Mojahedin oppose to any decision of relocation of the Ashraf to other camps inside Iraq which no doubt leads to destabilization of the organization. No need to say that MKO’s expulsion and the consequent shutting down of the Camp Ashraf crucially questions the organizational survival. However, under no circumstance the leading leadership agrees to undergo any change. But, is it the same with the subordinate ranks and members?
…Rajavi has reiterated two important issues; the preservation of Camp Ashraf regardless of the price it might cost and the promise that the Iranian regime would collapse in a span of two years. In a message issued in 2006, he fixed January 2009 as the deadline for the collapse. In fact, when he was fixing the time, the Bush Administration had just entered the countdown to its last two years and Rajavi promised that if nothing happen at the end …
The report (last updated 2007) clearly emphasizes that”…MEK leadership and members across the world maintain the capacity and will to commit terrorist acts in Europe, the Middle East, the United State, Canada, and beyond…”In addition, the report of course continues describing”Mojahedin Khalq Organization”by pointing out:
Rajavi’s hurried and unreasoning resort to armed phase followed by an illogically drawn timetable of short-term toppling of Iranian regime heavily affected the internal and external relations of Mojahedin. The third factor that forced the organization to cling to the alternate of the ideological revolution was the gradual dwindling of its social prestige and legitimacy
Now with the US National Intelligence Estimate report on December 3rd effectively removing any reason for war with Iran for the foreseeable future, there is nothing left for Rajavi to fill the void between now and January 2009. His deadline for destruction appears to have arrived sooner than he anticipated.
Again and again Rajavi, overconfident of terrorist actions that he referred to as ‘great operations’, predicted a short time overthrow in his press interviews. He even classified the definite time of overthrow into three periods: short, mid, and long and finally fixed the exact date in a 5 year span.
A look at a multitude of the crises the organization ran into following its declare of armed warfare after the initiation of the Islamic Republic in Iran well explain that the organization’s resort to ideological shift was the last option to surmount crises and guarantee the organization’s survival.
The failure of the guerilla warfare inside Iran, the separation of the Kurdistan Democrat Party from the NCR as well as the impossibility of using the soil of Iran’s neighboring countries were the main causes leading to the formation of the so-called NLA. The army was supposed to be an amalgamation of the forces
The ideological marriage of Maryam and Massoud [1984] and intra-organizational obligatory divorces [1988] constitute the strategic hallmarks of the ideological revolution within Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization [MKO] or the Mojahedin Cult as notoriously entitled.