Mojahedin Khalq (Rajavi cult) and the Aftermath of Recognizing POAC’s Judgment

Regardless of many contradictions in POAC’s judgment and remaining of MKO on the list of the proscribed organizations, MKO’s insistence to recognize the judgment necessitates its compliance with some rules. Granted that MKO has forsworn terrorism since June 2001, as it has claimed and is stated in the POAC’s judgment, the group has to present proven evidences to justify its claim of renunciation of terrorism. It has to be noted that MKO in its early adopted principles strongly advocated armed warfare as its strategy of struggle and assumed it a prerequisite for volunteers to be recruited in the National Council of Resistance (NCR). In effect, a sincere renunciation of terrorism requires a public announcement and making amendments to its adopted principles.

In spite of the fact that Mehdi Barai’s witness statement explained why it was not possible to make public the decision made in 2001 to put an end to the group’s military action, no barrier seems to be barring the group at the present. The reasons presented for not making the decision public are mere political justifications rather that prima facie evidences. He states, for instance, that the public announcement of the decision to end military operations would result in consequences:

– The decision would have a very considerable impact on the organisation, its members and sympathisers.

– The organisation had to exercise extreme prudence to pre-empt and prevent any political, social, security and organisational fall-out resulting from that decision.

– A premature announcement would have provided the regime with an enormous source of propaganda, not only to boost the morale of its own forces but also to demoralise the Iranian people in general and PMOI sympathisers in particulars.

– It might well have led to undesirable and imprudent reactions from certain units or individuals that risked creating several splinter groups which continued the military activities.

– The Iranian regime could also have capitalised on these potential splits through misinformation campaigns by for example setting up organisations claiming to be the PMOI and have them do and say whatever they want. [1]

Although the group announces its preparedness to exchange information with any concerned legal institution about MKO’s activities in the UK, Iran and Iraq, it is of great significance to announce if it has ever arranged to revise and make changes to its so far practicable organizational principles both within MKO and NCRI. To convince the Western parts, the group also has to certainly make changes to its long history of engagement in terrorism and clean a big bulk of it. How MKO can claim it has forsworn terrorism white in its still practicable charter of NCR, as a prerequisite to recruit members, it says:

It is prerequisite for any recruited member in the council to recognize the charts of the council, the provisional government and its bond duties as well as other made resolutions by the council. [2]

And consequently points to armed warfare as one of recognized paragraphs within the chart of NCR:

Any criticism of MKO’s strategy of widespread armed struggle adopted in military phase that may deny necessity of armed resistance is deemed absolutely illegitimate. [3]

Any silence from the part of MKO that shows it is reluctant to deal with the stated issues indicate that it is in no way sincere in abjuration of terrorism:

The prerequisite paragraph recognizing armed struggle should be officially denied by the NCR.

Other necessary amendments in NCR’s chart should be made.

The NCR’s recruits, if there will be any, should not be forced to submit to the paragraph.

MKO should openly announce that all those members expelled or separated for opposing or criticizing the policy of armed struggle can rejoin MKO or NCR if they will.

Like the early stated causes behind the decision to resort to armed struggle, MKO should justify the taken decision to end terrorism both in political and ideological aspects.

In many instances, MKO has maintained the legitimacy of self-defence in agreement with its strategy of armed warfare. MKO should explain how it can possibly justify two contradictory statements. Does the legitimate defence mean the same previously perpetrated terrorist activities? If true, so it has implicitly consented to have been engaged in terrorism before forswearing it and thus, it has nothing to do with claimed defence.

Finally, criticism of the armed warfare, strategically and theoretically, seems to be an absolutely deemed necessary procedure at the present by MKO.

If MKO is standing resolute against the renunciation of terrorism as it claims, at least a review of its previously adopted resolutions, some of which were mentioned, will imply the earnestness of its decision.

Notes:

[1]. PROSCRIBED ORGANISATIONS APPEAL COMMISSION, Appeal No: PC/02/2006.

[2]. Mehdi Khodai Sefat; Recognition of NCR.

[3]. Bijan Niyabati; A Different Look at the Ideological Revolution within MKO, p. 10.

Omid Pouya, Mojahedin.ws, December 23, 2007

سرویس محتوا

Related Articles

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published.

Back to top button