The “Third Option” as articulated by Maryam Rajavi, the leader of Mujahedin-e Khalq, is a strategic approach to regime change in Iran that rejects both foreign military intervention and appeasement of the current clerical regime. While the so-called third option should seem reasonable and democratic for the opponents of the Iranian government, it has not been embraced by them.
It depends on who’s proposing third option
The MEK’s background and nature are not compatible with the principals of third option. The apparent principals of third option are the followings:
1. No Foreign War: The strategy avoids any form of foreign military involvement in Iran
2. No Appeasement: It rejects negotiations and any diplomatic approach toward the Iranian government.
3. Regime Change by the Iranian People and Resistance: The core tenet is that regime change should be achieved through the efforts of the Iranian people and their organized resistance
The first principal is unheard of in the MEK’s background. The MEK was the only group that chose armed struggle is its fight against the Iranian newly established government in 1980s. It sided with Iraqi dictator in the first foreign war against Iran. It acted like the private army of Saddam Hussein in intelligence and military operations against Iranians.
After the fall of Saddam Hussein, the MEK was disarmed by the US military. Since then, it has been cooperating with the US and Israeli intelligence services and military in order to destabilize the government in Tehran.
Maryam Rajavi rejects diplomatic solutions because negotiation and diplomacy has never been a part of MEK’s strategy. The group has always been violently suppressing its opponents, critics and even its own dissident members. The only diplomatic effort made by the MEK has been through its hefty multi-million-dollar lobbying campaign in western parliaments.
The most controversial principle of third option is the last one: Regime change by the Iranian people and resistance. Maryam Rajavi has consistently emphasized that the Iranian people possess the essential elements for change.
The “organized resistance” that Rajavi refers to is allegedly the MEK’s network of supporters, activists, and members, both inside and outside Iran, who are committed to overthrowing the current regime. Where are these people?
It was just a few weeks ago that the New York Times reported that the MEK has almost zero support inside Iran.
The MEK dreams of mobilizing such a network to create a broad-based movement capable of challenging the Iranian government’s authority. However, the reality of the Iranian political scene indicated the opposite. Iranians of any political hate the MEK. Even if they want regime change, they do not trust Maryam Rajavi.
Democratic values and Third Option
According to Maryam Rajavi’s claims, the Third Option is presented as a democratic alternative to war and appeasement, with the goal of establishing a free, secular, and non-nuclear Iran. Its framework often highlights the MEK’s commitment to democratic values, human rights, and a secular government in Iran. This is intended to appeal to a broad range of Iranians and garner international support for the movement.
The success of third option highly depends on the ability of the MEK to effectively mobilize and organize the Iranian population. The strategy has been the subject of considerable debate and scrutiny, with critics questioning the MEK’s past actions and its ability to represent the diverse interests of the Iranian people.
The contradiction between Maryam Rajavi’s advocacy for democratic values for Iranians and the fact that MEK has a history of violence, cult-like practices, and internal authoritarianism, is the crucial topic raised by the experts. This contradiction is a complex issue with significant implications for the MEK’s credibility and its claims to represent the Iranian people.
The MEK’s internal structure and leadership have always been subject to scrutiny. Critics have described the group as a cult, citing its strict hierarchical structure, personality cult around Massoud Rajavi (Maryam Rajavi’s husband), and thought control and isolation of members. Defectors have reported instances of forced confessions, restrictions on contact with the outside world, forced celibacy and the suppression of dissent. These practices are seen as antithetical to democratic values, which emphasize individual freedom, critical thinking, and open dialogue.
Maryam Rajavi’s leadership role in the MEK raises questions about her commitment to democratic principles. The MEK’s internal structure and past actions contradict the values she publicly espouses, and so it undermines her credibility as a champion of democracy for Iran. The MEK’s history of violence and its cult-like practices have created a significant challenge for Maryam Rajavi to reconcile her advocacy for democratic values with the reality of the organization she leads.
The core of the contradiction lies in the disparity between the MEK’s stated goals of establishing a democratic Iran and the means it has employed to achieve those goals, as well as its internal organizational structure. The use of violence, the suppression of dissent, and the cult-like practices within the MEK are seen as incompatible with the democratic values that Maryam Rajavi claims to uphold. This contradiction raises questions about the MEK’s true intentions and its ability to govern democratically if it were to come to power in Iran.
Mazda Parsi