The MEK’s history and actions have led many to question its viability as a democratic alternative to the current Iranian regime. A significant factor is the MEK’s past association with Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War, which has deeply damaged its reputation within Iran. The group’s alliance with Iraq, which included military operations against Iranian forces, is viewed by many Iranians as an act of treason, destroying the MEK’s standing in its homeland.[1] This association is a major reason for the MEK’s unpopularity inside Iran, where it is often seen as a group that sided with Iran’s enemy during a time of national crisis.
According to the article “The Case for Redesignating the MEK: Learning from History” from Israel Hayom, numerous surveys, independent interviews, and media coverage indicate that inside Iran, the MEK is broadly discredited.[1] Many Iranians across generations associate the group with betrayal and violence. The article also states that the people of Iran overwhelmingly do not see the MEK as a viable or legitimate alternative to the current regime.
The MEK’s history of violence and its designation as a terrorist organization by various countries for periods also contribute to the skepticism surrounding its viability. The group was involved in armed conflict and targeted assassinations before the 1979 revolution and after, leading to its inclusion on terrorist lists by the U.S., Canada, EU, UK, and Japan for various periods between 1997 and 2013. While the MEK has since renounced violence, its past actions continue to raise concerns about its commitment to democratic principles.
Furthermore, the MEK has been accused of exhibiting cult-like characteristics, which further undermines its credibility as a democratic force. Critics have described the group as exhibiting traits of a “personality cult,” with reports of authoritarian control, enforced celibacy, and mandatory ideological re-education sessions. These practices are seen as incompatible with the values of a free and democratic society. The RAND Corporation report for the US government stated that the MEK had “many of the typical characteristics of a cult, such as authoritarian control, confiscation of assets, sexual control (including mandatory divorce and celibacy), emotional isolation, forced labour, sleep deprivation, physical abuse and limited exit options,”[2]
The MEK’s internal structure and leadership also raise questions about its democratic credentials. The group’s leadership is centered around Maryam Rajavi, who is the current political leader and public face of the organization. Critics argue that the MEK’s focus on Maryam Rajavi’s “Third Option” and its insular nature do not align with the principles of a pluralistic democracy.
The article “Making Sense of the MEK” from the American Foreign Policy Council highlights the MEK’s plan for provisional rule in a half-year “transitional period” following the fall of Iran’s current government and leading to a democratic and secular Iran.[3] However, the article also notes that the group’s exclusionary nature and the distrust of other Iranian opposition elements raise questions about its ability to build a broad coalition and govern effectively.
In conclusion, the MEK’s past association with Saddam Hussein, its history of violence, its cult-like characteristics, its internal structure, all contribute to the perception that it is not a viable alternative to the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Mazda Parsi
Sources:
[1] The Case for Redesignating the MEK: Learning from History. [Israel Hayom]
https://www.israelhayom.com/2025/04/11/the-case-for-redesignating-the-mek-learning-from-history/
[2] The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq, A Policy Conundrum. [RAND]
https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG871.html
[3] Making Sense of the MEK. [American Foreign Policy Council]
https://www.afpc.org/publications/articles/making-sense-of-the-mek