Cult leaders grab at all means and levers to stabilize their position within cults in a manner of naccountability to members; a feature leading finally to fascism and individual leadership…Rajavi did so to conceal the apparent contradiction between the fulfillment of ideological objectives of Mojahedin as reflected in the early organizational principles of MKO/PMOI/MEK and the consequences of his self-fabricated ideological revolution.
This is the very prominent feature of Mojahedin[MKO/PMOI/MEK] leadership particularly after the development of the ideological revolution that aimed at the legitimization of the idea that the ideological leadership of Rajavi would be no longer accountable to anybody. In addition, it was assumed that faultfinding with Rajavi would be a great and unforgivable sin. The study of the background and reasons of the occurrence of this feature in cult relations from a historical and theoretical point of view may give us a better understanding of the issue.
Having some features of cult leaders like megalomania and narcissism as well as borrowing cultic thought-reform techniques facilitated Masud Rajavi’s furthering of personal interests. Therefore, Rajavi has a more complex personality compared to other cult leaders. His charisma is not an inherent feature but is an instrument intentionally used to subordinate members.
Rajavi and his fellows claim that he is inheritor of all the ideological principles and the history of the organization. However, the fact is that the ideological principles of the organization[PMOI/MKO/MEK] have been manipulated, distorted, held in archive and even eliminated under the command of Rajavi and in his favor whenever necessary..
Of the current issues prevalent in the world of politics regarding the challenges MKO /PMOI/MEKhas risen to is that Rajavi has manipulated the history of MKO/PMOI and its founders. It is said that he and his fellows have made an attempt to misuse the history of the organization in a way to legitimize his unauthentic leadership imposed on the organization and its members. Here a number of fabricated memories made by a number of self-seeker MKO/PMOI members are reviewed in order to bring the matter to light.
Rajavi owes his leadership to a number of factors among which misusing and manipulating the history of the organization and its founders is of utmost significance paving the way for imposing Rajavi on the organization and expansion of his authoritarian leadership therein. ..the main part of this process has been taken place since 1985 when Rajavi used the ideological revolution as an instrument to stabilize his totalitarian and egocentric leadership within MKO/PMOI/MEK
In MKO, the terms Rajavi and ideology are not distinguishable and are actually identical. Despite all disputes on the factor of ideology and its function in social issues, the main blunder of Rajavi is that he hews not to the organizational principles and ideology of MKO; rather he has made an attempt to replace the ideology with himself representing the ideology and the one in the focus of attention. Rajavi has manipulated MKO ideology for justifying his wrongdoings and cultic behaviors imposed on the members under his command a number of which can be enumerated as self-immolation, conducting terrorist attacks, Machiavellian relations..
Massoud Rajavi is known to be an egocentric power maniac whose character and leading flaws has so far suggested exhibiting many of the behavioral characteristics of marked megalomania and paranoia. Many even go beyond to state that he is a psychopath who has succeeded to enforce himself onto the leadership position. Their assertion is in no way an arbitrary judgment but based on comprehensive researches done by prominent academics and cult experts.
the main strategy of Mojahedin leadership in recent years has been grabbing hold of empty promises to keep on his illegitimate hold over the body and soul of a number of deceived and ill-fated individuals. Two years ago, Rajavi promised to make the grounds for the overthrow of the Iranian regime up to the U.S presidential election; otherwise, members would be free to either remain in Camp Ashraf (dwelling of Mojahedin rank-and-files in Iraqi soil) or quit the organization.
The crushing coup over the body of the organization following the mass arrests in 1971 as well as the ideological schism of MKO/PMOI in 1975 were two alarming incidents that could well help its leaders to start a thorough analysis of strategic and ideological failures so as to make revisions to overcome further encountered challenges