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Mujahedin Khalq; A proxy force

Terrorism and British hypocrisy

On 22 June, British lawmakers removed the Mujahedin-e-Khalq Organization (MKO) from the UK’s list of banned terror groups, after a seven-year campaign by the organization.

Legislators approved the decision of the Court of Appeal, which ruled in May that the MKO, which has been guilty of many bloody terrorist attacks in Iran for 30 years, should no longer be listed as a proscribed group.

It killed several of Iran’s new leaders in the early years after the 1979 revolution and backed Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein in the 1980-1988 war with Iran.

According to a recent speech by Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki, the group has killed over 16,000 people in and outside Iran, including one president, one prime minister, four ministers and dozens of parliamentarians. Its terrorist activities are being carried out even today.

Recently, Iranian authorities arrested a group of MKO operatives for the assassination of Sheikh Hashem Samiri, a Friday prayers leader in the city of Ahvaz. Many of its members are wanted by the International Criminal Police Organization, Interpol.

The decision gives the group more freedom to organize and raise money in Britain. “After so many years of waiting, so many years of campaigning, so many setbacks and frustrations, at last our government has seen the light,” said Baroness Angela Harris, a House of Lords peer who backed the move.

British Home Office minister Tony McNulty said that the government had unsuccessfully appealed against the Court of Appeal’s decision because of the group’s violent past.

“The MKO admitted responsibility for a number of horrendous crimes carried out against the Iranian people, both civilian and military targets,” McNulty said.

The MKO is considered a terrorist organization by the US and the European Union so it is subject to an EU-wide assets freeze. However, its supporters say they now expect the EU to review the MKO’s status following the decision by the British court and lawmakers.

“I think it would be strange if they did not follow our lead,” Lord Steven Bassam said.

It is noteworthy to point out that a 2007 German intelligence report from the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution called the MKO a “repressive, sect-like and Stalinist authoritarian organization which centers around the personality cult of Maryam and Masoud Rajavi”.

For its part, Iran condemned as a “disgrace” the decision by Britain to lift a ban on the MKO.

“The British government’s action regarding the group of munafiqin is a disgrace and utterly condemned,” Foreign Ministry spokesman Mohammad Ali Hosseini said in a statement.

Iranian officials always refers to the MKO, which carried out a bloody wave of assassinations in Tehran in the early 1980s, as the “munafiqin,” meaning hypocrites.

“This action … is in line with London’s new policy to play with the card of terrorists to put pressure on the region’s nations and governments,” Hosseini said.

“This group is resented by Iran, Iraq and the world because of many terrorist operations it has done in these two countries,” he added.

The British decision comes at the same time as Iraq has just prohibited any contact with that group and is supporting the deportation of its members.

Dr. Ali al-Dabbagh, the Iraqi government’s spokesperson, said in a statement the Iraqi cabinet, in its regular session, deliberated MKO’s presence on Iraqi soil, its interference in Iraq’s local issues, its provocative participation against the elected Iraqi government and institutions, and its encouragement of terror against the Iraqi people”.

The remotion of the MKO from UK’s list of banned terror groups reveals the hypocrisy of the British authorities, who claim to be partners in the “war against the terror” but are willing to protect or even use terrorists in order to promote their interests in the Middle East and elsewhere.

The bloody background of the MKO is not apparently enough to persuade a British court and the Parliament that it is a terrorist organization.

It would be interesting to know if British authorities would have reached the same conclusion if the victims of the MKO ‘s actions had been British or Americans.

Press TV

August 11, 2008 0 comments
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The cult of Rajavi

Implication of Change in MKO

As stated, a cult to form a totalitarian society needs to bring about a profound change in members for achieving oneness with cult. Depending on the cult’s sphere of activity, the change is programmed under a variety of identified values to create receptivity to a new ideology.

There are countless ways and different avenues, and usually no single motivation, that drives people with different predispositions into cults. Many go to cults through their heads and some other go through their heart and emotions. However, what is of worth notification is that when a person melts in a cult, his/her whole strategy of attribution undergoes a total change and comes to believe that the new adopted ideology is the truest one in the world. There are also those who pretend to be followers because of the fearsome atmosphere of the cult and the employed measures of castigation. As Hoffer describes the converts of a cult:

Both they who convert and they who are converted by coercion need the fervent conviction that the faith they impose or are forced to adopt is the only true one. With- Jut this conviction, the proselytizing terrorist, if he is not vicious to begin with, is likely to feel a criminal, and the coerced convert see himself as a coward who prostituted his soul to live. 1

It can well be argued that as the recruits are involved in a group over a longer period of time, through the structure of the group, through new disciplines, through new behaviors and so forth, they shape a new personhood. So, it has a lot to do with when they are evaluated, and how far they’ve come from where they were before. It is the value system of the cults that attracts people to choose the gate opening to the most desired and optimal option; being it an avenue to salvation or terrestrial utopia.

Being recognized a cult of personality after its recognition as a terrorist group, Mojahedin Khalq Organization, MKO/MEK/PMOI, has developed its own terminology of cult values to entrap new recruits and to subjugate the already activists. It borrows the characteristics of a leftist cult proselytizing under a variety of catchy mottos like revolution, social change, freedom, emancipation of women and much more. To achieve the goals, first the members have to undergo a change themselves and the change is enforced through a number of processes if they show signs of reluctance; only the leaders and high ranking cadres seem to have already been acclimated to the changes and the whole body of the rank and file had to suffer the crushing pressure of the changing processes.

Some may question that why MKO insists on compelling the members to adapt themselves to the required changes? It has to be pointed out that MKO’s theoreticians of the group’s internal ideological revolution believe that any system of value has to be tested in a miniature model of society, the organization itself, before being generalized for the actual, real society and overpowering the ruling political power. But the first organizational objectives can be numerated as:

1- To destabilize members’ power of thinking in the face of critical circumstances

2- To prepare for change in the exterior milieu

3- To block members’ contact with the outside world

4- To prevent internal antagonistic moves against the made decisions

5- To get members ready for committing whatever command

6- To grow in members the illusion of being on the right path

7- To detect suspected infiltrators

8- To enforce unquestionable submission and total devotion to the leadership

9- To detach members from all personal attachments

10- To instill into members that they are safe until they are consistent with collective organizational identity

The organization strongly believes that the authority of change is beyond questioning and it is the most urgent task to be accomplished because:

1. It is essential for any ideological alteration

2. It is to legitimize organizational identity

3. It is the criterion to determine ideological disobedience

4. Being passive against it equals to becoming passive and slanting to enemy

5. Any reluctance to undergo it means being overpowered by anti-revolutionary, bourgeois attributes

6. vAnd finally, submission to change means an everlasting attraction towards the pole of the ideological leadership

Once Massoud Rajavi said “the effect indicates the cause”. He meant to say that change sets up the base for the continuation and legitimacy of the organization and it has to be ascertained within the organization through a change in ideological principles and teachings. It eventually crystallized into a cult. The ideological revolution set the door open for the change and Rajavi insisted it was a rebirth that all members necessarily had to go through it:

All have to experience this rebirth. All the sins you have committed comes to an end. Either you leave or accent to change. Make sure nobody remains but revolutionized among the real Mojahedin. Except those who may have not be informed. 2

Rajavi would compare the ideological revolution to a forge wherein the members had to be melted and reshaped as he desired them:

This [ideological revolution] is to test you; we need iron men. We seek new versions of power and capacity. Those Mojahedin who pass through this forge will be more rough and resistant. 3

As stated earlier, it was not a change only intended for the organization but aimed to encompass a grater milieu out of the organization:

Because of the fundamental role of this value system [ideological revolution] in ideology in general, the extent of the consequent changes within it included all the reactions and the individual- organization relations with the widespread scene of social and political sphere. 4

Thus, the ideological revolution turns into a standard to measure the members’ fidelity and commitment to the organization and leadership:

It is the ideological gauge that decides how good you are, and you are bad to the extent of the criticism you receive, and your power of dynamism depends on the change you undergo. 5

The ideological revolution before being considered an extraordinary way of initiating change in Mojaheidn Organization can well be defined as an internal coup d’état to accomplish Rajavi’s own ambitions and promoting him to the highest and unbeatable status of a hegemonic leader and even above that. Explained by Anne Singleton:

It [ideological revolution] is now operating around a pseudo-religious ideology for which Rajavi is the deity. Was the change necessary? Did they have to change in order to survive? It is possible to argue that any organisation has a degree of organic and dynamic change built into it. Also, that it must be flexible enough to make pragmatic alterations to the way it operates as a consequence of both the world it exists in and the demands of the situation it is in direct relation to. But the Mojahedin has done almost the opposite of what could have been expected. Rather than change in response to external demands, the organisation has wilfully ignored these and instead, obeying its own internal dynamic, rendered itself more and more distant from any constituency it might possibly have previously had recourse to for support. This internal dynamic is controlled directly by Rajavi himself and it demands that the organisation, down to every last member, must be kept totally and unquestioningly obedient to him. 6

References:

1. Eric Hoffer; The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements, New York: First Perennial Classics 2002, p. 99.

2. Massoud Rajavi’s speech in Paris, 1985.

3. Ibid.

4. Niyabati, Bijan; A different look at the internal ideological revolution within MKO, Khavaran publication.

5. Mahdi Abrishamchi’s speech on ideological revolution, 1985.

6. Anne Singleton; Saddam’s Private Army, Iran-Interlink, 2003.

August 11, 2008 0 comments
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Mujahedin Khalq Organization as a terrorist group

Mojahedin Khalq to be put in UK terrorist list once again

Lawmaker: Mojahedin Khalq (MKO, MEK, Rajavi cult) to be put in UK terrorist list once again

An Iranian lawmaker said here Friday that the terrorist Mujahideen Khalq Organization (MKO) will be put in the UK terrorist list once again.

Member of the Majlis National Security and Foreign Policy Commission Javad Karimi said a number of the UK parliamentarians had in a meeting with several members of his Commission said the UK parliament and government will follow the European Union in putting the MKO in their terrorist list once again soon.

The `Habilian Center’, which groups bereaved families of those martyred in terrorist incidents, quoted Karimi as saying that current term of Majlis has become more diplomatically active than its predecessors and intends to make maximum use its potential.

He hoped that London will soon rectify its past mistake so that suitable bilateral relations are built.

As for Iran’s parliamentary diplomacy to secure the MKO expulsion from Iraq, Karimi said on Iraqi people’s request, the issue of MKO expulsion from Iraq has become an axis of the Iran-Iraq diplomacy over the past years and this is the point on which Iraqi resident, prime minister and lawmakers have repeatedly laid emphasis.

He said Americans try to prevent materialization of the goal but judicially speaking, they are not in a much influential position and not much time remains until MKO expulsion from Iraq.

After the MKO members’ expulsion from Iraq, Iran will follow up the issue of the grouplet leaders’ hand over to Iranian judicial authorities and if necessary, they should be tried at the Hague as war criminals.

On the MKO activities in Jordan, he said since they know they will be expelled from Iraq, the MKO try to go to Jordan.

Despite a few number of Jordanian policy makers’ support for the MKO, the Jordanian government and nation are not willing to keep a number of notorious terrorists, he concluded.

August 11, 2008 0 comments
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Former members of the MEK

An Urgent Appeal

An Urgent Appeal, for Actions and Initiatives on behalf of Iranians in limbo in Iraq; in Defense of Human Rights and the Right to Asylum

Tragedy is too often the stuff of literature. The majority of people worldwide,Urgent Appeal try to avoid persons and situations that are shaped by too great a tragedy, concentrating instead on that which is simple and promises some easy resolution

Yet activists are literary figures. They concentrate on human tragedies, not shying away from multi-dimensional problems and readily working towards difficult solutions.

In a region increasingly marked with tragedy , perhaps no story is more tragic than that of the former members of the Iranian Mojahedin Khalq Organization (MKO), who wish to leave their state of limbo in war ravaged Iraq, can not return to Iran and hope for safety, and have not yet managed to gain asylum to any other corner of this earth.

The Iranian poet Shamlou – in his poem “Public Love” – talks of the dead of the year 1953 being the most loving of the living. And we have often repeated this when talking of those who have given their lives in any given year in the still ongoing struggle for freedom and human rights in Iran.

And yet one group of men and women, driven away by the unmet promise of the Iranian people’s revolution and told that if they loved their country and people well enough, they would give up everything and take up arms for just six short months, sought to prove this love by doing just this.

Security, jobs and children even were left behind, as these often young men and women – and some teenagers – left for Iraq , from where this struggle was to take shape.

Yet, each six month term was to be followed up with another, and they who had sought an alternative to two dictatorships within their own country, became victims of their leader’s power fantasies (which with time went as far as forcing all to divorce their partners and ban all other love – except the love for the one power – out of their very hearts) , Saddam Hossein’s war games , and the mind control, punishment routine , beatings and torture by their comrades!

And as the report released in 2005 by Human Rights Watch noted, there was “NO EXIT”![1] They were denied even the freedom to defect or leave. And so they were kept at Camp Ashraf in Iraq until this was turned into Camp “TIPF” , under the charge of US American forces. As hard at conditions were at Camp “TIPF”, with its recent closing the situation of these individuals became even more desperate.

Today, understanding the great and multi-faceted tragedy of these lives held in limbo and under extremely harsh and inhumane conditions , we deem it our responsibility to come to the defense of these fellow Iranians as well as to the defense of the legitimate rights of all political asylum seekers in Iraq. And we call upon all activists and defenders of human rights as well as political organs and organizations to familiarize themselves with this tragedy and – with us – to attempt to bring about a humane solution..

Iran National front – Europe (Germany); Summer 2008

The Following is a list of some of these former MKO members who are now in a state of limbo in Iraq, following the very recent closing of camp “TIPF”. Of these, 35 have been able to leave Iraq and are yet still in search of a destination.

 

Ebrahim Bolochi

Ebrahim Rahimi

Abolfazl Dehnamaki

Ahad Omidvar

Ahmad Soleimani

Ahmad Shahbazi

Ahmad Sehat

Ahmad Gharamohammadi

Ahmad Minai

Ahmad (pseudo name: Mehdi Ranjbar)

Ardeshir Baghbani

Arash Ahmadian

Esfandiyar Bakhshi

Esmail Momeni

Esmail Hooshyar

Afshin Gharatapeh

Iraj Golalipour

Iraj Mousavi

Parviz Derakshan

Parviz Ranjbar

Parviz Farahmand

Parviz Mousavi

Tohid

Jaber Tai Samirami

Jamal Azimi

Javad Assadi

Hamed Sarafpour

Hojatollah Rostampour

Hojatollah Kafai

Hassan Piransar

Hassan Nemati (Safar)

Hossein Bakhshalizadeh

Hossein Bazrpour

Hossein Borojani

Hossein Rezai

Hossein Zendegi

Hossein Mehravar

Hamzeh Tomari

Hamidreza Sistani

Hamidreza Karimi

Hamid Abdolghafari

Hamid Fellahat

Hamid Mohebi

Hamid Naji

Khosrow Dehani

Davoud Razavi

Dormohammad Dehani

Rayan Petrosian

Rahim Khodagholi

Reza Azmodeh

Reza Zand

Reza Mohammadi (Mehrtash)

Ramezan Ghorbanzadeh

Ramezan Mohammadinasab

Rouzbeh Kurdi

Soleiman Kheyri

Siavash Biyabani

Siavash Saidnia

Seyed Abbas Moussavi

Cyrus Taefi

Cyrus Vafa

Shokrollah Mohammadi

Shahab Ekhtiyari

Shirin Masratbakhsh

Sadegh Khorshidi

Sadegh Zohouri

Abedin Janbaz

Adel Kheyri

Adel Matlabi

Abdolamir Sayahi

Abdolsatar Jahangiri

Abdolkarim Mohammadtaghinejad

Abdollah Nikbakht Tabrizi

Ali Ahmadi

Aliakbare Bojari

Ali Bakhsh-afarinande (Reza Gooran)

Ali Barzegar

Ali Jahanifard

Ali Khademan

Alireza Shahmoradiyan

Ali Abdollahi

Ali Mohammad Baloch

Ali Moghadas

Ali Mirahmadi

Ali Miri

Alireaz Goyande

Alireza Mozenzade Tabrizi

Omad Bagheri

Gholamreza Asghari

Gholamreza Rezai

Gholamreza Kermani

Farzin Fasihi

Farshid Farsat

Farhad Bazrafshan

Firooz Karegar

Kambiz Taghipour

Kaveh Pourhamadani

Karam Eslami

Kamal Mousavi

Kiakavoos Amirahmadi

Keyvan Rastbin

Michael Petrosian

Majid Rouhi

Majid Shabani

Mohsen Abdolkhani

Mohsen Abdollahi

Mohammad Ebrahim Rahimi

Mohammad Amir Raisi

Mohammad Taghi Ansari

Mohamad Tehrani

Mohammad Hossein Yousefi

Mohmmad Dadjou

Mohammad Dostdar

Mohammad Razaghi

Mohammad Reza Hosseini

Mohammad Saadooni

Mohammad Sahebi

Mohammad Ali Ahmadi

Mohammad Ghale-joghi

Mohammad Karami

Mohammad Yousef Charezahi

Mahmoud Bayat

Mahmoud Khaleghi

Mahmoud Eynaki

Morteza Mohajer

Masoud Zarghami

Moustafa Heydari

Moustafa Shafiie

Mansour Asari

Mansour Keshmiri

Manouchehr Khodadadi

Mehdi Barjeste Garmaroudi

Mehdi Abbaszadeh

Mehdi Fazollahi

Mehdi Nikbakht

Mehrdad Abdolvand

Mehrdad Fathi

Mehrdad Vosoghi

Mousa Marzban

Mirbagher Sedaghati

Nader Keshtkar

Nader Naderi

Nadali Rahimi

Nasrollah Azari

Norouz Tavakol

Hadi Afshar (pseudo name: Said Jamali)

Hashem Ostovar

Homayou Kaviani

Vahid Karami

Younes Hassanpour

List compiled on 15.08.2008

[1]For more information please read: http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/mena/iran0505/1.htm

August 11, 2008 0 comments
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Mujahedin Khalq; A proxy force

US and the MEK: Blurring friends and enemies

The United States of America has consistently and historically championed itself as a preeminent nation in the world. However, since recent international and domestic events left the US in a more precarious position, they are desperately making friends with unlikely groups.

Post 9/11 US Befriending the MEK or MKO

President George W. Bush, his administration, and the mass media have carried the banner of an age-old mantra post-September 11, 2001: “The enemy of my enemy is my friend.” Along with this mantra, the aforementioned have also propagated a polarizing theory with public statements declaring, “You’re either with us, or against us.”

However, political situations are not always so black and white – but neither are friends and enemies.

The relationship between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the US has remained strained since the 1953 British and US Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) orchestrated coup d’état of Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddeq, who had aims of nationalizing Iran’s oil. Along with the following 1979 Islamic Revolution and ensuing 444-day student takeover of the US embassy in Tehran, Iran and the US continued to grow apart and remain isolated from one another.

US-Iranian political atmosphere and dominant American philosophies have encouraged the US government to forge a friendship with an Iranian opposition group that is living in exile, the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK, MKO or PMOI for the People’s Mujahedin of Iran).

BBC’s Newsnight on January 17, 2007 uncovered an offer that Tehran sent to Washington in 2003, stating Iran would abandon supporting Hamas and Hezbollah if the Western countries would ensure the MEK be disbanded. Many officials in the US government saw an enormous potential of working with Iran, but the offer was stopped in its tracks by Vice President Dick Cheney – and remained unsigned.

Instead of attempting to bridge the gaps between Iran and the US, the American government has been funding the MEK under a guise of ‘democracy promotion’ in Iran. Reported amounts of money differ, but consider the following:

July 16, 2008 the House of Representative’s Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs met to go over the 2009 International Affairs budget. Noted in a section, Function 150, was $65 million allocated as Economic Support Funds For Iran. Included in this same section, was $1.2 million to launch US-backed Radio Free Europe (a.k.a Radio Liberty Azerbaijani) broadcasts into Iran.

Jason Leopold, of The Public Record, wrote on July 10, 2008 that Congress has appropriated over $120 million to fund ‘democracy promotion’ projects inside Iran.

Investigative journalist and Pulitzer Prize winner, Seymour Hersh, revealed in his July 7, 2008 article for The New Yorker that the US has been operating with a covert budget of $400 million, he writes, for plans to “destabilize the country’s religious leadership.” This information was found in a highly classified Presidential Finding that “focused on undermining Iran’s nuclear ambitions and trying to undermine the government through regime change working with opposition groups and passing money.” Hersh also writes that both the CIA and American Special Operations groups have had “long-standing ties” to the MEK.

A Pentagon consultant told Hersh “the MEK has no CPA [Certified Public Accountant] auditing the books, and its leaders are thought to have been lining their pockets for years. If people only knew what the MEK is getting, and how much is going to its bank accounts – and yet it is almost useless for the purposes the [US] Administration intends.”

Even if this is true, the US steams ahead with its aid to the Mujahedin. Congressmen Bob Filner (D-CA) and Tom Tancredo (R-CO) co-chair a bi-partisan Iran Human Rights and Democracy Caucus – which is the main group lobbying for MEK support and removal from the US list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations.

Most recently Representative Tancredo stated in the House of Representatives that “it’s time to take the handcuff’s off the MEK” on July 14, 2008. At the same meeting, Rep. Filner claimed “the MEK provided significant intelligence that helped blow the whistle on Iran’s clandestine nuclear weapons and missile development programs” – neglecting to note that the National Intelligence Estimate deemed Iran did not have a nuclear weapons program since 2003.

Not only do Representatives Tancredo and Filner (and the rest of the MEK supporters in the US government) speak about the group as idealized forbearers of democracy, they also equate the MEK to Iranians en masse. Often times with statements like Filner’s from the aforementioned meeting, “we must…shift our support to the Iranian people” – herein he assumes the almost 70 million strong population of Iran aligns themselves with the MEK, an exiled fringe group.

The MEK in Camp Ashraf

The MEK were active in efforts to displace the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, but eventually severed their ties with followers of the Grand Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini, becoming a violent, militant opposition group inside Iran – one that carried out bombings, attacks and assassinations on both Iranian and Western targets. At the end of 1981, most MEK members were in hiding or exiled in France. In 1986, with developing Iranian-French relations, the Mujahedin were declared ‘undesirable aliens’ and relocated to Iraq.

Camp Ashraf, or Ashraf City, is north of Khalis in-between Baghdad and the Iranian border. It contains the largest consolidation of MEK members with a population around 4,000.

The 2003 US invasion of Iraq included air strikes on the Mujahedin. After the two parties came to terms on a ceasefire, in June 2003 US forces claim to have successfully disarmed Camp Ashraf. In tandem, seven US agencies screened individuals in Ashraf for past terrorist activities. A July 6, 2008 Washington Post article mentioned the FBI fingerprinted 3,800 individuals, and more than 40 already had previous records of known criminality in the FBI’s database.

Despite this finding, the American government concluded the Mujahedin did not have a terrorist basis, and the members of Ashraf City would be protected citizens under the Fourth Geneva Convention in July 2004. On the contrary, the MEK remains among 42 groups on the US State Department’s list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) since 1997. Their status on the list has to be renewed every 2 years, suggesting the US has consistently re-categorized the MEK as a terrorist group for over a decade.

Again, regardless of an FTO classification, the large monetary endowments from the US have allowed the MEK to turn Ashraf from a shanty desert town into a camp “made up of a complex of roads and buildings. It contains all sorts of educational, social and sports facilities. These include 4 Olympic size swimming pools, a shopping centre, a zoo, a park, 2 universities, a full size football pitch, a mosque and even a cemetery” – boasted MEK literature handed out at an Iran Human Rights and Democracy Caucus meeting on February 11, 2008.

The Mujahedin on the Terrorist List

Seeking legitimacy, the MEK is actively campaigning to be removed from lists designating it as a terrorist group.

After 7 years of efforts in the United Kingdom, the British Court of Appeals upheld the Proscribed Organizations Appeal Commission ruling that the MEK is not a terrorist organization in May 2008. The ruling was based on the finding that the court lacked evidence to conclude the MEK would resort to terror tactics in the future.

This de-listing means the group now has more freedom to meet, fund-raise, and conduct their operations. For example, one month after the British ruling, the Paris-based National Council Resistance of Iran (the umbrella group of which the Mujahedin is the main part) held a rally outside of Paris where many political figures were present to show solidarity.

How do the MEK represent themselves? They claim to be nonviolent, advocate a democratic, pluralist and secular system of government; advocate normalized relations with all the governments of the region and the world; advocate elimination of all forms of discrimination against religious and ethnic minorities; guarantee the individual and social rights stipulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; guarantee the separation of Church and State; and guarantee autonomy for Iranian Kurds. They also contend to have a ‘president in waiting,’ Maryam Rajavi, for the fulfillment of MEK’s ultimate goal: overthrowing the current Iranian government.

Conveniently ignored is a historical viewpoint of the group, an explanation of why they were exiled from Iran or justifications for their terror listing over time in various nations. Such as the May 2005 Human Rights Watch report that the MEK are rampant in human rights violations, naming them a ‘cult’ that runs ‘prison camps’ in Iraq, implementing physical and psychological abuse to prevent members from leaving.

All in all, a group with governmental overthrow as their main objective combined with a consistent terrorist designation would make a least likely ally, if the US considered it rationally.

A Misguided Union

Desperate with a bad economy, high oil prices, a sub-prime market lending debacle that is only worsening, wars waging on in Iraq and Afghanistan, and a US budget that will reach a record $482 billion in the upcoming year according to Bloomberg – the US is grappling for a way out.

Americans should be opening dialogue with the Iranian government, not opposition groups, as many believe that Iranian engagement in Iraq is the primary stabilizing factor that could allow a US withdrawal.

However, the MEK have become a friend of convenience, but not a friend offering any promising outcomes. Especially in a time where both Iran and the US have mounting levels of distrust for one another; how would supporting an enemy of Iran make Iran want to be a co-operative friend to the US?

By Nina Hamedani

August 11, 2008 0 comments
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The cult of Rajavi

The Concept of Change in Cults

What is of great significance in most cults, especially if they are political cults, is to design programs to and develop techniques to induce radical changes in facets of a person’s world view and subsequently to generate great conformity to organizationally specified prescriptions for behavior. Generally, as Thaler Singer suggests, “Cults tend to require members to undergo a major disruption or change in lifestyle”. Many cults put great pressure on new members to leave their families, friends, and jobs to become immersed in the group’s major purpose. This isolation tactic is one of the cults’ most common mechanisms of control and enforced dependency.

No doubt, any group of specific political, philosophical and social nature somehow tries to induce its members and followers to become immersed in the group’s major purpose. However, cults follow the same line with the exception that their employed techniques are in absolute contradiction with legitimate social purpose. The change cults focus on and tempt the members to undergo violates human and social standards and is imposed on them against their will. The process is also dominating in some political parties and organizations whose focal point is certain ideologies as in some active leftist and social parties.

In many political groups, regardless of the members’ religious and ideological commitment as well as social class and life-style, the members engage in activities outlined according to the group’s doctrine and protocol to accomplish the group’s legitimate goals. It can be said that they reach a broad consensus on struggling for the accomplishment of certain social interest while preserving their own personal penchants and faiths. Unlike them, cults’ main focus is on followers’ self-renunciation and surrender; members are required to give up all personal attachments and regular life-style and accept and submit to whatever they are called for or compelled to do. A cult’s extremity of shalt and shalt not principles depend on its sphere of activity and ideological as well as, if any, political preaching and instructions.

Drawing a difference between cults (referring to them as mass movements owith a variety of origins) and practical organizations, Hoffer explicates that:

THERE IS A FUNDAMENTAL difference between the appeal of a mass movement and the appeal of a practical organization. The practical organization offers opportunities for self-advancement, and its appeal is mainly to self-interest. On the other hand, a mass movement, particularly in its active, revivalist phase, appeals not to those intent on bolstering and advancing a cherished self, but to those who crave to be rid of an unwanted self. A mass movement attracts and holds a follower not because it can satisfy the desire for self-advancement, but because it can satisfy the passion for self-renunciation. 1

Thus, it appears that cults insist to induce change more to advance their own ends which lead to further personal decline of the members. The process of the change begins with a gradual ideological diversion and proceeds with a complete behavioral change and ends at the point where the cult dictates the smallest private affairs:

Cults are known to dictate what members wear and eat and when and where they work, sleep, and bathe as well as what they should believe, think, and say. On most matters, cults promote what we usually call black-and-white thinking, an all-or-nothing point of view. 2

The process is fulfilled most appropriately if the members are cut off from the social atmosphere and family. Life in isolation is what most cults try to encourage believers to adopt since the rationality of the outside world ceases to discourage the accomplishment of the process:

Cults tend to require members to undergo a major disruption or change in lifestyle. Many cults put great pressure on new members to leave their families, mends, and jobs to become immersed in the group’s major purpose. This isolation tactic is one of the cults’ most common mechanisms of control and enforced dependency. 3

It will be much absurd if a cult stays passive in generating change in the members. Cults are totalistic in nature and nobody accents to be under their control unless they have been totally dominated through the process of change:

Cults tend to be totalistic, or all-encompassing, in controlling their members’ behavior and also ideologically totalistic, exhibiting zealotry and extremism in their worldview. Eventually, and usually sooner rather than later, most cults expect members to devote increasing time, energy, and money or other resources to the professed goals of the group, stating or implying that a total commitment is required to reach some state such as "enlightenment." 4

In general, a totalistic cult necessarily entails emphasis on an absolute boundary between the followers and the exterior social environment so they feel fundamentally separate from the outside world. As a result, a sense of relationship is attained by forming intense identifications with the cult and moral and ideological principles are internalized as absolutes. Impulses, fantasies, behaviors and opinions not fully approved by the cult are denied and dissociated.

References:

1. Eric Hoffer; The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements, New York: First Perennial Classics 2002, p. 21.

2. Thaler Singer, Margaret; Cults in Our Midst: The Continuing Fight Against Their Hidden Menace, p. 10.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

August 11, 2008 0 comments
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Zeinab Taleb Jedi

N.Y. Judge Green-Lights Trial for Terrorism Case

N.Y. Judge Green-Lights Trial for Terrorism Case Involving Group Working With U.S. Military

A federal judge in Brooklyn has upheld a terrorism prosecution against a U.S. citizen working for a group violently opposed to the Iranian government.

Zeinab Taleb-Jedi had argued that her indictment for providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization was outrageous because the group to which she belongs, the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI), has been working with the U.S. military in Iraq.

But such are the fortunes of war, Eastern District of New York Judge Brian M. Cogan ruled in United States v. Taleb-Jedi, 06 cr. 652.

"Foreign relations generally and specifically during a time of war are not black and white, and the PMOI need not be viewed as a monolithic entity," the judge wrote. "It is perfectly permissible for the military to forge alliances with those in the PMOI with whom it wants to deal, while the Government deters through prosecution other individuals, particularly United States citizens, from rendering material support to the organization on their own."

Cogan observed that war itself is an "outrageous, but as determined by other branches of government, sometimes necessary undertaking."

Taleb-Jedi, who was born in Iran, came to the United States in 1978 and became a citizen in 1996. She worked for PMOI in America, then went to Iraq in 1999 to work at the group’s base. Among her activities were teaching English, translating documents and serving as a member of PMOI’s political department.

The U.S. State Department designated PMOI a foreign terrorist organization (listed as "Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization") in 1997, based on its involvement with assassinations and other activities targeting the Iranian government. Questioned by the Federal Bureau of Investigation after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Taleb-Jedi was arrested and charged with providing material support to the group on her return to the United States in 2006.

In addition to arguing that the prosecution should be thrown out, Taleb-Jedi also challenged her indictment on First Amendment grounds, claiming PMOI is not a terrorist organization and that she is entitled to be a member of it.

The judge said any claim that PMOI was not a terrorist organization was complicated by the group’s own acknowledgement of its involvement in assassinations and other violent activities. Moreover, he said, the group’s designation by the State Department fell within the discretion accorded the executive branch in matters of national security.

The rest of her First Amendment challenge failed because, according to the prosecution, she was an employee of PMOI rather than a mere supporter, the judge said. Freedom of speech and association, he said, did not extend to actively working on a terrorist group’s behalf, even if her duties were nonviolent.

The judge noted that many terrorist groups simultaneously engaged in education and social welfare programs. But he said, even if Taleb-Jedi’s work was in a benign area, "she may be freeing up or enabling another person to take part in something far more nefarious."

However, Cogan added, if Taleb-Jedi could advance evidence at trial showing that her participation in PMOI was more passive or explicitly nonviolent in nature, an acquittal might be warranted. For instance, he noted, if her English lessons were solely to help the group advocate before the United Nations, such conduct might not constitute material support.

Taleb-Jedi was represented by Justine Harris of Federal Defenders. In a statement, Harris said she and her client were eager to take the case before a jury.

"Ultimate resolution of many of the legal issues will depend on whether the government can sustain its allegations at trial," said Harris. "At the close of the evidence, we will all have to revisit the substantial First Amendment and Due Process issues at stake."

The government was represented by Eileen M. Decker, of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Central District of California, as well as Eastern District of New York Assistant U.S. Attorney Kellie T. Currie.

Anthony Lin  –  New York Law Journal 

August 11, 2008 0 comments
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The cult of Rajavi

A Cult Technique to Crush Antagonism

There always exist among the members of a cult or political group ones that display high level of antagonism and threaten the life of the cult or occurrence of schism. Unless cults and groups take countermeasures, the schism is inevitable. Being a cult of personality and susceptible to schism especially after the coupe d’état-like internal ideological revolution, MKO, facing increasing internal challenges, concocted excuses mainly to confront dissidents that could possibly nurture schism.

Massoud Rajavi’s marriage with his commander’s wife, Maryam Azodanloo, was considered by many to be a scandal and surfaced perversion. Being an undeniable truth, the organization developed a scenario to remodel the shaped mentality. The organization came up with the plan of organizing forced sessions of analyzing members’ political, moral and personal viewpoints about Rajavi. So complicated was the scenario that soon all antagonistic attitudes towards Rajavi floated up and the members tried to outmatch each other in demonizing and disparaging Rajavi and strongly condemned him of his eccentric deed.

Unknowingly, members were condemning themselves rather than Rajavi. The sessions meant to strongly condemn members of the guilt they had done in their past life and the way they tried to justify the vices. Explaining the process, Massoud Banisadr has stated:

This time as it was told by Masoud, we had to take him to negative infinity and accuse him of any thing which we could think of, and then judge him, if we reached to the verdict that he is not guilty, then we had to make him as mirror and this time judging ourselves. Meant accusing ourselves for the same crimes, which we accused him of. Following that we had to find our class tendencies. And our true nature, hidden under nice and gentle behaviour of ours. 1

Oddly enough, the process soon turned into a criterion to decide about qualified members for organizational promotions. The technique of eliciting confessions was practiced in collective gatherings and the members were forced to admit to their antagonistic and contradictory outlook not only about the leadership but also about other organizational issues; they had to ‘vomit their thoughts’ as the organization called it.

The sessions were somehow as if the members were on trial. The members’ confessions were enough to accuse them to demand Rajavi’s forgiveness. Feeling ashamed of accusing Rajavi, they would compose piles of recantation letters and urging Rajavi to forgive them. Ludicrous as it may seem, in many of these letters, members confessed to have been ignorant of Rajavi’s infallibility all the time. But the outcome of these trial-like sessions was critically serious:

In these hearing sessions the defendants had no advocate and besides, it was not so appropriate an atmosphere to provoke any protest; they held heads down and others spat at them. But what requires further consideration is that so the Falangist element and cult characteristics had bulged in the course of these years that a sister volunteered to kill her sister. 2

The interesting point is that such a process came to be justified under the philosophy of the ideological revolution. The dissenters and whoever repulsed the revolution had to pay a price. It was even much unbearable for a high ranking member:

High ranking members who couldn’t have the revolution, were not allowed to leave the organisation so in some cases they had no alternative except killing themselves. While they were living among us, they were forbidden to do anything, even helping in the kitchen was denied to them. 3

And some committed suicide because they could not tolerate the so-called revolution that ended to disgrace for all the organization:

Nasser, one of our army commanders, has killed himself with a blade given to him for shaving. … Later in another meeting, I heard from Rajavi that Eshagh, who was working with me in New York, has gone to hunger strike because his revolution has not been accepted. Few years later, after I left the organisation, I heard he hanged himself about the same time, but we were not told then, so I presume there were some more suicides which we didn’t hear about them. 4

Thus, a technique mainly developed to trace dissidents and disloyal to revolution turned into a lasting achievement with a multi-purpose function. Mojahedin’s irreparable loss after the military operation Eternal Light needed scapegoats to justify Rajavi’s insanity of masterminding such a mass suicide. Again the members were forced to confess that lack of total trust in Rajavi and their attachments to worldly attractions was a reason not to stand by their commitment to him. They had to devote themselves only to Rajavi and nothing else had to enter their hearts but his love. As Mohsen Rezai, a ranking cadre is quoted saying:

To follow him [Rajavi] ideologically, and not only politically, you have to see him and accept him not only in your mind, but in your heart. And you cannot do it unless you first open your heart to him. You should have no secret from him, no boundary should separate you from him. He should be the one and only, the closest person to you. To reach this close relationship, you have to work hard, beginning with the expression of all your contradictions and secrets, especially those concerning him. 5

So, a process formulated to detect and hamper attempts for schism and to accomplish a throughout internal purge becomes an integral part of a cult that practices deceptions, lies and exhibits murder in its heart under the disguise of a pro-democratic organization.

References:

1. Masoud Banisadr; Memoirs of an Iranian Rebel.

2. Shams-e Haeri, Hadi; The swamp, vol. II.

3. Masoud Banisadr; Memoirs of an Iranian Rebel.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

 

August 11, 2008 0 comments
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Iraqi Authorities' stance on the MEK

Mojahedin Khalq responsible for all violence in Dyali

Governor of Khalis: Mojahedin Khalq (Rajavi cult, MEK,MKO) responsible for all violence in Dyali

Staging a protest rally in front of Governor’s building, Hundreds of peoples of Khalis in Iraq called for the expulsion of MKO terrorists from their land.

The protesters, who carried different placards, demanded that the Iraqi government’s security plan should not change into a political issue and must involve all parts of Dyali province.

The demonstrators also declared their demands via the placards for the expulsion of MKO terrorists from Iraq.

Welcoming the movement against the presence of terrorists in Iraq and appreciating the Iraqi government’s recent military operation in Dyali province, the governor of Khalis demanded for the Iraqi government to intensify its operations in the region.

Oday Khedran also called for the presence of the Iraqi military and security forces in all critical parts of Khalis which have now changed into safe shelters for the armed terrorist groups.

He asked the Iraqi security forces to deport MEK terrorists from Iraq as soon as possible. He called MEK a terrorist cult which is responsible for all the existing unrests and violence in Dyali.

August 11, 2008 0 comments
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Mujahedin Khalq 's Function

The Quest in MKO history

Khodabandeh outlines Mojahedin Khalq (Rajavi cult,MKO, MEK) history with George Galloway MP

Download Khodabandeh outlines MKO history with Galloway MP

August 5, 2008 0 comments
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