Terrorism, regardless of any judgment or perspective from which we try to find its roots and conceptions, has become a serious threat to the world security and peace. Terrorism acts to achieve any goals, demands or specifically – political ends, have a long historical background. What have changed are the new methods and mechanisms being used for executing such violent acts. Terrorism, in our contemporary time, may have been successful in achieving some political achievements but comparing with the costs it has imposed, the achievements are not so significant. Today, the international consensus is stressing that the terrorizing and violent methods are not inherently capable of achieving such goals as democracy and justice in societies. Terrorist groups, as is widely accepted by all, are themselves a product of unjust relations and interactions. During some periods of history violent acts may have been the inevitable solution for resolving the ruling political parties’ stalemates, and in a broader scale in the international affairs. The increase in the number of armed groups during the 19th century was mostly the result of Marxism movements or as a response to this cause (the political stalemates). However, the relative change in the international structures and in-compensable costs, from one hand, and the use of violent acts by opportunist groups and anarchists, on the other hand, ultimately are some proofs for their ineffectiveness. Why, in fact, have the terrorism and violent methods been so greatly challenged, criticized and hated in our time? It seems that the main problem of these methods, regardless of their dangers for the general public and innocent lives, lies within that part of society that under the effect of such acts reach a self-alienating state. Terrorism converts its victims into people who are unable to see their surrounding world in no other way than wrath and violence. In fact, terrorism acts are not just used as a means for attaining their rightful rights or their political party’s demands, but becomes an ideology. The real threat of terrorism rests in the application of this ideology over all social interactions and its introduction to the spiritual life of the society. To better understand the depth of the problem, we first need to arrive at a more realistic understanding of the terrorism, and the knowledge of the mechanisms, interactions, and pedagogies used among the terrorist groups. What are the moral bases and principles among the terrorist groups? And finally, to what extent those who join such groups have a clear idea and understanding of the goals and strategies of terrorism? There is no doubt that those who are drawn into the terrorist groups based on even some legitimate grounds, do this originally because of being endowed with some adventure-seeking spirit. This mechanism, through some internal group interactions, turns a person into such being that is not even slightly comparable to the one who first joined the group. By calling the person a revolutionist, after a period of training for terrorist operations, they turn the person into a compulsive and in some cases into an ideologist person. He practically becomes a new person by joining a terrorist group; a new person who can now do things he could not do before. He not only morally and mentally but also psychologically becomes a different person. Terrorism ideologists and theorists, as part of their social revolution doctrine, assess their success in terms of the level of the violence and expansion of it over all social realms. According to these ideologists, the more widespread the violence is the more successful are the revolutionary groups. To them, the human creativity and talents must be put into work to create political stalemate. They use this method to tie the society’s destiny to those of theirs and turn the whole society into militarized and security factions. In such conditions, the passive substances in society will also be forced to join one of these fighting fronts, political parties or terrorist groups. A. Kavehpur-February 14, 2008
Mujahedin Khalq Terror group
THEY are Iraq’s forgotten terrorists, more than 3,000 fighters of the Mujahideen-e Khalq (MEK) languishing at one of their former military camps some 100km north of Baghdad.
‘They are definitely in a legal limbo. No one wants them,’ said Mr Said Boumedouha, a researcher at Amnesty International in London. No one, that is, except Iran.
The MEK, also known as the MKO or the People’s Mujahideen of Iran, is described as an Islamic Socialist group that advocates the overthrow of Iran’s government. Founded in Teheran in 1965, it opposed the rule of Iran’s shah, but was violently suppressed after the Iranian revolution as it was viewed as a threat by Ayatollah Khomeini’s newly established regime.
With its headquarters relocated to Iraq in 1986, the MEK fought with Saddam Hussein’s forces in the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988. They were organised as a conventionally armed brigade with an estimated fighting strength of 6,000 to 8,000 personnel. In mid-1994, Iraq’s Ministry of Defence announced that these fighters had been formally integrated with the country’s armed forces.
The MEK is designated as a terrorist organisation by the United States, the European Union and several individual countries – in part, it seems, because of anti-Western attacks and assassinations before the Iranian revolution. Teheran also views the MEK members as terrorists and has sought their extradition from Iraq.
There have been efforts to lift the yoke of this designation, including a 2002 call to end the US proscription signed by 150 members of Congress. In fact, some have suggested that Washington originally tagged it as a terrorist group in 1997 as a gesture to Iran’s newly elected reformist president.
The US proscription nevertheless remains in place, and the EU Council continues to blacklist the MEK despite a December 2006 ruling by the European Court of Justice that overturned Brussels’ edict freezing MEK funds.
There are currently some 3,360 MEK members at Camp Ashraf, located in Iraq’s Diyala province. About 110 others are defectors seeking refugee status and residing at the Ashraf refugee camp. Some have been voluntarily repatriated to Iran, claiming they were forced to join the MEK after being taken prisoner by Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) says it has helped in the repatriation of 255 former fighters, most recently just this month, but the US-led Multinational Force in Iraq provides a figure of 380.
Though part of the Iraqi army, the MEK effectively declared itself neutral when coalition forces invaded the country in March 2003, and surrendered without a fight after suffering a few air attacks. But there is some confusion concerning its subsequent status.
‘The MEK were never captured or classified as prisoners of war (under the Third Geneva Convention). ‘Protected person’ status (under the Fourth Geneva Convention) was granted as part of a ceasefire agreement negotiated between the US and MEK,’ explained Major Winfield Danielson, a press officer with coalition forces in Baghdad.
‘Each member of the MEK was required to sign a document renouncing violence and agreeing not to take up arms. The MEK was also disarmed.’
However, this is contradicted by earlier statements that MEK members’ status was changed from ‘prisoners of war’ to ‘protected persons’ in June 2004.
‘The change in their status is linked to the change of authority (on June 28, 2004, when an interim government assumed control of Iraq). It was also prompted by a process that saw each individual disarm and renounce violence,’ Lieutenant-Colonel Barry Johnson, a US spokesman for detainee operations in Iraq, told me at that time.
The shift is curious in either case. ‘Protected person’ status applies to civilians, whereas the MEK personnel were uniformed soldiers in an established army – and affiliated with a proscribed terrorist group at that. ‘It is not the responsibility of the ICRC to independently determine their status,’ said ICRC official Dorothea Krimitsas in an e-mail from Geneva. The ICRC has never visited Camp Ashraf due to security concerns. But the coalition would contend that this may be unnecessary as the MEK members are not being detained.
‘Neither the active MEK members nor the former MEK refugees are being detained,’ said Major Danielson. ‘The Ashraf refugee camp refugees have every right to depart and travel in Iraq using an Iraqi-issued laissez-passer. They can also repatriate to Iran if they desire, or they may stay in the camp.
‘The active MEK members who live in Camp Ashraf have ‘protected persons’ status. As part of the ceasefire agreement, they may travel outside the city of Ashraf but must do so under the protection of coalition forces.’
Nor are MEK members at Camp Ashraf facing criminal charges, with Major Danielson noting that ‘they are not charged with criminal offences’. This appears peculiar in view of existing laws in the US and elsewhere that criminalise support for terrorist organisations.
According to the US State Department, for example: ‘It is unlawful for a person in the US or subject to the jurisdiction of the US to knowingly provide ‘material support or resources’ to a designated Foreign Terrorist Organisation.’
As prisoners of war, the MEK personnel would have to be ‘released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of hostilities’, according to Article 118 of the Third Geneva Convention. For ‘protected persons’ under the Fourth Geneva Convention ‘internment shall cease as soon as possible after the close of hostilities’, according to Article 133.
The ICRC maintains that the Iraq war ended with the transfer of sovereignty to the country’s interim government in June 2004, with the fighting since then characterised as ‘an internal conflict internationalised by the presence of multilateral forces’.
The coalition argues that the MEK personnel at Camp Ashraf are not being detained. But nor are they wandering about or relocating.
‘Our position is that they shouldn’t be returned to Iran due to the fear of torture and the death penalty. And they shouldn’t be handed over to Iraq for the same reason,’ said Amnesty’s Mr Boumedouha. ‘Their immediate future looks bleak.’
In this context, Mr Boumedouha sees the US-led coalition’s oversight of MEK personnel at Camp Ashraf as something of a humanitarian act in keeping with the ‘protected persons’ provision. If that is the case, the coalition is upholding the spirit of the Fourth Geneva Convention but perhaps not its legal mandate, as Article Six states: ‘In the case of occupied territory, the application of the present Convention shall cease one year after the close of military operations.’
However, some have suggested an alternative interpretation of the coalition’s treatment of the MEK people.
Unconfirmed allegations have surfaced in Teheran and elsewhere that the US Central Intelligence Agency is using the MEK for covert operations in Iran. Teheran failed to respond to a request to substantiate these claims.
Straits Times, Robert Karniol, Defence Writer
Touting ‘Terrorists’
On paper, the Mujahedeen-e Khalq sounds like the sort of group the United States government might like to cultivate: well-organized Iranian exiles concentrated in Europe and Iraq who share Washington’s antipathy to the theocracy in Iran. The group — whose name translates as”warriors (or freedom fighters) for the people of Iran”– has its own”parliament in exile,”the National Council of Resistance of Iran, and says it supports a secular government, democracy, human rights, and women’s rights in Iran.
In practice, however, the Iranian group has some major shortcomings in the ally department. For the past decade, the State Department has listed the MEK as a”foreign terrorist organization,”and more recently has argued that the group displays”cult-like characteristics.”
The MEK has been waging a spirited campaign to persuade the U.S. to drop the terrorist designation — which would require either the secretary of State’s say-so or an act of Congress.
Although the group can’t make its own case directly, in the past several years two prominent former U.S. government officials have been publicly touting the MEK’s virtues and arguing that the United States should remove it from the terrorist list.
At the moment, the more high-profile and influential of these advocates is former House Majority Leader Dick Armey, R-Texas, a senior policy adviser at the global law and lobbying firm DLA Piper. Last year, Armey wrote two op-eds for Washington newspapers urging the State Department to drop the MEK’s terrorist designation.
“Never has the old adage ‘The enemy of my enemy is my friend’ been more true than in the case of the MEK,”he wrote in The Hill in July. And in The Washington Times in December, Armey wrote,”With a stroke of the pen, the secretary of State could, and should, remove the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq and the National Council of Resistance of Iran from the list of foreign terrorist organizations.”
In 2006, DLA Piper and Global Options, a crisis-management company, issued a 232-page report with a foreword by Armey and Neil C. Livingstone, then-CEO of Global Options, aimed at refuting the U.S. government’s allegations against the MEK and calling for an end to its terrorist designation.
Another public advocate for the MEK is Raymond Tanter, who was a senior staff member at the National Security Council in the Reagan administration and is now an adjunct professor at Georgetown University. In 2005, Tanter co-founded the nonprofit Iran Policy Committee, which lists as directors or advisers a half-dozen former executive branch, military, and intelligence officials and describes its mission as promoting a”central role for the Iranian opposition”in bringing about”democratic change”in Iran. The committee’s publications, conferences, and congressional briefings routinely urge the U.S. to take the MEK off its terrorist list, as well as to meet with and fund the group.
The MEK began as an anti-shah leftist group in the 1960s. It got on the wrong side of the United States when members assassinated several of the shah’s American advisers in the 1970s. In the three decades since Iran became an Islamic regime, the State Department says, the MEK has waged violent attacks inside that country, and it maintains the”capacity and will to commit terrorist acts in Europe, the Middle East, the United States, Canada, and beyond.”Over the years, the MEK has periodically reinvented its ideology, which today blends elements of Marxism, Islam, and feminism.
A charismatic husband-and-wife team leads the group: Massoud Rajavi, whose whereabouts are unknown, is the military leader, and Maryam Rajavi heads the political wing from France. The MEK’s size is also unknown, but the Council on Foreign Relations estimates that it could have as many as 10,000 members worldwide.
In 2005, Human Rights Watch issued a report detailing complaints from a dozen former MEK members that they suffered physical and psychological abuse while they were in the group. The State Department says that members undergo indoctrination and weekly”ideological cleansings,”are separated from their young children, and must vow”eternal divorce”– that is, to remain unmarried or to divorce their spouse.
The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 took a toll on the MEK, which had set up operations there after being driven out of Iran and, later, France in the 1980s. Because Saddam Hussein had been providing the bulk of its military and financial support, the State Department says, the MEK subsequently began to use”front organizations”to solicit contributions from expatriate Iranian communities.
The U.S. military disarmed the group’s foot soldiers in Iraq and now holds some 3,500 of them as”protected persons”under the Geneva Conventions at an encampment there.”We are not embracing them, we just don’t know how to [disperse] them”without putting their lives in danger, says Brookings Institution senior fellow Peter Rodman, who was an assistant Defense secretary through 2006.
MEK supporters argue that the group has renounced violence, poses no terrorist threat, and, in fact, presents a viable alternative to the theocracy in Tehran. The terrorist designation, they say, was a futile Washington sop to appease that regime.”The U.S. government at any moment can make that decision, and decide [that the designation] is unwarranted,”says Alireza Jafarzadeh, the former representative in Washington for the NCRI, and now a self-described consultant and a commentator on Fox News. Jafarzadeh blames”politics”for Washington’s failure to act and says that the MEK spends about 80 percent of its resources”to counter the consequences of the designation.”
MEK supporters argue that the group provided vital intelligence about Iran’s covert nuclear program in 2002, as well as about Iranian-sponsored attacks on U.S. soldiers in Iraq.
Although more than 220 members of Congress signed a letter in 1998 protesting the group’s terrorist designation, the MEK’s several legal challenges to the designation have failed, and legislative efforts to remove it have gone nowhere.
Despite the Bush administration’s tough line on the Tehran regime, the MEK’s political fortunes in the U.S. have declined in recent years. The NCRI was once allowed to maintain an office, hire lobbyists, hold press conferences, and generally operate openly in the United States. But in late 2003, the administration got tough and the Justice Department shut down the office. The group still has some congressional supporters — led by the ideological odd couple of Reps. Bob Filner, D-Calif., and Tom Tancredo, R-Colo.
And then there is Armey, whose history as an outspoken advocate for the MEK is murky. In their 2006 report, Armey and Livingstone touted regime change in Iran through active support for groups such as the MEK, but said that neither the MEK nor the NCRI provided any direction, control, or financing for the report. Armey’s July 2007 article had a similar disclaimer. The December 2007 article identified Armey only as the chairman of the FreedomWorks Foundation, a free-market advocacy group.
DLA Piper has received $860,000 in fees over the past four and a half years from Saeid Ghaemi, whom the firm identifies as an”Iranian-American businessman who works closely with the Iranian-American community in the U.S. to promote human rights and democracy in Iran.”Public records identify Saeid Ghaemi as a used-car dealer in the Denver area, but an Internet search turned up no information about his political work with the Iranian-American community. When National Journal reached him by phone to ask about his hiring of Armey and DLA Piper, Ghaemi said he was busy and would return the call. He failed to return that or subsequent calls.
Ghaemi’s brother, Tim Mehdi Ghaemi, a Denver-area real estate manager and broker, is a longtime active supporter of the MEK who bills himself as president of the group Colorado’s Iranian-American Community. Over the past three years, Tim Ghaemi has helped to organize half a dozen pro-MEK events, including a controversial January 2004 fundraiser that led the Treasury Department to freeze the assets of the event’s prime sponsor. In 2007, he provided $8,000 for Filner to travel to Paris to deliver a speech at an MEK rally. The Colorado group has a website that posts news about the MEK and articles about Tehran’s persecution of its Iranian opponents, but NJ could find no information about the group, its members, or its board of directors.
Reached by phone, Tim Ghaemi said that his brother, Saeid, was not part of Colorado’s Iranian-American Community, which he called a”larger umbrella group.”He referred to”other, smaller, organizations that work specifically on other projects”such as women’s rights and the rights of minority religious groups in Iran, including Christians and Jews. But”everybody, unanimously, inside and outside [Iran] — they say there is no other hope”than the MEK, Tim Ghaemi said. The United States does not need to”send one soldier, or spend one dollar”to defeat the Iranian rulers he added, but only has to”stop appeasing the regime and take the [MEK’s] name off the list.”
Lobbying disclosure records show that Saeid Ghaemi hired DLA Piper in November 2004, and that Armey joined the team representing him in the first half of 2005. Over time, the team has lobbied Congress; the Defense, State, and Treasury departments; and the National Security Council.
National Journal made repeated calls to Armey’s office for comment and information on how he became a supporter of the MEK. The office referred all calls to a DLA Piper spokesman, who provided no information.
Last year, Armey and the other lobbyists also worked on Ghaemi’s behalf for a House measure urging the secretary of State to designate the Quds Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps as a foreign terrorist organization. Shortly after a broader measure targeting Iran and the Quds Force overwhelmingly passed the House last fall, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice designated the force a terrorist group.
DLA Piper also lobbied in the Senate for the Iran Human Rights Act of 2007 that would, among other things, expand U.S. support for Iranian opposition groups to include those outside Iran, and would establish a State Department envoy to reach out to such groups.
Tanter, like some other MEK defenders, says he supports the group because it is the only opposition organization that really worries the mullahs in Tehran.”I did an analysis of all the opposition groups and found that the [Islamic Iranian] regime paid attention to [the MEK] 350 percent more than all the others. I am not here to lobby on behalf of groups on the foreign terrorist organization list. I am an American trying to preserve American national security abroad and save lives.”
Tanter’s tax-exempt Iran Policy Committee has raised a substantial amount of money in a short period of time. In its latest filing with the Internal Revenue Service, the group reported revenues of nearly $917,000 — with Tanter receiving about $102,000 in salary, and the group’s co-chairs, Bruce McColm and Chuck Nash, getting just over $32,000 and $21,000, respectively.
Tanter says his group raises money on the Web and from speeches.”Every time I speak before a pro-Israel group or an anti-Iranian-regime group, hundreds of people show up, and if I’m in Europe, thousands show up,”he said. The average contribution is less than $1,000, he said, but some have been six- and seven-figure donations from his former students who now”make a killing”on Wall Street and”remember me.”Tanter added that he drew on his retirement money to start the group.
The law prohibits anyone in the United States or subject to its laws from providing”material support or resources”to a designated foreign terrorist organization. But these financial sanctions don’t prohibit”U.S. citizens from expressing their views on economic sanctions matters — and that includes the designation of the MEK — to Congress or the Executive Branch”according to the Treasury Department, whose Office of Foreign Assets Control oversees the sanctions. Bill Livingstone, who worked with his brother Neil on the 2006 report, said that the authors made sure the report did not violate Treasury’s rules.
“The First Amendment protects Dick Armey to make his opinions known, and protects the Iran Policy Committee’s educational mission to find options to reinforce our diplomacy”toward Iran, Tanter said. He has hired an attorney who specializes in the arcane Treasury rules and contends that his group tries”to vet our money to make sure we’re not getting any”from prohibited groups. Tanter also points out that several of his group’s advisers and directors are retired military and intelligence officers with security clearances that they would do nothing to jeopardize.
The effect of Armey’s and Tanter’s efforts is unclear. So far, the MEK’s efforts to shed its terrorist designation have met with far more success in Europe than here. The group has won court decisions mandating that the European Union unfreeze the group’s assets and that Great Britain remove it from that country’s list of terrorist groups. The British government says it intends to appeal.
Although the State Department is required to review its designation of the MEK later this year, the group’s supporters fear that the decision will reflect a political climate that has become less sympathetic to their cause. Administration hard-liners, who have lost ground to pragmatists, have been further undercut by the recent National Intelligence Estimate stating that Iran stopped its nuclear weapons program in 2003 — a conclusion that the MEK disputes.”This so-called hard-line [Bush] administration is more interested in striking a grand bargain with Iran than the E.U. is,”Tanter said. He and other MEK boosters also contend that if relations with Tehran worsen, the MEK’s prospects could revive.
The neoconservative community, where the MEK has found support in the past, has become sharply divided, with critics becoming as vocal as supporters in conservative publications. I don’t think any administration is going to want to include them,”said Rodman, who describes himself as a hard-line opponent of the Tehran regime.”Everyone has rejected [the MEK]. They’re not the kind of people we want to work with.”
Julie Kosterlitz, National Journal Group Inc
EU human rights and civil foundations despite Zionist lobby’s efforts aimed at removal of MKO’s name from international terror organs, stress need for maintaining grouplet’s name in that list. Political and media circles within the European Union reflected those foundations’ demand during the Tuesday session of the European Parliament at that body’s EU-IRI Parliamentary Relations Commission. Among the other issues addressed at the session, there were discussions on a recent visit by an EU parliamentary delegation to the Islamic Republic of Iran. At the session which was held in the presence of the members of Iran-EU Parliamentary Relations Commission, EC representatives, EP members, and the head of the MKO, one more time the terrorist nature of that anti-Iranian organization was stressed. The head of MKO had attended the session on an invitation sent to her by a pro-Zionist EP member, but was seriously humiliated due to the heavy anti-MKO atmosphere of the meeting.
Failure in overthrowing the regime
The short-term plan to overthrow the Iranian regime announced by Rajavi at the peak of MKO’s wave of internal terrorist actions, such as the explosions in the central office of the Islamic Republican Party and the Prime Ministry Building, constituted the most controversial issue that challenged the Mojahedin’s leadership. Believing that these bloody terrorist deeds would lead to destabilization of the regime, Rajavi declared that it ultimately took six months to finalize the collapse.
The prime aftermath of the declared phases of armed warfare following Khordad 30th (20 June 1981) was that Rajavi’s promise proved to be a chimera. Although insignificant at the beginning, after a while and following the military failures and stalemates, the challenge turned into serious crises within MKO.
Again and again Rajavi, overconfident of terrorist actions that he referred to as ‘great operations’, predicted a short time overthrow in his press interviews. He even classified the definite time of overthrow into three periods: short, mid, and long and finally fixed the exact date in a 5 year span. A review of Rajavi’s position taking reveals the fact that after 20 June, he began to evade determining an exact date for the overthrow. Finally he postponed his promise until the death of the leader of Islamic Republic.
From the phase of 20 June on, followed by the formation of NCR, Rajavi promoted himself atop of both MKO and NCRI as the egocentric decision-maker. Although everybody was aware that he was the one to say the last word, later on, and in the course of ideological revolution, Mehdi Abrishamchi referred to the decisive role of Rajavi in critical decisions such as that which initiated the armed phase. Even the Western media were interested in his hegemonic leadership atop of the organization in those years. Many of them asserted that he cleverly dodged the reporters’question and in one case, Jean Gueyras tells the story of Rajavi and his misuse of power for his personal ambitions:
Hidden away in his country bunker in Auvers-sur-Oise, Mr. Massoud Rajavi, the leader of the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI) has mastered the art of allying the useful with the pleasurable. He sugar coats his decisions, even those about his private life, with politico-ideological statements of considerable grandiloquence. Thus, in October 1982, to justify his marriage to Firouzeh Bani Sadr, daughter of the former President of the Islamic Republic only eight months after the tragic death of his first wife, Ashraf Rab’i (killed on 8 February 1982 by the Pasdaran); he published a joint bulletin of the PMOI’s Politburo and Central Committee in which his marriage was presented as ‘one of the most important revolutionary decisions ever taken by the Mojahedin’ and as an initiative which would help consolidate the unity of the Iranian nation’. (1)
Antoine Gessler’s Autopsy of an Ideological Drift well explains that Rajavi and his organization are badly in need of being at the center of the world’s attention and are very afraid of being sunk into oblivion. Rajavi’s promises of victory to motivate his forces have never come true:
It involves an organization in permanent panic of being forgotten, a threat that grows day by day, and must, therefore, motivate its militants who have never witnessed the victory announced thousands of times in the past (2).
Such evidences prove the fact that even years before the ideological revolution and his promotion as the ideological leader, Rajavi had succeeded to maintain his unbeatable authority over the organization. After a while, the internal crises were well controlled but unsolved question of overthrow, in spite of the heavy responsibility of rampant terrorist operations, remained as an internal challenge that negatively affected Mojahedin’s relations. Then the circumstances lead to a condition in which Mojahedin were forced to deny the possibility of short- and mid-term overthrow. The critical situation of Mojahedin on the one hand and Iran’s prevailing over internal crises on the other hand corroborated fallacy of MKO’s promise of short-term overthrow. Although the leadership never acknowledged the fact openly, the analysis of the ideological development confirmed it. Niyabati’s outspoken fashion leaves no doubt that the leadership was convinced of the fact that the organization was structurally no match to cause regime’s downfall:
A summary of the political, military, organizational, and ideological aspects in fall 1984 made one point clear to Mojahedin, that was, the short-term overthrow of the regime was impossible due to the ideological-organizational structure on the one hand and outer-organizational political relations with various political trends active inside and outside of the country. (3)
According to Niyabati, such a particular phase was in fact the turning point of internal challenges Mojahedin had encountered. He refers to two years earlier when Mojahedin took the wrong path of the so-called phase of armed struggle that founded the background to such challenges. He further elaborates on two strategic solutions of Mojahedin in this regard and writes:
The year 1984 was a determining phase to reach a final settlement in political, military, strategic, and ideological scenes. The political and military impasse of armed resistance as well as the failure in short-term overthrow of the regime that came to light at the end of 1982 and became a proven fact at the beginning of 1983, led Mojahedin into a dilemma. (4)
Mehdi Khanbaba-Tehrani, an NCRI ex-member, in his review of the phase refers to failures and their aftermath within MKO and NCRI and concludes that the ideological revolution worked as the decisive solution to the desperate question of overthrow that was pressing hard on Rajavi and NCRI:
In my opinion, MKO has met serious crises due to the failure of the short-term plan of overthrow and its aftermath that has gravely questioned the organization’s leadership. Actually, the ideological revolution was the manifestation of such internal conflicts. To keep the integrity and life of the organization, Mojahedin’s leadership arrived at a compromise that resulted in pluralizing the leadership by means of adding a woman atop who had to change her name and get married to Rajavi. (5)
Hadi Shams-Haeri, another former member, considers the strategic stalemates and failures of MKO to be a result of Rajavi’s ineptitude, having no realistic appraisal of the situation inside Iran, and finally continuation of keeping the insiders in dark about the realities and insisting on the futile tactic of overthrow:
Of the Rajavi’s betrayals was advertising the overthrow of the Islamic republic as a possibly easy and quick task. In this regard, Rajavi never referred to the real problems and shortcomings that would be encountered on the route. (6)
Haeri also has the opinion that Rajavi is the sole responsible for the wrong decision of overthrow and the move on 20 June. He writes:
In fact, the armed warfare that initially aimed at overthrowing the regime in short-term and assuming the political power lasted not more than 1.5 years and ended in a complete strategic failure. The pioneer forces not only lost the ground but were strangled due to adverse circumstances. It happened as a result of inadequate and incorrect appraisal of forces’capacity on 20 June. (7)
As such, the issue of overthrow which acted as a motivator for winning the support of opposition groups, as well as some states standing in shadow, gradually turned into a factor arousing opposing reactions within MKO and NCRI.
References:
1. Gessler, Antoine; Autopsy of an Ideological Drift, Chapter 22.
2. ibid, chapter 19.
3. Niyabati, B. A different look at the ideological revolution within MKO. Khavaran publication, p.16.
4. ibid, p.16.
5. An inside look at left movements in Iran, some interviews with Mehdi Khanbaba-Tehrani, the interview 17.
6. Shams-Haeri, H. The swamp, Khavaran publication, p.35.
7. ibid.
Bahar Irani,Mojahedin.ws,December 6, 2007
Americans bizarre approach in arming proscribe terrorist organisations like Mojahedin Khalq Full report: Solana, Al-Baradi’i and China good for Iran’s active diplomacy Ali Larijani said that Iran, Javier Solana and International Atomic Energy Agency are the three angles of a triangle that has brought fruitful results for the Islamic Republic’s diplomacy while stressing the importance of using China as a potentially important card to play for future diplomatic engagements. At 1913 gmt the Iranian television started broadcasting a live interview with Ali Larijani, the former head of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran. Reacting to the National Intelligence Estimate report on Iran’s nuclear policy Larijani said:”This is in effect a triangle one of the angles of which is Iran, another which is Solana and the third is Al-Baradi’i… The Chinese have significant economic ties with us, while at he same time we have common interests. In other words, if a certain problem arises and becomes complex then the principle country within the group of 5+1 to be affected by this will be the Chinese”
The presenter, Morteza Heydari, asked for the overall reaction of Ali Larijani who said that ”this is a great fiasco for the Americans. The Americans must be impeached for this”. He added that although there are many ifs and buts in the report the main contention of the report is that the basis of all allegations against Iran is false. He pointed to the fact that the report says that ”we can say with great confidence that Iran does not have a military programme in its nuclear project”.
Larijani added: they do leave the door open with certain ambiguities in their report to allow US adventurism.
He went on to add that three issues come out in the overall analysis: Firstly that Iran has no nuclear arms. Secondly, that between 2003 and 2007 it has not pursued a military programme in its nuclear project and finally that it will not be able to do that until 2015.
He stressed that the report makes some erroneous statements notably that Iran has been pressurised into its cooperation with International Atomic Energy Agency. He dismissed these saying that they have misunderstood Iran’s confidence building and good will measures.
Presenter asked him why is it that out of the 150 page report they have only published 9 pages of it. Is it because the Americans are saying that Iran has stopped its military programmes when pressures increased on Iran or is it that the Democrats have put pressure on the Bush Administration to publish these nine pages.
Larijani said that this is no accidental leak or due to Democratic pressure. He continued that the Americans are facing a ”crisis of honesty”.
The former Supreme National Security General-Secretary and present advisor to the leader added that Bush had, also, said that it is due to the reforms of the intelligence apparatus that these sorts of reports come out. He dismissed it as disingenuous and dishonest.
He conjectured another possibility on the so called ”Zionist lobby”. 1930
The National Security advisor to the leader added: The other possibility is that they may try to manipulate some members of the 5+1 saying that although we accept that there may be no military aspect to Iran’s nuclear programme it nevertheless shows that pressures on Iran have worked which is why no military pursuit of the nuclear programme has been detected.
Larijani, also, paid tribute to the Iranian nation’s resolute stance against ”bullying” by USA and this is what has caused the report to be leaked.
Presenter asked why is it that the ”Zionists” have firmly rejected the report despite the fact that many of the European countries have reserved judgment.
Larijani said that ”Zionist” leaders have been shocked by this report. He said that he doubts that the ”Zionists” will be able to make great capital out of this.
Larijani added that the Chinese are playing a more active role which is positive and must be welcome.
Larijani said that there is no guarantee that the Americans will come to their senses and stop their policies against Iran. They have to understand that through putting pressures on Iran they can not dissuade Iranian people from their nuclear policies.
He added that as Iran is a democratic country then Iran must be engaged diplomatically:”If there is a country with a sustainable democracy in the region it is Iran. The influential aspect of Iran is important in the region. It is obvious that they can have a proper engagement with this country. It is in the interests of the 5+1 countries. When I spoke to some leaders of Europe they used to tell me that they want to use Iran’s potential to create security in the region and for extending economic relations. You can use this potential. It will be in your own interests. And, naturally you will achieve more in the realm of regional interests and energy security and comprehensive economic relations with Iran. This is our suggestions.”
Asked about President Bush’s statement that ”Iran is a danger” Larijani said that ever since September 11, 2001, there is an air of savagery in American attitudes.
Presenter asked that one of the reasons cited for the subsiding of tensions in Iraq is due to Iran meddling less in Iraq affairs, how true is this?
Larijani said that talks were held three times with Iran. Iran has presented a coherent programme to help Iraq but the Americans are conducting certain bizarre approaches such as arming non-military groups some 70,000 in number. He drew parallels between this policy and arming the Mojahedin Khalq fighters and Pezhak in Kordestan. He called this serious. He said that this tactic will not change the realities of Iraq.
He went on to say that Iran has always helped the Iraqi government while knowing its own obligations and duties.
He dismissed the war-peace dichotomy of some of the discourses in the West adding that these are for internal consumption and they are false, no one wants to see war and things must not be seen in such black and white terms.
Presenter asked him what the realistic scenario for Iran’s dossier to be closed in the Security Council?
Larijani said that by rights Iran’s dossier must be closed. He added, however, that what is right is not necessarily what will happen in reality.
Larijani added:”We have to pursue an active and smart diplomacy in order to block their adventurism. It is obvious that the Americans are pursuing a policy of creating nuisance. This particular avenue [The nuclear dossier] has been blocked now but they will pursue another agenda. It is clear what this new agenda is going to be. It is not very complex. I believe that if Iran pursues a several-pronged approach – which at any rate it is doing already – it can be quite effective. One of these is cooperation with the Agency. We have said that we will follow this line up. Mr Al-Baradi’i’s report was a good one. Of course I have made criticisms of it saying that it had to be written in a more precise way. Some of its statements are not the sort which is at the level of the Agency’s function. It suffers the same problems as this present report [The Intelligence Estimate] saying, for example, that Iran’s cooperation has been reactive. This has no technical or legal characteristic but can turn into a pretext for trouble-making entities.”
He also emphasised the negotiations with Javier Solana, the EU foreign policy chief saying:”The talks with Mr Solana are quite helpful. Please pay attention to the fact that the Modality approach was the fruit of the debates that we had with Mr Solana. In reality we made an agreement in Lisbon on the basis of which the modality of cooperation with Mr Al-Baradi’i was formulated and an agreement was reached with him. This is in effect a triangle one of the angles of which is Iran, another which is Solana and the third is Al-Baradi’i. This will really help.”
He further pointed to cooperation with the Chinese saying:”I believe that the Chinese constitute a good potential in this too. And my understanding that there are countries who are interested in China playing a useful role. The Chinese have significant economic ties with us, while at he same time we have common interests. In other words, if a certain problem arises and becomes complex then the principle country within the group of 5+1 to be affected by this will be the Chinese… I see that the future is generally bright but we need to pursue a smart diplomacy.” BBC Monitoring Middle East, December 07, 2007 Source: Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Network 2, Tehran, in Persian 1900 gmt 4 Dec 07
The ideological revolution within Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO) that led the whole organization onto the precipice of being labeled as a notorious cult of personality was not the result of an abrupt and overnight decision. A look at a multitude of the crises the organization ran into following its declare of armed warfare after the initiation of the Islamic Republic in Iran well explain that the organization’s resort to ideological shift was the last option to surmount crises and guarantee the organization’s survival. However, the key role of Massoud Rajavi in the process of deviation is of great significance.
Majority of the organization’s theoreticians are unanimous that the ideological revolution was the byproduct of a strategic dilemma but none of them attempts to dig out the truth about the roots of successive defeats and crises. An investigation into the history of the organization since 1975 and following the great schism within it discloses indisputably critical role of Rajavi since his assuming the lead. His decisions, regardless of their grave impact on strategic, political and ideological deviation, were inventions of a deviant mind spoiled by power ambitions. That is true that power corrupts but his later ideological revolution to gain full hegemony over the organization is a proof that the absolute power corrupts absolutely; no better destiny could be destined for the organization with Rajavi atop but a cult of personality.
The intention here is to examine the roots of the ideological revolution and the causes behind its start with Rajavi behind the steer. The following is an outline of the factors to be studied in detail.
The failed strategy of armed warfare and the aftermath crises
Failure in overthrowing the regime
Gradual dwindling of MKO’s social prestige
Possible occurrence of schism within the organization
serious deterioration of NCRI
political bankruptcy and loss of external backing
The statements and accounts by other opposition groups, active members of the organization as well as the separated members are the best presented evidences throughout the study. Bijan Niyabaty’s A Different Look at the Ideological Revolution within MKO, since it is a source composed by an active left sympathizer of the organization, can give detailed accounts on the process.
The failed strategy of armed warfare and the aftermath crises
The failed strategy of overthrowing the newly established ruling system in Iran is rooted in the irrationally adopted tactic of armed warfare following the organization’s first mass movement on 20 June in 1981. The turning point that was broadly being propagated at the time an which was supposed to speed up the inevitable collapse of the regime could no more stand the heavy squash of defeats and crises. As a result, the tone of Rajavi changed in justifying his unreasonably taken decision saying that his decision abided by no political, ideological and organizational logic but was a move following the example of Ashura. [1]
Being a fallacy or anything else, his reasoning worked well in wining over a multitude of insiders who supposedly had to challenge him and his ineffectiveness. Publicized passionate speeches and writings could easily convince and hush up whoever presumed to criticize:
Khordad 30th (20 June 1981) is our ‘Ashura”. On that day we had to stand up and resist Khomeini’s bloodthirsty and reactionary regime, even if it meant sacrificing our lives and the whole of our organization. We had to take this road to Karbala to keep alive our tawhidi ideology, follow the example set by Imam Hosayn, fulfill our historic mission to the Iranian people, and fight the most bloodthirsty, most reactionary, and most savage regime in world history. [2]
It took at least two decades to be admitted by a left analyzer of the organization that what MKO anticipated being a supposed mass movement turned to be nothing but failed militia warfare:
The strategy of a widespread and national-wide armed struggle was nothing more than declining a massive public uprising into the level of a limited militia struggle with no prospect. [3]
Rajavi’s strategy of urban militia warfare expanded into much sophisticated tactics of resistance cells, suicidal and armed operations following the June 20 uprising. Niyabati assumes that even long before, Mojahedin had lost their hope in the utility of the so called ‘esistance cells’ and Mojahedin’s strategic tactic had proved to be nothing but a great failure:
Now after five years, the armed warfare is still immobilized in the first stage of preparing a mass uprising. Mojahedin have so far tried all the possible approaches, from the urban militia warfare to the formation of resistance cells and from the suicidal operations to guerrilla warfare launched in the mountains and woods. [4]
In his analysis of Mojahedin’s received heavy blow on 8 February 1982, the raid of Iranian police forces into a MKO’s safe-house in Tehran that resulted in the killing of 20 members of Mojahedin including Musa Khyabani, MKO commander inside Iran after Rajavi’s escape to France, and Ashraf Rabiee, Rajavi’s first wife, Niyabati once more questions the accuracy of Mojahedin’s strategy of armed struggle:
The strategic blow on 8 February 1982 was an end to the accuracy of the urban guerilla warfare. [5]
The consequent doubts and uncertainty raised among a portion of the rational minds though remained covered up, but in the eyes of the leaders were undeniable facts that could possibly intensify internal crises. A large number of separated members admit that it created the best opportunity to persuade an internal reconsideration of the organizational strategies, but instead, unfounded justification and excuses gave way to a rapid grow of internal challenges. The seriousness of the challenge even worsens when one comes across the fact that before facing the crises, unquestionable faith in armed struggle was an essential prerequisite for the recruits of the organization. It was a taboo nobody was permitted to touch upon and any criticism of the approach was absolutely illegitimate even if convincing explanation and facts were adduced beforehand:
Any criticism of the widespread strategy of armed warfare adopted by Mojahedin in the military phase, if made to disapprove the essentiality of the armed resistance, is definitely illegitimate. [6]
Rajavi’s frequent shift to adopt various unsound tactics more than anything indicates a telling indecisiveness in Mojahedin’s leadership. Not only it deepens the already existing crises but also makes the organization vulnerable to further crushing crises that can hardly be curbed. Depicting a much realistic view, an ex-member has said:
What can be done? Does it mean that we should again resort to urban militia warfare? This vicious circle is the work of Rajavi; from the urban militia to terror teams, then to war in fronts, then to an army, and then to cross the border operation teams to launch mortar attacks. It seems he cannot, or does not want, decide on any tactic but associated with arms. [7]
Rajavi’s egocentric decision making has exposed him to the criticism of the insiders to the core. Although he never desists from rejecting allegations of leading the organization to total decadence, his critics believe he lacked the needed political acumen and experience as well as mental aptitude to surmount the crises:
Of course, this guy [Rajavi] suffers a lack of mental aptitude, political experience and insight. If he were experienced and his studies were not restricted to those of Marxist texts or was not hampered by organizational enterprise, that is much a pseudo-security and clandestine activity than political, actually the 20 June incident would never happen. [8]
Notes:
[1]. A historical incident when the third Shiit imam, Imam Hosayn, rose against the tyrant of the time and was martyred along with his 72 followers in Karbala in Iraq on 10 Moharram 61 A.H., publically called Ashura. Mojahedin from the very beginning argued that they were exemplifying the model of his uprising to justify their misdeeds. Mehdi Rezai, a member of Mojahedin, tried and executed by Pahlavi’s regime, in his court testimonies declared ‘each day should be turned into Ashura and each place into Karbala arguing that ‘history had taught the organization one clear lesson: that the only path to liberation is the armed struggle. (The court testimony of martyred mojahed Mehdi Rezai) (1973), pp. 90-3.
[2]. Mojahed, 129-31 (2-16 December 1982).
[3]. Niyabati, Bijan; A Different Look at the Ideological Revolution within MKO, Khavaran Publication, p. 14.
[4]. Ibid, 69.
[5]. Ibid, 14.
[6]. The statute of the National Council of Resistance
[7]. Soliloquies in solitude, a collection; interview with an ex-member of MKO.
[8]. Ibid.
Adm Gregory Smith: US military does not support terrorist Mojahedin Khalq (MKO) Interview with MEHR News, November 25, 2007 BBC Monitoring Middle East Text of report by Iranian conservative news agency Mehr
Tehran, 25 Nov: Rear Adm Gregory Smith, Communication Division Chief for the Multi-National Force-Iraq, who has repeatedly – and without proof – accused the Islamic Republic of Iran of engaging in negative activities in Iraq responded to questions form Mehr news agency concerning US military support to the Monafeghin terrorist group [pejorative meaning hypocrites used by the Iranian government to refer to the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MKO)]. The group has been placed on the list of terrorist groups. He claimed that the US military does not support any terrorist group including the MKO. He admitted: The American government considers the MKO group to be a terrorist group and once again claimed that the US military was not supporting them. Responding to a question from Mehr asking if the US government and the American military would assist the Iraqi government should it expel these individuals – or at the very not interfere with the expulsions, he answered in generalities, saying: We don’t respond to questions that are based on conjecture. This question is speculative, we don’t work on speculations.
Gregory Smith said he had no knowledge of plans for a new round of Iran-US talks on Iraq, saying: Issues relating to these talks are handled by the US embassy in Iraq.
The official spokesperson for the American forces in Iraq commented on the fate of Iranian diplomats who have been held captive by the occupiers since they were taken in Dey last year [Iranian month starts on 22 December], saying: As far as US officials are concerned these individuals are not diplomats. They shall remain in detention for as long as US official believe them to be a threat to Iraq.
Smith went on to say: A committee made up of representatives form the coalition [forces] and the Iraqi government is reviewing this issue.
Iraqi MP Ali al-Adib contradicts claims by this American military official that his country does not support the MKO group, saying: Even though the Iraqi constitution has banned the activities of opposition groups and organization form neighbouring countries, the US military supports the presence of mko terrorist group
In a recent interview with Mehr, Iraq’s Prosecutor General Ja’far al-Musavi confirmed that the file of the mojahedin terrorist group was under review and would not rule out the possibility of an agreement between Tehran and Baghdad that would include provisions for the extradition of the criminals.
He said that members of the mko terrorist group were guilty of participating in the massacre of innocent Iraqis, adding: The judicial process for the prosecution of these this group has started.
During the early days of the revolution, the mojahedin terrorist group acted to the great determent of our nation. They based themselves in camp Ashraf in the Iraqi province of Diala east of Bagdad. The former Ba’th government under the leadership of the executed dictator Saddam cooperated with this group during the imposed war against Iran in the early eighties [Iran-Iraq war 1980-88] and supported them extensively.
The current elected government of Iraq is attempting to remove traces of this terrorist group from its territorial borders because of their role in the massacre of Iraqi dissidents and the genocide against the shi’i uprising in 1991.
Claims made by this American official about Iranian diplomats that were abducted in Arbil this past Dey are being made while the Iraqi government and officials of the Kurdish Regional Government stress that these individuals were engaged in legal activities the Iranian consulate in Arbil. The Americans have only released two of the diplomats.
On Monday, October 1, 2007, Maryam Rajavi, the self appointed next president of Iran and the leader of the terrorist religious cult of mohahedin-e khalq of Iran was invited by the European People’s Party (Christian Democrats) Parliamentary Group to speak at the Council of Europe in Strasbourg.
This marked a dark day for the legitimacy and credibility of the EU. Indeed, inviting Maryam Rajavi goes against the very core principles of democracy and its practice. Mrs. Maryam rajavi and her organization which she represents have never stood by any of her claim of a believer in democracy and human rights. She simply speaks what she believes people want to hear without ever backing those words with actions.
She, along with her organization is responsible for the killings of hundreds of innocent Iranians in the years 1982 to as recent as 2003. One of the key reasons for today’s brutal conditions in Iran is in part thanks to the mohajedin and their role in supporting a violent means to an end and legitimizing crackdown by the Iranian regime.
They have for two decades been the long arm of Saddam Hussein in his terror against his own people as well his neighbors. They acted as the 5th division of Saddam Hussein’s army in waging war against Iran (1980-1988) and the repression and killing of kurds and shias in Iraq.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran-Iraq_War
This organization has a long history in repressing and killing of their own members as evidenced in human right report (NO EXIT: Human Rights Abuses inside MKO Camps) as well as sworn testimonies by former members.
http://hrw.org/backgrounder/mena/iran0505
http://www.iranpeyvand.com/2007/03/09/mko-terrorist-operations
As an effect, the invitation of such an individual is stains the EU parliament and its member who approved of this meeting and therefore must answer of their true intentions.
To use the mojahedin as some sort of a triumph card against the Iranian regime shows the lack of understanding of the Iranian psyche and the role that mojahedin plays in this part. It is a proven fact that the mojahedin hold no real support amongst the Iranian people and is seen as a traitorous group who in the past has allied with Iran’s enemy and now deliberately and behind the scene calls for attack on Iran by US forces. The regime in Iran has long since stopped looking at Mojahedin as a threat and only use them as a mean to legitimate their continued oppression of dissident voices amongst the populace.
Let’s not forget that the mojahedin continue to be listed as a terrorist organization by most of the western government and is listed in Interpol wanted list.
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/82738.htm
The only way EU and the world at large can help the Iranian people is to support and speak out in favor the true democratic voices within Iran and their struggle for a democratic Iran.
Karim Haggi Moni – Iranpeyvand – Oct 8, 2007
Jordan has inexplicably decided to give the Mojahedin Khalq Organization (MKO) leaders asylum and permission to conduct political activities in the country.
Jordan’s King Abdullah II popularized the deceptive expression Shia Crescent and made accusations against Iran a few months after Saddam Hussein’s Baath regime collapsed.
Saddam and the late King Hussein had historic and longstanding relations, and Jordan’s open support for Iraq during the 1980-1988 war against Iran is part of the historical record.
In its most important assistance, Jordan even gave Iraq access to the strategic port of Aqaba throughout the war.
Official reports from the eight-year war also reveal that thousands of Jordanian soldiers fought on the Iraqi side.
After Saddam’s fall in March 2003, Jordan started a new game. It signaled its agreement with the United States Greater Middle East Initiative but also started providing overt and covert support for Salafi terrorism in Iraq.
The West has turned a blind eye to the fact that Jordan has allowed Baathist remnants and Salafi terrorists to enter Iraq through its borders.
In addition, since the downfall of the Baath regime, Saddam’s family has been living in Jordan as the guests of King Abdullah II, despite the fact that many Middle East experts say Saddam’s family is one of the sources of terrorism in Iraq.
After Saddam was executed, with the support of the Jordanian government, his family was allowed to hold a magnificent semi-official ceremony in honor of the former dictator.
Meanwhile, Interpol recently decided to issue an arrest warrant for Saddam’s daughter Raghad for supporting terrorism in Iraq.
The latest anti-Iranian move by the Jordanian king, i.e. the decision to give asylum to MKO members, is much more serious than the previous actions.
Since the Mojahedin Khalq Organization carried out terrorist acts during the years Saddam gave them asylum in Iraq, U.S. forces restricted them to camps after taking control of the country.
When the pieces of the puzzle are put together, it is clear that the West is encouraging Jordan to take the role Saddam’s Iraq once played in confronting and attempting to contain Iran.
Yet, Jordan’s government has been facing a serious wave of social unrest since the final days of King Hussein, particularly in 1999 and 2000, which proves that Jordan is too weak to become a regional player able to contain Iran.
It would be wise for the Jordanians to reflect on the fate of Saddam, who once cooperated with the West in confronting Iran but later was found to be no longer useful.
There is no doubt that the establishment of a new anti-Iranian pole in the Middle East can seriously alter current political equations. However, the implementation of such an out-of-date formula meant to limit Iran’s regional influence will only increase tension and undermine the West’s regional interests.
Sept. 15 Tehran Times Opinion