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Former members of the MEK

MKO key Formula: Why Maryam … Because Masud

Memoirs of Ms. Batoul Soltani – Part 18
Supposedly Rajavi has always tried to manage his behaviors and relations like the ones of Imam Ali (the first Imam of Shiites and the fourth Caliph of Sunnis). He didn’t declare this claim orally, but implicitly it was obvious he acted in a way that his tendency was to represent such a personality.

He led the affairs in such a direction that his followers or Maryam were made to emphasize on this aspect of his personality.

Rajavi smartly showed off these distinct aspects of his personality through main arguments in the group. He tried to represent the patterns as theoretical and instructional while he was actually leading the audience to view him as the real example of those patterns or personalities [like Imam Ali]. For example, in case of his marriage with Maryam, he arranged the scene so skillfully that everyone believed he was the main person who accepted all the heavy accusation of the marriage due to ideological and political necessities. He or Mehdi Abrishamchi set the table very well that we couldn’t see behind the scene. Finally people like Abrishamchi or Davari (Pins of MKO) arranged a scenario implying that they were inspired Masud was the only one to bear all charges against him after Maryam Rajavi divorced Abrishamchi.

They tried to confirm that such devotion needs an extraordinary super-natural capacity. For instance, when Rajavi spoke of Spiritual Struggle [Jihad Akbar] he said: ”once fighting and martyrdom was the highest level of faith in the struggle, but today honesty and devotion are higher than martyrdom. He categorized them as holy warriors and revolutionary people. He said that Imams were pious men and prophets were sincere men. In fact he wanted to categorize himself in the group of Imams and prophets which are in a higher level than martyrs stand.

Following his interpretations, others were supposed to evaluate his ranking based on what they received from his words. The pins (like Maryam Rajavi) had the responsibility to introduce Masud Rajavi according to the interpretations he gave from Quran. Therefore, gradually they could give him the position of Imam Ali or Prophet Mohammad (peace be upon him).

When he wanted to form the leadership Council consisting of female members, he stated viewpoints on woman claiming that these are of Prophet Mohammad (peace be upon him) that he couldn’t perform them at his era due to the ignorance ruling his time, and now he [Rajavi] is accomplishing the Prophet’s task.

He claimed that one of the ideas of Prophet Mohammad (peace be upon him) and Imam Ali was that all political and administrative systems be based on women but they couldn’t actualize it. And now he is fulfilling their wish.

To choose the members of the leadership Council, the main criterion for Rajavi was how much they are devoted. There is a formula in MKO discussions:
They ask:”why Maryam” and then they answer: “because Masud”.
It means that Maryam is the first woman linked with Masud.

Maryam, herself asked:”why Maryam?” and then she answered herself:”because I love Masud more than anyone else does, because I was the first person who melted into Masud, I was unified in Masud, and I was just for Masud.”

In our ideological discussions, we tried to step forward after Maryam (following Maryam’s path) and talk about this kind of relationships. Every man or woman had to follow the same way to be melted into the leadership.

Following this argument, she said that we should love Masud instead of our husbands. If the members could have the same emotions and feelings for Masud as they have for their spouses, they could be true revolutionary fighters. This showed the extent of your devotion to Masud. Naturally, they chose the members of the leadership council according to this criterion.

About my own selection as a member of the leadership council, Maryam asked me: ”Do you know why you are selected despite the fact that you have recently entered the organization? Why we didn’t choose other people who have a longer period of membership?”

She made too many arguments and reasoning to prove that they have chosen me because I could comprehend the essence of revolution very well. She meant that I was totally melted into the leader’s ideas, because I could pass over my husband and children. The best criterion for MKO leaders was that a member could solve his problems and obstacles and could reach Maryam and Masud.

Any selection in MKO is based on the fact that how you have solved your contradictions: this measures your absolute devotion to the leaders.
Translated by Nejat Society

July 15, 2009 0 comments
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The MEK; Baath Party Accomplice

MKO, the illegal settlers in Iraq

The claims of MKO on keeping Camp Ashraf by means of grabbing at the issue of refugee rights has been turned to the main point of their conflict with the Iraqi government. It can be reviewed from different dimensions. A brief look at the past events regarding Mojahedin may give us a better understanding of the legal and political grounds of this claim. First the conditions in which Mojahedin moved to Iraq and the objectives they pursued by this movement have to be clarified to judge upon the accuracy of their present allegations from a political point of view rather than with regard to international protocols and conventions as practiced with the organization. Therefore, we have to identify the reason why Mojahedin entered Iraqi soil after their expulsion from France.

It is said that this movement has been aimed at achieving some political and ideological objectives rather than seeking refuge in Iraq. At that time (the meetings of Rajavi and Tariq Aziz) MKO aimed to make a strategic alliance with Saddam by this relocation and this alliance has been so determining and significant for two parties that neither legal international protocols nor refugee rights had been taken into consideration. Reviewing the past and the statements made by Rajavi and Saddam indicate that the transfer of Mojahedin from France to Iraq had mechanisms far beyond looking for refugee and according to evidences revealed later on, the interactions and relation of these leaders had been contrary to the international protocols and the Fourth Geneva Conventions in particular. The main part of these statements appeared in Rajavi’s declaration issued under the title “The valedictory message of the leader of the new Iranian revolution”. There, he points to issues like the necessity of overthrowing the Iranian government, using adjacency to Iranian soil for making a strategic shift in guerilla warfare and turning it into regional warfare and liberation war relying on his so-called liberation army etc. According to Rajavi:
I should say that here, in France, it is no more possible to further and lead the armed movement for overthrow in the most responsible positions. 1
As he further states:

If you ask me why I am going, I say it in one sentence: to light a fire in the mountains. 2

All over his 30-page declaration and explanations on the rationale behind his flight to Iraq, Rajavi hardly refers to the subject of seeking refuge therein.
At that time, Rajavi took a winning position toward the outsiders and never thought of a time when he had to resort to a fabricated subterfuge for justifying his illegal settlement in Iraq. Soon the close relationship between Rajavi and Saddam was revealed; a relationship that cannot be defined under any framework of international protocols and rules. Here some points are to be mentioned regarding the claims Mojahedin make in the present conditions:

1. The secret negotiations of Iraqi officials and Tariq Aziz in particular with France were based on the common policies of two countries against Iran.

2. The Iran-Iraq war had a determining role in Rajavi-Saddam alliance. Application for political refuge is based on a specific set of rules, however, Rajavi-Saddam interaction has been a political alliance not included in the framework of international conventions and refugee rights.

3. As asserted by Rajavi, his movement has been a strategic one for furthering his armed struggle against Iranian government rather than seeking refuge or anything else.
With regard to these factors, it is proved that the transfer of Mojahedin to Iraq has not been for seeking refuge therein and as evidences show, Rajavi moved to Iraq to ally with Saddam due to the strategic position of Iraq in the region next to Iranian borders. Although Rajavi could grab at the issue of seeking refuge at that time as the reason of his movement to Iraq, he refrained to do so due to his lack of political awareness, foresight as well as placing much reliance on the power of Saddam.

However, after the fall of Saddam when Rajavi lost all his political and military power and received a sharp reprimand due to his alliance with Saddam and illegal settlement in Iraq, he had no option but grabbing at international protocols and the Fourth Geneva Conventions to justify his past illegalities. An immediate shift in his policy after the fall of Saddam indicates that the issue of seeking refuge in Iraq is baseless and unjustifiable. Undoubtedly, if Saddam wasn’t deposed, neither was the issue of refuge seeking of Mojahedin mentioned nor any effort was made to prove the legitimacy of the presence of Mojahedin in Iraq.

References:
1. The historical flight for “peace and freedom”; the messages, reports, and news on the departure of the leadership of the new Iranian revolution from France to Iraq. MKO publication, 1986, p. 126.
2. ibid, p. 127.

July 14, 2009 0 comments
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Mujahedin Khalq as an Opposition Group

7 saboteurs with MKO links nabbed in Iran

MKO Leader Maryam Rajavi has supported the deadly violence that followed the June 12 presidential elections.

A number of saboteurs, who were arrested for creating post-vote mayhem in Iran, have exposed their links with the terrorist Mujahedin Khalq Organization (MKO).

Ali Eftekhari, deputy prosecutor in the northern province of Qazvin, said Monday that the seven detainees have been found to be”closely affiliated”with MKO operatives based in Iraq.
“With the main goal of destabilizing the country, they had lured the young and innocent into joining the anti-government riots,”said Eftekhari.

Eftekhari said the arrested saboteurs had sought to take advantage of the delicate situation in the country to advance the MKO political agenda.
“Following their arrest, they confessed to their links with MKO leaders living abroad,” said Eftekhari.”They said they were paid to gather classified information on the country and convey them to their supervisors in Iraq via independent news agencies such as Homa.”

Eftekhari went on to add that some of those arrested have been involved in post election unrest in Tehran, adding one of them was even arrested but was importunely freed later.
The Iraqi government has yet to fulfill its promises and fully expel MKO from Camp Ashraf in north of Baghdad. Recent reports suggest that the grouplet is still operating from their headquarters in Camp Ashraf, where they had been stationed for more than two decades.

Iranian security officials, in the days that followed the unrest, identified and arrested a large number of MKO members, who later confessed that they had been trained and equipped in Iraq to create post-election mayhem in the country.

They had also claimed to be operating under the aegis of the MKO command post in Britain.

The arrests shed light on the significant involvement of MKO terrorists in the recent street violence that killed over a dozen people in the country.

Founded in the 1960s, MKO is a Marxist guerilla group, which masterminded a slew of terrorist operations in Iran and Iraq — one of which was the 1981 bombing of the offices of the Islamic Republic Party, in which more than 72 Iranian officials were killed.
The terrorists are especially notorious for taking sides with former dictator Saddam Hussein during the war Iraq imposed on Iran (1980-1988).

July 14, 2009 0 comments
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Mujahedin Khalq Organization members' families

Hassan has been captured in Ashraf for more than 2 decades

Shaaban pour family worry about the fate of their beloved Hassan.
Hassan has been captured in Camp Ashraf of Rajavis’ Cult for more than twenty years according to Asgar Shaabani pour, Hassan’s brother who is an active member of Nejat Society Mazandaran Branch.

Asgar has tried a lot to release his brother from the bars of Camp Ashraf. Last year, together with a number of families of Nejat he went to Camp Ashraf gate but they were affronted by MKO officials including Ozra Alavi [Ms. Ozra Alavi Taleqani the Deputy Commander in Chief of the National Liberation Army] so they couldn’t visit their beloved ones.

In a meeting held in Mazandaran office of Nejat Society Mr. Shaaban pour noted that these days his old father is suffering the lack of his son so much as his only desire is to visit his son.

“My father went to Iraq to visit Hassan in 2002 and MKO authorities told him untruly that his son didn’t want to see him” Asgar said. After that trip his father became so disappointed.”My father had waited for 24 hours in front of Ashraf gate” Asgar added “nobody answered him, so he came back with tearing eyes.”

Concerned about the actual situation of his brother in Ashraf, Asgar noted that his brother was taken as a war prisoner in 1987 but since then, despite sending letters and referring to ICRC, Iraqi government and other international bodies, they have not been able to contact him.

A show of MKO’s TV channel was shown during the meeting, in which Hassan said:”when I was talking with my family on the phone, the agents of Islamic Republic cut our contact.” Regarding the show, Asgar said that as he remembers they have never had a phone contact with his brother and such words were definitely dictated by the cult’s leader.

Surprised by the show he wondered to believe which claim:”Hassan didn’t want to see his father at Camp Ashraf gate” or”Hassan called the family and IRI interrupted the contact”

At the end, Mr. Shaaban pour stated that his family has written various letters to international organizations asking for clarification of the case of their brother and his release to live in free society. 

July 13, 2009 0 comments
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Mujahedin Khalq Organization's Propaganda System

MKO financial assistance to a Ba’athi TV network

[The question is who is feeding MKO and what are the financial sources?
Where is this huge amount of funding come from?]

An Iraqi news site announced that MKO has allocated 18 thousand dollars to a television networkwho is feeding MKO and what are the financial sources belonging to one of the members of the Iraqi Ba’ath Party Salih al-Mutlaq in order to carry out propaganda against the Islamic Republic of Iran.

According to Habilian Association database quoting from the Iraqi news site of Aljewar MKO asked the authorities in Al babeliyah Television network, via providing them with financial helps, to intensify their propaganda against the Iranian government and the people.

The news also reveal that MKO has donated the sum to those in this TV network who struggle more in destroying the image of Iran.

MKO has also dedicated a fixed financial aid for those in the network who write or make programs against Iran.

The above mentioned satellite television network of Al babeliyah belongs to Salih al –Mutlaq who is a notorious anti Iranian Iraqi MP that has called for the survival of MKO terrorist cult in Iraq despite severe opposition of Members of Parliament and government of Iraq for the presence of MKO on the Iraqi soil.

He is an agent of the previous regime in Iraq and has still kept his belongings to the Ba’ath party.
Al-Mutlaq is a member of agriculture commission of the Iraqi parliament and was in charge of livestock and poultries of Sajedeh (Saddam’s wife) during the former regime in Iraq.

July 12, 2009 0 comments
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The MEK and Jundullah

US finances anti-Iran terrorist gang

Jundullah leader Abdulmalik Rigi received $100,000 from US operatives to fuel sectarianism in Iran in just one of their meetings, his brother has said.

"My brother Abdulmalik met several times with US forces in Pakistan," Abdulhamid Rigi told a group of tribal leaders and citizens in the town of Iranshahr in the southeastern province of Sistan and Baluchistan.

"I myself took part in one of those meetings, where we discussed recruitment, training, infiltrating Iran and methods of inflaming Sunni-Shia sectarianism for three hours. In that meeting, the Americans gave my brother $100,000," he added.

Abdulhamid also said that during the meeting in question, his brother had asked for computer and satellite equipment, which he used to recruit young Sunni Baluchies.

According to Jundullah’s former number two, young men were attracted to the group because it sought to portray itself as an Islamic and Jihadist movement.

He said that the group promoted the idea that killing two people from the Shia community would ensure entry to Paradise as they are infidels.

Abdulhamid said that he had shot his wife dead in the Pakistani city of Quetta while she was asleep, because his brother had said she must die for being a Shia and a government spy.
He added that Abdulmalik too had previously killed his own wife by slitting her throat for the same reason.

Abdulhamid Rigi had earlier confirmed that the ring leader had repeatedly met with US agents in the Pakistani cities of Islamabad and Karachi since 2005.

"In Pakistan, Malik [Abdulmalik Rigi] contacted an individual who resided in the US, who then put him through to the FBI," he said in a recent interview with Press TV.
Jundullah (meaning ‘God’s Army’) is a Pakistan-based terrorist group closely affiliated with the notorious al-Qaeda organization and is made up of disgruntled members of Iran’s Sunni Baluch community.

A 2007 Sunday Telegraph report revealed that the CIA had created Jundullah to achieve ‘regime change in Iran’.

The report said it was the very same US intelligence outfit that had tried to destabilize Iran by ‘supplying arms-length support’ and ‘money and weapons’ to Jundullah.

Another report posted by ABC also revealed that the US officials had ordered Jundullah to ‘stage deadly guerrilla raids inside the Islamic Republic, kidnap Iranian officials and execute them on camera’, all as part of a ‘programmatic objective to overthrow the Iranian government’.

Jundullah has carried out a number of bombings and other violent attacks in Iran resulting in many casualties. Some of the attacks for which it has claimed responsibility are the killings of at least 16 Iranian police officers in a 2008 attack, nine Iranian security guards in 2005, and another 11 in a 2007 bombing.

The group’s leader Abdulmalik Rigi has also publicly claimed responsibility for a bombing in May at a Shia mosque in the southeastern city of Zahedan, which left 25 worshipers dead and scores injured.

Soon after the attack, Abdulmalik Rigi admitted during an interview with a US-based satellite TV station that his group collaborated with another anti-Iranian terrorist group, the Mojahedin Khalq Organization (MKO).

"They (MKO) inform us about the regime’s activities in our areas of operations and let us know of the regime’s forces in these districts and send us most of the intelligence of our interest by email and messages," Rigi told the station.

MKO is listed as a terrorist organization by the US, Iran, and Iraq. Nevertheless, the US government has still not classified Jundullah as a proscribed terrorist organization.

July 11, 2009 0 comments
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The MEK and Jundullah

Rajavi-Rigi, a stereotypical image of terrorist alliance

Abdulmalik Rigi, the leader of the terrorist group of Jundullah in an interview with Rangarang TV has acknowledged his relations with MKO and the fact that he had received information from Rajavi-Rigi, a stereotypical image of terrorist allianceRajavi before launching terrorist attacks in Zahedan (an Iranian city) ending in 25 dead and tens of injured. There are some significant points to be noted in his statements:

1.The silence of the organization on these statements proves its complicity in these attacks and an approbation of Rigi’s statements.

2.International bodies and the EU in particular are responsible for illegal activities of MKO.

3.Human rights organs, England and its supreme court as well as the western advocates of Mojahedin who have prompted MKO’s removal from the terrorist lists have to be held responsibile of these terrorist perpetrations.

The extent to which the statements of Abdulmalik Rigi on his relationship with MKO are enforceable depends first of all on the will and desire of Western politicians, organs and governments. It has to be pointed out that removing the name of Mojahedin from the EU terrorist list was basically coupled with the claims that the group had stopped its terrorist activities since June 2001.

However, there are many evidences disregarded by the judges that the organization has committed various terrorist attacks since then. This negligence, knowingly or unknowingly, implies that proving the terrorist nature of the organization is more a matter of political considerations than mere truth. Therefore, all attempts for showing the contradictions of this vote seems futile and even may pave the way for the organization to cooperate with other problematic trends in committing terrorist attacks against Iranian citizens.

The statements of Rigi at a time when MKO insists to remove its name form the terrorist list of the US State Department indicates that Mojahedin are well aware of mechanisms and levers to play with westerners. They realize the fact that the process of making any decision in the global scene is a long one when time has a determining role in their future. In other words, labeling a group as a terrorist one or removing it from terrorist lists necessitates a long process and time is the Achilles’ heel of international bodies misused by MKO under several pretexts.

Another point is that Mojahedin have always acted paradoxically. As they chant pro-democratic slogans, they rely in practice on their terrorist and violent levers and principles. However, they do so in a way unfamiliar for the culture of the West. For example, along with their removal from the EU terrorist list, they commemorated the events of 30 Khordad (20 June) as a symbol of the initiation of their terrorist activities. Furthermore, they respect armed struggle and emphasize that the achievement of their objectives is impossible unless through armed struggle, terror, and violence. They also accuse the critics of armed struggle, make threats against them and finally claim that they have been oppressed while they spare no effort for provoking violence and terrorism in the region.

Abdulmalik Rigi refers to a key point on the present situation of the organization. He implies that the reason why Mojahedin have stopped their armed struggle at the time being is that they have encountered a cul-de-sac in Iraq as well as Auver-sur-Oise rather than making a decision for changing their policy. As he states:

Of course we’d like to do whatever they (Mojahedin) are after, we can perform something and they can do something else. We are able to transfer their members but I think they have some limitations in this regard and cannot make any movement in their [host] countries.

Evidently, what he means by things to perform is terrorist attacks like those carried out in Iranian Province of Zahedan and killing innocent citizens and the role of Rajavi would be transferring information, planning the attacks and finally hiding behind the EU and initiating propaganda blitz. According to Rigi, the organization has been mired in Iraq and cannot take any action. It also refrains to consent to the transfer of its forces to Iran by Rigi for committing terrorist activities since Mojahedin have been disarmed in Iraq and all their activities and movements are under the severe control of Iraqi government. They can neither pursue their terrorist actions in France at the time being since they are after using international pressure-levers for seeking refuge therein. However, they cannot conceal their aggressive and violent nature and make their best to instigate those like Rigi to envenom the atmosphere inside Iran.

In this way, Rajavi can both pursue his objectives in Europe to convince international bodies and grab at his old strategy of armed struggle and violence. The statements of Rigi imply that his future activities may be plotted and organized by Rajavi too. Whatever the extent of the simple-mindedness, simplicity, and optimism of the Europeans on turning a terrorist group into a political party, they have to take a realistic position toward an organization that never consent to revise its deeply rooted organizational principles and manifestos due to a variety of extremely ideological, strategic, political, psychological, cultic, egocentric, totalitarian, and egoistic leanings. In Mojahedin’s terminology, terrorism has a different definition. They believe violence improves the value of their struggle for freedom and democracy. That is to say, when they perform, or glorify, violent acts upon others, they attempt to raise or defend their organizational or collective value as seen through their own eyes. No problem, let the outsiders call it terrorism or whatever they like!

July 11, 2009 0 comments
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Former members of the MEK

The red-line discriminating between word and action in suicide operation

An interview with Batool Soltani on MKO self-immolations – Part six
Sahar Family Foundation: Will you please specifically recount instances of what can be defined as classified information?

Batool Soltani: Well, what can be specifically referred to are those information that supply details on the locations of headquarters within Auver-sur-Oise and Camp Ashraf. That is to say, any geographical, security detail about these and other camps mostly concerning the compounds of the leadership. There is much more related information; the extent of security measures for the entrance and the control of inter-organizational affairs, the whereabouts of cadres situated inside the camps and their hierarchical relations, and information about those organizationally permitted to pass in or out of these places. Regular and irregular visits of these places by the leadership, the setting plan of the buildings and the sections in the camps and the people positioned in them, how the security systems work to control the cadres’ shifts and what are the defensive measures, human or mechanically controlled, to reduce or counter threats from the outside are all instances of classified information. Of other instances to name are the existing differences within the Auver-sur-Oise and Camp Ashraf, the security check-points to ensure safe passage in and out, internal offices that verify the validity of the passports and visas, the rankings in the charge of controlling and issuing ID cards for individuals to enter the camps or the cadres who leave on missions. Anybody entering Mojahedin’s enclave is regarded to have passed over the red-line of a highly secretive boundary that is totally concealed from the outside world.

SFF: We will talk on the issue further later on. But now let’s have a look on the issue that any suicide operation inevitably has its own consequences. The aggressive kind, for example, will willingly or unwillingly lead to the death of some innocents in the vicinity. For instance, when the organization plotted suicide operations to assassin the leaders of Friday-Prayer, many other innocent crowds were perished along with the main target. I want to know how does the organization justify such deeds and who are in charge of deciding to stop or carry out these operations. Better to say, where lays the drawn red-line that justifies such operations?

BS: Your question can be answered from many angles. First, we have to ascertain how the organization and Rajavi in particular draw the red-line between the word and theory for carrying out these operations. Second, we have to see to what extent the words are actually practical, and third, what is the position of the leadership concerning what should not have actually happened and how he has treated with the disobedient. They are all related to understand the question and its different aspects. First of all, the red-line and instances are drawn just by the leadership and all operational ranks have to submit to it. Nobody dispatched for an operation can defy Rajavi’s drawn red-line and any operation team knows well that accomplishment of mission eclipses any other priority. Now, it is important to distinguish between Rajavi’s red-line of word and action. The red-line in Rajavi’s word is taking heed of protecting the life and property of the public who have no role in the operations as well as public buildings and passages. Interestingly, no saboteur is permitted to desist from the plotted operation just because he/she is overstepping the red-line. The only person with the authority to halt the operations is Masoud Rajavi himself.

Now, the question is, and only Rajavi can give a proper answer, how it is possible exactly to stop crossing the red-line in the course of an operation that has to be unquestionably performed and which only Rajavi himself can order to be halted. The context and setting of some of these operations invariably requires sacrifice of innocent people in the vicinity. Once, for example, when a terror team was sent to assassin Asadollah Lajevardi in Tehran’s bazaar, the role of crowds in the bazaar can never be underestimated since they play the role of a deterrent factor both while targeting the victim and when escaping from the scene; there are always people in the scene who may in an automatic reaction interfere or hinder and the assassins see no other way but to shoot at them to open the way or one may come between the assassin and the target. Naturally, there are two options; either you have to abandon the operation and escape or accomplish the mission regardless of violating the red-line with whatever casualty.

The latter requires that you have to be serious in completely obliterating any obstacle on the way. And Rajavi himself knows all these truths that it is impossible to carry out an operation of assassination without harming other innocents. It is the same case with suicide operations with the difference that the agent knows he/she hardly returns alive which greatly helps to violate the red-lines. But in the former, a hope fosters in the assassin that he/she may escape the scene with the aid of people, a hope instilled into him/her by the organization itself. As a result, the assassin tries to tie his/her destiny to a little of overstepping the red-line since the organization had falsely ensured him/her that people would create a protecting shield for a member of the organization to escape safely. But it differs in a suicide operation; here the accomplishment of the operation is of the higher significance than the number of the casualties present at the scene. Besides, the suicide is no more alive to be counted responsible for the innocent killed. Thus, this kind of operation is excluded from our issue of discourse and remains the kind after which the team has to necessarily return to its base after the operation.

When Rajavi plotted assassination of people like Lajevardi or the army commander Sayad Shirazi, he knew well that killing was an inseparable part of a planned operation which could never be fulfilled unless through homicide. Then, it is absolutely absurd if he maneuvers and insists on vocalized principles of his drawn red-line since the nature of these operations necessitate killing and blood-shed. Consequently, the assassin is not the authority to decide to stop or continue, he/she is only executing a killing plan drawn by somebody else watching the operation from many hundred kilometers away. It is really in absolute contradiction to Rajavi’s stated red-line and out of the control of the operatives. At the end, we see that there is nobody to be held responsible for violation of the red-line that has caused many innocent deaths; in fact, it is one of those Rajavi’s adopted childish tactics.

Now let’s see what are Rajavi and the organization’s reaction against operation teams that may have inadvertently violated the red-lines in the course of the operation. Here, the operatives may have been killed, arrested or returned. But, in any case, they are not the ones to be held responsible but their commander in charge of the operation. Rajavi severely reprimands them for the killings that are considered a violation of the stated red-lines. Of course, he is well aware of the fact that he is the sole one to be held responsible for the crime, but that is how he deals with the fallout and condemns others calling them inefficient and else. But nothing more happens and nobody is punished and all ends in a room in an outburst of humiliating words and sever reprimand because all know that Rajavi himself had practically a better understanding of what might happen and which he had implicitly given his seal of approval to cross his own drawn red-lines. But somebody has to be held responsible for mere formality who, of course, fails to be the leadership. I have to add that such a performance of formality runs only when the organization is disclosed by undeniable facts that tie it to the incident which it must be held accountable for. However, in many other cases, the success of the operation never lets anything else take a back seat and overshadows anything that more often fails to be ever mentioned and is of marginal interest to the organization.
To be continued
Sahar Family Foundation, Baghdad, July 08, 2009
Translated by Mojahedin.ws

July 9, 2009 0 comments
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Mujahedin Khalq; A proxy force

How cost effective is western support for the MKO ?

How cost effective is western support for the Mojahedin Khalq (MKO, MEK, NCRI, …)?
Following the Iranian election, some in the western media gave their assessment; the ensuing popular protests conducted by ordinary people in Iran following the presidential election had “failed”.

Of course, ‘failure’ indicates that there was some prior agreed aim or achievement, which in this case was not fulfilled. And there can be little doubt in anyone’s mind that what these ‘experts’ mean is that what the Iranian people ‘failed’ to achieve was regime change.

In fact, recent events have exposed, if nothing else, that the real failure has been in outsiders’ understanding and assessment of Iranian society and politics.

Looking at Iran from outside and through the lens of ‘regime change’ has led many western analysts and politicians to a false perception of the country – one based on wishful thinking rather than facts on the ground.

Perhaps it is this generally upheld false perception which has allowed American politicians, in particular, to convince themselves to pursue unhelpful – even damaging – policies aimed at ‘supporting’ Iranian people’s desires for social change and political progress. This has continued for some time in spite of clear calls from Iranians themselves (many in the USA) to stop funding so-called ‘opposition’ groups – among which it has become axiomatic that American support for your cause is the ‘kiss of death’.

There is, however, one group which has actively courted American support and which indeed is entirely dependent upon it because it has no constituency among Iranians, whether inside or outside the country. Of all the CIA backed ‘regime change’ groups, the nefarious Mojahedin-e Khalq is markedly different. For one thing, the group is profoundly unpopular among right thinking Iranians wherever they live and whatever their politics. Indeed in western countries, post-election protestors of all persuasions have angrily and vigorously expelled MKO activists from their demonstrations. The roots of this unpopularity certainly go back to the MKO’s collaboration with Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war. But it can also be traced to the MKO’s ideological belief in violence, its quasi-religious status and its use of cult methodology to recruit and maintain its membership.

To cover up this lack of support the MKO held its annual ‘bigger than ever’ June 20 commemoration rally in Paris in order to ‘prove’ its credentials. The fact that it has to pay attendees and that it reports attendance at around 1000% greater than the capacity of the venue does not embarrass the group or its backers.

It may seem strange, even in the context of American ‘interfering politics’, that such an unpopular group has western backers. But clearly the MKO offers something which no other group does. In simple terms the MKO offers Camp Ashraf in Iraq.

Camp Ashraf was established by MKO leader Massoud Rajavi and Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war and remains the MKO’s main ideological and military training base.

What makes the MKO unique in the context of external opposition to the Islamic Republic of Iran is the group’s willingness to use violence. In all its bases, but in Camp Ashraf in particular, the group’s members are indoctrinated using cult methodology inthe group’s ideology of violence and self-sacrifice so that they will perform acts of violence, terrorism and assassination to order without question.

This naturally renders them a valuable asset for any external enemy of the IRI which is prepared to fund and facilitate that violence.

No wonder the regime change proponents refuse to let the group follow its natural path of diminution and dissolution. No wonder the American Army was tasked with protecting and maintaining the group in Iraq even after the same force had disarmed the group as a foreign terrorist entity in 2003, and even though the MKO has been on America’s own terrorism list since 1997.

So far so logical. But where the logic falls down is in the detail and that detail is the MKO’s actual track record. For thirty years the MKO has carved out a niche for itself by preying on the Iranian people’s legitimate struggle against the narrow constraints imposed on them by their successive governments by posing for an ignorant and gullible western audience as a their leading cohort.

Although allegedly implicated in the recent violence in Iran and in Sweden, in reality over the past thirty years the MKO has been unable to effect any change whatsoever inside Iran through any means. The group’s last viable attempt to overthrow the ruling system was in 1988 with the Eternal Light operation. The attempt failed and thousands of MKO civilians lost their lives. Since then the group has been impotent and has done little more than launch irritant terrorist attacks into Iran from neighbouring Iraq. (Ironically, Maryam Rajavi recently donned a green scarf supposedly to signal to Mir Hossein Moussavi’s supporters that she is ‘on their side’. The MKO appear to have conveniently forgotten that Mr Moussavi was Iran’s Prime Minister in 1988.)

Currently the Iraqi Government is acting upon its legal obligation to remove all foreign terrorist groups from the country. This means the MKO’s base Camp Ashraf is in the process of being dismantled. The former militants living there will be removed to third countries; namely Europe. Of course, the removal of Camp Ashraf does not mean that the MKO will no longer be able to provide mercenary forces for regime change proponents. The MKO’s foreign terrorists will relocate to Europe and will have to adapt their tactics accordingly.

What the MKO’s western backers might want to consider is the cost effectiveness of continued support for a group which has nothing but self-promoting propaganda to show for itself after thirty years.
By Ann Singleton

July 9, 2009 0 comments
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Saudi Arabia

Saudi intelligence chief meets Rajavi

Saudi intelligence chief meets Rajavi looking for an office to create move his terror base
Saudi intelligence chief Prince Muqrin bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, met recently in the Jordanian capital, Amman, Masoud Rajavi, head of the MKO terrorist organization, which the Iranians call "hypocrites."

Center of Islamic Haramain, according to informed sources, reported that Rajavi and some of the leaders of the organization who have left Iraq for Jordan in order to move to European capitals and take political asylum, met with a number of intelligence officials of Israel, Saudi Arabia, as well as Jordan, US and France.

The sources added that Saudi intelligence chief and head of terrorist Mujahedeen, Masoud Rajavi, disscused the latest incidents in Iran, and organizing projects for future iranian regime but Muqrin postponed a decision for Rajavi’s request to open an office of his organization in Riyadh to discuss the matter with other senior Saudi officials, while other reports say that Egypt In agreement with Saudi Arabia has offered to open an office for the Organization in Cairo.

July 9, 2009 0 comments
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