Bahar Irani

The Least Required Qualifications for the Custody of Iraqi Children

It was earlier discussed that Maryam Rajavi’s announced readiness to take care of 1,000 Iraqi orphans and pay for all their expenses in Camp Ashraf is supposed to be a bid to attain certain political interests and especially to strengthen her group’s foothold in Iraqi soil. Hardly can it be considered a humanitarian move since Mojahedin’s phased ideological revolution had already targeted destabilizing relative emotional attachments of the insiders and conceptualizing the idea that the leadership is the focal point of absolute love and devotion. Conjugal attachments and familial affections had to be sacrificed for the leader; the outcome was forced ideological divorce of the spouses and separation of children from their parents.

Suppose that MKO’s suggestion is for a good and humanitarian cause. There are globally adopted minimum standards that had to be met for children foster care and guardianship is subject to certain rules. According to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, “States Parties shall ensure that the institutions, services and facilities responsible for the care or protection of children shall conform with the standards established by competent authorities, particularly in the areas of safety, health, in the number and suitability of their staff, as well as competent supervision”. Thus, any individual or organization that intends to take care of children has to meet required benchmarks according to adopted laws of a country concerning child care and welfare.

Although in some details different because of the regional, cultural, and religious considerations, countries in their jurisdiction consider sever qualifying regulations for the guardians and custodians. There is a unanimous agreement that they have to be subject to no limitation and entitled to no especial protection and assistance. Moreover, they should be liable to no prosecution for charges against them and accused of no criminal acts and abuse particularly done against children. Above all, they should be financially eligible and it has to be ensured that the guardianship does not result in improper financial gain for those involved in it.

Considering the least qualifications for the custody of children, now the question is that are Mojahedin qualified enough to take care of Iraqi children? First, they have to be subject to no limitation and entitled to no especial protection and assistance. It is broadly known that Mojahedin’s members are restricted in Camp Ashraf that is regarded as a military camp rather than a residential complex. At the present, no child lives in the camp and all children have been already evacuated to Western countries and most of the members are held against their will. Even their stay at the camp is transient since the Iraqi government is determined to expel all the members who are under the supervision of Coalition Forces that designated the members as “protected persons” under the Geneva Convention and posted guards at their bases since 2003.

In respect of criminal acts and charges, regardless of many instances of inter-organizational liquidations, MKO has committed many hundreds of assassinations and political killings as well as shedding blood of many innocent children and civilians according to its own officially issued military communiqué. Its globally proscription as a terrorist group by the State Department, the EU’s country members and some other countries is a telling evidence of its countless perpetrated atrocities. There are also evidences of the members’ children receiving ideological and cult educations and harsh military trainings in MKO-run hostels and basis scattered in Western countries.

Is MKO eligible financially to foster Iraqi orphans? According to the State Department’s report, “Before Operation Iraqi Freedom began in 2003, the MEK received all of its military assistance and most of its financial support from Saddam Hussein. The fall of Saddam’s regime has led MEK to increasingly rely on front organizations to solicit contributions from expatriate Iranian communities”. French prosecutor general had earlier on March 19 requested the anti-terror court to add new charges against MKO and the leader of the group Maryam Rajavi. The new charges are reported to be money laundering and fraud charges added to the previous case which includes connection with terrorism and saboteur groups. In Germany, the government investigations uncovered Mojahedin’s illegal financial activities where it abused the members’ children, who had been evacuated during the first Gulf War, to beg in the streets. In general, the group’s funds are the pile of no clean money.

Now, does MKO meet minimum standards that are required to qualify it for the custody of Iraqi children? Where the MKO members’ children were illegally deprived of their rights and even their identity and freedom, for which the leaders have to stand trial, how the cult’s leader presumptuously announces readiness to take care of innocent Iraqi orphans? Of course, that is clear that the Iraqis never consent to see their orphans out of frying pan into the fire.

Bahar Irani – Mojahedin.ws – August 8, 2007

August 14, 2007 0 comment

Human Rights Abuse in the MEK

Abuse of Children and MKO’s Least Achievement

In her speech made on 30 June in Paris, Maryam Rajavi, Mojahedin’s cult she-guru, announced her group’s readiness to look after of 1,000 Iraqi orphans. The unexpected demand might be considered a humanitarian move unless you are familiar with MKO’s terrorist and cult nature. But those familiar with the group’s internal relation presuppose differently. Before going any further, it seems essential to reconsider the following issues:

*. Surveying the issue of family in Mojahedin’s organizational relations from the beginning until the ideological revolution.

*. Surveying condition of children in Mojahedin’s organizational relations from the beginning until the ideological revolution

It is not wrong to say that the family has been an issue of dispute in MKO that has challenged it from its very beginning. For Mojahedin, the legitimacy of any phenomenon is appraised according to its degree of accordance with the ideological and political ends of the organization. Since the family in itself necessitates certain responsibilities, then, any enforced responsibility out of the organizational command is deemed to be an impending element. In the history of the organization, we encounter countless instances of forced organizational marriage and divorce and in many cases, the group plotted tricks to debilitate the emotional attachments between the couples that resulted in divorce.

Unlike what is sought in conventional marriages, Mojahedin’s organizational marriages were prudent policies for the accomplishment of political objectives. In fact, none of these marriages rested on love and emotional infrastructure and the leaders weighed it as an appropriate means to gratify sexual needs of the members to expedite the fulfilment of the organization’s policies. Consequently, unbidden fruits of these marriages, namely the children, will have no better destiny than their parents.

Thus, looking at family and children as instruments to achieve power and political goals, MKO leader’s shedding crocodile tears for Iraqi children is supposed to be a bid to attain certain interests. Here are suppositions that prove Maryam Rajavi’s demand is a suspicious political tactic rather than a humanitarian move.

At the present, MKO has an unstable and unbearable position in Iraq. The Iraqi government is determined to expel the group as a terrorist group that is conspiring with insurgent dissidents against the Iraqi legal government. To frustrate terrorists’ plots, the Iraqi police are debarring Iraqis from visiting Camp Ashraf known as the den of conspiracy. Maryam Rajavi’s suggestion at such a critical juncture is a countermeasure tactic. In case the international humanitarian organizations welcome the offer for the wellbeing of the innocent children, and if we are cautiously optimistic of a good-will-prone offer, MKO’s expulsion from Iraq will be postponed.

MKO continue to maintain on the State Department and the EU terror list that has greatly undermined MKO’s political manoeuvre and has jammed it in a political cul-de-sac. In fact, it is big strategic failure for MKO that advertise to pose as an alternative for Iranian regime. Maryam Rajavi’s offer, supported by the group’s advocates that lobby Western parliaments, contributes to augment propagandistic pressures in an attempt to remove the terrorist label.

The Human Rights Watch report concerning human rights abuse within MKO and the group’s cult-like practices against the insiders is pressing the group to provide justifiable reasons for the insider and outsider critics. Maryam Rajavi’s offer is a futile struggle that implicitly challenges the HRW’s report and rebuts the critics.

The US State Department’s released list of designated terrorist organizations on April 30 highlighted unprecedented facts about MKO and announced that “In addition to its terrorist credentials, the MEK has also displayed cult-like characteristics”. It also asserted that MKO’s members are required to undertake a vow of "eternal divorce" and that children are reportedly separated from parents at a young age. MKO has so far dodged explaining away such allegations and Maryam Rajavi’s publicized proposal, if gains public acclaim, might partly challenge the accusations.

Maryam Rajavi’s offer that justifiably depicts the painful plight of Iraqi children draws support of many human rights activists to welcome the seemingly humanitarian move. It would be relatively a success for the group both in political stage and fundraising activities. Exploiting children for fundraising has its own long history in MKO. After separating children from their parents, these innocent children were sent to Western countries to take part in the street fund-raising activities under false pretences of being homeless Iranian children whose parents were executed by Iranian regime. For years Mojahedin were active in illegal fundraising activities through charities like Iran Aid in England; the funds were then spent in purchase of the arms. Possibly, the group seeks to establish a similar Iraq Aid charity in Iraq to cover the expenses of its terrorist and cult activities.

The ex-members’ increased counter-MKO activities to bring further secrets of manipulating cult-like techniques of the group into light has much frustrated the organization. The group’s manner of confronting the dissidents is typically violent. In his recent message issued from his hideout, Massoud Rajavi plainly threatened the dissidents and critics of the group. The harsh reaction provides cult-proven and undemocratic attitudes of MKO. Any positive reaction to Maryam Rajavi’s offer questions the accuracy of the ex-members’ disclosures and decreases the consequent psychological pressures exerted on MKO.

Inactivity and passiveness are dominating Camp Ashraf as a result of great disappointment of an uncertain destiny in Iraq. It has debilitated the morale of the forces in Camp Asharf to a great extent especially following the redesignation of the group as a terrorist group that works an inevitable impediment to seek asylum in any country. If Maryam Rajavi’s suggestion catches a global attention, it will give the forces encouragement of reconsidering their detachment and leave of Camp Ashraf.

The ex-member activists in European countries and especially in Iran centralized under Nejat Assossiation, established by the ex-members and the families of the members still held in MKO, is a big challenge for the group. The emotional impact of the families on the members who have been deprived of all emotional relations are inevitable. The families visit and contact with members in Camp Ashraf has jeopardised the group’s security and contribute to unveil what the organization prefers to remain concealed.

Thus, the real intention of MKO terrorist cult weighs on a globally acclaimed humanitarian move and proposal. That is enough to see children being victimized in a cult that respects not the least for their rights. Ideologically controlled context of MKO hardly leaves a suitable room for children to grow up and, frankly speaking, MKO lacks any standard concerning children, their rights, and even how to take care of them in the same way as the world outside. The process of mutation in Mojahedin cult is extraordinary; a lamb entering the cult comes out as a tiger.

Bahar Irani – Mojahedin.ws – August 5, 2007

August 8, 2007 0 comment

The Ideology of the MEK

The Shaped Destiny of Children in the Ideological Revolution (10)

Coming to pass MKO-run media bureaus in the Europe and also among the member residents of Camp Ashraf we encounter young people that hardly you can see any relative correspondence between their age and the atmosphere wherein they are exhausting their juvenile vigorousness. These youths, who can be well denominated as the fourth generation of Mojahedin, represent the same enthusiast and decisiveness of their previous generation. Furthermore, their amazing authority over organizational doctrines and teachings is in no way a deniable fact nor a media display to attract attentions. Many may ask, then, who are they and how they have been so experienced, being so young, in organizational, political and ideological issues.

In the history of political movements, Mojahedin are believed to be the sole organization that the impact of their activities has imposed heavy costs on whoever is in the reach of its surroundings. In the same way, the tragic destiny of children in MKO, before and after the ideological revolution, has not been investigated sufficiently. Political, fundraising as well as emotional exploitation of children by Mojahedin is one of the cases reported by many former MKO members as instances of human rights abuses in MKO.

The general consensus of opinion is that children should enjoy complete immunity from any form of manipulation and abuse. Human rights institutions and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights have repeatedly confirmed that children are entitled to special care and assistance and that especial measures have to be taken to protect children from all forms of physical and mental abuse, maltreatment and exploitation.

After the ideological revolution, Mojahedin concluded to separate children from their parents in an attempt to destabilize the foundation of family which the group believed to be a strategic impediment. The U.S first invasion to Iraq was a good alibi to accomplish the goal. The evacuation of children to other countries under the pretext of providing safety and security for them not only guarantied the accomplishment of the ideological objective but also paved the way to upbring and discipline the organization’s future combat force. Now, after two decades, the various dimensions of such an action have been fully revealed. Mojahedin’s attempt to undertake the guardianship of the children whose parents have separated from the organization signifies Mojahedin’s exploitative nature concerning the children. A number of former members of MKO have elaborated on the various dimensions of the group’s inhuman practices. Ann Singleton in her “Saddam’s private army” well refers to the process of separating babies from their parents as part of speeding up the application of the Internal Revolution:

More cynically still, Rajavi used the Gulf War as a pretext to have all the children removed from the bases in Iraq. The children had acted as a brake on the application of the Internal Revolution. Whilst the children were around, it provided an excuse for spouses to meet up in a family context. There was the possibility for ‘divorced’ couples to continue a covert relationship. Rajavi wanted the total devotion of everyone with no rivals. For him, the children represented his most dangerous rivals for their parents’ affections and loyalties. So on the pretext of having them evacuated to safety during the allied bombing, he had children even as young as two months old, sent abroad where they were adopted by Iranian families or kept in dormitories. (1)

However, that is not the full dimension of the oppression suffered by children at the hands of Mojahedin. The potential and practical European laws and regulations concerning the children granted Mojahedin an opportunity to exploit the European governments as well as citizens. The Europe provided MKO the best milieu to educate children for its cult-like purposes. But under drastic measures and vigilance of related state-run institutions the real intention of MKO is exposed for the public:

In Germany, the government uncovered the Mojahedin’s financial activities. After a two year investigation, the German High Court on 21st December 2001 closed the Mojahedin ‘shop’ – twenty-five houses and bases – after evidence was found of misuse of Social Security and fraud. Disturbingly, the Mojahedin had used the members’ children who had been evacuated during the Gulf War of 1991. These children, whilst they lived in the Mojahedin’s bases in Germany, were required to undertake work in the base and take part in fund-raising activities, collecting money in the street. At the same time, the Mojahedin were abusing every possible avenue of Social Security in Germany in order to claim benefits for these children. Documents in Germany showed that ten to twelve million Marks had been used by the Mojahedin to buy weapons. Considering that a Social Security claim of 130 – 260 Marks could be made per child per day, this is a conservative figure of the amount that the Mojahedin collected on account of these children. (2)

Further appalling aspects of MKO’s abuse of children include application of brainwashing techniques to indoctrinate them with subversive organizational ideologies to be later recruited into NLA based in Camp Ashraf. The two instances of self-immolation by Neda Hassani in England and Yaser Mohammadi in Camp Ashraf can be mentioned as explicit consequences of children trained according to mentioned techniques. The low age of these two young victims confirms the terrible process the children have gone through in the European and Iraqi camps. Of course, any raised objection was neutralized by a variety of tricks. According to Ann Singleton, Mojahedin shaped the destiny of these young victims by means of preplanned ideological, political, military, as well as terrorist schemes:

Some of the older children soon returned to Iraq and though still under-age, became members of the NLA. They were expected to ‘reject’ their parents as part of the new ideology. In other cases, a parent bravely refused to be separated and decided to accompany their children abroad. As usual, although the Mojahedin denounced these people as defectors, as weak and useless people, they did all they could to keep hold of them and have them work in their bases in the West. In all, the losses were few and Rajavi consolidated his hold over the members’ minds, hearts and lives. (3)

Bijan Niyabati, a left activist of NCRI, has made open confessions regarding emotional and organizational misuse of children within MKO. He has elaborated on such events far beyond what other former MKO members have stated. He confesses openly that Mojahedin indoctrinate children in such a way to make them highly vengeful and aggressive. He also maintains that these innocent children are implanted by ideological relations and principles of their adoptive parents:

On the other hand, there are innocent children whose only sins are to be born in a family engaged in revolutionary struggle without considering the children’s opinion for the sacrifice of majority. Hundreds of such children have to undergo an awful fate. You have to be yourself a child and have experienced such a destiny to develop a full comprehension of such a human tragedy. You have to have been separated from your mother and have been raised by a foster mother to feel the pain of worry and rage suffered by these children. Then you can make a dagger of your tears and sigh and a bullet of your wrath to hit the heart and head of the agents who are responsible for all these human tragedies. So you may have no doubt for unquestionable necessity of overthrowing the regime of whip and gallows. (4)

He acknowledges the fact that the process of separating children from their parents, at the command of the leader of MKO, aims at making children bear the grudge against MKO enemies; a fact referred to by many former MKO members as the most anti-human aspect of ideological revolution. Mojahedin, however, deny the accusation. According to Niyabati, the innocent children are inspired with violence and trained where to surface it while they do not know why they have to do so. The statements made by Niyabati surfaces the hidden dimensions of the awful process taking place inside MKO and they are even more telling than what other MKO’s ex-members expose. He refers to the hegemony and cultist relations onto which children are exposed and these statements work as verified evidences for any international human activist and organization, evidences which unveil the truth about the abuse and exploitation of defenseless children by Mojahedin-e Khalq.

References

1. Singleton, Ann; “Saddam’s private army”, Iran-Interlink.

2. Ibid

3. Ibid

4. Niyabati, Bijan; A different look at the ideological revolution within MKO, Khavaran Publication, p.100.

Bahar Irani – Mojahedin.ws – August , 2007

August 4, 2007 0 comment

The cult of Rajavi

Behavior Control Techniques in Mojahedin Cult (8)

Of the major challenges touched upon by MKO’s ex-members after the ideological revolution was the occurrence of an overall change in organizational relations as well as intra-organizational controlling procedures in order to exercise a permanent and all-out mental, emotional and political control over the insiders. It was aimed to break members’ ties of attachment to anything and replace them with an ideological, political and social dependence to Rajavi’s leadership.

However, such procedures were in progress even before the ideological revolution but in a moderate and less complex fashion. The latest medical and psychological achievements as well as mind control techniques exploited by the majority of cults have to be taken into consideration in order to develop a good understanding of MKO’s internal revolution.

Intra-organizational relations of Mojahedin bear various titles before and after the ideological revolution, for instance, security control, self-criticism, organizational doctrines, organizational training and the like. The aim here is to probe into the utilized techniques to have control on the insiders’ manner of conduct although the term ‘control’ may not fully explain the cult-like behavior of MKO. The so-called “Amaliat Jari” or the ‘current operation’ is a routinely exploited approach by MKO with no exact equivalent found in political and cult lexicons. It is an apparatus for ever appraising members’ relative degree of submission to Rajavi’s leadership. In these regular compulsory sessions members at all levels are harshly rebuked and criticized under a variety of excuses that consequently undermine the members’ confidence in themselves as well as their judgment and leads them to a state of absolute submissiveness and deprives them of pursuing any solution to the problems they may face.

Taking a brief look at the memoirs and testimonies of MKO ex-members may be of some help here. Masoud Banisadr, a detached member, in describing his mental and psychological condition in one of these sessions of current operation explains:

My temperature was rising. I could not think at all. I felt helpless as if I was naked and others were looking at me. I felt like a two-year-old baby. I had lost all my power of logic, comprehension and expression. [1]

In contrast to the Middle Age approaches of physical torture, repressions, and intimidation to have control over the individuals, Rajavi took advantage of modern psychological manipulation to influence members. Masoud Banisadr points to one of the instances in which MKO leader (Rajavi) had a meeting with ‘HE’, namely members of executive committee with the highest rank available to members. Although it may bring about a sense of disgust, it is mentioned to get a better understanding of different dimensions of relations in MKO. Masoud states:

Before saying anything else, he surprised everybody by saying: “I have heard from Dr . . . that your pee has bubble. Strangely according to what I heard from him, our ‘HE’ member’s pee has bubble while our ordinary member’s pee is bubble-less.” Then when he faced strange and puzzled look of members said: “Don’t look at me with surprise, like you don’t know what that means. It means, few years after ‘ideological revolution, still you have not been able to neutralize your sexual desires and still you have ejaculation of semen, which creates bubble in your urine. I thought this problem has been solved by the people under your responsibility!!” After his speech as usual few brothers who always were ready to follow his word and elaborate more in backing to whatever he had said already, start talking. One of them went as far as saying that: “We were not ‘HE’ we were ‘HEEE’.” The noise people make for calling or stopping donkeys. It implied that we were not members of the organization but donkeys, animals without any power to solve their natural needs. [2]

Surprisingly, Bijan Niyabati, a theoretician of ideological revolution, believes that the importance of the successful accomplishment and the main objective of the ideological revolution lie in the strict control of members both in joint and individual relations. He writes:

To unlock the boxes (minds of members) is the main theme and the first stage of ideological revolution. [3]

Niyabati justifies Mojahedin’s system of control as an appropriate means to overthrow the Iranian regime by resorting to the scientific achievements. At the same time, MKO rejects the ex-members’ testimonies of being manipulated by brainwashing techniques that are reported by humanitarian organizations and Human Rights Watch report and accuses these international bodies of a joint conspiracy with Iran against the group. Regardless of such baseless accusations, there are numerous evidences that prove these techniques are exploited within MKO. Niyabati makes use of the anatomy and structure of man’s brain in an attempt to justify the abusive tactics of the ideological revolution:

In a seminar investigating the most recent scientific achievements concerning function of different parts of the brain, it was said that the activity of each hemisphere affects the social behavior of the person. For instance, the left hemisphere is the location of such subjects such as mathematics, logic and politics and the right hemisphere is related to culture, art, poetry and emotion. Activation of any of these parts besides the genetic influences of the parents may determine the social role one might play in the future. [4]

In her book ‘Cults in our midst’, Margaret Singer brings up instances of such cultist programs that manipulate conjoined ancient and modern techniques to confront the insiders’ beliefs. She further explains that such techniques may alter the behavior, mentality and even political orientation of members thus exercising an all-out control over them. The hidden boxes (members’ minds), mentioned by Niyabati, have to be opened. The result would be persuasion to submit to a total hegemony as practiced in most cults in general and in MKO in particular. As Singer explains:

These latter-day efforts have built upon the age-old influence techniques to perfect amazingly successful programs of persuasion and change them. What is new – and critical – is that these programs change attitudes by attacking essential aspects of a person’s senses of self, unlike the earlier brainwashing programs that primarily confronted a person’s political beliefs. [5]

Singer maintains that there are different terms describing such processes all of which follow the same route:

A number of terms have been used to describe this process, including brainwashing, thought reform, coercive persuasion, mind control, coordinated programs of coercive influence and behavior control, and exploitative persuasion. [6]

The significance of such processes, as compared to the techniques utilized by other political organizations that more focus on the control and changing attitude to substitute ideological teachings, unfolds when we notice that the instrucational techniques underline the exposure of the individuals’ unconscious. Therefore, a member’s individuality, known as this Achill’s heel, makes him defenseless against a new system of value. That is what Niyabati describes as a novel move put into practice by Mojahedin after the ideological revolution:

The meetings of ideological revolution are originated as an unprecedented fashion within MKO. The instructional trainings being marginalized, the attitudinal programs are gradually imposed. [7]

References

1. Banisadr, Masoud; The memoirs of an Iranian rebel. Abroad Publication, 231.

2. ibid, 386.

3. Niyabati, Bijan; A different look at ideological revolution in MKO, Khavaran publication, 44.

4. ibid, 28.

5. Singer, Margaret Thaler; Cults in Our Midst: The Continuing Fight Against Their Hidden Menace, Jossey-Bass; Rev Upd Su edition, April 2003, 60.

6. ibid, 53.

7. Niyabati, Bijan; A different look at ideological revolution in MKO, Khavaran publication, 49.

Bahar Irani – July 17, 2007

July 19, 2007 0 comment

The cult of Rajavi

The Purport of Individuality in Mojahedin Cult (7)

Of the major challenges the so-called Marxist revolutionary organizations or those under the influence of the Marxism in the contemporary history encounter is how they conceptualize the individual or individuality in contrast to their liberal definition. As defined by the theoreticians of these groups, individual rights are subordinate to social rights and the real value and legal status of individuals are considered to be the same as counter-revolutionary values that are somehow the legacy of the bourgeoisie. In such movements, the first step into the milieu of theory and revolutionary action should be a combat against the individual’s social status and its denial.

The organizational experiences of the leftist parties in general and countless victims of Stalin’s reign in particular are typical instances of the individuals being victimized for the cause of the contemporary revolutionary moves. As such, the groups and organizations that adhere to Marxism in violent warfare and social struggle have the same understanding of individuality. In some instances, they blend Marxist views with that of religious instructions while considering a priority for the former over the latter. For these organizations, individuality means smearing revolutionary values and culture with the stain of the bourgeoisie and sacrificing interests of the group for that of the individual. The outcome of these creeds is physical annihilation of members and depersonalization in the case of any conflict between members and organization whether the grounds of discordance are justified or not.

The course of events in MKO in the past four decades witnesses such instances of conflict which led to the murder of at least four dissent members. However, we are not to review such cases in this article. We are to remind that individuality is of no significance in such organizations. In other words, these kinds of organizations consider individuality as a means to gain organizational objectives so that any criticism on the part of members leads to their physical annihilation. It has to be pointed out that such a process in MKO led to consequences much different from that of other political movements due to the unique features of the group. The climax in MKO was the ideological revolution that mainly targeted the depersonalization in all its social, psychological and mental modes. According to one of the MKO’s ex-members, the gist of ideological revolution is as follows:

Close your eyes, let me hold your hands and ask not whereto you are being taken. [1]

That is the substratum of ideological revolution within Mojahedin that proves the group’s shift into a cult as a result of the negation of democratic elements in the inter-organizational relations as well as encountering numerous strategic stalemates. Establishing an ideological revolution on depersonalization enables the leadership to enforce the leader’s egocentric wills on members and to require the members’ blind obedience that the organization preferably calls it absolute devotion.

Compulsory divorce and marriage, suicidal operations, self-immolations, hypocrisy and a lot more are the immediate consequences of depersonalization and annihilation of mental capacity of members that constitute one of the theoretical challenges of MKO on the one hand and develop personal hegemony of Rajavi on the other hand. Mojahedin justify such a paradox resorting to metaphysics making leadership a sacred and divine entity. As Bijan Niyabati explains, the process of the ideological revolution requires blind obedience with no logical justification:

It goes without saying that such a process is of no logical significance. The main factors contributing to this process are not knowledge and logic but love and emotion and the instruments are not justification and discussion but devotion and obedience. [2]

Then he takes advantage of the expressions of Islamic mysticism for more justification:

In spiritual journey, no question is allowed. The wayfarer has to put his faith in Sheikh wholeheartedly and must regard him as the most perfect person to conduct him in spiritual training, guidance and education, be his interlocutor and obey Sheikh far from any inward or outward objection. [3]

Such justifications forge another paradox as they are in total contradiction with MKO’s standards of developing a worldview based on practical and scientific facts. However, Mojahedin deny such a paradox in order to pass over the challenges they encounter. Mojahedin insist to pose as respecting the rights of the individuals and even tolerating dissidents and critics. In contrast to these claims, makeup of Mojahedin’s internal ideological revolution infuses a much complicated system of values for the individuals:

As I pointed out before, ideological revolution in general means a substitution for conventionally adopted ideology and system of values. In other words, it involves a fundamental alteration in a specific value system. That is, to revolutionize values and standards. It is self-evident that because of the fundamental role of the substituted value system in the ideology in general, any change therein includes all those action and reactions as well as member-organization relations to a full extension of political and social level. [4]

This kind of relation based on the absolute devotion and blind obedience rather than reason and knowledge or political or social weight inevitably results in depersonalization. It makes individuals devoid of any value and devalues any value system out of MKO context.

Even the members’ suffering sustained in the course of struggle to ascertain the ideals are well denied in Mojahedin’s delineated value-system:

Within this scope, neither past campaign records nor organizational qualifications and political conscience count. [5]

Thus, Mojahedin radically deny the role of individuals in their organizational relations and despise it as an element of counter-value. As recently included in the State Department report to maintain MKO on its terror list, the cult-like behaviors within MKO corroborate the routinely practiced acts of depersonalization:

In addition to terrorist actions, Mojahedin express cult-like behavior. At the beginning, the newcomers are indoctrinated with MKO ideology and the revolutionary history of Iran. They have to take the oath of ‘permanent divorce’ and take part in weekly security cleansings. Moreover, the children are separated from their parents. Maryam Rajavi, MKO’s leader, has fostered a cult of personality and claims to be incarnated with Prophet Mohammad.[6]

Now the question arising here is that what is the real status of such an ideology based on blind obedience and absolute devotion of members in our world of knowledge, reasoning and intellectuality?

References:

1. Shahsavandi, S; An interview by ‘Voice of Iran’ radio, Part 112.

2. Niyabati, Bijan; A Different Look at Mojahedin’s Ideological Revolution, Khavaran Publication, 113.

3. ibid, 40.

4. ibid, 115.

5. ibid, 114.

6. The U.S. State Department report. April 30, 2007.

Bahar Irani – July 11, 2007

July 14, 2007 0 comment

Mujahedin Khalq 's Function

Operation Morvarid, an Evidence of MKO’s Role in Iraq’s Internal Suppressions (6)

The presence of MKO in Iraq for the accomplishment of joint strategic objectives in line with local and regional transitions expanded MKO-Saddam coalition far beyond a simple collaboration that ended in an ideological unity. The extent of their cooperation covers a broad range of issues, but here the focus is on the role of Mojahedin in the bloody suppression of Iraqi Kurds in a conducted operation called Morvarid (pearl) that again turned into a cause for the separation of many insiders.

Explicitly referring to the role of MKO in this crackdown, the recently published State Department’s report quotes Maryam Rajavi encouraging MKO combatants to "take the Kurds under your tanks". Also, there is a TV documentary picturing Kurds mainly based on evidences presented by the eye-witnesses, victims, and even the former MKO members who took part in the operation. Despite all such authentic documents, Mojahedin claim they have not been responsible for Kurds repression and put the blame on the Iranian government as well as the former MKO members. However, Bijan Niyabati’s A Different Look at Mojahedin’s Internal Revolution refers to the key role played by Mojahedin in Kurds repression in Iraq. He points to the fact tat Mojahedin took part in this operation as a token of their gratitude to the regime of Saddam Hussein and also in order to win his absolute trust. According to Bijan Niabati:

The Operation Morvarid may be considered as a remarkable military and political victory for Mojahedin as well. Morvarid stabilizes MKO’s stance in Iraqi soil. Both Iraqi regime, somehow owing its survival to the presence and resistance of Mojahedin, and Mojahedin, for the first time associating with a regional and strategic ally tolerating one of the rare revolutionary and radical organizations that is a remnant of the cold war era and bears to pay the regional as well as international costs of such an alliance, see in each other the features of a strategic ally. Mojahedin proved to be not only a trustful ally but also can be accounted as a parameter of power in regional fluctuations. 108

An analysis of these statements may reveal the motives behind and the dimension of MKO-Saddam joint collaboration in suppression of Iraqi Kurds:

1. The Operation Morvarid stabilizes MKO’s presence in Iraqi soil.

2. Iraqi regime owes its survival in Iraq to the presence and resistance of MKO.

3. It is for the first time that Mojahedin have found a regional and strategic ally.

4. Each sees in the other the features of a strategic ally.

5. Mojahedin proved to be not only a trustful ally but also accounted as a parameter of power in regional fluctuations.

The above factors summarize different dimensions of the alliance from both a political and strategic viewpoint far from any attempt to confirm or deny the role of Mojahedin in repression of the Kurds.

Quoting Rajavi, To be Judged by the History openly refers to other ideological and political factors that tie the two sides; it is a tie of brotherhood and destinies, and the assertion of cult-like features shared by MKO and Iraqi Ba’th party. The Operation Pearl totally represents the orientation of MKO toward Saddam’s regime and its opponents during and after Saddam’s downfall. Furthermore, the case Anfal, dealing with Saddam regime’s suppression of Kurds, is open before the court and it is much likely that the role of Mojahedin in this case be investigated. In this regard, a great number of former MKO members have made requests for giving testimony in the court. Also, the U.S. State Department report confirms MKO’s participation in the crackdown. Finally, it has to be noted that the book written by Niyabati elaborates on the relationship between MKO and Iraqi regime from different angles which will be discussed later

Bahar Irani – Mojahedin.ws – July 5, 2007

July 10, 2007 0 comment

The Ideology of the MEK

Internal Relations of MKO and Ideological Revolution (5)

MKO falsely claims to be practicing the most democratic modes in its internal relations. It announces that the organization has always provided an open window for dissident members, critics, and even infiltrators to express their views and is showing the highest degree of tolerance compared with other revolutionary organizations. On the contrary, most former MKO members report instances of human rights abuses in organization. They acknowledge the fact that Mojahedin suppress dissident members by means of intimidation, torture, false accusations, contempt and other psychological pressures. The main objective of such actions is to stop members leave the organization; otherwise they have to suffer physical and mental pressure as well as being branded as the agents and traitors.

Understanding of the fact that leaving cults is too difficult and costly may give us an insight into the psychological pressure adopted by the organization toward its critics. In fact, physical and mental pressure exercised upon dissident members by means of imprisonment, torture and brainwashing is shared by MKO and other cults. The raised contradiction between the organization’s principles and acts of revisionism are not only the cause for members’ separation but also may help reveal the reason why the organization suppresses dissident members. The book “Cults in Our Midst” gives us a clear picture of how dissatisfied members and critics are treated within a cult:

There is a closed logic system of an authoritarian leadership tolerating no criticism or change except that is confirmed by the leader. If you criticize or complain, the leader or others may accuse you of being a quitter and the organization is not accountable at all. In such a closed system of logic, you may not question any principle or rule or refer to the facts of contradiction concerning the ideological system or the instructions you have already received. In case you expose such observations, your statements may be altered and debated in a way that they completely contradict what you intended. You are made feel you have been wrong from the beginning. In cults, members are always wrong and the system is always right. [1]

Such mental and physical approaches have been applied after the initiation of the ideological revolution within MKO as a reaction against the ever-increasing criticisms on the part of members. According to many MKO’s ex-members, in this phase, under the pretext of security considerations, many dissident members and critics were either imprisoned or killed suspiciously. Mojahedin are also accused of establishing prisons inside the organization and exercising mental and physical pressures on prisoners. Niyabati justifies such actions as the inevitable consequence of ideological revolution aiming at testing the loyalty of members to leadership. He considers members’ blind obedience and submission to imprisonment, physical and mental tortures as a factor of confirming their loyalty to the leadership:

“Mojahedin leadership, in line of replacing and stabilizing new elements in Hanif’s ideology, needed recognition of trustful forces, even if they were suspected and confined by their ideal organization. [2]

It has to be noted that such procedures are rooted in Stalin’s security clearance of communist party in the Soviet Union in an attempt to make members obedient by means of physical and mental tortures. According to Singer when writing on a phase of the USSR communist party:

During purge trials in the Soviet Union in 1930’s, men and women who were accused of plotting secret moves against the government had to sign false confessions and as well as giving false testimonies concerning crimes committed by others. The world media were bewildered and astonished to face such a phenomenon. [3]

Regardless of security justifications, Niyabati justifies the circumstance from a different angle. In his view, the Camp Ashraf is a micro model materializing all the constituents of an ideal society. He considers security system, police forces and prison as essential factors for the survival of the political power and also as manifestations of the MKO’s approach toward an ideal society. He refers to the necessity of the existence of prison and security system in such a miniature model and considers physical and mental tortures exercised in Camp Ashraf as a practice of how to deal the dissidents and critics:

Such a society had to be a micro model of a real society consisting of government, president, the parliament in exile, armed forces, police forces, prison, court, mass media, diplomatic relations, economical and logistic systems. [4]

Despite such justifications, Niyabati cannot present a solution for the aftermath of the ideological test:

The way the organization treated such members (dissident members and critics) on the eve of the formation of a value-driven revolution seemed to be highly problematic well beyond a mere security issue. [5]

Niyabati implicitly states that the organization initiated a “process of clarifying” that later on worked as a granted opportunity to take revenge on dissidents and start an internal purge:

Whatever it was, the process of clarifying gave rise to a wrong procedure of treating insiders in MKO. The move failed in long-term to meet political and strategic objectives of the organization that led the Iranian people’s modern revolution. [6]

Such assertions confirm the claims made by former MKO members concerning the exposure of the insiders to imprisonment, mental and physical torture inside the organization. Mojahedin react to claims harshly as they did when the Human Rights Watch report revealed instances of abuses inside the group; the international body was consequently branded as collaborating with Iran. Mojahedin insist on saying that they have a democratic form of leadership and organizational relations. In Human Rights Watch report we read:

Human Rights Watch interviewed five of these former MKO members who were held in Abu Ghraib prison. Their testimonies, together with testimonies collected from seven other former MKO members, paint a grim picture of how the organization treated its members, particularly those who held dissenting opinions or expressed an intent to leave the organization. [7]

Somewhere else, we see that the interrogative sessions lead to the death of some members:

The witnesses reported two cases of deaths under interrogation. Three dissident members—Abbas Sadeghinejad, Ali Ghashghavi, and Alireza Mir Asgari—witnessed the death of a fellow dissident, Parviz Ahmadi, inside their prison cell in Camp Ashraf. Abbas Sadeghinejad told Human Rights Watch that he also witnessed the death of another prisoner, Ghorbanali Torabi, after Torabi was returned from an interrogation session to a prison cell that he shared with Sadeghinejad. [8]

References

1. T. Singer, Margaret; Cults in Our Midst: The Continuing Fight Against Their Hidden Menace.

2. Niyabati, Bijan. A Different Look at Mojahedin’s Internal Revolution , Khavaran Publication, 54.

3. T T. Singer, Margaret; Cults in Our Midst: The Continuing Fight Against Their Hidden Menace..

4. Niyabati, Bijan. A Different Look at Mojahedin’s Internal Revolution , Khavaran Publication, 54.

5. ibid.

6. ibid.

7. Human Rights Watch report. No Exit: Human Rights Abuses inside MKO Camps, 5.

8. ibid.

Bahar Irani – Mojahedin.ws – July 1, 2007

July 4, 2007 0 comment

The Ideology of the MEK

Mojahedin’s Failed Operation and the Ideological Revolution

Although not yet translated into English, Bijan Niyabati’s “A Different Look on Mojahedin’s Ideological Revolution” contains countless evidences that challenge MKO’s adopted circumstantial decision-takings. Being an ardent advocate of MKO and the Rajavis, Niyabati has never intended to criticize the group’s strategies and the leadership flaws; rather his book maintains an absolute appreciation of the organization. The book, however, infers a source of unquestionable facts that challenge MKO in a variety of crucial phases.

Based on Niyabati’s book, the intention is to go through the organization’s ideological revolution that consequently resulted in the group’s transformation into a cult. Of the great importance is that the analyses by Niyabati and other ex-members are in some way identical; the difference lies in the fact that the former is still a ranking member of MKO while the latter are labeled as the agents of the Islamic Republic.

The failure of the operation Eternal Light (Forough Javidan) initiated challenges against Rajavi’s egocentric decision-making that led many forces of the organization to their death. Most of his critics believe that the operation was in no way correspondent with the organization’s line of strategy and that, Rajavi’s uncertain analysis of the post cease-fire situation compelled him to make a hasty decision.

In spite of claims made by Rajavi and his commanders that the operation was a great success with unbelievable military achievements, the casualties were much greater for Mojahedin to sustain. Niyabati explicitly calls the operation a great loss and defeat:

The operation Eternal Light was definitely a military failure. Through the operation, Mojahedin and Iranian modern revolutionaries lose hundreds of the best commanders of the coming revolution. (P. 82)

However, both Mojahedin and Niyabati insist on the strategic and political achievements of the operation. But it is believed that the achievements in general were nothing more than surfacing and theorizing the narrowest internal relations molded as the ideological revolution that is considered to be the “lost ring” and justification of the strategic crisis within Mojahedin. The post-operation phase was much critical and Mojahedin came to face a remarkable drop out of the members and a predominant sense of passivity among the remnants. But before these disharmonies could surface, rajavi took the control in hand and shifted to another phase of the ideological revolution to confront the non-surfaced crisis. Here are a number of analyses made by the ex-members on the operation.

The operation Eternal Light was the result of the search for an outlet out of an inevitable cul-de-sac rather than to be a strategic necessity. An analysis of the operation from the political and tactical point of view and Rajavi’s rationalization of the operation indicates that the move was the outcome of a desperate situation that had completely immobilized Mojahedin both in political and military fronts. A group that had once concentrated all its campaign marrow in a form of militia warfare and had already suffered great loss, suddenly and unbelievably had shifted to adopt a classic military tack to start a big cross-border operation. In fact, Mojahedin hurried to take advantage of a no-war no-peace situation created after the ceasefire. Niyabati explains the situation as this:

In the created interval following the acceptance of the ceasefire and after the deployment of the UN forces and the closure of the borders, the Iraqi army, in order to gain the upper hand in the upcoming peace negotiations, started slight and scattered over-the-borders military operations and inflicted heavy losses over the body of the regime’s military machine. It was a real chaos in the fronts and many Iranian forces were putting down the arms to flee. The acceptance of the ceasefire had damaged the regime’s dignity. (P. 78)

In spite of Mojahedin’s earlier insistence on peace and ceasefire, the group never anticipated that Iran would consent to ceasefire and was dreaming a long-lasting war that preciously troubled the water for Mojahedin to fish. Based on rajavi’s own analysis of the situation that discarded the possibility of any peace agreement, niyabati says:

The Mojahedin’s leadership utterly shocked by the fait accompli (acceptance of ceasefire by Iran) decided to counteract. It was a truth that in the strategy of the modern liberation war, no room was left at all neither for peace nor for ceasefire. (p. 79)

Regardless of the fact that at the end Rajavi made the claim that the operation was merely a political move propelled by a feeling of self-sacrifice, the move was mainly planned, under the illusion that Iran was vulnerable, to topple the regime. It was not long after sacrificing a great number of the forces that Rajavi, to avoid shouldering the responsibility of the failure, started analyzing the operation as being political and justifying the defeat. He condemned his forces of being a slave of inner and outward inclinations which worked as the alibi for putting the next phase of the ideological revolution into practice. In fact, the failure granted him the best opportunity to sharply reprimand the forces and to announce that he has found the recourse to topple the regime with the same remainder of the forces.

The second phase of the ideological revolution started from the point where Mojahedin came to recognize an urgency to have further control over the forces. It was much because the group could no more rely on the strategic “social element”, namely the masses, to assume power under the pretext of the revolution of the masses. As Niyabati sums up:

From this point on (the operation) Mojahedin develop a quantitative perception concerning revolution, the vanguard role and its association with the masses. From now on, the revolution is no more an issue for the masses. (p. 86)

Explicitly evident in the analyses of the ex-members, Mojahedin are bankrupt in social support. Maryam Rajavi, well aware of such a crucial lack, sees no other choice but to rely on the remainder of the forces when she says “with this same Liberation Army we can and must overthrow the regime of Khomeini”.

Expounding on Maryam Rajavi’s new position concerning the regime change, Niyabati thus depicts the potentialities of the Liberation Army:

With this noted sentence uttered by Maryam Rajavi following her promotion to the second rank in the leadership, the responsibility of overthrowing the regime was officially rendered to the vanguard. That is the point where the function of the army that had the mission to break the spell of repression and to pave the way for the mass uprising comes to an end and the army itself bears the vocation of overthrow. (p. 86)

Niyabati believes that the second reason behind the ideological revolution was to deprive the forces of any sense of psychological and mental confidence and to establish a new system of revolutionary values. The remainders of the operation Eternal Light could neither be reorganized nor could possibly be employed in the new strategic path. Furthermore, they could not be replaced as they were old revolutionary veterans. The solution, as Niyabati points out, was either a shift in the strategy or making the forces pass through an ideolog:

Now the circumstances compelled Mojahedin to adopt a new course. In respect to the existing condition neither the pivotal role of the Liberation Army could be of any significance nor could it continue to be national but ideological. (p. 86)

It was a necessity that could only emerge out of a forcibly tensed relation, in contrast to the previously loose context, within Mojahedin. As Niyabati points out:

Thus, the ambiance of the post-operation of compels Mojahedin to abandon the policy of extension to get tense. Once more Mojahedin establishment enters a new phase of its internal ideological revolution. (p. 87)

The ideological revolution that initiated in 1984 to end the leadership council and to promote Rajavi to an uncontested leader, evolves into an expanded system of heretical values that affects the innermost layers of Mojahedin’s internal as well as political relations.

Obviously, because of this novel system of ideological values in general, the extent of changes includes all the acts and reacts and the ideological regulation of the individuals with the organization in all aspects of political and social contexts. (p. 23)

Majority of detached members represent nearly the same aforementioned causes that advanced the second phase of the ideological revolution following the failure in the operation Eternal Light. In fact, most agree that it was the very start point for transforming Mojahedin into a cult.

All references are from Bijan Niyabati’s “A Different Look on Mojahedin’s Ideological Revolution”

Bahar Irani – Mojahedin.ws – June 2007

June 13, 2007 0 comment

Mujahedin Khalq; A proxy force

The US Instrumental Use of MKO

As reported on April 24, Rep. Dennis Kucinich introduced a resolution to the United States Senate to impeach Vice President Dick Cheney for high crimes and misdemeanors. One of the broached allegations included in the third article of the resolution presents evidences of Dick Cheney’s contacts with Mojahideen-e Khalq Organization (MKO). The article states:

M(3) The Vice President is fully aware of the actions taken by the United States towards Iran that are further destabilizing the world as evidenced by the following: …

MMM(D) The United States has been linked to anti-Iranian organizations that are attempting to destabilize the Iranian government, in particular the Mujahideen-e Khalq (MEK), even though the state department has branded it a terrorist organization.

The report comes at a time when the EU has taken a decisive step to keep MKO as a terrorist group on the list and the State Department continues to consider it a blacklisted terrorist group with no possible revision. However, Scott Ritter’s earlier statements concerning the US position in utilizing MKO against Iran’s nuclear issue well patronizes the US dual stance in dealing with MKO.

All these reports and remarks highlight a fact that among the American political wings there can be found an explicit contradiction concerning the instrumental application of MKO and the ways to deal with it. It has emboldened the group to avail itself of the existing leverages in the West to wedge into the subsisting gap between Iran and the West to accomplish its own interests in spite of being proscribed a terrorist group.

Regardless of the US possible engagement with MKO to secure its global interests and that to what extent MKO could be effective to satisfy the wish of Americans, it has been actually evidenced that MKO, because of lacking a social support for its terrorist atrocities and since the Americans are fully aware of its ideological drifts, will be made into another fundamentalist al-Qaeda. The West and the US in particular should bear it in mind that if al-Qaeda perpetrated suicide operations to jeopardize the US interests, MKO is capable of inducing the members to commit self-destruction operations such as those self-burnings in June 2003 for whatever trifle cause that can be easily worked out.

The US sponsoring of MKO similar to that of al-Qaeda, with the exception that MKO ideologically inherits characteristics of a destructive cult, might end to a much bitter experience with that of al-Qaeda. MKO, as the State Department asserts, moves on a dual strategy that enables it in any circumstance to accomplish its strategic ends. It seems that the current challenge within the US Administration concerning utilizing or boycotting MKO should necessarily end to a comprehensive unanimity by tracing that al-Qaeda held pestilent factors in MKO. The made comparison, from the structural and contents point of view, will give way to whether utilize MKO or not.

Mojahedin.ws – Bahar Irani – May 1, 2007

May 3, 2007 0 comment

The Ideology of the MEK

Why Mojahedin Shun Manifesting Contents of Ideological Revolution? (4)

As mentioned, to have a good understanding of the ideological revolution within MKO, first we have to go through its contents. But before, the importance of the phenomenon from Mojahedin’s point of view has to be necessarily asserted, a phenomenon that according to many critics and separated members was de facto manifestation of Mojahedin’s historical and ideological potential to evolve into a cult. In fact, now after nearly two decades of the events, there is not yet unanimity about its essentiality either in internal or external relations and also its applicable function in Mojahedin’s strategy. On this issue, Niyabati states:

Now eighteen years after the ideological revolution and in spite of reaching maturity, yet neither Mojahedin could themselves resolve on a non-ideological explanation in respect to the phenomenon nor those out could develop an understanding of its nature and function within Mojahedin’s internal relations and its inevitable impacts on the formation and regulation of relations with others. [1]

In this case of study, the main reference will be Bijan Niyabati’s “A look within MKO’s ideological revolution” for some reasons. First Mojahedin have not taken any position to approve or disapprove the book whereas they traditionally hardly tolerate any contradictory ideological or political criticism and react immediately. Their meaningful silence on the book can be considered a tacitly approbation of the contents.

Second, the author openly announces to be a member of Mojahedin. He is so attached to the group that in defence of its being labelled as terrorist, he declares to be proud of being a terrorist. Following the proscription of Mojahedin in the list of the EU in 2002 and in response to Rajavi’s call to protest the decision, he wrote:

It is a claim I have never made over the years neither within nor outside of your [addressing Rajavi] organization, but now talking in the position of an irreligious, secular element and keeping unto my past view-points and fully aware of the political, legal consequences I addressing you cry out that if Mojahedin are terrorist, then, I am also a Mojahed-e Khalq. [2]

Somewhere else in the same message in appreciation of the strategy and the third phase called ‘survive in the rift’, namely creeping into the created gap between the West and Iran to survive and escalate the tension to advance the overthrow, Niyabati writes:

It was only your resistance that, in the course of one the most critical chapters of Iranian history, kept the flames of an absolute resistance against one of the most tremendous forces of the contemporary history aflame and dipped the white flags of surrender one after another and, at the same time, by being entangled in complicated political sphere and the widespread political relation with all the imperialist world and by the merit of vigilance took advantage of tiny breaches to thwart their plots and to unburden the armed resistance and tried all the possibilities according to the revolutionary principles and never dissolved in them and remained revolutionary. [3]

These remarks work as reliable factors in assertion of Mojahedin’s strategically dual nature and evidences for approving it as a cult.

Third, Niyabati’s book is an acknowledgment of his debt to Mojahedin and their ideological revolution as well as being written in commemoration of his wife, Shirin Baqerabadi, who was killed in Mojahedin’s perpetrated military operation called the Eternal Light. However, it seems that many critics and the theoreticians advocating the change unanimously agree that the armed strategy and the related tactics to overthrow the Iranian regime have proved to be unproductive.

Regardless of all these views, the main focus is on the supposition that Mojahedin’s dual character and contradictory conducts in the West and within the Camp Ashraf endorse its truly cult structure. Its proximity to the same Western determined evaluation of a cult well crystallizes it as one of the most visible examples of a group that blends the characteristics of a terrorist group with a cult.

On the question of whther Mojahedin from the very initiation enjoyed latent cult inclinations or it was an imediate outcome of its ideological revolution, it should be explained that at least after the ideological revolution Mojahedin was not the same as in the past. Expounding on the point, Niyabati says:

Mojahedin organization after the ideological revolution is no more the same Mojahedin organization before the revolution. [4]

Notes

[1]. Bijan Niyabati; A look within MKO’s ideological revolution, Khavaran Publication, 2.

[2]. Niyabati’s response entitled “I am a Mojahed as well” to Rajavi’s call to protest proscription of Mojahedin as a terrorist group.

[3]. Ibid.

[4]. ]. Bijan Niyabati; A look within MKO’s ideological revolution, Khavaran Publication, 2.

Bahar Irani – Mojahedin.ws – April 23, 2007

April 26, 2007 0 comment

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