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Iran

Security official denies MKO is stationed in Iraq’s Kurdistan

 A top Interior Ministry official has dismissed reports that Mojahedin Khalq Organization (MKO) members have been stationed in the Iraqi Kurdistan region.

“Iraqi officials do not allow such transfer,” Deputy Interior Minister for Security Affairs Ali Abdollahi stated on Monday.

Elsewhere in his remarks, Abdollahi refuted the news that Abdolmalek Rigi’s spouse has entered Iran.

Rigi, the leader of the terrorist Jundallah group, was arrested in last February and hanged in June.

Pakistanis not waiting to cross border into Iran

He also dismissed the reports that a huge crowd of Pakistanis from the flood-stricken areas are waiting across the border to enter Iran.

MP Abbasali Noura on Saturday warned about the potential arrival of a huge number of Pakistanis into Iran.

However, an entry of flood-hit Pakistani nationals into the country could be a security threat to the country in the future, Abdollahi noted.

He added that the Iran-Pakistan border is under tight control and necessary measures have been taken to prevent illegal crossings.

Although Iran borders insecure countries, it is among the secure countries in the world, the Interior Ministry official noted.

He also cited the smuggling of drugs, weapons, and alcoholic drinks into the country as the major nuisances

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Iraqi Authorities' stance on the MEK

Iraq urged to fire MKO members

An Iraqi security official has urged the government to fire members of the notorious terrorist group Mojahedin Khalq Organization (MKO) from the country.

The MKO is funding armed groups to cause chaos and disorder in central Diyala province, said Ahmed al-Zarkushi, the mayor of Saadiyah district in Diyala, Mehr news agency reported.
The mayor further pointed out that the terrorist group has been using Iraq’s wealth more than the Iraqi people.

The Iraq-based MKO is listed as a terrorist group by much of the international community.
Founded in the 1960s, the MKO has masterminded a slew of terrorist operations in Iran and Iraq, killing thousands of people and wounding many more.

The group is especially notorious in Iran for having sided with former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war.

Following the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, US troops disarmed the MKO terrorists at Iraq’s Camp Ashraf, where they were based, and surrounded it until Iraqi forces took over responsibility for the camp in 2009.

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MEK Camp Ashraf

Discontent spreads in MKO camp in Iraq

Disgruntled members of Iranian terrorist group "Mojahedin Khalq" (MKO) based in Iraq have been staging sporadic riots in their ‘Camp Ashraf’ base complaining of forced stay in the camp.

Discontent members of the terror group, which colluded with Iraq’s late dictator Saddam Hussein in his eight-year aggression against Iran, have been complaining of poor conditions in the camp and their lack of access to outside and family members, ISNA reports Sunday, quoting a website operated by families of Iranian terror victims.

They have recently been subjected to tight control and increased pressure by the camp’s leaders for any signs of revolt or discontent. Camp residents are not even allowed to leave the camp for medical reasons.

In the past three month, several MKO members have reportedly escaped from the camp to join family members of those trapped inside the camp.

The family members have been waiting in the vicinity of the camp hoping to hear from or gain access to their loved ones.

According to the report, there have been increased instances of writing anti-MKO slogans on walls and even distribution of flyers critical of senior MKO leaders within the camp.

Originally established in the 1960’s as a group opposing the rule of the US-backed regime of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, some MKO members changed course after the Islamic Revolution in 1978 and opposed the establishment of an Islamic Republic. After conducting numerous major terror operations and bombings against Iranian officials and civilians loyal to the government, most members of the group escaped the country facing wide-spread public wrath.

Eventually, the group colluded with Iraq’s dictator Saddam Hussein in his war against Iran and was allowed to establish Camp Ashtaf near Iran’s western border to assist Saddam in his war effort and also lead an insurgency against the Islamic rule in Iran.
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Also : 
Riots Break Out at MKO Camp in Iraq

TEHRAN (FNA)- Reports coming out from the main training camp of the anti-Iran terrorist Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization in northern Iraq said that a large number of MKO’s deprecating members started riots and angry protests to end their forced presence in Camp Ashraf.

According to a report by the Habilian Association, an Iran-based human rights group, the MKO leaders have increased their pressures and control over the members of the terrorist group to prevent possible defection and escape by unsatisfied members.

Reports also said that all exit and entry doors have been locked and none of the members, even those suffering from acute disease and illness, is allowed to leave the camp – about 60km (37 miles) north of Baghdad.

MKO ringleaders have ordered the camp guards to stage snap inspections of the group’s members and their personal belongings under the pretext of finding the lost weapons.

Such behaviors have sparked discontent among a number of MKO members and made them escape the camp and return to their anguished families during the last 3 months.

Earlier this year, Iraqi security forces took control of Camp Ashraf and detained dozens of the members of the terrorist group. The Iraqi authority also changed the name of the military center from Camp Ashraf to the Camp of New Iraq.

The MKO, whose main stronghold is in Iraq, is blacklisted by much of the international community, including the United States.

Before an overture by the EU, the MKO was on the European Union’s list of terrorist organizations subject to an EU-wide assets freeze. Yet, the MKO puppet leader, Maryam Rajavi, who has residency in France, regularly visited Brussels and despite the ban enjoyed full freedom in Europe.

Some other ranking members of the MKO who have had a role in the assassination of a large number of Iranian citizens and officials are currently living in France.

The group started assassination of Iranian citizens and officials after the Islamic Revolution in a bid to take control of the newly established Islamic Republic. It killed several of Iran’s new leaders in the early years after the Revolution, including the then President, Mohammad Ali Rajayee, Prime Minister, Mohammad Javad Bahonar and the Judiciary Chief, Mohammad Hossein Beheshti who were killed in bomb attacks by MKO members in 1981.

The group fled to Iraq in 1986, where it was protected by Saddam Hussein and where it helped the Iraqi dictator suppress Shiite and Kurd uprisings in the country.

The terrorist group joined Saddam’s army during the Iraqi imposed war on Iran (1980-1988) and helped Saddam and killed thousands of Iranian civilians and soldiers during the US-backed Iraqi imposed war on Iran.

Many of the MKO members have abandoned the terrorist organization while most of those still remaining in the camp are said to be willing to quit but are under pressure and torture not to do so.

A May 2005 Human Rights Watch report accused the MKO of running prison camps in Iraq and committing human rights violations.

According to the Human Rights Watch report, the outlawed group puts defectors under torture and jail terms.

Numerous articles and letters posted on the Internet by family members of MKO recruits confirm reports of the horrific abuse that the group inflicts on its own members and the alluring recruitment methods it uses.

The most shocking of such stories includes accounts given by former British MKO member Ann Singleton and Mustafa Mohammadi — the father of an Iranian-Canadian girl who was drawn into the group during an MKO recruitment campaign in Canada.

Mohammadi recounts his desperate efforts to contact his daughter, who disappeared several years ago – a result of what the MKO called a ‘two-month tour’ of Camp Ashraf for teenagers.

He also explains how the group forces the families of its recruits to take part in pro-MKO demonstrations in the western countries by threatening to kill their loved ones.

Lacking a foothold in Iran, the terrorist group recruits ill-informed teens from Iranian immigrant communities in western states and blocks their departure afterwards.

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USA

US Intelligence Assessments Warn about MKO’s Terrorist Activities

The recent US intelligence assessments said that the anti-Iran terrorist Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO) still retains the ability to stage terrorist operations.
US Intelligence Assessments Warn about MKO's Terrorist Activities
According to a Saturday report by the Habilian Association, an Iran-based human rights group, the US Department of State made the announcement in newly declassified documents for the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colombia Circuit.

Among the disclosures in the declassified material was an August 2008 US Intelligence Community Terrorist Threat Assessment, which clearly states that "the MKO retains a limited capability to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism".

"The MKO publicly renounced violence in 2001, but limited intelligence reporting indicates that the group has not ended military operations, repudiated violence, or completely or voluntarily disarmed," the US intelligence report said.

"The intelligence community assesses that although there has not been a confirmed terrorist attack by the MKO since the organization surrendered to Coalition Forces in 2003, the MKO retains a limited capability and the intent to use violence to achieve its political goals," the document added, ignoring the several terrorist operations conducted by the MKO in Iran and Iraq since the US invasion of the country in 2003..

"UN inspectors say that much of the information provided to the UN by the MKO about Iran’s nuclear program has a political purpose and has been wrong," the document noted.
The US announced last month that the group will remain in the US list of terrorist groups and organizations.

The announcement came despite intense efforts by Zionist lobbies and a number of the US Congressmen to delist the group.

The US State Department announced in its recent annual report on terrorism that no change has been made in the MKO’s status.

The MKO insists that the US should delist it as a terrorist organization, a demand which has been rejected so far by Washington.
An appeals court in the US had earlier ruled that the State Department should review the terror status of the MKO.

The MKO had filed a petition against the US blacklisting in 2008.

The Bush administration, however, rejected the request in its final days in 2009, after examining the material submitted by the group and the US intelligence community, including classified information.

In July 2010, a three-judge panel of the US Court of Appeals in Washington said in a 22-page decision that the US government failed to give the group a fair chance to rebut unclassified information that claimed the group supported terrorist activities.

The government was obligated under a 1996 antiterrorism law and 2004 revisions to give the group the chance to rebut unclassified information, the appeals court said, adding that the group was "permitted access to the unclassified portion of the record only after the decision was final."

In a statement, the State Department said it would study the decision, but added that the US government continues to view the group as a terrorist organization.
The MKO, whose main stronghold is in Iraq, is blacklisted by much of the international community, including the United States.

Before an overture by the EU, the MKO was on the European Union’s list of terrorist organizations subject to an EU-wide assets freeze. Yet, the MKO puppet leader, Maryam Rajavi, who has residency in France, regularly visited Brussels and despite the ban enjoyed full freedom in Europe.

Some other members of the MKO who have had a role in the assassination of a large number of Iranian citizens and officials are currently living in France.

The group started assassination of Iranian citizens and officials after the Islamic Revolution in a bid to take control of the newly established Islamic Republic. It killed several of Iran’s new leaders in the early years after the Revolution, including the then President, Mohammad Ali Rajayee, Prime Minister, Mohammad Javad Bahonar and the Judiciary Chief, Mohammad Hossein Beheshti who were killed in bomb attacks by MKO members in 1981.

The group fled to Iraq in 1986, where it was protected by Saddam Hussein and where it helped the Iraqi dictator suppress Shiite and Kurd uprisings in the country.
The terrorist group joined Saddam’s army during the Iraqi imposed war on Iran (1980-1988) and helped Saddam and killed thousands of Iranian civilians and soldiers during the US-backed Iraqi imposed war on Iran.

Earlier this year, Iraqi security forces took control of the training base of the MKO at Camp Ashraf – about 60km (37 miles) north of Baghdad – and detained dozens of the members of the terrorist group.

The Iraqi authority also changed the name of the military center from Camp Ashraf to the Camp of New Iraq.

Many of the MKO members have abandoned the terrorist organization while most of those still remaining in the camp are said to be willing to quit but are under pressure and torture not to do so.

A May 2005 Human Rights Watch report accused the MKO of running prison camps in Iraq and committing human rights violations.

According to the Human Rights Watch report, the outlawed group puts defectors under torture and jail terms.

Numerous articles and letters posted on the Internet by family members of MKO recruits confirm reports of the horrific abuse that the group inflicts on its own members and the alluring recruitment methods it uses.

The most shocking of such stories includes accounts given by former British MKO member Ann Singleton and Mustafa Mohammadi — the father of an Iranian-Canadian girl who was drawn into the group during an MKO recruitment campaign in Canada.

Mohammadi recounts his desperate efforts to contact his daughter, who disappeared several years ago – a result of what the MKO called a ‘two-month tour’ of Camp Ashraf for teenagers.

He also explains how the group forces the families of its recruits to take part in pro-MKO demonstrations in the western countries by threatening to kill their loved ones.

Lacking a foothold in Iran, the terrorist group recruits ill-informed teens from Iranian immigrant communities in western states and blocks their departure afterwards.

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USA

MKO Remains in US Blacklist

The anti-Iran terrorist group, the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO), remained in the US list of terrorist groups and organizations despite intense efforts by Zionist lobbies and a number of the Congressmen to delist the group.

The US State Department announced in its recent annual report on terrorism that no change has been made in the MKO’s status.

The MKO insists that the US should delist it as a terrorist organization, a demand which has been rejected so far by Washington.

An appeals court in the US had earlier ruled that the State Department should review the terror status of the MKO.

The MKO had filed a petition against the US blacklisting in 2008.

The Bush administration, however, rejected the request in its final days in 2009, after examining the material submitted by the group and the US intelligence community, including classified information.

In July 2010, a three-judge panel of the US Court of Appeals in Washington said in a 22-page decision that the US government failed to give the group a fair chance to rebut unclassified information that claimed the group supported terrorist activities.

The government was obligated under a 1996 antiterrorism law and 2004 revisions to give the group the chance to rebut unclassified information, the appeals court said, adding that the group was "permitted access to the unclassified portion of the record only after the decision was final."
In a statement, the State Department said it would study the decision, but added that the US government continues to view the group as a terrorist organization.

The MKO, whose main stronghold is in Iraq, is blacklisted by much of the international community, including the United States.

Before an overture by the EU, the MKO was on the European Union’s list of terrorist organizations subject to an EU-wide assets freeze. Yet, the MKO puppet leader, Maryam Rajavi, who has residency in France, regularly visited Brussels and despite the ban enjoyed full freedom in Europe.

Some other members of the MKO who have had a role in the assassination of a large number of Iranian citizens and officials are currently living in France.

The group started assassination of Iranian citizens and officials after the Islamic Revolution in a bid to take control of the newly established Islamic Republic. It killed several of Iran’s new leaders in the early years after the revolution, including the then President, Mohammad Ali Rajayee, Prime Minister, Mohammad Javad Bahonar and the Judiciary Chief, Mohammad Hossein Beheshti who were killed in bomb attacks by MKO members in 1981.

The group fled to Iraq in 1986, where it was protected by Saddam Hussein and where it helped the Iraqi dictator suppress Shiite and Kurd uprisings in the country.

The terrorist group joined Saddam’s army during the Iraqi imposed war on Iran (1980-1988) and helped Saddam and killed thousands of Iranian civilians and soldiers during the US-backed Iraqi imposed war on Iran.

Earlier this year, Iraqi security forces took control of the training base of the MKO at Camp Ashraf – about 60km (37 miles) north of Baghdad – and detained dozens of the members of the terrorist group.

The Iraqi authority also changed the name of the military center from Camp Ashraf to the Camp of New Iraq.

Many of the MKO members have abandoned the terrorist organization while most of those still remaining in the camp are said to be willing to quit but are under pressure and torture not to do so.

A May 2005 Human Rights Watch report accused the MKO of running prison camps in Iraq and committing human rights violations.

According to the Human Rights Watch report, the outlawed group puts defectors under torture and jail terms.

Numerous articles and letters posted on the Internet by family members of MKO recruits confirm reports of the horrific abuse that the group inflicts on its own members and the alluring recruitment methods it uses.

The most shocking of such stories includes accounts given by former British MKO member Ann Singleton and Mustafa Mohammadi — the father of an Iranian-Canadian girl who was drawn into the group during an MKO recruitment campaign in Canada.

Mohammadi recounts his desperate efforts to contact his daughter, who disappeared several years ago – a result of what the MKO called a ‘two-month tour’ of Camp Ashraf for teenagers.
He also explains how the group forces the families of its recruits to take part in pro-MKO demonstrations in the western countries by threatening to kill their loved ones.
Lacking a foothold in Iran, the terrorist group recruits ill-informed teens from Iranian immigrant communities in western states and blocks their departure afterwards.

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USA

The MEK remained in US terror list

The MEK remained in US terror listDespite all the vast propaganda campaign and pulling any lobbying string, while leaving no stone unturned, for taking the name of MEK out of the US State Department terror list, once again this terrorist group was designated as a foreign terrorist organization.

In a new report by the US Department of State office of the coordination for counterterrorism which was released on August 5, 2010, Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization was referred to as a terrorist organization.

MUJAHADIN-E KHALQ ORGANIZATION
aka MEK; MKO; Mujahadin-e Khalq (Iranian government name for group); Muslim Iranian Students’ Society; National Council of Resistance; NCR; Organization of the People’s Holy Warriors of Iran; the National Liberation Army of Iran; NLA; People’s Mujahadin Organization of Iran; PMOI; National Council of Resistance of Iran; NCRI; Sazeman-e Mujahadin-e Khalq-e Iran
Description:

The MEK was originally designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on October 8, 1997. The MEK is a Marxist-Islamic Organization that seeks the overthrow of the Iranian regime through its military wing, the National Liberation Army (NLA), and its political front, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI).

The MEK was founded in 1963 by a group of college-educated Iranian Marxists who opposed the country’s pro-western ruler, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. The group participated in the 1979 Islamic Revolution that replaced the Shah with a Shiite Islamist regime led by Ayatollah Khomeini. However, the MEK’s ideology – a blend of Marxism, feminism, and Islamism – was at odds with the post-revolutionary government and its original leadership was soon executed by the Khomeini regime. In 1981, the group was driven from its bases on the Iran-Iraq border and resettled in Paris, where it began supporting Iraq in its eight year war against Khomeini’s Iran. In 1986, after France recognized the Iranian regime, the MEK moved its headquarters to Iraq, which facilitated its terrorist activities in Iran. Since 2003, roughly 3,400 MEK members have been encamped at Camp Ashraf in Iraq.

Activities:
The group’s worldwide campaign against the Iranian government uses propaganda and terrorism to achieve its objectives. During the 1970s, the MEK staged terrorist attacks inside Iran and killed several U.S. military personnel and civilians working on defense projects in Tehran. In 1972, the MEK set off bombs in Tehran at the U.S. Information Service office, a U.S. diplomatic facility staffed by internationally protected persons, the Iran-American Society, and the offices of several U.S. companies to protest the visit of President Nixon to Iran. In 1973, the MEK assassinated the deputy chief of the U.S. Military Mission in Tehran and bombed several businesses, including Shell Oil. In 1974, the MEK set off bombs in Tehran at the offices of U.S. companies to protest the visit of then U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger. In 1975, the MEK assassinated two U.S. military officers who were members of the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group in Tehran. In 1976, the MEK assassinated two U.S. citizens who were employees of Rockwell International in Tehran. In 1979, the group claimed responsibility for the murder of an American Texaco executive.

In 1981, MEK leadership attempted to overthrow the newly installed Islamic regime; Iranian security forces subsequently initiated a crackdown on the group. The MEK instigated a bombing campaign, including an attack against the head office of the Islamic Republic Party and the Prime Minister’s office, which killed some 70 high-ranking Iranian officials, including Chief Justice Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti, President Mohammad-Ali Rajaei, and Prime Minister Mohammad-Javad Bahonar. These attacks resulted in a popular uprising against the MEK and an expanded Iranian government crackdown that forced MEK leaders to flee to France. For five years, the MEK continued to wage its terrorist campaign from its Paris headquarters. Expelled by France in 1986, MEK leaders turned to Saddam Hussein’s regime for basing, financial support, and training. Near the end of the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, Baghdad armed the MEK with heavy military equipment and deployed thousands of MEK fighters in suicidal, mass wave attacks against Iranian forces.

The MEK’s relationship with the former Iraqi regime continued through the 1990s. In 1991, the group reportedly assisted the Iraqi Republican Guard’s bloody crackdown on Iraqi Shia and Kurds who rose up against Saddam Hussein’s regime. In April 1992, the MEK conducted near-simultaneous attacks on Iranian embassies and installations in 13 countries, demonstrating the group’s ability to mount large-scale operations overseas. In June 1998, the MEK was implicated in a series of bombing and mortar attacks in Iran that killed at least 15 and injured several others. In April 1999, the MEK targeted key Iranian military officers and assassinated the deputy chief of the Iranian Armed Forces General Staff, Brigadier General Ali Sayyaad Shirazi.
In April 2000, the MEK attempted to assassinate the commander of the Nasr Headquarters, Tehran’s interagency board responsible for coordinating policies on Iraq. The pace of anti-Iranian operations increased during “Operation Great Bahman” in February 2000, when the group launched a dozen attacks against Iran. One attack included a mortar attack against a major Iranian leadership complex in Tehran that housed the offices of the Supreme Leader and the President. In 2000 and 2001, the MEK was involved in regular mortar attacks and hit-and-run raids against Iranian military and law enforcement personnel, as well as government buildings near the Iran-Iraq border. Also in 2001, the FBI arrested seven Iranians in the United States who funneled US$ 400,000 to an MEK-affiliated organization in the UAE, which used the funds to purchase weapons. Following an initial Coalition bombardment of the MEK’s facilities in Iraq at the outset of Operation Iraqi Freedom, MEK leadership negotiated a cease-fire with Coalition Forces and surrendered their heavy-arms to Coalition control. Since 2003, roughly 3,400 MEK members have been encamped at Ashraf in Iraq.

In 2003, French authorities arrested 160 MEK members at operational bases they believed the MEK was using to coordinate financing and planning for terrorist attacks. Upon the arrest of MEK leader Maryam Rajavi, MEK members took to Paris’ streets and engaged in self-immolation. French authorities eventually released Rajavi. Although currently in hiding, Rajavi has made “motivational” appearances via video-satellite to MEK-sponsored conferences across the globe.
According to evidence which became available after the fall of Saddam Hussein, the MEK received millions of dollars in Oil-for-Food program subsidies from Saddam Hussein from 1999 through 2003. In addition to discovering 13 lists of recipients of such vouchers on which the MEK appeared, evidence linking the MEK to the former Iraqi regime includes lists, as well as video footage of both Saddam Hussein handing over suitcases of money to known MEK leaders, and of MEK operatives receiving training from the Iraqi military.

Strength:
Estimates place MEK’s worldwide membership at between 5,000 and 10,000 members, with large pockets in Paris and other major European capitals. In Iraq, roughly 3,400 MEK members are gathered at Camp Ashraf, the MEK’s main compound north of Baghdad. As a condition of the 2003 cease-fire agreement, the MEK relinquished more than 2,000 tanks, armored personnel carriers, and heavy artillery. Between 2003 and 2006, a significant number of MEK personnel voluntarily left Ashraf, and an additional several hundred individuals renounced ties to the MEK and been voluntarily repatriated to Iran.

Location/Area of Operation:
The MEK’s global support structure remains in place, with associates and supporters scattered throughout Europe and North America. Operations target Iranian government elements across the globe, including in Europe and Iran. The MEK’s political arm, the National Council of Resistance of Iran, has a global support network with active lobbying and propaganda efforts in major Western capitals. NCRI also has a well-developed media communications strategy.

External Aid:
Before Operation Iraqi Freedom began in 2003, the MEK received all of its military assistance and most of its financial support from Saddam Hussein. The fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime has led the MEK increasingly to rely on front organizations to solicit contributions from expatriate Iranian communities.
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2009/140900.htm

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Mujahedin Khalq Organization

Why is the PMOI so isolated as a political opposition?

This is a vital and serious question whose answer will solve the ambiguities which still exist among some of the Iranians who are living in foreign countries and have been deceived by the lies which the PMOI’s leaders have told them about the organization, as well as the few foreign politicians who are acting as the PMOI’s backers.

I believe the best source which can answer this question is the separated members who have spent more than twenty years in that so-called organization and who can evaluate the organization (PMOI) easily as experts. These separated members are an excellent source of information about everything which goes on inside the PMOI and I had better say these separated people are like a blueprint so that everyone by referring to them can find their answers.
These separated people are the best assets available to disclose the hidden aspects of the PMOI which have deliberately been hidden from outsiders by the PMOI’s leaders. For that reason the PMOI’s operatives and leaders are very much afraid of these people because of their expert knowledge of the PMOI’s real entity and content, so they label them as Iran’s mercenaries and agents, etc.

Now with this prelude, I will share my point of view with you about this subject.

I believe the PMOI cannot describe itself as an opposition group. My reasoning is as follows:

1. The PMOI has a criminal record which began in the 70’s by killing American citizens and destroying foreign offices and properties in Iran: some of their terrorist missions are as follows:

#May 1972- U.S. air Force Brigadier General HAROLD PRICE, chief of the Air Force Section of U.S. Military Advisory Group in Iran.
#June 1973- U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Lewis Hawkins, U.S. military mission.
#May 1975- Colonel Paul Schaeffer and Lieutenant Colonel Jack Turner, U.S. Air Force officers in the mission.
#August 1976- 3 civilian employees of Rockwell International, Donald J Smith, Robert R Grangrad, William C Catrel advising the Iranian military.
Bombing and Kidnapping
#In December of 1970 carried out an abortive attempt to kidnap U.S. Ambassador Douglas MacArthur.
#President Richard M. Nixon’s trip was marred by a series of bombings, including one explosion at the Tomb of the Shah’s father shortly before the President and his hosts were scheduled to arrive.
#The offices of El Al Airlines, Shell Petroleum, British Petroleum, British Overseas Airways, a Jewish Emigration office in Tehran, and numerous other U.S. facilities and properties were bombed and victimized.
#In July 1975, two bombs were exploded in two places, first one in USA and Iran Committee building and the second one in the English Consul in the city of Mashad .
#On 4th July 1975, PMOI’s terrorists stopped the motorcade of the American Ambassador in Tehran and opened fired at his car.
#In 1979, they supported the American Embassy occupation in Tehran and their operatives who were student leaders participated in occupying the Embassy.

2. Their full cooperation with Iraq’s notorious dictator Saddam Hussein and his army and intelligence service for two decades. They participated in the suppression and oppression of Kurds and Shiites in 1990 -1991 to show their loyalty to Iraq’s dictator, Saddam Hussein.

3. Illegitimacy among Iranian people because of their military and intelligence cooperation and collaboration with Saddam Hussein’s army and intelligence service. It is helpful to know that the PMOI were utilized as informants by Saddam Hussein’s government for providing top secret military and civilian target information to Saddam Hussein’s army to use for bombardment or missile attacks during the eight years war between Iran and Iraq and in return they were receiving money and military equipment, garrisons, armoured vehicles, free passes with permission to carry guns throughout Iraq, etc. The PMOI was utterly dependent on and attached to Saddam Hussein’s government, financially and militarily. (The video tapes revealing exchanges of money and top secret information between the Iraqi side and the PMOI’s agents are available as documents.)

4. Utilizing violence and armed struggle to forward its strategy which is rejected and cursed among the Iranian people as a method. They killed and assassinated many Iranian officials as well as innocent people and bombed many places and exploded many oil pipes between 1981 and 2003.

How can a criminal organization like the PMOI, with a bloody record and hands smeared with blood, claim to be a legitimate opposition group? They are criminals and they should be tried in courts of law for their bloody past. They do not have any popularity among Iranian people at all and Iranian people in their recent protests throughout Iran, especially after Iran’s presidential election, showed that not only do they not support the PMOI as an opposition group, but rather they blame the PMOI for provoking the Iranian government to use violence against their peaceful protests and demonstrations. How can Iranian people accept a violent religious cult (PMOI) which did not have mercy even upon its own members and their families, as an opposition group? The Iranian people deserve to have freedom and real democracy and they are struggling to gain them in the best way possible, so how can the Iranian people, who are intelligent, politically savvy, smart and experienced, relinquish and renounce freedom and democracy which they are struggling to achieve, and cave in to a violent and treacherous cult which through its cultic ideology and destructive politics would bring more captivity, misery and catastrophe for them?

The PMOI is a dangerous criminal cult and the only thing that they are thinking of is gaining power by all and any means and nothing else.

The Iranian people have chosen their way – peaceful protest – of retrieving their freedom and democracy.

In conclusion, the PMOI does not have the slightest chance in Iran’s future politics, so the PMOI leaders and operatives should wake up and stop dreaming and see the reality on the ground. Still, the question which comes to every right thinking person’s mind is “how can a bunch of criminals whose hands are smeared with the blood of Iraqi and Iranian people have such a claim?

Clearly we need to look beyond the Iranian people to answer this particular question.
Respectfully,

Hassan Piransar, Paris, a critic of Rajavi’s Cult

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MEK Camp Ashraf

Iraq and the American Pullout: Separate We Must

The withdrawal of United States combat troops on August 31 falls during Ramadan, the Muslim month of fasting and prayer; a timetable better suited to the American political cycle than to MEK also participated in the 1979 take-over of the US Embassy in Tehran and so its members, as designated terrorists, are not eligible for resettlement in the USconditions in Iraq. Ramadan usually sees a spike in violence as religious fervour combines with heat and hunger. But delaying the withdrawal another year would mean the Iraq war surpassing the Vietnam war in length. The timing could have been better for Iraq, but withdrawal is overdue for the US. Having never been justified in the first place – legally, strategically, or defensively – it is time to endmilitary engagement in Iraq.

The United States has dug its military into the landscape, requiring enormous sums of taxpayer dollars to maintain its presence. It justifies its Iraq addiction by claiming only its soldiers can prevent Iraqis from killing each other and the Iraqi government from falling apart. For their part, many Iraqi politicians rely extensively on the US military, even as they call for the end of the occupation to score political points against rivals. It is an unhealthy, co-dependent relationship and the withdrawal will be a withdrawal in all senses of the word, possibly incurring further damage in the process if not undertaken responsibly.

IN CHAOS
Iraq’s political landscape is in bad shape and likely to get worse, but there is nothing the US military can or should do to prevent this. Some argue that the combat presence should be extended, raising visions of renewed sectarian bloodshed, Arab-Kurd violence, and the lack of Iraqi security force competence as justification for renegotiating Washington’s security agreement with Baghdad.

There are very real risks of violence and destabilisation, but committing US troops ad infinitum would have almost no impact on the underlying causes, and escalating violence should not justify another Iraq fix. On the contrary, a continued US military presence would deter Iraqis from taking-on the issues themselves, the only long-term solution to Iraq’s problems, particularly in regards to security which is a domestic rather than international issue.

Once American combat troops leave, Shi’a followers ofMoqtada al-Sadr will be deprived of their favourite devil and will lose relevance unless they can turn their energies to solving the country’s electricity crisis and improving relations with its Arab neighbours.

With fewer US bases, Al Qaeda in Iraq will have a reduced number of targets and its presence there is likely to diminish. After all, it has very few natural allies even among the Sunni Arab population.

Iyad Allawi’s Iraqiyya party won a tiny advantage in the March 7 vote, but Allawi has squandered whatever mandate he had by failing to form a coalition with any of the other major political parties. His frequent travels to Sunni Gulf countries further alienate him from the Shi’a population.
The National Alliance, intended to unite the rule of Law party with the Iraqi National Alliance in an undefeatable bloc, has likewise frittered away its mandate by botching the basic issue of who will lead the coalition.

Nuri al-Maliki, supposedly a strong leader, clutches onto the premiership even as the country crumbles around him because of a lack of leadership. Death threats against party leaders abound, and at least three elected officials have already been assassinated.

If a new government has formed by August 31, it may exclude at least one of the main demographic groups: Kurds, Sunni, or Shi’a. As in 2005, there is no appetite for a national unity government that would put all parties into the same tent and force them to compromise on de-Baathification and Kirkuk, issues that Iraqis are willing to kill and die for, rather than make concessions on.

If a national unity government is rammed into existence, the reluctant players will spend their four years in office squabbling rather than tackling the tough issues. The alternative of leaving-out one or more parties, may result in increased violence, but it may also lead to the development of a healthy opposition, able to credibly challenge the government when it acts illegitimately.

WITHDRAW SLOWLY…
The US will not be going cold turkey in its withdrawal. With its remaining fifty thousand support troops and 1,300 civilians and diplomats, it would do well to focus on getting the country electrified and supporting constitutional reform, things Iraqis themselves see as major stumbling blocks for economic and political development.
Nothing would stabilise Iraq more than reliable electricity, which would allow business growth and employment of those who might otherwise join militias to support their families. Electricity would attract investment and make it possible for the oil and gas sectors to expand, increase refrigeration of vaccines and fresh food, benefit schools, and even have allowed more people to watch World Cup games; it is no coincidence that major protests prompting the Electricity Minister to resign occurred in June during the football tournament.

The delay in government formation both in 2005 and this year underscores the vital need to reform the constitution as well as the rest of the legal structure. The constitution’s ambiguous, vague wording, written in haste and barely ratified in 2005, resulted in both Iraqiyya and the National Coalition claiming in March to have won the right to form the next government. Without the laws, courts, and constitution for political and legal solutions, Iraqis will rationally choose violence as the most effective means to solve problems.

…AND WITHDRAW RESPONSIBLY
The US should, however, withdraw responsibly. Our departure will have consequences for many Iraqis. To ignore our responsibilities would, in the words of US Congressman Brad Sherman, ‘Allow a human rights catastrophe to occur in Iraq just because we are in the process of leaving.’ Representative Sherman was referring to the Mujahadeen-e-Khalq (MEK), about three thousand radical Iranians held in Camp Ashraf in Iraq who oppose the Iranian government. Baghdad has no sympathy for the MEK because it assisted Saddam Hussein in suppressing Iraqi Shi’a and Kurds. The US withdrawal could result in a piranha-like feeding frenzy as both Iraq and Iran exact revenge.

MEK also participated in the 1979 take-over of the US Embassy in Tehran and so its members, as designated terrorists, are not eligible for resettlement in the US. Camp Ashraf, however, postpones the inevitable and risks becoming another Guantanamo Bay. MEK members who took part in acts of terror should face justice, possibly through an ad hoc United Nations tribunal that would ensure a fair trial. Those exonerated should then qualify for resettlement.

Even more desperate than the MEK are the estimated one hundred thousand Sahwa members, Sunni insurgents who initially fought against Americans in 2003-4 but then cooperated with them against Al Qaeda from 2005-8. Al Qaeda targets Sahwa members for betraying them, Shi’a militias despise them for working with the Americans, and the Shi’a government is reluctant to include the former insurgents in either the police or security forces.

Like MEK, Sahwa insurgents do not qualify for resettlement in the US. However, without Sahwa’s assistance, US forces would almost certainly have been defeated. Having signed a deal with Sawha we should uphold our end of the bargain by protecting remaining members from being picked off by Al Qaeda or Shi’a militias. We should help Sahwa families join the US refugee programme; restrictions on resettlement should not apply to innocent spouses and children. The credibility of America as a strategic partner in the Gulf depends in large part on how we treat our Arab allies, including Sahwa members.

As the military withdraws, thousands of Iraqis will lose their jobs as translators and assistants. Along with income loss they will face death threats for having worked with Americans and will no longer have the protection of nearby forces. Those who want to be resettled in the US should have quick and efficient access to the Refugee Assistance Program. For those who do not wish to leave Iraq, generous severance packages should benegotiated, taking into account their increased need for security as US troops depart.

On August 31, there may not yet be a new government to escort the US out, let alone take responsibility for the country’s security. People will undoubtedly still suffer from severe electricity shortages, with no air conditioning or refrigeration for most at the hottest time of the year. Clean water will be scarce and crops will be dying. There will be long, angry lines at fuel stations, rubbish mounting in the streets, and occasional explosions with accompanying screams and sirens. Basically, most people’s idea of hell. But separate we must.

Rachel Schneller, Foreign Service Officer, US State Department, currently International Affairs Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations. The views in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the US Government or State Department.

Rachel Schneller, Chatham House,The World Today, Volume 66, Number 8/9

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Iraqi Authorities' stance on the MEK

Iraqi Kurdistan Deplores US Plans for Moving MKO terrorists to Kurdistan

The government of the Iraqi Kurdistan region on Wednesday announced its strong opposition to the US plans for moving the members of the anti-Iran terrorist Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO) to the mountainous areas on the Iraq-Iran-Turkey borders. The government of the (Iraqi) Kurdistan region and the central government in Baghdad will in no way agree with such a measure," Spokesman of Pishmarga Ministry of the Iraqi Kurdistan

"The government of the (Iraqi) Kurdistan region and the central government in Baghdad will in no way agree with such a measure," Spokesman of Pishmarga Ministry of the Iraqi Kurdistan region Jabbar Yavar told FNA.

Yavar also dismissed media reports that the regional government has been informed of the plan by the US officials, and stressed that nothing has been said to the officials of the Iraqi Kurdistan region in this regard.

The US forces are not entitled to the right to move the MKO members and such a decision should only be taken by the Iraqi government, he underlined.

Iraqi security forces have recently taken control of the training base of the MKO at Camp Ashraf – about 60km (37 miles) north of Baghdad – and detained dozens of the members of the terrorist group.

The Iraqi authority has also changed the name of the military center from Camp Ashraf to the Camp of New Iraq.

An official of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), who asked to remain anonymous, told FNA on Tuesday that the White House had in a message called on his group to harbor the members of the MKO in the Qandil Mountains at the Iranian borders.

The source also revealed that Washington has vowed to stop Turkish Army attacks against the PKK in return for the Kurdish group’s cooperation with the White House in this regard.

He underlined that the PKK is still mulling over the deal, but declined to reveal any further detail.
The source also reserved judgment over the PKK’s possible response to the White House demand.

The PKK is listed as a terrorist organization internationally by a number of states and organizations, including the United States, the United Nations, NATO and the European Union.
The organization has been listed as one of the 12 active terrorist organizations in Turkey as of 2007 and Turkey labeled the organization as an ethnic secessionist organization that uses terrorism and the threat of force against both civilian and military targets for the purpose of achieving its political goal.

Also, the MKO, whose main stronghold is in Iraq, is blacklisted by much of the international community, including the United States.

Before an overture by the EU, the MKO was on the European Union’s list of terrorist organizations subject to an EU-wide assets freeze. Yet, the MKO puppet leader, Maryam Rajavi, who has residency in France, regularly visited Brussels and, despite the ban, enjoyed full freedom in Europe.

Some other members of the MKO who have had a role in the assassination of a large number of Iranian citizens and officials are currently living in France.

The group started assassination of Iranian citizens and officials after the Islamic Revolution in a bid to take control of the newly established Islamic Republic. It killed several of Iran’s new leaders in the early years after the revolution, including the then President, Mohammad Ali Rajayee, Prime Minister, Mohammad Javad Bahonar and the Judiciary Chief, Mohammad Hossein Beheshti who were killed in bomb attacks by MKO members in 1981.

The group fled to Iraq in 1986, where it was protected by Saddam Hussein and where it helped the Iraqi dictator suppress Shiite and Kurd uprisings in the country.

The terrorist group joined Saddam’s army during the US-backed Iraqi imposed war on Iran (1980-1988) and helped Saddam and killed thousands of Iranian civilians and soldiers during the war.

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USA

The DOS responses to previous demands of MKO designation review

The judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia urging the State Department to review its decision to label MKO as a terrorist is the last ofthe State Department has never changed its views about the inclusion of the notorious MKO terrorists a quintuple series concerning MKO’s designations by the Secretary of State. The following text is the last response by the Department of State denying MKO petition for review of the order in question. The three previous responses are also linked in this last one. The response well indicates that the State Department has never changed its views about the inclusion of the notorious MKO terrorists and has ever insisted that the group’s designation complied with the governing statute and all constitutional requirements. We have to wait to see how sincere and determined America is in its war against terrorism when it designates a group as a FTO on sound evidences.

National Council of Resistance of Iran, Petitioner, v. Department of State and Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State, Respondents

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit. – 373 F.3d 152

Argued April 2, 2004 Decided July 9, 2004

On Petition for Review of Orders of the Department of State.

Paul F. Enzinna argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner. Martin D. Minsker entered an appearance.

Douglas Letter, Litigation Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General.

Before: HENDERSON, GARLAND, and ROBERTS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROBERTS.

ROBERTS, Circuit Judge:

1 This is the fourth in a series of related cases concerning the biennial designations by the Secretary of State of the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK)1 and its aliases as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO). See People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 182 F.3d 17 (D.C.Cir.1999) (PMOI I); National Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192 (D.C.Cir.2001) (NCRI); People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 327 F.3d 1238 (D.C.Cir.2003) (PMOI II); see generally 8 U.S.C. § 1189. In 1999, and again in 2001, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) was determined by the Secretary of State to be an alias of MEK and was accordingly also designated an FTO. See 1999 Designation, 64 Fed.Reg. at 55,112; 2001 Redesignation, 66 Fed.Reg. at 51,089. In May 2003, after a remand to cure certain due process deficiencies, see NCRI, 251 F.3d at 208-09, the Secretary decided to leave in place the 1999 and 2001 designations of NCRI as an FTO. NCRI now again petitions for review. After reviewing NCRI’s arguments, the entirety of the administrative record, and certain classified materials appended to that record, we conclude that the Secretary’s latest designation complied with the governing statute and all constitutional requirements. We therefore deny the petition for review.

2 The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) empowers the Secretary of State to designate an entity as an FTO whenever the Secretary determines that (1) the entity is foreign; (2) it engages in terrorist activity; and (3) the terrorist activity threatens the security of the United States or its nationals. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1). A designation as an FTO persists for two years, after which the Secretary may redesignate the entity as an FTO for a succeeding two-year period upon finding that the statutory circumstances still exist. Id. § 1189(a)(4)(B).

3 An FTO designation visits serious consequences on the affected organization: The Secretary of the Treasury may require financial institutions to freeze any assets of the FTO, id. § 1189(a)(2)(C); the members and representatives of the FTO become ineligible to enter the United States, id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(IV), (V); and anyone who knowingly provides "material support or resources" to the FTO — including any donation of money — may be prosecuted and imprisoned for up to fifteen years, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1). The manifest purpose of these provisions is to deny terrorist organizations support — financial or otherwise — in and from the United States. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-383, at 43-45 (1995) (House Report on AEDPA’s primary predecessor bill).

4 Despite these serious consequences of designation, the governing statute affords suspect entities only "truncated" participation in the administrative process leading to the designation and "quite limited" judicial review after the fact. NCRI, 251 F.3d at 196. As we noted in PMOI I, "unlike the run-of-the-mill administrative proceeding," "there is [under AEDPA] no adversary hearing, no presentation of what courts and agencies think of as evidence, [and] no advance notice to the entity affected by the Secretary’s internal deliberations." 182 F.3d at 19. Once the Secretary has designated an entity an FTO, the statute directs us to "hold unlawful and set aside a designation" only if we find it to be:

5 (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law;

6 (B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;

7 (C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitation, or short of statutory right;

8 (D) lacking substantial support in the administrative record taken as a whole or in classified information submitted to the court [ex parte and in camera], or

9 (E) not in accord with the procedures required by law.

10 8 U.S.C. § 1189(b)(3). Although the statute permits this court to base its review either "solely upon the administrative record" "taken as a whole," or as supplemented by any classified information submitted by the Secretary, the Act makes no provision for the disclosure of that classified material to the designated entity. See id. § 1189(b)(2), (3)(D); see generally 28 C.F.R. pt. 17 (governing access to classified national security information).

11 In 1997, and every two years since, the Secretary has designated MEK an FTO. See 1997 Designation, 62 Fed.Reg. at 52,650; 1999 Designation, 64 Fed.Reg. at 55,112; 2001 Redesignation, 66 Fed.Reg. at 51,089; 2003 Redesignation, 68 Fed.Reg. at 56,861. Starting in 1999, the Secretary added NCRI to the list of designated FTOs, having concluded that NCRI was an alias of MEK. See 1999 Designation, 64 Fed.Reg. at 55,112 ("I hereby designate … the following organization as a foreign terrorist organization: … Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization … also known as National Council of Resistance, also known as NCR."). NCRI now, for the second time, seeks review of that designation. In NCRI’s previous challenge — brought jointly with MEK — we concluded that both the 1999 designation of MEK as an FTO and the designation of NCRI as an alias of MEK satisfied the requirements of the statute. Specifically concerning NCRI, we held — based on the record then presented to us by the Secretary — that the Secretary’s conclusion that NCRI was an alias of MEK "does not lack substantial support and … is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor otherwise not in accordance with law." NCRI, 251 F.3d at 199.

12 As a constitutional matter, however, we determined that the procedures afforded by the statute and employed by the Secretary in arriving at those designations violated both organizations’ due process rights. See id. at 208-09. We did not vacate the Secretary’s designation as to either MEK or NCRI, but remanded to the Secretary with instructions that each entity be afforded the opportunity to: (1) respond to any part of the Secretary’s administrative record that is not classified material; (2) file evidence on its own behalf; and (3) be meaningfully heard by the Secretary. Id. at 210.

13 Both MEK and NCRI availed themselves of these opportunities. NCRI submitted voluminous materials that purported to demonstrate that it was sufficiently independent of MEK that it could not be considered an alias of that organization. On September 24, 2001, the State Department informed MEK and NCRI that the Secretary had decided to leave the 1999 designation of MEK in place but that "no such determination regarding the NCRI as an alias of the MEK is possible at this time." Letter of Ambassador Francis X. Taylor, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Dep’t of State, at 2 (Sept. 24, 2001). This was shortly followed, on October 5, 2001, by the Secretary’s redesignation of both MEK as an FTO and NCRI as an alias of MEK. See 2001 Redesignation, 66 Fed.Reg. at 51,089. At that time, the State Department assured NCRI that although "the present situation… requires continued designation of [NCRI] as an alias of MEK for now," upon the completion of review of NCRI’s submissions, "the Secretary will make a de novo determination in light of the entire record, including the material you have submitted." Letter of Ambassador Francis X. Taylor, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Dep’t of State, at 1 (Oct. 5, 2001).

14 Nearly a year later, the State Department provided for NCRI’s review additional materials obtained by the FBI in the course of "its long-running investigation of the MEK and NCRI." Letter of Ambassador Francis X. Taylor, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Dep’t of State, at 1 (Sept. 4, 2002). Within two months, NCRI submitted its response. See Letter of Paul F. Enzinna, Esq. (Nov. 1, 2002). In May 2003, the State Department completed its review process and, on May 24, the Secretary decided to leave in place the 1999 and 2001 "designations of the National Council of Resistance (NCR) and the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) as foreign terrorist organization aliases of the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK)." Action Mem. from William Pope & William H. Taft, IV to the Secretary of State, at 3 (May 22, 2003) (Action Mem.). NCRI now petitions for review of this latest decision.

15 NCRI’s primary argument is that the Secretary’s conclusion that NCRI is an alias of MEK lacks substantial support in the administrative record. NCRI insists that it is an umbrella organization of Iranian dissident persons and groups of which MEK is only a single member, no more powerful than any other. In addressing this contention, we begin with our earlier holding in this action. In NCRI, we concluded — based on the record then presented to us — that the Secretary’s designation of NCRI as an alias of MEK "does not lack substantial support and … is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor otherwise not in accordance with law." 251 F.3d at 199. Although that decision is obviously not determinative of the question before us today — we are now reviewing a record that has since been supplemented both by the Government and NCRI — its holding must nevertheless inform our decision here. Logically, NCRI’s challenge can succeed only if the new record materials establish its independence from MEK so that we can no longer affirm that "the Secretary, on the face of things, had enough information before [him] to come to the conclusion" that NCRI is an alias of MEK. Id. Having reviewed the supplemented administrative record as a whole and the classified information appended to it, we conclude that NCRI has not met this burden.

16 To explain our decision, we must first review what it means — in the very particular context of AEDPA — for one organization to be an alias of another. On its previous appeal, NCRI argued that the Secretary lacked authority under AEDPA to designate an entity an FTO based on a finding that it was an alias of another designated FTO. See id. at 200. We rejected that contention, finding that the grant of authority to designate FTOs "implies the authority to so designate an entity that commits the necessary terrorist acts under some other name." Id. In so doing, we used a mathematics metaphor — specifically, the transitive property — to describe the alias concept: "Logically, indeed mathematically, if A equals B and B equals C, it follows that A equals C. If the NCRI is the [MEK], and if the [MEK] is a foreign terrorist organization, then the NCRI is a foreign terrorist organization also." Id.; see also id. ("If the Secretary has the power to work those dire consequences on an entity calling itself `Organization A,’ the Secretary must be able to work the same consequences on the same entity while it calls itself `Organization B.’"). Seizing upon our earlier invocation of the transitive property, NCRI now argues that the administrative record does not demonstrate that "A equals B" — that is, that NCRI equals MEK — and therefore NCRI cannot be an alias of MEK. Indeed, NCRI rightly points out that even the State Department acknowledges that NCRI and MEK are not " one and the same." See Pet. Reply Br. 4-6.

17 Implicit in NCRI’s argument, however, is a mistaken assumption that the alias concept, under AEDPA, is bounded by the transitive property. This reads too much into our mathematical metaphor in NCRI. See Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 244 N.Y. 84, 94, 155 N.E. 58 (1926) (Cardozo, J.) ("Metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it."). While it is certainly correct to use the term alias to describe scenarios where a single entity is known by more than one name — for instance, Mojahedin-e Khalq is an alias for People’s Mojahedin, two names for the same organization, one Farsi, the other English — nothing in AEDPA or any more general rule of logic or language requires that the application of the alias concept be strictly limited to such circumstances.

18 To the contrary, our citation in NCRI to First National City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 103 S.Ct. 2591, 77 L.Ed.2d 46 (1983), indicates that we intended the alias concept to have a sweep beyond the transitive. In that case, which concerned a suit brought by Banco Para El Comercio Exterior (BPECE) against First National City Bank for performance under a letter of credit, the Supreme Court held that First National could counterclaim for setoff of the value of its assets that had been seized and nationalized by the Cuban government, notwithstanding the fact that BPECE had been established by the Cuban government as a juridical entity separate from the government. See id. at 623-34, 103 S.Ct. at 2598-2603. Acknowledging a presumption that "government instrumentalities established as juridical entities distinct and independent from their sovereign should normally be treated as such," id. at 626-27, 103 S.Ct. at 2599, the Court nevertheless concluded that the normally separate juridical status had to be set aside where the Cuban government was the real party in interest behind BPECE’s letter of credit claim, id. at 632, 103 S.Ct. at 2602. The Court, in reaching its conclusion, looked to ordinary principles of agency law, noting that "where a corporate entity is so extensively controlled by its owner that a relationship of principal and agent is created, we have held that one may be held liable for the actions of the other." Id. at 629, 103 S.Ct. at 2600 (citing NLRB v. Deena Artware, Inc., 361 U.S. 398, 402-04, 80 S.Ct. 441, 442, 4 L.Ed.2d 400 (1960)). We think those same ordinary principles of agency law are fairly encompassed by the alias concept under AEDPA. When one entity so dominates and controls another that they must be considered principal and agent, it is appropriate, under AEDPA, to look past their separate juridical identities and to treat them as aliases.

19 The inclusion of these fundamental precepts of agency law within AEDPA’s alias concept is entirely consistent with — indeed, necessary to — the effective pursuit of the statute’s objective of denying support in and from the United States to terrorist organizations. Just as it is silly to suppose "that Congress empowered the Secretary to designate a terrorist organization… only for such periods of time as it took such organization to give itself a new name, and then let it happily resume the same status it would have enjoyed had it never been designated," NCRI, 251 F.3d at 200, so too it is implausible to think that Congress permitted the Secretary to designate an FTO to cut off its support in and from the United States, but did not authorize the Secretary to prevent that FTO from marshaling all the same support via juridically separate agents subject to its control. For instance, under NCRI’s conception, the Government could designate XYZ organization as an FTO in an effort to block United States support to that organization, but could not, without a separate FTO designation, ban the transfer of material support to XYZ’s fundraising affiliate, FTO Fundraiser, Inc. The crabbed view of alias status advanced by NCRI is at war not only with the antiterrorism objective of AEDPA, but common sense as well.

20 We need not plumb all the complexities of agency law to determine when an agent, under AEDPA, is the alias of its principal. It is sufficient for our purposes to note that the requisite relationship for alias status is established at least when one organization so dominates and controls another that the latter can no longer be considered meaningfully independent from the former. See, e.g., NLRB v. Deena Artware, Inc., 361 U.S. 398, 403, 80 S.Ct. 441, 443, 4 L.Ed.2d 400 (1960) ("`Dominion may be so complete, interference so obtrusive, that by the general rules of agency the parent will be a principal and the subsidiary an agent.’") (quoting Berkey, 244 N.Y. at 95, 155 N.E. 58); Casino Ready Mix, Inc. v. NLRB, 321 F.3d 1190, 1196 (D.C.Cir.2003) ("`agent’ is one who agrees to act `subject to [a principal’s] control’") (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1, cmt. a (1958)); cf. Transamerica Leasing, Inc. v. La Republica de Venezuela, 200 F.3d 843, 848 (D.C.Cir.2000) ("A sovereign is amenable to suit based upon the actions of an instrumentality it dominates because the sovereign and the instrumentality are in those circumstances not meaningfully distinct entities; they act as one.").

21 We thus frame our inquiry here as whether "the Secretary, on the face of things, had enough information before [him] to come to the conclusion" that NCRI was dominated and controlled by MEK. PMOI I, 182 F.3d at 25. Based on our review of the entire administrative record and the classified materials appended thereto, we find that the Secretary did have an adequate basis for his conclusion. While our determination is buttressed by classified information provided to us on an ex parte and in camera basis — the contents of which we cannot discuss — the voluminous unclassified materials contained in the administrative record by themselves and by a comfortable margin provide sufficient support for the Secretary’s conclusion, given the standard of review. It would serve little purpose to catalogue all the material in the administrative record supporting the conclusion that NCRI is dominated and controlled by MEK, but we will set out below a few of the pieces of information we found to be most compelling. As we do so, it bears repeating that AEDPA does not permit us, in exercising our limited judicial review, to make any "judgment whatsoever regarding whether the material before the Secretary is or is not true," but allows us to inquire only whether the Secretary "had enough information before [him] to come to the conclusion" that NCRI is dominated and controlled by MEK. Id.

22 After an extensive investigation of MEK and NCRI, the FBI reported to the State Department that "[i]t is the unanimous view of the FBI personnel who are involved in and familiar with the FBI’s investigation of the [MEK] that the NCRI is not a separate organization, but is instead, and has been, an integral part of the MEK at all relevant times." Letter of Charles Frahm, Section Chief, International Terrorism Operations Section II, at 1 (Aug. 28, 2002). Contrary to NCRI’s portrayal of itself as an umbrella organization, of which the MEK was just one member, the FBI concluded that it is NCRI that is "the political branch" of the MEK. Id. Attach. at 1.

23 This conclusion was based in large part on evidence gathered from the search — executed in December 2001 pursuant to a valid warrant — of a house in Falls Church, Virginia apparently used as office space by both NCRI and MEK. There, the FBI discovered NCRI and MEK materials "commingled together, and not separated," including bank records, signed blank checks, MEK propaganda, NCRI publications, travel documents, and letterhead which listed the same French address for each organization. Id. Attach. at 2-4. Crucially, among the recovered documents was a schematic breakdown of the "Iranian Resistance," which described NCRI as "The Political Branch" of the movement. Id. at Tab 6.

24 Additionally, earlier investigations of MEK and NCRI had revealed that the two organizations shared an essentially unitary leadership structure. The overall head of MEK, Massoud Rajavi, also leads NCRI. And Rajavi’s wife, Maryam Rajavi, was selected by NCRI to be Iran’s President-inExile. Id. Attach. at 2; see also id. Attach. at 4 ("The leadership of [MEK] and NCRI is intermixed, and the entities operate in a day-to-day way as a single unit."). These facts corroborated the FBI’s earlier conclusion prior to the 2001 designation of NCRI as an FTO that "the NCR/NCRI is in fact controlled by and inseparable from the MEK." Decl. of Agent Michael Rolince (quoted in Action Mem., Tab 2 at 11).

25 The State Department acknowledged that "NCRI has submitted numerous affidavits purporting to show that it is not controlled by the MEK and is not an MEK front," and even credited some of NCRI’s "subsidiary points." Action Mem., Tab 2 at 12, 9. The agency, however, concluded that "the evidence developed by the FBI is convincingly to the contrary." Id. Tab 2 at 12. It may be true that the State Department relied very heavily on the conclusions of the counterterrorism experts of the FBI. As noted above, though, under the narrow powers of judicial review Congress has accorded to us under AEDPA, it is emphatically not our province to second-guess the Secretary’s judgment as to which affidavits to credit and upon whose conclusions to rely. We are to judge only whether the "support" marshaled for the Secretary’s designation was "substantial." 8 U.S.C. § 1189(b)(3)(D). We conclude that the support for the Secretary’s conclusion that NCRI was dominated and controlled by, and thus was an alias of, MEK was indeed substantial, and we therefore reject NCRI’s statutory challenge to its designation as an FTO.

26 This leaves only NCRI’s constitutional challenges to certain procedures employed in making that designation. Specifically, NCRI argues that due process requires that (1) it be provided access to any classified materials that the Secretary relied upon in making the designation, and (2) it have an adversary hearing before the agency at which it could confront witnesses against it. Both these arguments are foreclosed by our earlier decisions in NCRI and PMOI II. See 251 F.3d at 208-09, 327 F.3d at 1242-43. Concerning NCRI’s claim that it is entitled to review classified materials, in NCRI we wrote that the government "need not disclose the classified information to be presented in camera and ex parte to the court under the statute." 251 F.3d at 208. In PMOI II, addressing the same claim, this time brought by MEK, we were even more emphatic: "We reject this contention…. We already decided in [NCRI] that due process required the disclosure of only the unclassified portions of the administrative record." 327 F.3d at 1242. PMOI II also disposes of NCRI’s claim for an adversary hearing. There, we held that NCRI established the constitutional baseline for fair process and, the Government having complied with those commands on remand, that "nothing further is due." Id. at 1243. We reach the same conclusion with regard to NCRI.

1

The Mojahedin-e Khalq translates into English as People’s Mojahedin. [AR268] The Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK) is known in English as the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI). Our prior decisions have variously referred to the Mojahedin-e Khalq as MEK, People’s Mojahedin of Iran, and PMOICompare PMOI I, 182 F.3d at 20 ("the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran — the MEK, for short"), with NCRI, 251 F.3d at 197 ("petitioner People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (`PMOI’)"). To limit confusion, wherever possible we will use the terms Mojahedin-e Khalq and MEK, and, except in case names, not the terms People’s Mojahedin or PMOI. We adopt this convention because it is the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization that the Secretary has designated as a foreign terrorist organization. See Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 62 Fed.Reg. 52,650 (Oct. 8, 1997) (1997 Designation); Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 64 Fed.Reg. 55,112 (Oct. 8, 1999) (1999 Designation); Redesignation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 66 Fed.Reg. 51,088, 51,089 (Oct. 5, 2001) (2001 Redesignation); Redesignation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 68 Fed.Reg. 56,860, 56,861 (Oct. 2, 2003) (2003 Redesignation).

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