Home » The Ideology of the MEK » Why Mojahedin Shun Manifesting Contents of Ideological Revolution? (4)

Why Mojahedin Shun Manifesting Contents of Ideological Revolution? (4)

As mentioned, to have a good understanding of the ideological revolution within MKO, first we have to go through its contents. But before, the importance of the phenomenon from Mojahedin’s point of view has to be necessarily asserted, a phenomenon that according to many critics and separated members was de facto manifestation of Mojahedin’s historical and ideological potential to evolve into a cult. In fact, now after nearly two decades of the events, there is not yet unanimity about its essentiality either in internal or external relations and also its applicable function in Mojahedin’s strategy. On this issue, Niyabati states:

Now eighteen years after the ideological revolution and in spite of reaching maturity, yet neither Mojahedin could themselves resolve on a non-ideological explanation in respect to the phenomenon nor those out could develop an understanding of its nature and function within Mojahedin’s internal relations and its inevitable impacts on the formation and regulation of relations with others. [1]

In this case of study, the main reference will be Bijan Niyabati’s “A look within MKO’s ideological revolution” for some reasons. First Mojahedin have not taken any position to approve or disapprove the book whereas they traditionally hardly tolerate any contradictory ideological or political criticism and react immediately. Their meaningful silence on the book can be considered a tacitly approbation of the contents.

Second, the author openly announces to be a member of Mojahedin. He is so attached to the group that in defence of its being labelled as terrorist, he declares to be proud of being a terrorist. Following the proscription of Mojahedin in the list of the EU in 2002 and in response to Rajavi’s call to protest the decision, he wrote:

It is a claim I have never made over the years neither within nor outside of your [addressing Rajavi] organization, but now talking in the position of an irreligious, secular element and keeping unto my past view-points and fully aware of the political, legal consequences I addressing you cry out that if Mojahedin are terrorist, then, I am also a Mojahed-e Khalq. [2]

Somewhere else in the same message in appreciation of the strategy and the third phase called ‘survive in the rift’, namely creeping into the created gap between the West and Iran to survive and escalate the tension to advance the overthrow, Niyabati writes:

It was only your resistance that, in the course of one the most critical chapters of Iranian history, kept the flames of an absolute resistance against one of the most tremendous forces of the contemporary history aflame and dipped the white flags of surrender one after another and, at the same time, by being entangled in complicated political sphere and the widespread political relation with all the imperialist world and by the merit of vigilance took advantage of tiny breaches to thwart their plots and to unburden the armed resistance and tried all the possibilities according to the revolutionary principles and never dissolved in them and remained revolutionary. [3]

These remarks work as reliable factors in assertion of Mojahedin’s strategically dual nature and evidences for approving it as a cult.

Third, Niyabati’s book is an acknowledgment of his debt to Mojahedin and their ideological revolution as well as being written in commemoration of his wife, Shirin Baqerabadi, who was killed in Mojahedin’s perpetrated military operation called the Eternal Light. However, it seems that many critics and the theoreticians advocating the change unanimously agree that the armed strategy and the related tactics to overthrow the Iranian regime have proved to be unproductive.

Regardless of all these views, the main focus is on the supposition that Mojahedin’s dual character and contradictory conducts in the West and within the Camp Ashraf endorse its truly cult structure. Its proximity to the same Western determined evaluation of a cult well crystallizes it as one of the most visible examples of a group that blends the characteristics of a terrorist group with a cult.

On the question of whther Mojahedin from the very initiation enjoyed latent cult inclinations or it was an imediate outcome of its ideological revolution, it should be explained that at least after the ideological revolution Mojahedin was not the same as in the past. Expounding on the point, Niyabati says:

Mojahedin organization after the ideological revolution is no more the same Mojahedin organization before the revolution. [4]




[1]. Bijan Niyabati; A look within MKO’s ideological revolution, Khavaran Publication, 2.

[2]. Niyabati’s response entitled “I am a Mojahed as well” to Rajavi’s call to protest proscription of Mojahedin as a terrorist group.

[3]. Ibid.

[4]. ]. Bijan Niyabati; A look within MKO’s ideological revolution, Khavaran Publication, 2.


Bahar Irani – Mojahedin.ws – April 23, 2007

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