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"ideological revolution"

The Vanished Public Support and the Ideological Revolution (11)

Ideological revolution of Mojahedin has its roots in the lack of public support inside Iran. It seems that Mojahedin have been well aware of the fact even before their internal revolution when they surfaced their opposition in the first mass movement on 20 June in 1981. Of the major causes of the degradation is the group ‘s hysterical adopting of a violent armed warfare. Mojahedin’s blind assassinations and bloody terrorist operations repelled Iranian people and made Mojahedin disappointed of availing itself of the determinative public element inside the country. It has to be noted that Mojahedin’s diplomatic shift towards European parties and organizations to procure support and their associating with the Western ultra-right wings caused its further isolation. The ideological revolution, however, was the chief surge that tossed Mojahedin down the precipice of unpopularity. Here on, from a political point of view, Mojahedin replaced the internal support with a variety of political leverages such as attempts made to escalate the existing tension between Iran and other Western states to advance the strategy of destabilizing and overthrowing the Iranian regime. From the ideological point of view, it tabooed criticism of any kind against organizational hierarchy and thwarted any possible schism and disobedience.

The dissidence of a large number of members who reproved Mojahedin’s failed strategy of relaying on alien support convinced the leaders to consider it a necessity to banish them. The initial phase of ideological revolution, the marriage of Massoud Rajavi and Maryam Azodanloo which was an obvious departure from religiously adopted conventions of Iranian culture, had to be accomplished concealed from the eyes of the public to stop further social aversion. This phase of the ideological revolution, regardless of the adverse aftermath, was in itself a commit of suicide. That is clear that the atmosphere permitted no entrance to the next phase unless Mojahedin relayed not the least on the social support. Moreover, Mojahedin’s move to Iraq is a good verification of the fact that the absolute public rejection had disillusioned the leaders and instigated the group’s bellicose nature.

Many of NCRI’s members had earlier warned the organization of the probability of losing internal support. Although they were accused of falling for the enemies’ disinformation and were stamped by many labels, it was later tacitly accentuated by the leaders that absence of public support left the organization with no other option but resorting to the ideological revolution. Ehsan Shari’ati, a detached member of NCRI, elaborating on roots of discordant political, ideological and strategic views writes:

We criticized Mojahedin of promising short-run overthrow of the Iranian regime, justifying armed warfare, terror and coup d’atat for regime change in Iran and excluding the role of masses. (1)

Hadi Shams-Haeri, once an active member of MKO, finds the roots of the absence of social support in the early years of the Iranian revolution when the organization frenetically fell back on the use of arms:

In the course of the 1979 revolution [Mojahedin] failed to be organizationally associated with people and to bring the ˜social element’ into the stage because of their resorting to application of arms and being filled with a fleeing of superiority while they were totally unfamiliar with political work. (2)

He also elaborates on MKO’s totalitarianism in seeking political power as the main reason of the lack of social support:

The majority of Mojahedin at the time lacked the needed political experience and believed that struggle meant assuming the power. As a result, from the very beginning they abandoned people and intended to seize the power by coup d’tat through infiltrating the regime and disturbing the political atmosphere. (3)

Also, he refers to Mojahedin leadership being under the illusion of rejoicing in widespread support. Rajavi’s unrealistic vision worked as a ploy for his power-seeking ambitions:

Illusionary and nai’ve imaginations of Rajavi to have the support of people and the army personnel made the group dream that in the near future they might achieve political power in Iran and anticipated the overthrow in a term of no longer than one or two months after June 20. In his “summary of one year’ Rajavi has said: ˜Mojahedin enjoy the support of nearly 40 percent of the army personnel’ and even estimated the public support to 50 percent. (4)

Such comments confirm the accuracy of Niyabati’s analyzing strategic and organizational failure of Mojahedin from 20 June 1981 up to 1984. The only difference is that Niyabati tries to relate such failures to international political transitions and an imaginary dominant repression inside Iran. However, he acknowledges the fact that the main cause for such a failure has been the lack of support, calling it in his own terms a ‘strategic bolt’:

The fact was that Mojahedin were still facing the problem of mobilizing masses for armed struggle that was known to be a locked strategic bolt and the three-year-long plan to overthrow the regime proved to a an absolute failure. (5)

Niyabati considers the occurrence of the ideological revolution as the sole solution for the survival of Mojahedin. He maintains that strategic failure of MKO as a result of the lack of internal support had to be replaced by radicalization in the form of an ideological revolution:

We had to either submit to the existing political conditions or engage in politics and changed to the position of the radicals of the left and resorted to armed warfare for the violent overthrow of the regime with all its internal and external aftermaths. (6)

The point worth noting is that Niyabati is well aware of the public reactions against MKO’s ideological revolution; however, he points to a fact that in such a condition people were of no significance for Mojahedin. It was an absolutely proven fact that ideological revolution was initiated as the sole solution to prevent the total dissolution of MKO. He maintains that the external public reactions to the ideological revolution had no legitimacy for Mojahedin and that, “the outsiders have for long lost their legitimacy in the eyes of Mojahedin” (7).

And finally he asserts that the main objects of the ideological revolution were not people or the social element; it was rather an immediate response by the leaders to an ever-increasing crisis flustering MKO from the inside. Although he makes an effort to theoretically justify such a strategy, but what is implied is that at the present time Mojahedin have to find a solution for their survival rather than elaborating on the absence of mass support. According to Niyabati, ideological revolution is the inevitable aftermath of such a strategic challenge caused by the lack of public support:

Therefore, internal ideological revolution of Mojahedin may be considered as the leadership’s advocated solution to the confronted challenges as well as a step to the next complicated phase; its short-term targets were not Iranians but Mojahedin themselves. (8)

References

1. Shari’ati, Ehsan; The ups and downs of National Council of Resistance. Abroad publication, p.20.

2. Shams-Haeri, Hadi; The Swamp, Abroad publication, p.17.

3. Ibid, p.6.

4. Ibid, p.12.

5. Niyabati, Bijan; A different look at the Internal Revolution of Mojahedin, 2005.

6. Ibid, p.17.

7. Ibid, p.43.

8. Ibid, p.33.

Bahar Irani – Mojahedin.ws – August 17, 2007

August 19, 2007 0 comment

The Ideology of the MEK

The Arranged Ideological Revolutions (1)

The Arranged Ideological Revolutions; the Passage of Mojahedin-e-Khalq Organization (MKO) from a Political Group to a Religious Cult

Based on Dr. Massoud Banisadr’s “Memoirs of an Iranian Rebel”

The translated text of Hojjat-ollah Aflaki’s speech made at the Symposium of the Link between Cults and Terrorism held in Isfahan. He is an expert and researcher on Iranian history.

Introduction

Structural Characteristics of Cults:

Considering proposed definitions of a cult, its purpose, nature and structure, it is revealed that all cults share certain characteristics which distinguish between them and nations, religions and religious sects. Cult formation is based on such shared characteristics, intentionally or unintentionally, which continuously develop even when the cult is declining.

Such characteristics consist of ideas, rituals, rules, doctrines and unique theories which distinguish a certain cult from other cults and the society. It has to be noted that this stage is determined intentionally by cult leaders, founders and ideologues.

There are some cases in which cult formation has not been predetermined and leaders were to bring about religious and social reforms. However, as a result of inferring new ideologies, they have separated themselves from others thus forming a cult faced with opposed ideologies on the part of the society.

Another characteristic of cult is the factor “devotion” and blind obedience of devotee toward mentor or leader. Such a characteristic is not present in the fundamental definitions of cult but the fact is that during history, cultists have not denied such a factor rather they are proud of it and consider their membership in a cult as a bliss and honour. They regard themselves as sheep protected by cult leader. For example, the factor of devotion in the cultist structure of Sufism, Isma’ilie Alamout (followers of Hasan Sabbah), Isma’ilie Mahallati (in Iran, Tajikistan, India, England, and Africa) is the main characteristic to the point that followers of Agha Khan Mahallati presented him equal in his weight gold and diamond. (Schpigel Journal, 1949, No.29, 33).

Cults have other characteristics which are either the result of above-mentioned features or complement them. First, from a cultist viewpoint, people are either insider or alien and the latter are misled. Second, cultists have to observe the factor “keeping secret” carefully so they never let others participate in their circles. For example, Sufis scarcely let others participate in their sessions of invocation or “Sama” Or leftist groups in Iran shook hand with each other in a special way and called it revolutionary as opposed to imperial one. They called each other “comrade” and “brother” and attired in contrast to common norms. As such, it may be necessary to study such cult characteristics in Mojahedin-e-Khalq Organization (MKO) in order to discover corresponding similarities within the group compaired wit other known cults.

B. Cult Conducts within MKO

MKO has internal and external aspects which are somehow contradictory referred to by its former members. The emphasis put by the organization on factors such as honesty and keeping secret confirms this fact since MKO is not merely a guerilla or political group rather its leaders consider it as a cultural, religious, and social group aimed at improving all aspects of human life. As such, keeping secrets in the organization involves security issues as well as instructional, ideology and inter-organizational conducts. Finally, as a result of ideological revolutions in the organization, this political group turned into a dogmatic cult.

It seems that most ideological revolutions formed by Massoud Rajavi, MKO’s leader, against Islamic republic of Iran have been preplanned and then revealed as separate revolutions to justify the organization’s actions. Eventually, all such ideological revolutions turned MKO into an ideological and religious cult and enhanced Massoud Rajavi from the stance of a guerilla leader to an ideological one who appointed his wife as the ideological mother of MKO. Below, a number of the organization’s approaches are listed.

1. Ideological revolutions concerning the relation between men and women:

The process in which Maryam Azodanloo (Maryam Rajavi) turned into ideological mother of MKO is very interesting. Such a process is a clause of ideological revolution and reveals cult formation process clearly. It has to be pointed out that such a process includes various stages of ideological revolution and has happened over years. (Memoirs of an Iranian Rebel, 478).

Some of the clauses of the revolution which promoted Maryam Rajavi to the position of the ideological mother of the organization are as follows: only Maryam Rajavi can participate in female sessions since she is their mother. Massoud Rajavi is not only the ideological leader of MKO but occupies the position possessed by a Shiite Imam. The insiders’ heart had to be enamored with his love and submit to him in total obedience. (Memoirs of an Iranian Rebel, pp.242, 428,478).

Gender revolution aimed at making members far from sexual inclinations which make men consider women as subjects of trading who lure them and try to attract the attention of men by showing off. Therefore, such a revolution was brought about in order to overcome gender crisis intensified in recent years in the organization despite separation of men and women. One of the main approaches in this regard was absolute separation of men and women to the point that men were not allowed to participate in women sessions nor vice versa. Even a man could not sit on a chair on which a woman was sitting before. However, Maryam Rajavi was an exception to these rules. (Memoirs of an Iranian Rebel, 379).

Gender attachment is human grave from which Mojahedin have to flee. They can do so through above-mentioned ways and also professing their sinfulness before Maryam and Massoud. It means that all people are sinful, wives are witches and marrying them is forbidden. (Memoirs of an Iranian Rebel, pp.342-5). In many sessions, Massoud Rajavi and associate cadres acted offensively toward other highly educated members some of whom represented the National Council of Resistance in countries such as the U.S. For example, once Massoud Banisadr, the representative of the National Council of Resistance in the U.S., was about to speak and Massoud Rajavi introduced him as follows: “a dead man speaking deep from his grave”. Anyway, profess of sinfulness was one of the major characteristics of this clause of revolution, i.e. all members are sinful and it is only Maryam Rajavi who is innocent. Therefore, Maryam and he have to be relied upon in all matters. Since nobody deserves knowing Massoud except Maryam, he has to pass this way along with Maryam. Therefore, members have to follow Massoud Rajavi and Maryam Rajavi fighting against Islamic republic of Iran both politically and ideologically. As such, the presence of Maryam Rajavi as the single ideological member of the organization was vital to understand Massoud Rajavi, his love to God and members and his detestation of Khomeini, the Islamic revolution leader. (Memoirs of an Iranian Rebel, pp.347, 354).

In fact, the main objective of all ideological revolutions is winning absolute obedience of members, the most fundamental factor for running the cults. Therefore, Mojahedin have to be absolute devotees and stop doing common practices like jesting, free study, working out of the organization, unless it is an act of fundraising, non-organizational relations, attachment to personal property and sexual relations out of organization, keeping their personal books and the like. (Memoirs of an Iranian Rebel, pp.207, 214).

The process of divorce revolution was as follows: Massoud Rajavi was considered as imam of the time and nobody was worthy enough to see him since the members and their partners were themselves the veils. Therefore, women were told their husband and men were their barrier. So couples got divorced. Even single members underwent such a revolution promising not to get married in the future. All divorce papers were signed and delivered to Massoud Rajavi over one week. Any doubtful member was punished severely. For example, a member called Yaghubi who was a ranking member lost his status as a result of having relation with his wife. Or other members such as Karim Haqqi and his wife Maryam Babaee were subject to severe torture over years which ended with the wife’s suicide.

In fact, the main reasons behind such revolutions, and divorce revolution in particular, were not those acknowledged by the organization’s leaders, rather, they were as follows: winning complete obedience of members, solving marriage problem in the organization (in which men were 3 times more than women) (Memoirs of an Iranian Rebel, p.238) and also a terrible monopolism to the point that according to a foreign reporter, Massoud Rajavi could not endure members loving anybody except him. Consequently, children were sent to orphanages so as not to see their parents.

In fact, divorce and gender revolutions were complementary. It is worth noting that before divorce revolution, members were said to marry each other to compensate for emotional problems of those members losing their partner in Forugh operation. (Memoirs of an Iranian Rebel, 326). Moreover, in divorce revolution, couples were forced to perform three-fold divorce in which they could never possibly remarry. Such a divorce is against Islamic rules. Such actions by MKO turned it into a religious cult exceeding human rights.

Ideological revolution of MKO considered men as wild and passive creatures so that it was believed that men should be replaced by women in the organization. Moreover, they were ordered to criticize each other openly and even call their friends murderer. Otherwise, Massoud Rajavi and other officials got angry, offended them, and called them rubbish, dirty mouse, traitor, hypocrite since they did not criticize others. (Memoirs of an Iranian Rebel, pp.392, 426-7,).

This stage of revolution aimed at expelling opposed members and replacing them with women. In addition, they made members admit to guilts they have done before in the presence of Massoud Rajavi and Maryam Rajavi and Tahereh. Once a man complained of his wife being so thin was called by officials as obscene, cuckold, rubbish, fool, etc. it is evident that according to the organization’s ideology, women had superiority over men. (Memoirs of an Iranian Rebel, pp.230, 234).

Massoud Rajavi believed that ideological revolution may increase members” capabilities so they performed such offensive actions toward members. According to one clause, men could not achieve high ranks so 12 female members were selected as key members of leadership council and 12 females were selected as alternative members. All of them declared that Massoud Rajavi is their master and they are his maid. (Memoirs of an Iranian Rebel, pp.380, 421).

It is doubtful why 12 members were appointed. Such a selection seems ideological since 12 symbolizes the number of Shiite innocent Imams. Furthermore, appointing females instead of males confirmed the superiority of women over men. MKO believed that it was necessary to fight against Islamic Republic of Iran so women took responsibilities not based on meritocracy. Such considerations led to so called seat revolution (Memoirs of an Iranian Rebel, pp.285, 283, 414, 482,).

In fact, the issue of feminism in MKO aimed at expelling those male members who criticized the organization, accusing Islamic Republic of Iran of exploiting women, and abuse of women’s tender emotions to secure the leadership of Massoud Rajavi and his wife turned the organization into a cult. Although the organization tried to conceal the issue of divorce revolution which was to the advantage of Islamic Republic of Iran but the memoirs of separated members revealed it (Memoirs of an Iranian Rebel, 368).

It is worth noting that before the performance of forced divorces, all members got divorced in the presence of Abrishamchi, MKO’s number 2 in rank, who had already wedded them all in the name of Massoud Rajavi and Maryam Rajavi. (Memoirs of an Iranian Rebel, 25).

Translated by mojahedin.ws

August 19, 2007 0 comment

The Ideology of the MEK

The Shaped Destiny of Children in the Ideological Revolution (10)

Coming to pass MKO-run media bureaus in the Europe and also among the member residents of Camp Ashraf we encounter young people that hardly you can see any relative correspondence between their age and the atmosphere wherein they are exhausting their juvenile vigorousness. These youths, who can be well denominated as the fourth generation of Mojahedin, represent the same enthusiast and decisiveness of their previous generation. Furthermore, their amazing authority over organizational doctrines and teachings is in no way a deniable fact nor a media display to attract attentions. Many may ask, then, who are they and how they have been so experienced, being so young, in organizational, political and ideological issues.

In the history of political movements, Mojahedin are believed to be the sole organization that the impact of their activities has imposed heavy costs on whoever is in the reach of its surroundings. In the same way, the tragic destiny of children in MKO, before and after the ideological revolution, has not been investigated sufficiently. Political, fundraising as well as emotional exploitation of children by Mojahedin is one of the cases reported by many former MKO members as instances of human rights abuses in MKO.

The general consensus of opinion is that children should enjoy complete immunity from any form of manipulation and abuse. Human rights institutions and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights have repeatedly confirmed that children are entitled to special care and assistance and that especial measures have to be taken to protect children from all forms of physical and mental abuse, maltreatment and exploitation.

After the ideological revolution, Mojahedin concluded to separate children from their parents in an attempt to destabilize the foundation of family which the group believed to be a strategic impediment. The U.S first invasion to Iraq was a good alibi to accomplish the goal. The evacuation of children to other countries under the pretext of providing safety and security for them not only guarantied the accomplishment of the ideological objective but also paved the way to upbring and discipline the organization’s future combat force. Now, after two decades, the various dimensions of such an action have been fully revealed. Mojahedin’s attempt to undertake the guardianship of the children whose parents have separated from the organization signifies Mojahedin’s exploitative nature concerning the children. A number of former members of MKO have elaborated on the various dimensions of the group’s inhuman practices. Ann Singleton in her “Saddam’s private army” well refers to the process of separating babies from their parents as part of speeding up the application of the Internal Revolution:

More cynically still, Rajavi used the Gulf War as a pretext to have all the children removed from the bases in Iraq. The children had acted as a brake on the application of the Internal Revolution. Whilst the children were around, it provided an excuse for spouses to meet up in a family context. There was the possibility for ‘divorced’ couples to continue a covert relationship. Rajavi wanted the total devotion of everyone with no rivals. For him, the children represented his most dangerous rivals for their parents’ affections and loyalties. So on the pretext of having them evacuated to safety during the allied bombing, he had children even as young as two months old, sent abroad where they were adopted by Iranian families or kept in dormitories. (1)

However, that is not the full dimension of the oppression suffered by children at the hands of Mojahedin. The potential and practical European laws and regulations concerning the children granted Mojahedin an opportunity to exploit the European governments as well as citizens. The Europe provided MKO the best milieu to educate children for its cult-like purposes. But under drastic measures and vigilance of related state-run institutions the real intention of MKO is exposed for the public:

In Germany, the government uncovered the Mojahedin’s financial activities. After a two year investigation, the German High Court on 21st December 2001 closed the Mojahedin ‘shop’ – twenty-five houses and bases – after evidence was found of misuse of Social Security and fraud. Disturbingly, the Mojahedin had used the members’ children who had been evacuated during the Gulf War of 1991. These children, whilst they lived in the Mojahedin’s bases in Germany, were required to undertake work in the base and take part in fund-raising activities, collecting money in the street. At the same time, the Mojahedin were abusing every possible avenue of Social Security in Germany in order to claim benefits for these children. Documents in Germany showed that ten to twelve million Marks had been used by the Mojahedin to buy weapons. Considering that a Social Security claim of 130 – 260 Marks could be made per child per day, this is a conservative figure of the amount that the Mojahedin collected on account of these children. (2)

Further appalling aspects of MKO’s abuse of children include application of brainwashing techniques to indoctrinate them with subversive organizational ideologies to be later recruited into NLA based in Camp Ashraf. The two instances of self-immolation by Neda Hassani in England and Yaser Mohammadi in Camp Ashraf can be mentioned as explicit consequences of children trained according to mentioned techniques. The low age of these two young victims confirms the terrible process the children have gone through in the European and Iraqi camps. Of course, any raised objection was neutralized by a variety of tricks. According to Ann Singleton, Mojahedin shaped the destiny of these young victims by means of preplanned ideological, political, military, as well as terrorist schemes:

Some of the older children soon returned to Iraq and though still under-age, became members of the NLA. They were expected to ‘reject’ their parents as part of the new ideology. In other cases, a parent bravely refused to be separated and decided to accompany their children abroad. As usual, although the Mojahedin denounced these people as defectors, as weak and useless people, they did all they could to keep hold of them and have them work in their bases in the West. In all, the losses were few and Rajavi consolidated his hold over the members’ minds, hearts and lives. (3)

Bijan Niyabati, a left activist of NCRI, has made open confessions regarding emotional and organizational misuse of children within MKO. He has elaborated on such events far beyond what other former MKO members have stated. He confesses openly that Mojahedin indoctrinate children in such a way to make them highly vengeful and aggressive. He also maintains that these innocent children are implanted by ideological relations and principles of their adoptive parents:

On the other hand, there are innocent children whose only sins are to be born in a family engaged in revolutionary struggle without considering the children’s opinion for the sacrifice of majority. Hundreds of such children have to undergo an awful fate. You have to be yourself a child and have experienced such a destiny to develop a full comprehension of such a human tragedy. You have to have been separated from your mother and have been raised by a foster mother to feel the pain of worry and rage suffered by these children. Then you can make a dagger of your tears and sigh and a bullet of your wrath to hit the heart and head of the agents who are responsible for all these human tragedies. So you may have no doubt for unquestionable necessity of overthrowing the regime of whip and gallows. (4)

He acknowledges the fact that the process of separating children from their parents, at the command of the leader of MKO, aims at making children bear the grudge against MKO enemies; a fact referred to by many former MKO members as the most anti-human aspect of ideological revolution. Mojahedin, however, deny the accusation. According to Niyabati, the innocent children are inspired with violence and trained where to surface it while they do not know why they have to do so. The statements made by Niyabati surfaces the hidden dimensions of the awful process taking place inside MKO and they are even more telling than what other MKO’s ex-members expose. He refers to the hegemony and cultist relations onto which children are exposed and these statements work as verified evidences for any international human activist and organization, evidences which unveil the truth about the abuse and exploitation of defenseless children by Mojahedin-e Khalq.

References

1. Singleton, Ann; “Saddam’s private army”, Iran-Interlink.

2. Ibid

3. Ibid

4. Niyabati, Bijan; A different look at the ideological revolution within MKO, Khavaran Publication, p.100.

Bahar Irani – Mojahedin.ws – August , 2007

August 4, 2007 0 comment

The Ideology of the MEK

Internal Relations of MKO and Ideological Revolution (5)

MKO falsely claims to be practicing the most democratic modes in its internal relations. It announces that the organization has always provided an open window for dissident members, critics, and even infiltrators to express their views and is showing the highest degree of tolerance compared with other revolutionary organizations. On the contrary, most former MKO members report instances of human rights abuses in organization. They acknowledge the fact that Mojahedin suppress dissident members by means of intimidation, torture, false accusations, contempt and other psychological pressures. The main objective of such actions is to stop members leave the organization; otherwise they have to suffer physical and mental pressure as well as being branded as the agents and traitors.

Understanding of the fact that leaving cults is too difficult and costly may give us an insight into the psychological pressure adopted by the organization toward its critics. In fact, physical and mental pressure exercised upon dissident members by means of imprisonment, torture and brainwashing is shared by MKO and other cults. The raised contradiction between the organization’s principles and acts of revisionism are not only the cause for members’ separation but also may help reveal the reason why the organization suppresses dissident members. The book “Cults in Our Midst” gives us a clear picture of how dissatisfied members and critics are treated within a cult:

There is a closed logic system of an authoritarian leadership tolerating no criticism or change except that is confirmed by the leader. If you criticize or complain, the leader or others may accuse you of being a quitter and the organization is not accountable at all. In such a closed system of logic, you may not question any principle or rule or refer to the facts of contradiction concerning the ideological system or the instructions you have already received. In case you expose such observations, your statements may be altered and debated in a way that they completely contradict what you intended. You are made feel you have been wrong from the beginning. In cults, members are always wrong and the system is always right. [1]

Such mental and physical approaches have been applied after the initiation of the ideological revolution within MKO as a reaction against the ever-increasing criticisms on the part of members. According to many MKO’s ex-members, in this phase, under the pretext of security considerations, many dissident members and critics were either imprisoned or killed suspiciously. Mojahedin are also accused of establishing prisons inside the organization and exercising mental and physical pressures on prisoners. Niyabati justifies such actions as the inevitable consequence of ideological revolution aiming at testing the loyalty of members to leadership. He considers members’ blind obedience and submission to imprisonment, physical and mental tortures as a factor of confirming their loyalty to the leadership:

“Mojahedin leadership, in line of replacing and stabilizing new elements in Hanif’s ideology, needed recognition of trustful forces, even if they were suspected and confined by their ideal organization. [2]

It has to be noted that such procedures are rooted in Stalin’s security clearance of communist party in the Soviet Union in an attempt to make members obedient by means of physical and mental tortures. According to Singer when writing on a phase of the USSR communist party:

During purge trials in the Soviet Union in 1930’s, men and women who were accused of plotting secret moves against the government had to sign false confessions and as well as giving false testimonies concerning crimes committed by others. The world media were bewildered and astonished to face such a phenomenon. [3]

Regardless of security justifications, Niyabati justifies the circumstance from a different angle. In his view, the Camp Ashraf is a micro model materializing all the constituents of an ideal society. He considers security system, police forces and prison as essential factors for the survival of the political power and also as manifestations of the MKO’s approach toward an ideal society. He refers to the necessity of the existence of prison and security system in such a miniature model and considers physical and mental tortures exercised in Camp Ashraf as a practice of how to deal the dissidents and critics:

Such a society had to be a micro model of a real society consisting of government, president, the parliament in exile, armed forces, police forces, prison, court, mass media, diplomatic relations, economical and logistic systems. [4]

Despite such justifications, Niyabati cannot present a solution for the aftermath of the ideological test:

The way the organization treated such members (dissident members and critics) on the eve of the formation of a value-driven revolution seemed to be highly problematic well beyond a mere security issue. [5]

Niyabati implicitly states that the organization initiated a “process of clarifying” that later on worked as a granted opportunity to take revenge on dissidents and start an internal purge:

Whatever it was, the process of clarifying gave rise to a wrong procedure of treating insiders in MKO. The move failed in long-term to meet political and strategic objectives of the organization that led the Iranian people’s modern revolution. [6]

Such assertions confirm the claims made by former MKO members concerning the exposure of the insiders to imprisonment, mental and physical torture inside the organization. Mojahedin react to claims harshly as they did when the Human Rights Watch report revealed instances of abuses inside the group; the international body was consequently branded as collaborating with Iran. Mojahedin insist on saying that they have a democratic form of leadership and organizational relations. In Human Rights Watch report we read:

Human Rights Watch interviewed five of these former MKO members who were held in Abu Ghraib prison. Their testimonies, together with testimonies collected from seven other former MKO members, paint a grim picture of how the organization treated its members, particularly those who held dissenting opinions or expressed an intent to leave the organization. [7]

Somewhere else, we see that the interrogative sessions lead to the death of some members:

The witnesses reported two cases of deaths under interrogation. Three dissident members—Abbas Sadeghinejad, Ali Ghashghavi, and Alireza Mir Asgari—witnessed the death of a fellow dissident, Parviz Ahmadi, inside their prison cell in Camp Ashraf. Abbas Sadeghinejad told Human Rights Watch that he also witnessed the death of another prisoner, Ghorbanali Torabi, after Torabi was returned from an interrogation session to a prison cell that he shared with Sadeghinejad. [8]

References

1. T. Singer, Margaret; Cults in Our Midst: The Continuing Fight Against Their Hidden Menace.

2. Niyabati, Bijan. A Different Look at Mojahedin’s Internal Revolution , Khavaran Publication, 54.

3. T T. Singer, Margaret; Cults in Our Midst: The Continuing Fight Against Their Hidden Menace..

4. Niyabati, Bijan. A Different Look at Mojahedin’s Internal Revolution , Khavaran Publication, 54.

5. ibid.

6. ibid.

7. Human Rights Watch report. No Exit: Human Rights Abuses inside MKO Camps, 5.

8. ibid.

Bahar Irani – Mojahedin.ws – July 1, 2007

July 4, 2007 0 comment

The Ideology of the MEK

The Leadership Hegemony after the Ideological Revolution (2)

In the first section of the article, it was discussed that in MKO’s ideological revolution, one of the basic principles of organization, council leadership or democratic centralism, was denied; hence many members of the organization got separated. Members’ detachment violated none of the organizational principles of MKO as in one of the instructional pamphlets of organization titled ‘A Survey of the Possibility of Deviation in Democratic Centralism or the Difference between Scientific and Non-scientific Suspicion in Organizational issues’ it had been asserted that members could willfully leave the organization and even establish a new organization or branch in case democratic centralism took a course of deviation:

The possibility of deviation of democratic centralism in future, as it happened in the past, is self-evident. However, the question is what we should do? Shall we withdraw and remain passive? [1]

As noted, the possibility of deviation of democratic centralism was a taken for granted issue and the separation of members did not necessarily led to a state of passivity and the cease of struggle, rather the separated members were obliged to continue the line of struggle and to unmask the deviants. Taking the possibility into consideration, the process of fighting against deviation of democratic centralism was thus phased:

If deviation or an act of revisionism is proven, that is, any principally adopted political and ideological components is neglected, the internal opposition takes the first step to initiate a non-aggressive confrontation against the move. [2]

The next step, in case the deviated leading cell failed to ameliorate, would inevitably be the separation, schism and even uncovering the instances of deviation:

Yet, in the next phase and in case our attempts yielded no results, the schism is the solution to an organization which is not likely to revise its position. The schism is requisite in such cases as there are precedents for many revolutionary parties. [3]

In respect to the necessity of the continuation of struggle following the schism we read:

Then we have to be engaged in a wide struggle in a new front against the new opportunist and revisionist move by taking advantage of appropriate modes of struggle. [4]

As such, separation and even act of disclosing are considered as democratic rights on the part of the members. In this regard, the separation of Parviz Ya’qubi, one of the high-ranking members of organization, and his initiation of a new organization called ‘the Followers of the Path of Mussa’ may be considered as exercising organizational and democratic rights of members far from unfounded claims made by Rajavi accusing Ya’qubi. After the declaration of the first phase of the ideological revolution in 1985, a great number of members criticized Rajavi for denouncing council leadership. Ali Akbar Rastgoo, one of the ex-members of MKO, refers to Rajavi’s egocentric moves as the main cause of disintegrating the organization [5]. Mojahedin denied democratic centralism and declared openly the formation of a new leadership led by Rajavi:

A full comprehension of such a great revolution… is in fact a deep grasp of the elevated combination of a belief in the new leadership of Massoud and Maryam and the ideological obedience to them [6].

In this regard, it has been pointed out that Mojahedin have denied the most important achievement of contemporary movements. Niybati describes such an achievement from a different angle:

It was the first time in the history of contemporary revolutions that an organization denied the principle of democratic centralism, a principle achieved after several hundred years of revolutionary struggle, and (correctly or incorrectly) handed over the overall authority to a leader who is accountable only to God. [7]

The ideological revolution was in itself a result of the organization’s failures during 1981-1985 and aimed at preventing separation of the members and disunity. However, in this process, Rajavi’s hegemony turned to be the major cause behind all deviations and failures of organization. In this regard, Massoud Jabani writes:

Most of the principles and regulations of organization are there but on the paper and have no practical function, like the council leadership, democratic centralism and internal criticism. Rajavi launched a coup d’etat under the pretext of probable coup d’etats made against him and the organization in order to subordinate members by means of brainwashing. [8]

Bijan Niyabati asserts that Mojahedin’s ideological revolution was at first the outcome of the strategic failures of the organization from 1981 to 1985 and then, an attempt to prevent disintegration of the organization:

To protect revolution against reactionary moves and practices of exploitation, the sole solution is to immune the organization and its leadership against splitting and disintegration. [9]

Taking the above-mentioned points into consideration, we may come to the following conclusions:

1. Based on the theoretical principles of organization, separation, schism and disclosure of any instance of deviation from ideological and political principles in general and the principle of council leadership (democratic centralism) in particular is regarded as the absolute and democratic right of members.

2. Mojahedin themselves acknowledge the ideological revolution and negation of democratic centralism and, thus, the separation from organization may be an inevitable and predictable reaction on the part of the members.

3. Ideological revolution occurred as a result of deviation and strategic failure of the organization; Rajavi’s hegemony was an attempt to confront probable schism and members’ detachment.

4. Mojahedin’s exposed accusations against the separated members is an unjustly adopted tactic to avoid further criticism and to wrestle with the internal crises.

References

1. A Survey of the Possibility of Deviation of Democratic Centralism or the Difference between Scientific and Non-Scientific Suspicion in Organizational Issues. (1979). Tehran: MKO publications. p.54.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid, 59.

4. Ibid.

5. Rastgoo, Ali-Akbar; Mojahedin in the Mirror of the History, 259.

6. Mojahed , No. 242.

7. Niyabati, Bijan; A Different Look at Mojahedin’s Ideological Revolution, Khavaran Publication, 35.

8. Jabani, M; Psychology of Aggression and Terror, pp. 87-90.

9. Niyabati, Bijan; A Different Look at Mojahedin’s Ideological Revolution, Khavaran Publication, 21.

Mojahedin.ws – June 25, 2007

June 28, 2007 0 comment

The Ideology of the MEK

The Leadership Hegemony after the Ideological Revolution (1)

The article is compiled in two parts. It aims at reviewing the development of leadership in MKO from the beginning up to 1985. Next , the term ‘leadership’ in the context of ideological revolution would be defined and compared to the statements made by MKO’s ex-members concerning anti-democratic nature of Rajavi’s personal leadership and its role in the strategic failures of organization. As such, three relative topics will be discussed: leadership in MKO, leadership in ideological revolution, and the reasons of the ex-members’ opposition to hegemonic and ideological leadership of Rajavi.

Leadership constitutes one of the major issues of ideological revolution in MKO. In fact, the ideological revolution set up the meeting-point wherein the council leadership, referred to as the democratic centralism, was delegated to Massoud Rajavi. Although in the organization’s manifest the council leadership is considered to be a taken for granted and unalterable issue, many critics as well as MKO’s ex-members believe that the organization has been led under Rajavi’s hegemony.

Based on the resources of the organization itself, the significance of council leadership has been elaborated. Since the definition is derived out of Marxist doctrines and explicitly that of Mao’s viewpoints concerning collective leadership, of course it has its roots in dialectic Materialism which Mojahedin strongly believe to be instrumental for further comprehension of the council leadership. Elucidated on the structure and the best standards needed for conducting a revolutionary organization we read:

Centralism, as the highest decision-making organ, consists of the most qualified elements that in whole build up the most appropriately composed structure within an establishment. That is to say, the leading cadre is appointed based on the cadres’ prime qualifications that were manifested through a variety of revolutionary assignments. [1]

Also, in drawing a clear demarcation between democratic centralism and non-revolutionary, reactionary apparatus exploited by dictatorial and hegemonic controllers Mao is quoted:

In non-revolutionary (reactionary) systems (dictatorial administrations and military commanding echelon in reactionary armies) leadership is either hegemonic or simply a formality that have no logical conformity with the leader’s position and qualifications. Differently, in a revolutionary organization the most qualified elements in whole take the sensitive role of leadership upon themselves. [2]

In contrast to these statements, a brief look at the history of MKO from the beginning up to the ideological revolution, and also in two other critical phases of mass arrests in 1971 and the ideological schism in 1975, reveals the traces of hegemonic leadership. In an analysis of the chief reasons leading to tragic events of 1971, the charismatic leadership of Hanifnejad was concluded to be of significant impact which led to a decision on his intra-organizational execution. According to Lotfollah Meisami:

…Also indicated in the message was that because of his remiss, the leader had to be executed within the organization. They came to the conclusion that Hanifnejad, known to be the ideological symbol, had to commit suicide. [3]

However, Pahlavi’s regime executed Hanifnejad and the issue was totally forgotten. In the next phase, the schism, Mojahedin believe Shahram’s hegemony as well as the impact of Marxism and non-revolutionary traits led to the schism within the organization. Since then, Rajavi, inside the prison, gained a central status in the leadership to the point that in (30 Khordad) June 1981, he individually decided and declared the armed struggle phase. Rajavi has repeatedly acknowledged his full responsibility for the decision:

… he (Rajavi) individually made the serious ideological decision to get engaged in armed warfare, despite the probability of physical annihilation of organization. [4]

The interval between started from 1975 to 1985, when the first clause of ideological revolution of the organization was declared, may be considered as the process of theorizing personal leadership in the organization. Niyabati refers to this phase as follows:

For the first time in the history of contemporary revolutions an organization disclaimed its adopted principle of democratic centralism, a several hundred year-long achievement of the organized revolutionary struggle, and (correctly or incorrectly) hands over the leadership to a leader who is accountable only to God. [5]

Mojahedin substituted hegemonic leadership for their former and typical model of leadership, is referred to by Niabati as the Achilles’ heel. They denied democratic centralism openly, in their view of the matter imitating the model of Shiite leadership. The typical feature of this leadership mode is that the leader is in no way held responsible for whatever flaw. Above that, nobody is permitted to violate the sanctuary of leadership and he is immune of any challenge, and liable to be the cause for the insiders’ absolute self-devotion and blind obedience. As Niyabati describes

The sole solution to the issue which has long been the Achilles’ heel of all the contemporary movements and revolutions lies in the development and the maintenance of the theory of imamate in the organization. [6]

Taking such an approach, regardless of the historical background and ideological infrastructure of Mojahedin, was due to their encountered crises as a result of successive failures. It is a main reason the ex-members point to for their separation. Abrahamian expounding on Rajavi’s hegemony states:

In mid 1987, MKO possessed all the features of a cult. It had its own elevated leadership status formally known as leader but he was informally labeled as the existing imam. Mojahedin have established a rigid hierarchy with all the orders issued from the top and the prime duty of any common force is unquestionable and blind obedience. The organization has developed its own distinct ideology. [7]

The dissidents and critics interpret such adopted approach as explicit transformation into a cult that since long was the cause for the detachment of many members and fails to be limited to the declaration of the ideological revolution in 1985. For instance, a number of affiliated student associations in Europe issued a letter declaring their separation from MKO because their ideological and political viewpoints opposed the hegemony of Rajavi which, they believed, was steering the group toward cultist relations in the near future, a prediction that came true a few years later.

Reza Ra’isi Toosi, Hamid Noohi, and Hussein Rafi’i analyzed the process of hegemonism and violation of democratic centralism that transformed the organization into a cult:

If the leader (Rajavi) continues to disavow self-criticism and returns not to respect adopted principles, he will increasingly be mired. Depending on whether the organization will achieve political power or undergo complete isolation, the degree of deviations varies. [8]

Then, they predict the future of organization as follows:

In case the liberal move fails to assume political power, and specifically be contradicted roughly and face stalemate, it will inevitably transform into a cult due to its isolation and separation from the masses, many instances of which the history can recall. [9]

References

1. A Survey of the Possibility of Deviation of Democratic Centralism or the Difference between Scientific and Non-Scientific Suspicion in Organizational Affairs, MKO publications, Tehran, 1979, p. 6.

2. Ibid.

3. Meisami, L. (2003). Those Who Passed: The Memoirs of Lotfollah Meisami. Tehran. vol.2, 112.

4. Niyabati, Bijan; A Different Look at Mojahedin’s Ideological Revolution, Khavaran Publication, 22.

5. ibid, 35.

6. ibid, 90.

7. Abrahamian, Yervand; Radical Islam.

8. The Process of Separation, Mo’ud publication, 1980, 164.

9. ibid, 164.

Mojahedin.ws – June 14, 2007

June 21, 2007 0 comment

The Ideology of the MEK

Mojahedin’s Failed Operation and the Ideological Revolution

Although not yet translated into English, Bijan Niyabati’s “A Different Look on Mojahedin’s Ideological Revolution” contains countless evidences that challenge MKO’s adopted circumstantial decision-takings. Being an ardent advocate of MKO and the Rajavis, Niyabati has never intended to criticize the group’s strategies and the leadership flaws; rather his book maintains an absolute appreciation of the organization. The book, however, infers a source of unquestionable facts that challenge MKO in a variety of crucial phases.

Based on Niyabati’s book, the intention is to go through the organization’s ideological revolution that consequently resulted in the group’s transformation into a cult. Of the great importance is that the analyses by Niyabati and other ex-members are in some way identical; the difference lies in the fact that the former is still a ranking member of MKO while the latter are labeled as the agents of the Islamic Republic.

The failure of the operation Eternal Light (Forough Javidan) initiated challenges against Rajavi’s egocentric decision-making that led many forces of the organization to their death. Most of his critics believe that the operation was in no way correspondent with the organization’s line of strategy and that, Rajavi’s uncertain analysis of the post cease-fire situation compelled him to make a hasty decision.

In spite of claims made by Rajavi and his commanders that the operation was a great success with unbelievable military achievements, the casualties were much greater for Mojahedin to sustain. Niyabati explicitly calls the operation a great loss and defeat:

The operation Eternal Light was definitely a military failure. Through the operation, Mojahedin and Iranian modern revolutionaries lose hundreds of the best commanders of the coming revolution. (P. 82)

However, both Mojahedin and Niyabati insist on the strategic and political achievements of the operation. But it is believed that the achievements in general were nothing more than surfacing and theorizing the narrowest internal relations molded as the ideological revolution that is considered to be the “lost ring” and justification of the strategic crisis within Mojahedin. The post-operation phase was much critical and Mojahedin came to face a remarkable drop out of the members and a predominant sense of passivity among the remnants. But before these disharmonies could surface, rajavi took the control in hand and shifted to another phase of the ideological revolution to confront the non-surfaced crisis. Here are a number of analyses made by the ex-members on the operation.

The operation Eternal Light was the result of the search for an outlet out of an inevitable cul-de-sac rather than to be a strategic necessity. An analysis of the operation from the political and tactical point of view and Rajavi’s rationalization of the operation indicates that the move was the outcome of a desperate situation that had completely immobilized Mojahedin both in political and military fronts. A group that had once concentrated all its campaign marrow in a form of militia warfare and had already suffered great loss, suddenly and unbelievably had shifted to adopt a classic military tack to start a big cross-border operation. In fact, Mojahedin hurried to take advantage of a no-war no-peace situation created after the ceasefire. Niyabati explains the situation as this:

In the created interval following the acceptance of the ceasefire and after the deployment of the UN forces and the closure of the borders, the Iraqi army, in order to gain the upper hand in the upcoming peace negotiations, started slight and scattered over-the-borders military operations and inflicted heavy losses over the body of the regime’s military machine. It was a real chaos in the fronts and many Iranian forces were putting down the arms to flee. The acceptance of the ceasefire had damaged the regime’s dignity. (P. 78)

In spite of Mojahedin’s earlier insistence on peace and ceasefire, the group never anticipated that Iran would consent to ceasefire and was dreaming a long-lasting war that preciously troubled the water for Mojahedin to fish. Based on rajavi’s own analysis of the situation that discarded the possibility of any peace agreement, niyabati says:

The Mojahedin’s leadership utterly shocked by the fait accompli (acceptance of ceasefire by Iran) decided to counteract. It was a truth that in the strategy of the modern liberation war, no room was left at all neither for peace nor for ceasefire. (p. 79)

Regardless of the fact that at the end Rajavi made the claim that the operation was merely a political move propelled by a feeling of self-sacrifice, the move was mainly planned, under the illusion that Iran was vulnerable, to topple the regime. It was not long after sacrificing a great number of the forces that Rajavi, to avoid shouldering the responsibility of the failure, started analyzing the operation as being political and justifying the defeat. He condemned his forces of being a slave of inner and outward inclinations which worked as the alibi for putting the next phase of the ideological revolution into practice. In fact, the failure granted him the best opportunity to sharply reprimand the forces and to announce that he has found the recourse to topple the regime with the same remainder of the forces.

The second phase of the ideological revolution started from the point where Mojahedin came to recognize an urgency to have further control over the forces. It was much because the group could no more rely on the strategic “social element”, namely the masses, to assume power under the pretext of the revolution of the masses. As Niyabati sums up:

From this point on (the operation) Mojahedin develop a quantitative perception concerning revolution, the vanguard role and its association with the masses. From now on, the revolution is no more an issue for the masses. (p. 86)

Explicitly evident in the analyses of the ex-members, Mojahedin are bankrupt in social support. Maryam Rajavi, well aware of such a crucial lack, sees no other choice but to rely on the remainder of the forces when she says “with this same Liberation Army we can and must overthrow the regime of Khomeini”.

Expounding on Maryam Rajavi’s new position concerning the regime change, Niyabati thus depicts the potentialities of the Liberation Army:

With this noted sentence uttered by Maryam Rajavi following her promotion to the second rank in the leadership, the responsibility of overthrowing the regime was officially rendered to the vanguard. That is the point where the function of the army that had the mission to break the spell of repression and to pave the way for the mass uprising comes to an end and the army itself bears the vocation of overthrow. (p. 86)

Niyabati believes that the second reason behind the ideological revolution was to deprive the forces of any sense of psychological and mental confidence and to establish a new system of revolutionary values. The remainders of the operation Eternal Light could neither be reorganized nor could possibly be employed in the new strategic path. Furthermore, they could not be replaced as they were old revolutionary veterans. The solution, as Niyabati points out, was either a shift in the strategy or making the forces pass through an ideolog:

Now the circumstances compelled Mojahedin to adopt a new course. In respect to the existing condition neither the pivotal role of the Liberation Army could be of any significance nor could it continue to be national but ideological. (p. 86)

It was a necessity that could only emerge out of a forcibly tensed relation, in contrast to the previously loose context, within Mojahedin. As Niyabati points out:

Thus, the ambiance of the post-operation of compels Mojahedin to abandon the policy of extension to get tense. Once more Mojahedin establishment enters a new phase of its internal ideological revolution. (p. 87)

The ideological revolution that initiated in 1984 to end the leadership council and to promote Rajavi to an uncontested leader, evolves into an expanded system of heretical values that affects the innermost layers of Mojahedin’s internal as well as political relations.

Obviously, because of this novel system of ideological values in general, the extent of changes includes all the acts and reacts and the ideological regulation of the individuals with the organization in all aspects of political and social contexts. (p. 23)

Majority of detached members represent nearly the same aforementioned causes that advanced the second phase of the ideological revolution following the failure in the operation Eternal Light. In fact, most agree that it was the very start point for transforming Mojahedin into a cult.

All references are from Bijan Niyabati’s “A Different Look on Mojahedin’s Ideological Revolution”

Bahar Irani – Mojahedin.ws – June 2007

June 13, 2007 0 comment

The Ideology of the MEK

The Ideological Revolution, the Mojahedin Cult’s Devised System of Values

It has long been asserted that Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO) has restructured the status of a cult. Interestingly, in contrast to terrorist allegations that it attempts to deny, MKO prefers to take no position against or for the cult allegations. In many cases, as it were a mission to accomplish, the paid critics try to challenge the allegations arguing that the term “cult” is a product of split in religions which has nothing to do with political groups. However, a review of admissions by the ex-members concerning the ideological revolution inside MKO reveals that the group can closely be identified with other existing cults, all of whom share the same features that classify them as cults.

At the present, the world is concerned about the threat of the destructive cults and many concerned organizations and bodies have initiated a campaign to reveal the menace and threats of cults and develop a public awareness. No doubt, not only the religious sects but also other active social and political groups and factions take advantage of cult-molds to convince their insiders to move on the path they lead them on. The features are the same; the difference lies in the aims and the attractively drawn perspectives. Recent researches reveal that although partisans of a certain political group strongly reject to be referred to as subjects of a cult, they are indeed involved in cult practices and activities.

In MKO, similar to other cults, the partisans are under the influence that only those who adhere to the group’s ideology are on the right path. But to accept the cult’s proposed ideology, the insiders’ old system of beliefs has to be fragmented to be replaced with the revolutionary one. It is the prerequisite for the total obedience of the leader. Dennis Tourish expounding on the issue states that:

Cults exercise an extraordinary influence over the lives of their followers. Cherished belief systems are scrapped. Many cult leaders espouse high-sounding ideals. For all that, their primary goal is obedience. A toxic internal atmosphere is created, in which dissent fights a losing battle against conformity. [1]

Thus, the cherished belief systems have to be scrapped first. The annihilation of the insiders’ accepted system of values happens through a sudden shock. Consequently, the minds of the insiders stop any resistance and lose their power of defense and they are prepared to be indoctrinated by subversive cult ideologies. Bijan Niyabati, a member of MKO’s National Council of Resistance, defines MKO’s internal ideological revolution as a new cherished system of values that replace those long publicly idolized in the world outside through a shock:

A successive interpolation of new elements of value into the old system of values is possible only through upsetting the equilibrium of old value system that occurs only by the means of a sudden shock. [2]

The process, he believes, is accomplished through either assuming a political power or an organizational hegemony.

However, although to disrupt the predominant value equilibrium in an individual in order to be substituted by new value equilibrium proves not to be unmanageable, it is a long, hard task to be accomplished either through assuming an authoritative political power (as well as controlling economy and the media) or a stricken shock. To disrupt the subsisting equilibrium and to prepare an individual to be reconciled with the new milieu, it is evident that only a shock and nothing else can possibly be productive. [3]

MKO’s internal ideological revolution proposes a new, totalistic vision of values that completely challenges the long-lasting, dominant religious and cultural values. Although MKO believes that the ideological revolution has to be first interiorized before being externalized, the leaders are well aware that it is no more than another cause to embrace so as to justify their acts of indecency.

MKO’s ideological revolution would never be passed onto the world outside because it is purely an ideological dogma dominating the Mojahedin cult to have total control over the insiders. That is natural not to face MKO’s protesting against the accusations of being a cult, since in this new, sacred system of value, the organization is held together by charismatic relationships that demands total commitment to the Rajavis at the top.

Notes:

[1]. Dennis Tourish & Tim Wohlforth: On the edge; political cults right and left, 16.

[2]. Niyabati, Bijan: A different look at Mojahedin’s internal revolution, 35.

[3]. Ibid, 26.

Mojahedin.ws – May 21, 2007

May 26, 2007 0 comment

The Ideology of the MEK

Why Mojahedin Shun Manifesting Contents of Ideological Revolution? (4)

As mentioned, to have a good understanding of the ideological revolution within MKO, first we have to go through its contents. But before, the importance of the phenomenon from Mojahedin’s point of view has to be necessarily asserted, a phenomenon that according to many critics and separated members was de facto manifestation of Mojahedin’s historical and ideological potential to evolve into a cult. In fact, now after nearly two decades of the events, there is not yet unanimity about its essentiality either in internal or external relations and also its applicable function in Mojahedin’s strategy. On this issue, Niyabati states:

Now eighteen years after the ideological revolution and in spite of reaching maturity, yet neither Mojahedin could themselves resolve on a non-ideological explanation in respect to the phenomenon nor those out could develop an understanding of its nature and function within Mojahedin’s internal relations and its inevitable impacts on the formation and regulation of relations with others. [1]

In this case of study, the main reference will be Bijan Niyabati’s “A look within MKO’s ideological revolution” for some reasons. First Mojahedin have not taken any position to approve or disapprove the book whereas they traditionally hardly tolerate any contradictory ideological or political criticism and react immediately. Their meaningful silence on the book can be considered a tacitly approbation of the contents.

Second, the author openly announces to be a member of Mojahedin. He is so attached to the group that in defence of its being labelled as terrorist, he declares to be proud of being a terrorist. Following the proscription of Mojahedin in the list of the EU in 2002 and in response to Rajavi’s call to protest the decision, he wrote:

It is a claim I have never made over the years neither within nor outside of your [addressing Rajavi] organization, but now talking in the position of an irreligious, secular element and keeping unto my past view-points and fully aware of the political, legal consequences I addressing you cry out that if Mojahedin are terrorist, then, I am also a Mojahed-e Khalq. [2]

Somewhere else in the same message in appreciation of the strategy and the third phase called ‘survive in the rift’, namely creeping into the created gap between the West and Iran to survive and escalate the tension to advance the overthrow, Niyabati writes:

It was only your resistance that, in the course of one the most critical chapters of Iranian history, kept the flames of an absolute resistance against one of the most tremendous forces of the contemporary history aflame and dipped the white flags of surrender one after another and, at the same time, by being entangled in complicated political sphere and the widespread political relation with all the imperialist world and by the merit of vigilance took advantage of tiny breaches to thwart their plots and to unburden the armed resistance and tried all the possibilities according to the revolutionary principles and never dissolved in them and remained revolutionary. [3]

These remarks work as reliable factors in assertion of Mojahedin’s strategically dual nature and evidences for approving it as a cult.

Third, Niyabati’s book is an acknowledgment of his debt to Mojahedin and their ideological revolution as well as being written in commemoration of his wife, Shirin Baqerabadi, who was killed in Mojahedin’s perpetrated military operation called the Eternal Light. However, it seems that many critics and the theoreticians advocating the change unanimously agree that the armed strategy and the related tactics to overthrow the Iranian regime have proved to be unproductive.

Regardless of all these views, the main focus is on the supposition that Mojahedin’s dual character and contradictory conducts in the West and within the Camp Ashraf endorse its truly cult structure. Its proximity to the same Western determined evaluation of a cult well crystallizes it as one of the most visible examples of a group that blends the characteristics of a terrorist group with a cult.

On the question of whther Mojahedin from the very initiation enjoyed latent cult inclinations or it was an imediate outcome of its ideological revolution, it should be explained that at least after the ideological revolution Mojahedin was not the same as in the past. Expounding on the point, Niyabati says:

Mojahedin organization after the ideological revolution is no more the same Mojahedin organization before the revolution. [4]

Notes

[1]. Bijan Niyabati; A look within MKO’s ideological revolution, Khavaran Publication, 2.

[2]. Niyabati’s response entitled “I am a Mojahed as well” to Rajavi’s call to protest proscription of Mojahedin as a terrorist group.

[3]. Ibid.

[4]. ]. Bijan Niyabati; A look within MKO’s ideological revolution, Khavaran Publication, 2.

Bahar Irani – Mojahedin.ws – April 23, 2007

April 26, 2007 0 comment

The Ideology of the MEK

Why Mojahedin Shun Manifesting Contents of the Ideological revolution? (3)

As mentioned before and according to a traditional tendency within Mojahedin, they deliberately conceal the events and happenings. An example to mention is the ideological schism within the group in 1975. In this phase, they ducked to impart the news of schism before the declaration of the ideological schism by Taqi Shahram. On the other hand, they strived to convince the converted Marxist members in the prison not to reveal their conversion and keep behaving as a religious member. It was only after the declaration of the Marxist wing that Mojahedin announced the so-called twelve-clause statement. Many separated members of Mojahedin, including Saeed Shahsavandi, Lotfollah Meisami who were in prison at the time, have talked about the issue in detail.

Mojahedin insisted on holding in the schism at a time when such events and splits were common and inevitable in any revolutionary organization. But Mojahedin, believed to be a political group, chose to impart no piece of information. It could be that the group was worried to lose the support of the religious forces at the time. That is to say, Mojahedin utilized the concealment as a tactic in continuation of taking advantage of the financial aids and recruiting the religious, political forces. Following such a double-faced policy, it was the same case with Mojahedin’s position towards the Islamic revolution in 1979 and its cleric leader. In fact, the adopted tactic granted Mojahedin an opportunity to reorganize as well as to recruit and train new forces.

In the historical process of Mojahedin there can be found numerous instances of adhering to the tactic of camouflage for organizational, political, and … interests. But, following the ideological revolution inside Mojahedin, they took a different trend. The only thing sneaked out of the organization was its qualitative echoes on the members and sympathizers. Of course, the left impression differed in respect to the ranks and organizational echelon. Those nearer to the leading cell at the top felt a closer pertinence to the issue and, as a result, showed more emotional and sentimental reaction. Mehdi Abrishamchi quoting Massoud Rajavi talking about the impact of the ideological revolution on Mahmood Ataei, a member of the Central Cadre, said:

Don’t you remember that Rajavi in his speech referred to Mahmood Ataei who had written that ‘let me cut off my hands so you may believe’? What does it mean? It means that Massoud’s self-confidence does not mean self-confidence in himself, Massoud’s self-confidence means trust of Mojahedin in Mojahedin. [109]

In a report prepared following the video-taped display of the ideological revolution in an organizational meeting in the Europe, Mojahedin talk of similar impacts on lower rank sympathizers residing in European countries. In a part of this report annexed to the pamphlet “The ideological revolution within Mojahedin Khalq” Mehdi Abrishamchi states:

England – A lady who had a Ph.D. in political science said while crying ‘so long I have studied in the university but after my few hours of being present in this meeting, I felt I have learned something and came to know what position a woman occupies and what price should one pay to perceive it. I bow my head. Anybody who conceives should bow his head.’ This lady at first refused to watch the video-taped ceremony of the Norooz meeting; she at times got angry and swore at the organization.

Somewhere else, reporting the reaction of a woman while watching the video display, the report reads:

France – An Iranian woman said ‘the move dissolved the inwoven complex in women. I was not a sympathizer but tonight, for the first time, I quivered and cried. I have bought the book “woman on the course of freedom” and a poster of Ashraf to hang it before my eyes. Tonight, I have achieved freedom’.

Here is another remark:

Germany – An Iranian carpet dealer: ‘I underwent a change. I could not believe. For the first time in my life I sat motionless for 5 hours not knowing how it passed. I had improper ideas about Women but now they are corrected. The words changed me. I want to write a letter to the leadership.’

Regardless of these claims whether being true or not, the importance lies in the irrational and sentimental aspects that have impacts on people. They are the factors that are in themselves considered unconventional in relation to conducts within other similar political organization and which turn to be the criterion to gain organizational legitimacy. Talking on the primary importance of this aspect to comprehend the ideological revolution, Niyabati in his book “The Mojahedin ‘s ideological revolution” writes:

It is obvious that the process does not follow a rational approach. The dominant element in the process is not “logic and reason” but “love” and “emotion”. The means are not dispute and contentment but devotion. That is the point wherein Massoud claims the heart of Mojahedin. [113]

And so as to apprehend the evolution:

In this great scene neither is the campaign background of any importance nor the organizational qualification and even the political conscious. [114]

Actually, the benchmark that qualifies a member to be received in the precinct of the ideological revolution is thus defined:

The wayfarer devoid of any will should stand like a log surrendering himself to the axe of the carpenter to be carved in any form he wills.

To have a good understanding of the correlation, it is necessary to have a good recognition of the content which Mojahedin strongly shun to be revealed. However, the Niyabati’s book as well as the detached members’ testimonies there can be found details of some kind.

Bahar Irani – Mojahedin.ws – April 15, 2007

April 5, 2007 0 comment

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