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"ideological revolution"

The marriage of Masud Rajavi and Maryam Azdanlou

The MEK’s Ideological Revolution

The ideological marriage of Maryam and Massoud [1984] and intra-organizational obligatory divorces [1988] constitute the strategic hallmarks of the ideological revolution within Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization [MKO] or the Mojahedin Cult as notoriously entitled. Although there is a five-year interval between the two events, ideological divorces are a complementary step to the marriage of Maryam and Massoud that deteriorated the status of family life in MKO. Mehdi Abrishamchi, Maryam Rajavi’s late husband, justifies the act of Maryam’s divorce from him and her remarriage to Massoud as removing the problem of family as a barrier in the way of Maryam and Massoud. It is the first time the structure of family life is put into challenge. He says:

Maryam had to be either unquestionably promoted to a high status in the organization released of any [conjugal] obligation, just like Massoud, and be totally devoted to revolution or had to give it up. Here, the simple issue of family was creating an incongruity.

to download the video file click here

Another possibility that led the organization to mastermind and theatricalize such a show was to open a passage out of the encountered strategic cul-de-sac following the organization’s failure in overthrowing the Iranian regime on the one hand and to deter the possibility of any organizational split or demise on the other hand.

A larger number of MKO’s separated members especially in recent years have exclusively focused on the ideological revolution and the internal objectives Rajavi sought. In his review, Hadi Shams Haeri writes:

The so-called ideological revolution in 1985 that was much a cover for the strategic failure of the organization and a move aimed at averting accusations posed against Rajavi could not achieve all its objectives and acquit Rajavi completely. Therefore, it deemed necessary to find a scapegoat for the organizational failures and the strategic impasse. The plotted conspiracy against [Ali] Zarkesh was the continuation of the conspired [ideological] revolution in 1985. As such, we come to the conclusion that the other consequent ideological revolutions were in fact conspiracies in order to overcome the challenges at hand in every stage. [6]

A number of other former MKO members also evaluate the ideological revolution in the same way and believe that the ideological revolution was based on the mechanism of externalizing the internal contradictions within the organization and delineating a new line of relation based on an all-encompassing and blind obedience to Rajavi.

It is worth noting that nearly two years before the development of the ideological revolution and obligatory divorces, Rajavi held a completely different idea on intra-organizational marriages and the concept of family. Believing to be modeling on some legal, Islamic ideological creeds, he encouraged marriage and foundation of family as a revolutionary act. In summarizing his one-year struggle in armed phase, Rajavi has said:

In organizational reports, there are cases in which those members who have lost their wives or husbands in armed operations are so emotionally depressed that have declared they prefer to remain single for ever… But this is not a perfect and revolutionary idea since the Prophet, Islamic Imams and also all the reformers and revolutionary leaders of the world have denounced it. Therefore, the organization advises such members, and also the unmarried, to get married to anybody they will if possible. According to the Holy Quran and the doctrines of our ideological leaders, we have to consider the marriage as a part of our struggle not something to be thrown away.

November 7, 2023 0 comment

Mujahedin Khalq Organization members' families

My mother divorced her husband during the MEK Ideological revolution

The long-time MEK supporter Ebrahim Mohammad Rahimi is dying of brain cancer in a London hospital. His son Sepher Mohammad Rahimi also in London wants to contact his mother, who is in Iraq. The MEK’s response is swearing and defamation – saying Ebrahim has covertly worked for the Iranian regime for many years.

This week, Sepher wrote to the UNHCR and the ICRC refuting the MEK’s statements.

He added, “during the ideological revolution inside the MEK, my mother divorced her husband. That has nothing to do with me. Why is she refusing to speak with me, her child? Neither I nor my father have ever said a single word against the MEK. Please arrange contact with her before he dies.”

Ebrahim Mohammad Rahimi spent many years with the MEK. He eventually managed to escape the camp in Iraq by taking refuge in the American run TIPF for four years before getting back to London. During the internal revolution of the MEK, Rahimi sent his son, Sepher, live with his grandparents in Iran. Sepher has now returned to London where his father is terminally ill in hospital. Sepher’s mother is still with the MEK and Rahimi and his son have tried to make contact with her before he dies. They have now begun asking MEK lobbyists for help since the MEK leaders only reacted by calling them “agents of the Iranian regime”.

January 3, 2016 0 comment

The cult of Rajavi

MKO Cult: New phase of Ideological revolution is on the way

Ebrahim Khodabandeh has published a series of articles in which he reveals what MEK insiders divulge to him about what is happening inside the cult.

In part 8 of the ongoing articles Khodabandeh says this coming week marks the 50th anniversary of the MEK and Massoud Rajavi is on overdrive to spend money to uphold the past (nobody in the MEK still thinks they are continuing the original path of ant-Imperialism).

Rajavi will shortly announce who he has appointed as the new MEK leader and will start a new series of Ideological Revolution sessions.

According to people inside the MEK, this is his last effort to keep it together and stop it disintegrating. The reason is that nobody believes in it anymore and the MEK is falling apart.

The most common doubts and questions which are being raised, and are being suppressed through physical and mental means, are:

– Rajavi always said after Maliki we will move back to Camp Ashraf, but everyone sees that even Camp Liberty is being closed and everyone is being moved to Albania.

– Second, how long does a man live that he is in hiding for 12 years? What’s the point of him?

– Third the NLA and military capability is finished, so what happened to the armed struggle which Rajavi still insists we must believe in? How does that work?

– There are many question about the recent nuclear deal and the fate of Camp Maryam in France as the French are saying more and more clearly that the MEK are no longer – have never been – welcome there.

– There is a huge amount of questioning and uncertainty about the fate of the people in Albania. There is clearly no plan. What is Rajavi’s strategy or tactic for them?

– The main question which frightens the MEK more than any other and which is gaining momentum is, ‘Can anyone give an example of the MEK doing anything for themselves, any independent action or strategy it has followed that has not been dictated by Saddam Hussein, America, Israel or Saudi Arabia?’

August 30, 2015 0 comment

Massoud Rajavi

Forged System of Values in MKO’s Ideological Revolution

Rajavi forged ideological revolution as a forge to shape the adherents as he wished

Delivering a speech in the manner of a sermon in Paris in 1985, Massoud Rajavi addressed the Forged System of Values in MKO’s Ideological Revolution members saying: “This [ideological revolution] is to test you; we need iron men. We seek new versions of power and capacity. Those Mojahedin who pass through this forge will be more rough and resistant”.

Believing to be the smith, Rajavi likens his forged ideological revolution to a forge to shape the adherents as he willed. In this new system of values, the standard for a faithful Mojahed were set to measure the members’ degree of loyalty and commitment to the organization and leadership. The imposed revolution before being considered an extraordinary way of initiating change in MKO can well be defined as an internal coup d’état to accomplish Rajavi’s own ambitions and promoting him to the highest and unbeatable status of a hegemonic leader and even above that. Of course, it was not so easy a task to compel members to surrender to the Rajavi’s selfish ambitious on their own will and to dissolve in a leader whom many believed to be inadequate to assume the status.

Since MKO is heavily built on a hierarchical structure, the members are controlled and organized under the command of higher ranks who in turn receive orders from higher command echelon. It made it much easier for the organization to impose the change on the members through such a forced stratum either through persuasion or designed processes of penalization. As the members would be provoked by persuasive heroic deeds of the responsible ranks, the statements of submission had to be first made by them. In this way, the rational thinking power of the rank and file had to be paralyzed under the impact of the impressive expressions of emotional parodies. Consequently, through a new plot of a systematic fashion of letter writing, the ranking members were allotted to write consecutive open letters of congratulation to the newly wed Rajavis, and Massoud Rajavi himself in particular, appreciating the heroic move and the initiated new phase in MKO.

There were countless volume of these letters, known as the letters of ideological revolution, with identical themes of expressing total devotion to the leadership and his novel ideological revolution. Resorting to these crafts to subjugate its own insiders was in direct contrast to its democratic slogans advertising on the political scene. There are more than enough volume of these letters as evidences all published in the organization’s official gazette Mojahed soon after the unconventional marriage. Writing of her unconditional dedication to ideological revolution, Mina Khiyabani, the teenage member wedded to Mahdi Abrishamchi soon after he divorced Maryam Azodanlu, in her letter addressed to Rajavi stated:

I hope to be close behind you and devoted to your emancipating revolution with my soul. To be worthy to follow the path, I need to be cleaned of whatever evil and element of filth. I bow to you to the extreme of my appreciation of your high status, and appreciate your miraculous move of self-sacrifice, that is far above the martyrdom of many thousands, that has guaranteed a history. Now I believe to be all blameworthy before this revolution. I hope this revolution will act as a motivation to reinforce iota of values within me to make me capable of being under your command as once I was. *

Mohammad Seyyedi Kashani, one of the oldest, experienced veterans whose organizational activities even exceed that of Rajavi, was another devotee who directed a letter in which he stated:

Dear Massoud, I will call you brother no more. You are my sage. Dear to my heart. You are my teacher…. many things have undergone a change in the organization and also inside us. I am sure that the last rusted layers of the old world would be eliminated from within the forces and sympathizers. Obviously, in our most favourite organization the real Mojahed is the one who is more unselfish and capable and also most cherished before God. *

In another letter from Mohammad Hayati, another member of MKO, we read:

I congratulate the blessed marriage of my ideological leader Massoud and Maryam. Definitely and knowingly I recant for failing to understand the grandeur of this leadership. *

In the letter of Hussein Abrishamchi, Mahdi Abrishamchi’s junior brother and a commander in chief of the organization, addressed to the Rajavis it was stated:

I wish I could kneel before you [Maryam] and Massoud as the forerunners of this great revolution and take my oath of allegiance. *

Mohsen Rezai, a member of central cadre, in his testament of allegiance to Rajavi earnestly supplicated salvation from him:

Great men have marvellous power of attraction and repulsion. Now I see it in you and you can influence all. Anybody endowed with an iota of humanism and nobility falls in your love and you repel whoever walks in the wrong path. I am sure that you will be among those closest to God in the Day of Judgment and I am also sure that you will take my hand for my salvation.*

Mahdi Abrishamchi, playing his own influential role in the ideological revolution, was one of the most enthusiastic espouses of the move started by his ex-wife and Rajavi:

This ideological move shed light on all of us. We were purged of our filth and dirt by passing through the hearth of purification that Rajavi demonstrated. Now our ideology is shining and we are different people. We have the honour of surpassing all those that ceased to follow the path. Now I dare say that , after this revolution, we are true members of Mojahedin, aren’t we? We pride ourselves on being his [Rajavi] followers and disciples; he is our mentor and educator who trained us and we hope he will do in future, and he will. We praise God for leading us to the right path through Massoud and Maryam, otherwise we would have gone astray. *

As seen, in all these letters the ranking members insist to state that the crystallized ideological revolution has led to great changes within them and the structure of the organization as well. According to many assertions made by Rajavi, Mojahedin are engaged in a never-lasting change until all intended objectives of leadership have been accomplished.

* The quotes are all from Mojahed issues 241, 242, 247 published in 1985.
Mojahedin.ws, January 17, 2013
http://www.mojahedin.ws/en/?p=16982

January 19, 2013 0 comment

The cult of Rajavi

MKO’s Ideological Revolution, an Absolute Deviation

The Cult of Mojahedin; A Modern Cult of Personality – 3

The internal ideological revolution was the turning point that paved the way for the transformation of MKO to a cult of personality. Rajavi needed to construct a plot, regardless of the large cost, similar to that of the ideological drift in 1975 drafted by Taghi Shahram, who broke the seemingly Islamic ideology of the organization and officially announced it to be Marxism. Consequently, Shahram suppressed any protest and opposition and even plotted assassinations to liquidate opponents or as a method of silencing them.

Now ten years later, in 1985, Rajavi had faced a more complicated situation worse than before. The announced armed warfare with the heavy cost imposed both on regime and the organization had proved totally unproductive. Rajavi had come under harsh criticism and disapproval and blamed for his countless errors that had led to discredit what was being advertised as a revolutionary movement because of excessive use of unnecessary terror. And Rajavi was in urgent need of exploiting the intact huge potentiality of female insiders as motivators in inter-organizational relations and a prototype of a campaigning modern woman for tradition-bond Iranian women. The big change started itself with another error and scandal and the Rajavis, Massoud and Maryam, were the firsts to publicly break with Islamic and Iranian tradition; a wife’s infidelity misrepresented a sacred act and was considered as a turning point in the campaigns of the organization as well as a shocking strike against Islamic Republic regime! Any logical mind could anticipate what would be the outcome of a change started by challenging established traditions that Rajavi judged as impediments in the path of spurring innovations. MKO was the first in Iranian contemporary history to publicly legitimizing the unconventional remarriage of a woman immediately after her divorce.

Maryam was known to be the fruit of the so-called “ideological revolution” and who, consequently, paved the way for the other details of the revolution and was built a prototype for Iranian women. Mehdi Abrishamchi, a ranking aid to Rajavi and Maryam Rajavi’s late husband, was himself the one to make the first sacrifice for the revolution! and among the firsts to justify his wife’s divorce and her remarriage to Rajavi:

Maryam had to be either unquestionably promoted to a high status in the organization free from any [conjugal] obligation, just like Massoud, and be totally devoted to revolution or had to give it up. 1

According to Abrishamchi, since Maryam had to be promoted to a leadership status and every decision in the organization had to be made by Maryam and Massoud together, the matrimonial obligations and restrictions prevented Maryam to be in Massoud’s company all the time. She had to deny all her obligations and tear whatever bonded her except to Massoud and the revolution. As such, her divorce and remarriage before anything was instilled to be the accomplishment of a revolutionary obligation. Thus, the marriage was hailed as a great sacrifice made by Masoud and Maryam and all the members had to follow the steps to undertake their own revolution not in a similar line with the leaders but by identifying their personal shortcomings in later arranged self-criticism sessions. Immediately following the Rajavi’s marriage, the military command of the MKO issued a directive stating:

In order to carry out your organizational duties under the present circumstances, there is an urgent need to strengthen and deepen this ideological revolution. You must pay the necessary price by allocating sufficient time and resources for absorbing related teachings…Thus in your daily routines give priority to listening to radio messages and explanations provided by your commanders. Believe in the central committee’s proclamation that “this ideological revolution will enhance the Mojahedin’s capacities enormously; it will ever more unify and cleanse our ranks.”…Be certain that your deep belief in the novel leadership of the new democratic revolution of the heroic Iranian people, meaning Masoud and Maryam Rajavi, and by making a direct connection with this leadership and setting it as your example….you will be able to correct your work habits and be able to deal with and resolve personal, organizational, and military difficulties. 2

It was followed by another directive issued by the Social Division commanding the members to prove their revolutionary obedience by submitting to the initiated self-criticism tradition within the organization:

To understand this great revolution…is to understand and gain a deep insight into the greatness of our new leadership, meaning the leadership of Masoud and Maryam. It is to believe in them as well as to show ideological and revolutionary obedience of them…By correcting your old work habits and by criticizing your individual as well as collective shortcomings, we shall gain much awareness in confronting our enemies…Report to your commanders and superiors in a comprehensive manner your progress, its results and outcomes that you gain from promoting and strengthening this ideological revolution. 3

Consequently, protests were aborted and a cult of personality was provided for the leader and his wife to the sanctuary of where nobody was permitted either to enter or violate it. The experience taught Rajavi to apply this tactic to remove any obstacle and save the organization and him when facing a challenge. His Machiavellian inclinations and his seizing any opportunity to achieve his goals made the impossible possible for him. The members` crushed identity had made them undergo an amazing metamorphosis to follow the orders. The exploited coercive mental and physical approaches against the insiders developed into a counteraction against the ever-increasing criticisms and protests.

According to many MKO’s ex-members, in this phase, under the pretext of security considerations, many dissident members and critics were either imprisoned or killed suspiciously and the first consequences of settlement in Iraq was establishing prisons and exercising mental and physical pressures on prisoners. The worst was despicable justification by zealous devotees of Rajavies for such maltreatment and offenses which they called the inevitable consequence of the ideological revolution which they believed to be necessary for assessing the loyalty of members to leadership. In their opinion, themselves enjoying the abundant luxury of the post-revolution, blind obedience and submission to imprisonment, as well as suffering physical and mental tortures were indications of expressing absolute devotion and loyalty to the leadership.

Resources:

1. The delivered lecture by Mehdi Abrishamchi on the internal ideological revolution within MKO, [1985].
2. Mojahed, No. 241, April 4, 1985.
3. Mojahed, No. 242, April 12, 1985.

January 14, 2013 0 comment

Former members of the MEK

On MKO’s Ideological Revolution

Memoirs of Batoul Soltani – Part 17
As a high ranking member of the leadership Council, I was in charge of a series of meetings, and I received special trainings from Maryam Rajavi on how to deal with the contradictions arising from ideological divorce which forced a woman to leave her husband in order to stay loyal to the organization’s ideas.

Besides, Masud managed the meetings of the ideological revolution himself saying:”suppose that you have brought an Iranian youth to the organization and you want to explain and justify the ideological revolution to him. You should clarify it to him that he cannot be married and be a fighter at the same time. You should explain that one cannot think of sexual or emotional problems while one is struggling.

Then you should ask this question that whether one wants to be in the path of struggle and liberty or in the path of a normal life. So, this was the way we encountered the newcomers explaining that they would fail to succeed in their struggle to the extent that they are involved in external problems. For example, when we argued with an unmarried girl, we told her: ”in the core of your personal relations and emotions, there is a symbol which is the idol of the society”. Then we asked her:”what‘s your symbol and idol, as a girl in the society?” and then we answered the question ourselves: ”a good husband according to your ideals.”

Also for a married woman, there has always been a person in the heart of her emotions. I remember the example that Rajavi always used to use: ”what does a revolutionary person have to give as the price of his revolution? You have left your homes, your families, your spouses, and your children, so what do you offer to your revolution now?” Then he added “But I’d say that you have a lot to give for the revolution and that is your emotions.” They dealt with the center of emotions in individuals because it is the origin of motives and interests. Thus, they analyzed the members’ internal motives to remove all other motives from the members’ minds except the motive of struggle. On the other hand, we tried to suppress the alleged anti-revolutionary motives of the members saying that: “all your motives have to be for the organization and according to the desires of the leaders.”

If an individual has a problem with understanding such a mechanism, he will be likely to leave the group someday.” Then the officials try to guess in which phase that individual will have problems with the internal ideological revolution so they recognize if the person is an appropriate recruit or not. In fact, for Mojahedin, recruitment means total devotion to the organizational relations. They try to reach their goals by using these anti-human levers.

About the marriage of Masud and Maryam, they make some examples: they believe that Maryam’s efficiency has become much higher than the time she was Abrishamchi’s wife and when she removed the obstacle of her ex-husband and linked herself to Masud, she raised her abilities to the level of the first authority of MKO while before her ideological marriage with Masud she was just in charge of a single unit! Then they make it a practical fact in the routine life of members. They try to convince members that the only way to promote your abilities is to link yourself with Masud by abandoning your spouses, your families, and your children… For instance, they asked Maryam:”could you do your current tasks before your divorce and marriage with Masud?” she replied:”No, I was unable to do so, I was weak. I could not even manage two persons. Then my energy was liberated, my abilities flourished. I could rely on another point which was Masud Rajavi so I could accept higher responsibilities.” This has become a proof for their arguments.

I believe that Masud Rajavi has a very poor relationship with men. This aspect of his personality is very clear within his regular relations. I remember that he seriously disagreed with men to film his internal meetings. So he ordered that all leadership Council meetings should be filmed by women only. He planned a time schedule for some women to learn how to work with a camera. He hysterically opposed the men. Now, when I look back, I see the roots of this characteristic in his sensuality and jealousy. Maybe, it is natural that when a man is among a number of women, he would not like another man to be there. This is my internal feeling. That’s why Rajavi tried to choose women for all needed forces related to him. I think he couldn’t tolerate a camera man in front of himself.

He tried hard to remove the members of the political office since they were all men. Apparently he believes that women work very hard so he was always fond of women. When a new woman entered the organization, he was fascinated by her. He welcomed her by joking and having fun. In the high ranks of the hierarchy of the group he was all the time seeking to remove a man from the high ranks and replace him with a woman. Due to this personal tendency he filled up his leadership Council with a selection of female members.
Translated by Nejat Society

July 2, 2009 0 comment

The Ideology of the MEK

The ideological revolution, a solution or the critical episode

In a series of articles entitled”The Role of Strategic Stalemates in MKO ideological Shift”, mechanisms of the ideological revolution, its effects and consequences were studied according to the statements made by Bijan Niyabati and some former MKO members. It was concluded that the ideological revolution was the leadership’s sole solution for numerous political, military, and strategic failures of armed phase adopted by the organization in order to save it from the danger of split and even disintegration. It is worth mentioning that Bijan Niyabati made his utmost effort to imply the meaning that the ideological revolution was an inevitable reaction to Mojahedin impasses. He considers it as a reasonable answer to the challenges Mojahedin had encountered and the sole resolution for the dilemma to survive; the organization had to either follow the past route or suffer another schism. However, trying to underline the role of Rajavi in internal revolution, he regards the survival and improvements of Mojahedin indebted to Rajavi and his talents. Also, he refers to the potentiality of Mojahedin to overthrow the Iranian regime under the leadership of Rajavi. As such, reviewing the course of events of Mojahedin in the past and their split in 1975 in particular, he considers reorganization of MKO under the leadership of Rajavi a great success that was fulfilled with the development of the ideological revolution. What is worth thinking is his insistence to prove that Mojahedin in either phases were radically leftist. In this regard he writes: While in prison, Masoud Rajavi issued a message entitled”Islam, Left Marxism to initiates an all-out struggle against the coup d’état within the organization. His brilliant 12-clause declaration message not only determines the identity of Mojahed-e Khalq and draws the borders between left and right, but also stabilizes the element of anti-Imperialism, i.e. the main element of the ideological revolution of Hanif, and creates a new Khalq. [1] He insists on saying that at the peak of these events is Rajavi’s full leftist orientation as a factor of revolutionary, Islamic, and anti-imperialism nature of MKO. As such, he does his best in order to make a left assessment of the 1984 ideological revolution: The year 1984 was the decisive year in all political, military, strategic, and ideological stages. The encountered cul-de-sac in political, military, and armed resistance as well as the proven inability to overthrow the regime in short-term … forced two options on Mojahedin. It had to either submit to the existing conditions or resort to politics or, by embracing all internal, external, and international consequences of resorting to armed warfare and violent overthrow of the regime, lean to the left and yield to radicalism. [2] Then, he refers to the equal role of Rajavi in both phenomena and regards it as a key factor and writes: Following the internal coup d’atat within MKO and Masoud Rajavi’s unbeaten political-ideological victory in keeping the plotters in isolation and continuing to safeguard the ideology of Hanif that resulted in reorganization of Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization stabilized his already unrivaled status among Mojahedin. [3] Rajavi’s reorganization required the essential prerequisite of purging already joined members and enhance a new round of recruitment: Masoud Rajavi, disregarding the existing reactionary potentials, restructures the organization through purging the forces with any reactionary orientations and resorts to the incomplete plan of Hanif in training”versatile cadre”. All the prior recruitments were cancelled and new recruitments were made among the imprisoned Mojahedin. [4] Both Rajavi and Niyabati focus on two key points necessitating ideological revolution as a lever against the crises imposed on Mojahedin. 1. Rajavi’s revolution has been developed for the qualitative progress of Mojahedin aiming at fulfilling the promise of overthrow. In this regard, Rajavi points to the power of Mojahedin being hundredfold. 2. Though they were under the pressure to lean towards the right, the ideological revolution made them bend to extreme left and, even in Niyabati’s words, radicalized and vaccinated them: In order to safeguard the revolution against the social and imperialist offenses, there is no way but immunizing and vaccinating the organization against any split and total breakup. [5] It is worthwhile to investigate to what extent Mojahedin succeeded to gain desirable results with regard to the present status of the organization on the one hand and their distance to their main strategic objective, i.e. overthrowing the Iranian government on the other hand. Besides, the study of the political and ideological orientation of Mojahedin may clarify the extent to which their radicalized position toward left is pragmatically guaranteed. Although in order to get a true understanding of Mojahedin it is necessary to review cultist factors, we try to evaluate their ideological revolution on the basis of their own claims. As such, we have to review their position in relation to the past. Here, some questions are raised to compare the present situation of Mojahedin with that of critical phases before the development of the ideological revolution: *What is the present status of Mojahedin to fulfill the strategic promise of overthrowing Iranian regime? **Compared with their position in past, to what extent Mojahedin have been succeeded in winning the support of internal social factor, opposition groups, and international support. With regard to destructive impacts of the ideological revolution on the internal relations of Mojahedin, the external relations are also subsequent of adverse internal impacts. Their most important challenge now, as the after-effect of the ideological revolution, is the lack of legitimacy among opposition groups and also international institutions as well as Western and European countries. Now Mojahedin are accused of a variety of charges and human rights violations they have failed to give any explanation. 1. Terrorist charges mentioned in the reports released by the US State Department, E.U., and other European countries and Canada. 2. Violation of human rights in their intra-organizational relations as publicized by the Human Rights Watch. 3. The accusation of establishing a cult of personality in the latest report released by the US State Department in April 2007. 4. Collaborating with Saddam in ethnic cleansing of Iraqi people. Besides, there are other met crises including internal split, expulsion from Iraq, and the case of 17 June self-immolations and more. Such consequences resulted from the internal activities of Mojahedin themselves but it suffered a lot of external problems at the expense of their deceptive bend towards right to take advantage of the strategic lever of the U.S to confront Iran. However, the U.S. is enough aware of the cultist and opportunistic nature of Mojahedin not to be duped by their tricks. It has to be pointed out that after the ideological revolution, MKO turned into an anti-democratic cult of personality with a strategic and ideological leadership of its own. The internal shift has intensified although Mojahedin make great attempts to deny the charge in their media in order to win the support of western politicians. Offering a third solution, suggesting formation of solidarity front, pseudo-democratic activities in the Europe and the west, disavowing terrorism, supporting the human rights resolutions and opposing nuclear activities of Iran, â€¦ are instances of activities done in order to win the support of the West and the U.S in particular. That is all resulting from Mojahedin’s extreme hypocritical entity and Machiavellianism requiring them to adopt paradoxical approaches in internal and external relations. In fact, the Mojahedin after the ideological revolution are a by-product of strategic hypocrisy. The interesting point is that Niyabati believes hypocrisy is byproduct of a closed society:

Hypocrisy is the inevitable product of the paradox between mental values and the objective realities of a closed society. [6] Is it possible to consider the ideological revolution with such challenging achievements as the sole solution for Mojahedin’s crises? And is the insistence on highlighting the role of Rajavi to the point to regard him as a demigod and celestial creature anything but a process to hide the incompetence and flaws of Mojahedin leadership? A suggestion is to investigate the supposed achievements of the ideological revolution of Mojahedin from their own viewpoint, i.e. the inevitable reaction to strategic failures, impasses and radicalization and also the so-called genuine role of Rajavi. It has to be investigated to what the extent the ideological revolution has succeeded to enhance Mojahedin and help them achieve their strategic objective of destabilizing and undermining the Iranian regime to cause its collapse. Has the organization ever been successful in implementing and practicing the chanted slogans of man’s freedom and emancipation of women who are claimed to have been suffering historical exploitation and slavery? No doubt, numerous evidences and testimonies made public by ex-members and victims of Mojahedin who found the opportunity to escape the cult can help better to fathom the threatening, malicious nature of Mojahedin cult masquerading as a pro-democratic political group.

References: 1. Niyabati, B. A different look at the ideological revolution within MKO, p. 3. 2. ibid, p.16.

3. ibid, p.7

4. ibid.

5. ibid, p.20.

6. ibid, p.35.

February 17, 2008 0 comment

The Ideology of the MEK

The Ideological Revolutionary and the Failed Strategy of Overthrow

Internal ideological revolution within Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO) was started as a result of a number of factors including the strategic failure of the organization in overthrowing the Iranian regime. In fact, the revolution was the outcome of the two fold necessity of first to overcome the encountered internal crises and second, to secure the political revival of the organization. In addition, the danger of split threatened Mojahedin more than before. The organization’s failed policy of overthrowing Iranian regime that was much a result of the leadership’s autocracy and defect of a sound political vision ended in absolute failure and the consequent withdrawal of the operational teams back to the Western borders and eventually onto the Europe. Massoud Rajavi in Paris declared that the Iranian regime enjoyed only 10-15 percent of public support and promised its overthrow in a one to three-year-long period.

As the first reaction to this failure, Rajavi determined two successive short-time and long-time plans for overthrow. However, recalling forces to abroad and their exit from Iran led even the most optimistic MKO members to be pessimistic about the made claims. As such, the first signs of challenge between the leadership of Rajavi and the rank and file appeared. After a while, the Iranian regime managed to control the crises completely which affected the status of Mojahedin and its alias, the National Council of Resistance. Deeply mired, it was impossible for Mojahedin to either change and reform the existing conditions or continue their adopted policies. Niyabati expounds on the conditions leading to the development of ideological revolution as follows:

It was impossible to do with the existing conditions due to the internal discrepancies within the sole democratic alternative whose present fragile political alliance hardly moved on the past line on the one hand, and the inevitable backwash of MKO’s failed strategy of overthrow in short-time within the organization and all around the world on the other hand. 20

It was the same case within the NCR. Those NCR members who were deceived to join on the pretext of short-time overthrowing of the Iranian regime and mainly aimed to achieve their own objectives were instigating a second crisis. Naturally, it was Rajavi who was the target of all accusations. In this regard, Niyabati says:

It was even worse in political stage. Mojahedin’s failure to overthrow the regime in short-term and to integrate, claiming to be the sole democratic alternative, anti-monarch and anti-cleric political parties put heavy pressure from the inside and outside on Mojahedin. It was self-evident that Rajavi was the one to be accused. 16

As the critics challenged the leadership increasingly, the first stages of the ideological revolution were planned in order to control the internal crises. Almost all the MKO ex-members refer to the challenge as the main factor leading to the ideological revolution. Failing to present convincing explanations, Mojahedin accuse dissatisfied members and critics in different ways and label them with a variety of names. Bijan Niyabati evaluates the mechanism and the necessity of the ideological revolution similarly. He reviews the interval between the declared armed struggle phase up to the meeting of Rajavi with Tareq Aziz and points to the fact that the ideological revolution was the sole solution to overcome from the strategic failure of the organization. Summarizing the course of events from 1981 to 1984, Mojahedin are convinced that a shock is assential to control the internal crises of the organization:

The year 1983 was the decisive year in all political, military, strategic, and ideological stages. The encountered cul-de-sac in political, military, and armed resistance as well as the proven inability to overthrow the regime in short-term, which was evident in late 1982 and was proved to be impossible through 1983, forced two options on Mojahedin. It had to either submit to the existing conditions or resort to politics or, by embracing all internal, external, and international consequences of resorting to armed warfare and violent overthrow of the regime, lean to the left and yield to radicalism. 17

The most probable reaction on the part of the members was predicted to be a split in the organization. The opposition of dissidents who played a key role in the organization, led the officials to give priority to confront and overcome the threat of another schism. As Niyabati writes:

It was a prepared condition only if one out of many members of the time’s political bureau or central committee, who were brilliant campaigners against the two regimes, moved on a different path and overtly questioned the failed guerrilla armed struggle. Among the other lower-rankings, problem-makers like Parviz Yaqubi and Saeed Shahsavandi and so were enough to sound the alarm.21

Finally, to become immunized against any risk of split and demise, the organization resorted to the ideological revolution. Since the rank and file’s challenge with the leader was highly probable due to the strategic failure of the organization, the ideological revolution mainly aimed at keeping the leadership out of the reach of any criticism and entrusting him an unquestionable ideological and political status. Niyabati believes:

To protect revolution against reactionary moves and practices of exploitation, the sole solution is to immune the organization and its leadership against splitting and disintegration. 21

Thus, the ideological revolution was devised as a firewall and immunity that protected the organization against any form of demise. However, the avalanche-like detachment of MKO and NCRI members well indicate that the organization was stepping onto a path of deviation both in principles and leadership.

The quotes are all from Bijan Niyabati’s A Different Look at Mojahedin’s Ideological Revolution, originally in Persian.

Bahar Irani – Mojahedin.ws – November 3, 2007

November 4, 2007 0 comment

The cult of Rajavi

Cult Parameters within MKO’s Internal Ideological Revolution

Of the key terms to develop an understanding of MKO’s internal revolution is the notion of ‘being in the leader’s debt’. That is the principle that requires all the individuals to deny their personal qualifications and potentialities and completely rely on the leader for the legitimacy of any value. In other words, any goodness is attributed to the leader and the vices are all on the part of the individuals. Through this mechanism, the personality of the insiders crystallizes under the absolute submission to the leader and no claim of any significance, theoretically and practically, or encouragement are validated unless by the leader’s approbation. In general, the insiders, regardless of their ranks and potentialities, must feel indebted to the leader for their success and spiritual felicity. To reach this stage, the insider has to be first purged of his wholly sinful past lived in the absence of the leader; it is impossible unless he is full of remorse and is dissolved in the teachings of the sphere he has joined. Expounding on the process that the insider has to undergo, Maryam Rajavi has said:

In anybody’s career can be found flaws and individual-class ill-indoctrinations engulfing him which deprive him of the blessings of an outward leader. Anybody who believes to be his own leader is left in the sepulchre of his own thoughts. You must push aside the tombstone and reach for a handhold outside. Attach yourself to the source of leadership to gain energy. [1]

According to such a vision, of course the insider must consider himself in somebody’s debt who has unbounded him from a dark, sinful past lived wholly devoid of a leader. Whatever he has committed in the past, even if they were acts of virtues, are worthless in the presence of the newly adopted leader. From here on, the past being completely denied, the individual’s qualifications and personality is conditioned to the absolute submission to the leadership. As Bijan Niyabati admits:

He [who is absorbed by the revolution] is a no one that represents no individual value. His gained prestige is neither an award of his imprisonment inside the prisons of Shah and clerics nor his presence in the fronts of fire and blood. He is neither an eloquent orator nor a highly educated man. He is not even a man. In a word, he carries none of his past merits. [2]

Simply said, a person’s badge of courage and the valor of his revolutionary combats as well as his gained social prestige and all the other merits are volatilized. Now, unquestionable self-surrender is the mechanism that generates his promotion and grants him personality and legitimacy:

From then on, promotion in rank and status is attained not by the virtue of political and organizational qualifications, but through prostrating before a woman. A woman who, for the first time in the history of Shiism, is promoted to the status of an imam. [3]

Denial of the past and absolute submission to the leader leaves the door open for anyone who wishes to join. These two factors demarcate between the old and the new worlds and they are the infrastructures of Mojahedin’s ideological revolution. Is it, as Mojahedin claim, the discovered missing-link in the world of creation that is exclusively possessed by Mojahedin and inserted in their revolutionary methodology? They insist to say that the issue of the ideological leadership and solemnizing mutual relations are tokens of ingenuity and creativeness owned by Mojahedin and which comply with the laws of existence. As Mehdi Abrishamchi admits:

Nowhere in a context out of our mind can we legislate. We must discover laws. We make success if our discovery is proper, otherwise we fail. Social development and evolution have their own set of rules, too. We make advance if we discover their rules, otherwise, we cannot. [4]

Then he asserts that Mojahedin’s leadership has developed a better comprehension of these issues and, thus, has proved to be much qualified for the leadership:

As the human society is part of the created world which is superior to our society and world, the one who has a deeper vision of the general laws dominating the motion of the world and society, which in its simplest definition is termed as ideology, can revolutionize the society. [5]

Is that really the missing-link Mojahedin claim to have discovered? In fact, the claims are the most commonly techniques practiced by the majority of movements’ leaders at least in the past century. Eric Hoffer in his social and psychological autopsy of the believers in the contemporary mass movements, being reactionary or revolutionary, and the exploited techniques to transmute their believers observes that all of them end in cults. More interestingly, the presented evidences are from among the capitalism and socialism camps as well as fascist and pseudo-fascist movements. Tracing the factors in the Soviet Union’s Communist Party, Hoffer has said:

The total surrender of a distinct self is a prerequisite for the attainment of both unity and self-sacrifice; and there is probably no more direct way of realizing this surrender than by inculcating and extolling the habit of blind obedience. When Stalin forces scientists, writers and artists to crawl on their bellies and deny their individual intelligence, sense of beauty and moral sense, he is not indulging a sadistic impulse but is solemnizing, in a most impressive way, the supreme virtue of blind obedience. All mass movements rank obedience with the highest virtues and put it on a level with faith:”union I of minds requires not only a perfect accord in the one Faith, but complete submission and obedience of will to the Church and the Roman Pontiff as to God Him- self.”Obedience is not only the first law of God, but also the first tenet of a revolutionary party and of fervent nationalism.”Not to reason why”is considered by all mass movements the mark of a strong and generous spirit. [6]

What happens in MKO in respect to inspire in insiders the feeling of regret for the past is surprisingly identical with what Stalin did in his purges of the old Bolshevik leaders when he deprived them of any possibility of identification with the past which consequently led to their unbounded contempt for the past and for history:

It is somewhat terrifying to realize that the totalitarian leaders of our day, in recognizing this source of desperate courage, made use of it not only to steel the spirit of their followers but also to break the spirit of their opponents. In his purges of the old Bolshevik leaders, Stalin succeeded in turning proud and brave men into cringing cowards by depriving them of any possibility of identification with the party they had served all their lives and with the Russian masses. These old Bolsheviks had long ago cut themselves off from humanity outside Russia. They had an unbounded contempt for the past and for history which could still be made by capitalistic humanity. They had renounced God. There was for them neither past nor future, neither memory nor glory outside the confines of holy Russia and the Communist party and both these were now wholly and irrevocably in Stalin’s hands. They felt themselves, in the words of I Bukharin.”isolated from everything that constitutes the essence of life.”So they confessed. By humbling themselves before the congregation of the faithful they broke out of their isolation. They renewed their communion with the eternal whole by reviling the self, accusing it of monstrous and spectacular crimes, and sloughing it off in public. [7]

To stabilize the authority of Nazi Party, as Hoffer points out, the devout are always urged to seek the absolute truth with their hearts rather than their minds:

The devout are always urged to seek the absolute truth with their hearts and not their minds.”It is the heart which is conscious of God, not the reason.”Rudolph Hess, when swearing in the entire Nazi party in 1934, exhorted his hearers:”Do not seek Adolph Hitler with your brains; all of you will find him with the strength of your hearts.”[8]

As Hoffer discusses, insiders’ self-surrender is blazoned as atonement for the past sins which the groups themselves cultivate in the insiders:

Self-surrender which is the source of a mass movement’s unity and vigor, is a sacrifice, an atonement, and clearly no atonement is called for there is a poignant sense of sin. Here, as elsewhere, the technique of a mass movement aims to infect people with a malady and then offer the movement as a cure. An effective mass movement cultivates lea of sin. It depicts the autonomous self not only as barren and helpless but also as vile. To confess and repent is to slough off one’s individual distinctness and separateness, and salvation is found by losing oneself in, the holy oneness of the congregation. [9]

The meeting point to comprehend bilateral cult relations is that in the paradoxical converge of the two factors the person comes to recognize the new identity he is led into. Rajavi has always reiterated that he bears the responsibility for the sins the members have done. Rajavi is promoted as the theophany that forgives his followers’ sins and warrantees their salvation. That is what Hoffer terms as ‘a tender spot’. To achieve salvation, Rajavi requires insiders’ total devotion which is accomplished through undergoing a certain process. Explaining on the tender spot, Hoffer states:

There is a tender spot for the criminal and an ardent wooing of him in all mass movements. St. Bernard, the moving spirit of the Second Crusade, thus appealed for recruits:”For what is it but an exquisite and priceless chance of salvation due to God alone, that the omnipotent should deign to summon to His service, as though they were innocent, murderers, ravishers, adulterers, perjurers, and those guilty of every crime?”Revolutionary Russia too has a tender spot for the common criminal, though it is ruthless with the heretic-the ideological”deviationist.”It is perhaps true that the criminal who”embraces a holy cause is more ready to risk his life and go to extremes in its defence than people who are awed by the sanctity of life and property. [10]

A scrutiny into MKO’s teachings of the ideological revolution well approves that, in contrast to the organization’s claims, its parameters are nothing more than emulating commonly practiced cult techniques. It is a historically proven fact that most cults apply these techniques since they work the best in the recruitment and enslavement of the new members. MKO is not an exception.

Sources:

[1]. Shams-e Haeri, Hdi; Mordab [Swamp] (originally in Persian), vol. II, p. 101.

[2]. Niyabati, Bijan; A Different Look at the Ideological Revolution within MKO, Khavaran Publication, p. 102.

[3]. Ibid.

[4]. Mehdi Abrishamch’ lectures on MKO’s ideological revolution.

[5]. Ibid.

[6]. HOffER, ERIC; The True Believer, Harper &. Row Publishers, New York, 1966, p. 108

[7]. Ibid, pp. 62-63.

[8]. Ibid, p. 77.

[9]. Ibid, pp. 55-56.

[10]. Ibid, p. 56.

Bahar Irani – Mojahedin.ws -October 14, 2007

October 16, 2007 0 comment

The Ideology of the MEK

Mojahedin leadership before and after the ideological revolution

From the beginning (1965) up to the time being, the issue of leadership in MKO, in spite of stressing on democratic centralism, has actually faced sever challenges. During the early formation years, from 1965 to 1972 when Mohammad Hanifnejad was executed, Hanifnejad’s hegemonic political leadership was known to be the main cause behind the demise of almost 80 percent of the organization’s cadres. So crushing was the strike over the body of the organization that, as Meisami explains, he was held responsible and was inter-organizationally sentenced to death. Concurrently, a court martial sentenced him to death and it was all settled. In the second phase, 1972-75, following the first ideological revolution that led to the ideological schism of the organization, Taqi Shahram assumed Mojahedin leadership; it was due to a power vacuum and his personal potentialities that he could succeed to an autocratic leadership.

In the third phase, 1975 up to now, Rajavi has occasionally ignored the council leadership and developed his hegemonic leadership. Rajavi was regarded as the political leader of Mojahedin before the ideological revolution in 1985 but since then he has been appointed as both the political and the ideological leader of MKO. From the beginning, such a process in the internal relations of MKO has been criticized by the members. After the ideological revolution that started Rajavi’s autocratic political and ideological leadership, a greater number of MKO members, including Parviz Yaqubi and Saeed Shahsavandi, quitted the organization compared with the earlier two phases.

The aim here is, based on the organization’s own sources and acknowledgments made by defectors, to investigate the process of the appointment of the ideological leadership, the reasons behind members’ separation and the disposition of the ideological leadership. Democratic centralism was regarded as the best approach for leading MKO as asserted in the organization’s original documents and sources:

The complexity of social issues and the fundamental differences between a revolutionary organization and society necessitates a council leadership particularly when the organization aims at bringing about fundamental changes within social institutions. In such a situation, an individual can not resolve all the problems. Moreover, council leadership prevents the interference of an individual’s shortcomings to have any impact on the organization; in council leadership an individual’s weakness is thwarted by others’ talent which reduces any possible risks. [1]

As such, some factors such as the complexity of social and political conditions as well as individual features make council leadership to be the first priority. The internal ideological revolution within Mojahedin replaced council leadership, both theoretically and politically, with that of Rajavi’s autocratic ideological leadership. As admitted by a majority of defectors, it was modeled on the Soviet Union’s Communist Party in the reign of Stalin. As Saeid Shahsavandi elaborates:

The Ideological revolution began in 1985. As I said before, I worked in the political department up to 1986 coincident to the transitions made in the Soviet Union. Since I had lived in France for many years, I could read French books and be informed of the events. Then I found that the course of events in our organization was in fact a miniature model of Soviet Union’s communist party particularly during Stalinism reign following the war. Such a mental awareness got me into more problems since I began holding inter-organizational discourses and expressing limited oppositions and finding some other like-minded. [2]

Interestingly, Abrishamchi has the same opinion when justifying the ideological revolution:

It is a reality that in MKO Massoud’s thoughts is problem solving ideologically and determine the ideological boundary. It is not surprising since every ideology has its own ideologue. For all Marxists, there can be found a person’s name next to their ideology; then for Leninists, Maoists and much more. [3]

According to Niyabati and other MKO ex-members, such a leadership as well as the ideological revolution, in contrast to internal discourses that ideological and political leadership is sequel to an evolutionary course, were the outcome of Rajaviâ€™s subsequent strategic failures and were aiming at thwarting probable organizational split. In such a system, leadership is deified. Niyabati considers ideological revolution and the issue of leadership as the upshot of the political and strategic failures of the organization. He believes that the solution to such failures is either retreating from armed warfare or, as he calls it, resorting to ultra-left and revolutionary radicalism:

We had to either submit to the existing conditions and resort to politics or, by embracing all internal, external, and international consequences of resorting to armed warfare and violent overthrow of the regime, lean to the left and yield to radicalism. [4]

According to him, leaning toward the left and radicalism before anything necessitates a fundamental change of mentality on the issue of the leadership. He believes that the status of the leader should be beyond the reach of any criticism and challenge:

In the ancient grasp, Hanif and Massoud are the first founders of the organization, but here Massoud is the connecting point. In the ancient grasp, leader is so accessible that could be easily challenged. But here the ideological leadership is out of reach and to access him, one needs passing through Maryam who is a warrant. [5]

Niyabati resorts to imamate theory in Shiite in order to justify the state of the leadership of Mojahedin:

The core of the ideological revolution was to resolve Massoud’s ideological leadership. The sole solution to the issue which has long been the Achilles’ heel of all the contemporary movements and revolutions lied in the development and the maintenance of the theory of imamate in the organization. [6]

Furthermore, he makes it clear that the leader is held only accountable to God:

For the first time in the history of contemporary revolutions an organization disclaimed its adopted principle of democratic centralism, a several hundred year-long achievement of the organized revolutionary struggle, and (correctly or incorrectly) hands over the leadership to a leader who is accountable only to God. [7]

Mehdi Abrishamchi expounds on the theory of leadership in much simpler words:

The leadership bears no accountability downward. His accountability is determined by the ideological-political principles of the organization. [8]

Unlike Niyabati, Abrishamchi denies Rajavi’s being even accountable to God:

Everybody in the organization is a subordinate except for the leader. Neither is Maryam who is not inferior to Massoud. Both of them are responsible for themselves and not accountable to anybody. They solve problems relying on ideology and their own power of reflection. [9]

All the statements made by MKO ex-members in addition to that of the theoreticians of the ideological revolution and Abrishamchi denote the same fact: denying the council leadership and democratic centralism and the acceptance of the ideological leadership of Rajavi as the symbol of the organizational, ideological and political legitimacy. In a nutshell, Shahsavandi describes the ideological

revolution and the ideological leadership of Rajavi in the following terms:

The ideological revolution aims at proving the fact that it makes no difference who you are, who you were, what you did, how long you spent in the prison, what torments you suffered, and how long you were active in the organization; if you are not connected to Mr. and Mrs. Rajavi and fail to be their believers and absolutely committed to them, whatever you have done is worth nothing. Thus, Massoud can easily demote or promote ranks overnight. [10]

Resources

1. Investigation of the possibility of deviation in democratic centralism (1979), Mojahedin Publication, p. 43.

2. Interview by Saeid Shahsavandi: Radio Voice of Iran.

3. The lecture delivered by Mehdi Abrishamchi on the internal ideological revolution within MKO. Taleqani Publication, 1985.

4. Niyabati, Bijan; A Different Look at Ideological Revolution within MKO, Khavaran Publication, 17.

5. Ibid, 57.

6. Ibid, 90.

7. Ibid, 35.

8. 3. The lecture delivered by Mehdi Abrishamchi on the internal ideological revolution within MKO. Taleqani Publication, 1985.

9. Ibid.

10. Interview by Saeid Shahsavandi: Radio Voice of Iran, session 123.

Bahar Irani – Mojahedin.ws – Sep. 30, 2007

October 1, 2007 0 comment

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