify his strategic failures. Rajavi has misused ideology for the accomplishment of his egocentric ambitions. In other words, Rajavi has formed a personal ideology of his own and has imposed it on the organization and its members.

This complex process is fabricated in a way that gives many of his followers the illusion that he is the human’s savior. However, this process is borrowed from other cultic groups and organizations. According to Madeleine Tobias:

Cultic groups usually originate with a living leader who is believed to be "god" or godlike by a cadre of dedicated believers. Along with a dramatic and convincing talent for self-expression, these leaders have an intuitive ability to sense their followers’ needs and draw them closer with promises of fulfillment. Gradually, the leader inculcates the group with his own private ideology (or craziness!), then creates conditions so that his victims cannot or dare not test his claims. How can you prove someone is not the Messiah? 1

Rajavi misuses the ignorance of his followers in his favor for satisfying his abnormal, psychopath, and revengeful personality and raising his status to a godlike position. He even sanctifies aggression and terror by means of ideology and regards them as the achievements of the ideological revolution and as Eric Hoffer puts into words goes beyond all limits: “The holy terror only knows no limit and never flags”. 2

The political and theoretical splits formed within the followers of Marxism and other like doctrines may be justified based on their diverse interpretations of the fundamentals of their ideology. In fact, Marxism, Stalinism and Maoism are more the result of the egocentric and totalitarian ideas of humans rather than resourceful ideas and doctrines. However, in MKO ideology has turned into an instrument that is pretended to be valued and adhered upon but in fact is manipulated and fabricated to the point that even is used to legitimize the status and leadership of Rajavi:

In MKO, it’s the ideas of Masoud that solve the problems and determine the ideological limits. Yet it is of no surprise. Every ideology has its own interpreter and expositor. Like all Marxists, Leninists, and Maoists whose ideology is represented by the name of one person. The difference between Mojahedin and others regarding their strategy, tactics and activities has its roots in Mojahedin’s particular ideology. 3

Although Rajavi theorized even the most murderous and aggressive behaviors and terrorist attacks of MKO by means of ideology and considered the sole solution for his ideological dispute with capitalism the so-called liberal war, today he has a rightabout-face, pretending to support peaceful activities, democratic Islam, and finding solution for global disputes due to the concerns caused by the very ideology of MKO. The issue of misusing the ideology by Rajavi is a wide one far beyond the factors mentioned here and calls for taking a close look at the activities of MKO leadership in recent three decades.

December 18, 2008 0 comments

Massoud Rajavi

Opposition to ideological revision

Errors of a cult leader; Opposition to ideological revision

The crushing coup over the body of the organization following the mass arrests in 1971 as well as the ideological schism of MKO in 1975 were two alarming incidents that could well help its leaders to start a thorough analysis of strategic and ideological failures so as to make revisions to overcome further encountered challenges. Although the former incident gave the warning and made the remnant cadres and the Central Council to seat analyzing the past errors, yet, as their analyses failed to be accurate and precise, it added more pile of errors to those already leading the organization to a serious state. The role of Masoud Rajavi in all these deteriorating process is known to have been critical. However, the failure in the identification of the main source of impasse within the organization intensified the crises and resulted in the ideological schism of MKO into two wings of Marxist and non-Marxist in 1975.

In any case, the organization achieved partial recovery from the 1971 coup due to the social support it had broadened among different factions and classes of religious and bourgeois as well as the capability of some Central Council members like Ahmad Rezaee. However, it took the organization no long to suffer its schism in 1975. It is said that from the blow of 1971 onwards, the policy of the organization turned out to be in apparent contradiction to the religious principles established by the early Mojahedin leading to substantial discrepancies not accounted for by the newly formed leading cadre. Also, there are some evidences that a number of high-rankings had converted to Marxism prior to the mass arrests. According to Dr. Karim Rastegar, a former member who was witnessing the course of events during 1970s:

In 1971, I was sent to section 4 in Qasr prison. Many MKO rank and files as well as all high-rankings were there including Reza Bakeri, Bahman Bazargani, Mehdi Khosroshahi, Musa Khiabani, and Masoud Rajavi. There were heated ideological discussions there and many expressed their viewpoints. In other words, they openly declared their conversion to Marxism. 1

The members’ false perception of the true nature of Islam as well as leaders’ negligence in conceptualizing Islamic principles resulted in the repulsion of Islamic orders and conversion to Marxism on the part of a great number of Mojahedin. As Abrahamian puts into words:

According to the Marxist Mojahedin, their ‘political consciousness’ had been raised once they began to study systematically ‘dialectical materialism’, especially the works of Marx, Lenin, and Mao Tse-tung. Hence, they claimed, Marxism had revealed to them the fallacies of Islam. 2

The Marxist Mojahedin were neither raw recruits nor ideological simpletons. On the contrary, among them were many surviving intellectuals of the early Mojahedin like Taqi Shahram, Bahram Aram, and Vahid Afrakhteh whose conversion led to the domination of Marxist ideology over the organization. However, Rajavi issued an order to keep their conversion secret. Consequently, converted members maintained their presence and activities in the organization following a dual policy.

The majority of those observing Rajavi’s performance indicate that his passivity, negligence, and indifference caused some problematic members such as Taqi Shahram, Bahram Aram enter the central committee while they were known to be Marxist. Mohammad Mehdi Jafari, an eyewitness, states:

They [Shahram and Aram] concealed their Marxist inclination as they joined the organization and when the top leaders of the organization were arrested and executed, they started to declare their conversion to Marxism openly. Some revisionists such as Aram, Shahram, and Afrakhteh dared to express their opposition to Islam and conversion to Marxism due to the weak personality of top officials like Masoud Rajavi and Masoud Bazargani. 3

There were some intellectual members warning Rajavi against the forthcoming crises even before the declaration of the Marxists wing’s manifesto in which the ideological position of Mojahedin had been explained; however, Rajavi acted indifferently and even accused those members of having dogmatic views, hence paving the way for the occurrence of the great schism of 1975. One of those members was Dr. Karim Rastegar who repeatedly notified Rajavi that how risky the ideological metamorphosis could be but he paid no heed. Even when Rajavi was convinced that Taqi Shahram, the guerrilla fighter blamed for the 1975 schism, was about to expand Marxist views within the organization, he told Karim Rastegar that the world of politics necessitated it to ignore some issues; otherwise, they would be blamed for their past mistakes. Yet again, Rastegar insisted on his viewpoints and asked Rajavi for preventive measures but he said:

Shut up! We are a political group. In a political group, withdrawal means suicide. You will be dismissed if I hear you tell other members that the organization is ideologically problematic. You have to either obey my words or quit the organization. 4

Lotfollah Meisami, an MKO former member, expounds on the fact that Rajavi resorted to a variety of methods to prevent ideological revision of organizational principles and preserved the dialectical and dualistic policy of MKO. For instance, he asked critics and dissident members to work individually on their viewpoints. Evidently, they failed to come to a valid conclusion on their own. Then, suffering from isolation, they were compelled to ignore their ideology and conform to the group’s set of beliefs.

Rajavi deliberately kept silent up to the declaration of the manifesto of schism. Then, he promised to revise the organizational principles of MKO having another look at Islamic doctrines. However, after the victory of Islamic revolution in Iran, as Rastegar asserts, he broke his promise and moved on his past career to synthesize Islam and Marxism to form a dialectical ideology to achieve his primary objective of assuming an egocentric political power.

References

1. An interview with Dr. Karim Rastegar, Cheshmandaz Weekly, No. 21.

2. Abrahamian, Ervand. The Iranian Mojahedin, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, p. 146

3. Meisami, Lotfollah; Those who went away.

4. An interview with Dr. Karim Rastegar, Cheshmandaz Weekly, No. 21.

November 10, 2008 0 comments

Human Rights Abuse in the MEK

Neocon’s Pet Iranian Revolutionaries Accused of Torture

An Iranian rebel group that is aggressively campaigning for Washington’s support as part of a "regime change" strategy in its homeland has committed serious abuses, including torture and prolonged isolation, against dissident members, according to a leading human rights watchdog.

The group, the Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK), insists that it should lead a U.S.-backed effort to bring what it has termed democratic rule to Iran. Last month, it organized a rally, attended by several powerful Republican lawmakers and billed as the "2005 National Convention for a Democratic, Secular Republic in Iran," at Washington’s historic Constitution Hall.

But MEK’s own human-rights record during its almost 20 years as an armed group sheltered and supported by former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein belies its professed commitment to democratic rule, Human Rights Watch (HRW) said in a 28-page report, "No Exit: Human Rights Abuses Inside the MEK Camps," released Thursday.

"The Iranian government has a dreadful record on human rights," said Joe Stork, Washington director of HRW’s Middle East division. "But it would be a huge mistake to promote an opposition group that is responsible for serious human rights abuses."

The report comes amid rising tensions between Washington and Tehran focused primarily on U.S. charges that Iran is building a nuclear weapon, a development that President George W. Bush has described as "unacceptable."

The U.S. administration has not yet explicitly endorsed "regime change" in Iran, but hardliners based primarily in Vice President Dick Cheney’s office and at the Defense Department have made little secret of their belief that such a policy should be adopted. Their only question is how best to achieve that goal.

Since the March, 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, where the MEK had been based since 1986, the group has tried to persuade Washington that it holds the key to overthrowing the Islamic Republic next door.

It has been backed in this quest by right-wing lawmakers, a group of hardline neoconservatives and retired military officers called the Iran Policy Committee (IPC), and some U.S. officials â€“ particularly in the Pentagon â€“ who believe that the MEK could be used to help destabilize the Iranian regime, if not eventually overthrow it in conjunction with U.S. military strikes against selected targets.

While the group’s supporters in the Pentagon so far have succeeded in protecting the several thousand MEK militants based at Camp Ashraf near the Iranian border from being dispersed or deported, they have failed to persuade the U.S. State Department to take the group off its terrorist list, to which it was added in 1997 based on its attacks during the 1970s against U.S. military contractors and its participation in the 1979 seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran. The European Union (EU) also cites the MEK as a terrorist organization.

After a year-long tug-of-war between the two U.S. agencies, a truce between State and the Pentagon was apparently worked out. MEK members at Camp Ashraf were designated "protected persons" under the Geneva Conventions.

Since then, the Pentagon has recruited individual members of the MEK to infiltrate Iran as part of an effort to locate secret nuclear installations, according to recent articles published in The New Yorker and Newsweek magazines. At the same time, nearly 300 members have taken advantage of an amnesty in Iran to return home, leaving a total of 3,534 MEK members inside Camp Ashraf as of mid-March, according to the HRW report.

In this context, the MEK and its supporters have been campaigning hard for the group to be "de-listed" by the State Department as a terrorist group. That appeared to be the principal demand of last month’s rally, which was addressed via video-conference by MEK’s co-president, Maryam Rajavi.

In another column published by the International Herald Tribune in January, Rajavi, who also heads the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), a MEK front group, stressed that she was "committed to holding free and fair elections within six months of regime change, to electing a constituent assembly and handing over affairs to the people’s elected representatives."

Those claims are likely to invite greater skepticism in light of the new HRW report, which is based on a series interviews between February and May 2005 with 12 former MEK members currently living in Europe.

They testified to a pattern of torture, beatings, and prolonged detention in solitary confinement at military camps in Iraq after they criticized the group’s policies and what they called its undemocratic practices, or indicated that they planned to leave the organization. Two of the interviewees said they had personally witnessed the deaths of two prisoners under interrogation.

Those who wished to leave the organization were held incommunicado in special units in the camps, they said. If they held a high rank in the MEK, they were held for years; one of the interviewees reportedly was held for a total of eight and a half years; another for five years.

The most brutal treatment was meted out to suspected dissidents in secret prisons located within the MEK camps, according to the report. Four of the witnesses, who were suspected of dissident views, testified that they had all been severely tortured and forced to sign false confessions asserting that they had links to Iranian intelligence agents.

Three of them witnessed the death of Parviz Ahmadi, a former unit commander, in February 1995, shortly after a particularly severe beating. His death was reported three years later in the MEK’s publication, Mojahed, which described him as a "martyr" killed by Iranian intelligence agents.

Five of the witnesses were eventually transferred to Abu Ghraib prison during the 1990s and released by Saddam Hussein’s government in 2001 or 2002.

The testimonies included in the report also lend weight to the view that the MEK is more of a cult than a political movement. They suggest that the group’s exile in the early 1980s, followed by the marriage of Masoud and Maryam Rajavi in 1985, set off a series of phases in what the husband-and-wife team declared was a permanent "ideological revolution" that the couple embodied.

These included compulsory divorce of married couples, regular self-criticism sessions, renunciation of sexuality, and absolute mental and physical dedication to the leadership. "The level of devotion expected of members was on stark display in 2003 when the French police arrested Maryam Rajavi in Paris," HRW said. "In protest, 10 MEK members and sympathizers set themselves on fire in various European cities; two of them subsequently died."

by Jim Lobe

June 28, 2008 0 comments

The Ideology of the MEK

The Role of Strategic Stalemates in MKO ideological Shift 2

Failure in overthrowing the regime

The short-term plan to overthrow the Iranian regime announced by Rajavi at the peak of MKO’s wave of internal terrorist actions, such as the explosions in the central office of the Islamic Republican Party and the Prime Ministry Building, constituted the most controversial issue that challenged the Mojahedin’s leadership. Believing that these bloody terrorist deeds would lead to destabilization of the regime, Rajavi declared that it ultimately took six months to finalize the collapse.

The prime aftermath of the declared phases of armed warfare following Khordad 30th (20 June 1981) was that Rajavi’s promise proved to be a chimera. Although insignificant at the beginning, after a while and following the military failures and stalemates, the challenge turned into serious crises within MKO.

Again and again Rajavi, overconfident of terrorist actions that he referred to as ‘great operations’, predicted a short time overthrow in his press interviews. He even classified the definite time of overthrow into three periods: short, mid, and long and finally fixed the exact date in a 5 year span. A review of Rajavi’s position taking reveals the fact that after 20 June, he began to evade determining an exact date for the overthrow. Finally he postponed his promise until the death of the leader of Islamic Republic.

From the phase of 20 June on, followed by the formation of NCR, Rajavi promoted himself atop of both MKO and NCRI as the egocentric decision-maker. Although everybody was aware that he was the one to say the last word, later on, and in the course of ideological revolution, Mehdi Abrishamchi referred to the decisive role of Rajavi in critical decisions such as that which initiated the armed phase. Even the Western media were interested in his hegemonic leadership atop of the organization in those years. Many of them asserted that he cleverly dodged the reporters’question and in one case, Jean Gueyras tells the story of Rajavi and his misuse of power for his personal ambitions:

Hidden away in his country bunker in Auvers-sur-Oise, Mr. Massoud Rajavi, the leader of the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI) has mastered the art of allying the useful with the pleasurable. He sugar coats his decisions, even those about his private life, with politico-ideological statements of considerable grandiloquence. Thus, in October 1982, to justify his marriage to Firouzeh Bani Sadr, daughter of the former President of the Islamic Republic only eight months after the tragic death of his first wife, Ashraf Rab’i (killed on 8 February 1982 by the Pasdaran); he published a joint bulletin of the PMOI’s Politburo and Central Committee in which his marriage was presented as ‘one of the most important revolutionary decisions ever taken by the Mojahedin’ and as an initiative which would help consolidate the unity of the Iranian nation’. (1)

Antoine Gessler’s Autopsy of an Ideological Drift well explains that Rajavi and his organization are badly in need of being at the center of the world’s attention and are very afraid of being sunk into oblivion. Rajavi’s promises of victory to motivate his forces have never come true:

It involves an organization in permanent panic of being forgotten, a threat that grows day by day, and must, therefore, motivate its militants who have never witnessed the victory announced thousands of times in the past (2).

Such evidences prove the fact that even years before the ideological revolution and his promotion as the ideological leader, Rajavi had succeeded to maintain his unbeatable authority over the organization. After a while, the internal crises were well controlled but unsolved question of overthrow, in spite of the heavy responsibility of rampant terrorist operations, remained as an internal challenge that negatively affected Mojahedinâ€™s relations. Then the circumstances lead to a condition in which Mojahedin were forced to deny the possibility of short- and mid-term overthrow. The critical situation of Mojahedin on the one hand and Iran’s prevailing over internal crises on the other hand corroborated fallacy of MKO’s promise of short-term overthrow. Although the leadership never acknowledged the fact openly, the analysis of the ideological development confirmed it. Niyabati’s outspoken fashion leaves no doubt that the leadership was convinced of the fact that the organization was structurally no match to cause regime’s downfall:

A summary of the political, military, organizational, and ideological aspects in fall 1984 made one point clear to Mojahedin, that was, the short-term overthrow of the regime was impossible due to the ideological-organizational structure on the one hand and outer-organizational political relations with various political trends active inside and outside of the country. (3)

According to Niyabati, such a particular phase was in fact the turning point of internal challenges Mojahedin had encountered. He refers to two years earlier when Mojahedin took the wrong path of the so-called phase of armed struggle that founded the background to such challenges. He further elaborates on two strategic solutions of Mojahedin in this regard and writes:

The year 1984 was a determining phase to reach a final settlement in political, military, strategic, and ideological scenes. The political and military impasse of armed resistance as well as the failure in short-term overthrow of the regime that came to light at the end of 1982 and became a proven fact at the beginning of 1983, led Mojahedin into a dilemma. (4)

Mehdi Khanbaba-Tehrani, an NCRI ex-member, in his review of the phase refers to failures and their aftermath within MKO and NCRI and concludes that the ideological revolution worked as the decisive solution to the desperate question of overthrow that was pressing hard on Rajavi and NCRI:

In my opinion, MKO has met serious crises due to the failure of the short-term plan of overthrow and its aftermath that has gravely questioned the organization’s leadership. Actually, the ideological revolution was the manifestation of such internal conflicts. To keep the integrity and life of the organization, Mojahedin’s leadership arrived at a compromise that resulted in pluralizing the leadership by means of adding a woman atop who had to change her name and get married to Rajavi. (5)

Hadi Shams-Haeri, another former member, considers the strategic stalemates and failures of MKO to be a result of Rajavi’s ineptitude, having no realistic appraisal of the situation inside Iran, and finally continuation of keeping the insiders in dark about the realities and insisting on the futile tactic of overthrow:

Of the Rajavi’s betrayals was advertising the overthrow of the Islamic republic as a possibly easy and quick task. In this regard, Rajavi never referred to the real problems and shortcomings that would be encountered on the route. (6)

Haeri also has the opinion that Rajavi is the sole responsible for the wrong decision of overthrow and the move on 20 June. He writes:

In fact, the armed warfare that initially aimed at overthrowing the regime in short-term and assuming the political power lasted not more than 1.5 years and ended in a complete strategic failure. The pioneer forces not only lost the ground but were strangled due to adverse circumstances. It happened as a result of inadequate and incorrect appraisal of forces’capacity on 20 June. (7)

As such, the issue of overthrow which acted as a motivator for winning the support of opposition groups, as well as some states standing in shadow, gradually turned into a factor arousing opposing reactions within MKO and NCRI.

References:

1. Gessler, Antoine; Autopsy of an Ideological Drift, Chapter 22.

2. ibid, chapter 19.

3. Niyabati, B. A different look at the ideological revolution within MKO. Khavaran publication, p.16.

4. ibid, p.16.

5. An inside look at left movements in Iran, some interviews with Mehdi Khanbaba-Tehrani, the interview 17.

6. Shams-Haeri, H. The swamp, Khavaran publication, p.35.

7. ibid.

Bahar Irani,Mojahedin.ws,December 6, 2007

December 9, 2007 0 comments

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