Mojahedin sometimes resorted to people, thought to be able to do something for the organization; people like Paul Wolfowitz, John Bolton and …
The main point the group tries to hide from its own members is that the group was fully supported by Saddam and some other western countries while being out of terror list but it could do nothing.
the Argentine Israelite Mutual Association (AMIA) building in Buenos Aires exploded killing 85 people. A car was reprted to have been detonated before the building. According to the testimony of at least a dozen eye witnesses, there was no car bomb but explosion came from the inside outwards. Although the”internal explosion theory”was later proved by the experts, the Israel’s sovereignty over this issue influenced the course of the investigations.
MKO’s ties to John Bolton are not limited to the post-Iraq war era or his appointment as the US ambassador to the UN but they were established long ago when the contacts of the MKO with Zionist lobby in the US were expanded.First, the MKO sent him gifts and during an electoral campaign, he received large amounts of money from the MKO. After that, MKO regularly rewarded him with money that was called gift or other kinds of aids.
John Bolton, who was then the Under-Secretary of State for Arms Control, privately conveyed to International Atomic Energy Agency officials his suspicions that Iran was conducting research – at Parchin,….So, at a press conference held in Paris on 3 February, 2005, by the National Council of Resistance of Iran (a US State Department designated”terrorist organization”) Mohammad Mohaddessin, the self-styled Chairman of their Foreign Affairs Committee, made certain specific charges about Iran’s ongoing nuclear programs….
The function of Mojahedin at least through the past 25 years well indicates that they had availed themselves of given opportunity, Saddam’s overall backing and other reactionary political factions as well as the debilitating, prolonged war and controversies among the countries of the region. Of course, Mojahedin had given a pledge to make up for all protections and backings they had received after assuming power in Iran.
Following the order of Iraqi officials and coalition forces on the expulsion of MKO from Iraq and banning all propagandistic and political activities of the group in this country, it’s impossible for the group to continue its studio works in Camp Ashraf. As soon as Camp Ashraf is cleared of terrorist elements, TV installations and establishments of the group will be confiscated by the Iraqi government
The continuation of this move indicates that the leaders of the group are still seeking solutions to overcome the current crisis (for the group) in Iraq.Also, other activities by the group show that the priority for the MKO leaders is to find a way out of the crisis in Iraq and that all MKO efforts (in order to help the group politically and structurally) have failed so far.However, MKO’s spokespersons never speak directly of what they are dealing with in Iraq (in order not to worsen the situation of their demoralized members in Camp Ashraf) and the future of the group.
The scant number of the participants, two hundred is MKO’s own exaggerated number, might indicate that the sympathizers residing in the Western countries cannot be easily deceived by Mojahedin’s advertised demands that only serves to further the organizational objectives rather than being concerned about the plights of members held in Camp Ashraf.
During the past few years Mojahedin have employed all their political might to magnify Iran’s nuclear threat to lead on their power struggle to be entrusted the legitimacy of an alternative. As political bankrupts, Mojahedin even lost their last residue of political legitimacy among other opposition who believed in them as ultimate hope. Mojahedin’s propaganda blitz to infuse that Iran did not have any peaceful intentions …
On the other hand, Mr. Ahmed Bokhari, Director of UNHCR’s Middle East Affairs, announced that the members of MKO can get refugee status (in Iraq or another country) under three conditions:
1. Cutting ties with the Mojahedin-e Khalq organization
2. Denouncing terrorist activities (in the past)
3. Giving pledge not to return to terrorism again