A present for cults’ leader
Rajavis and Cult Leadership
Massoud Rajavi, leader of the Mojahedin-é Khalq Organisation (MKO), issued a statement from his hiding on 29th October 2007 (7th Aban 1358) which appeared on the organisation’s website "hambastegimeli" on 1st November 2007 (10th Aban 1358).
In his lengthy statement he has tried to encourage the US administration to launch a full-scale military attack against Iran and has also tried to provide as many excuses as possible for that purpose. He clearly complains why the Americans are in the state of "no war" with the Islamic Republic of Iran and why they don’t finish off the job.
Towards the end of his statement, Rajavi who is addressing the Iranian regime in Tehran warns them:
وعده نهايي ارتش آزادي با شما در تهران…….
"The last engagement of the Liberation Army with you is in Tehran". That is, the National Liberation Army (NLA) will fight all the way through to Tehran and topple the mullahs’ regime forcibly.
In his statement Rajavi clearly threatens anybody who is not advocating war and is opposing the regime peacefully. The title of his message of course is "War or Peace with Religious Fascism?" and Rajavi clearly emphasises that they [NLA combatants] will not give up their war with the regime.
Rajavi ends his statement by declaring that:
راه حل مريم در پايتخت شيروخورشيد پيروز ميشود……
"Maryam’s solution will win in the capital of the lion and the sun".
Maryam Rajavi has proposed that the NLA be armed and backed by the US Army in Iraq and assisted to enter Iranian territory and fight against the Iranians and move towards Tehran. She has also offered that her forces in Iraq be helped and used by the Americans to perform sabotage activities in Tehran and other major Iranian cities.
Rajavi’s statement clearly shows that by no means does he favour any peaceful solution to the Iran problem and is absolutely certain that he will use violence to reach his political goals.
Ebrahim Khodabandeh, November 11, 2007
Ebrahim_khodabandeh_2006@yahoo.com
The ideological marriage of Maryam and Massoud [1984] and intra-organizational obligatory divorces [1988] constitute the strategic hallmarks of the ideological revolution within Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization [MKO] or the Mojahedin Cult as notoriously entitled. Although there is a five-year interval between the two events, ideological divorces are a complementary step to the marriage of Maryam and Massoud that deteriorated the status of family life in MKO. Mehdi Abrishamchi, Maryam Rajavi’s late husband, justifies the act of Maryam’s divorce from him and her remarriage to Massoud as removing the problem of family as a barrier in the way of Maryam and Massoud. It is the first time the structure of family life is put into challenge. He says:
Maryam had to be either unquestionably promoted to a high status in the organization released of any [conjugal] obligation, just like Massoud, and be totally devoted to revolution or had to give it up. Here, the simple issue of family was creating an incongruity. [1]
The contradiction solved through the marriage of Maryam and Massoud as a necessary and inevitable phenomenon, it leads to a peaceful coexistence in the organization. According to Abrishamchi, since Maryam was being promoted to a leadership status and every decision in the organization had to be made by Maryam and Massoud together, the matrimonial obligations and restrictions prevented Maryam to be in Massoud’s company all the time. She had to deny all her obligations and tear whatever bonded her except to Massoud and the revolution. As such, her divorce and remarriage before anything was the accomplishment of a revolutionary obligation. The organization moving on a revolutionary path required Maryam’s all-time presence and thus the marriage was regarded to be totally ideological and revolutionary. As justified by Abrishamchi:
We had to accept the fact that it was probable that in the future there happened an event in which there was a one percent probability that Maryam would be unable to take part in decision making and Massoud had to solve the problems alone or by his other assistants since Maryam was obliged to her husband. In such a condition, Maryam could not take part in confrontation of all organizational challenges and could lead to losing her organizational status. However, the essentiality of being unified with her responsibility was her ever-presence in revolutionary problem solving; otherwise her status of compeer was nothing more than an ideological formality. [2]
However, it is not all the reason justifying the mechanism of Maryam’s divorce and remarriage. It really takes time to develop a true understanding of inter- organizational obligatory and ideological divorces that Abrishamchi termed as an act of ‘sacrifice’ and ‘beheading the emotions’. In fact, the ideological marriage was the first taken step that explicitly predicted what would be required of the members in near future. Niyabati writes:
On that day [Maryam’s divorce and remarriage] it was difficult to fathom what was happening. It was only a matter of a few years to generalize the divorce and remarriage model in the organization, a criterion to decide members’ degree of ideological loyalty. As Massoud had already put it, ‘If you fail to understand now, then wait. I don’t know how long, but one, five or ten years later you will come to understand’. [3]
The strategic objective of the marriage of Maryam and Massoud and finally generalization of obligatory divorces in the organization is an issue which needs to be reflected on carefully and as Rajavi had said, it took some time to be surfaced.
Another possibility that led the organization to mastermind and theatricalize such a show was to open a passage out of the encountered strategic cul-de-sac following the organization’s failure in overthrowing the Iranian regime on the one hand and to deter the possibility of any organizational split or demise on the other hand. According to Abrishamchi and Niyabati, the ideological revolution was a process of externalizing the contradictions and paradoxes in order to prevent any rapture or split in the organization. The marriage in itself was working as a mechanism of shock that could lead to externalizing the doubts and ambiguities remained long latent in the members. As described by Niyabati, the ceremony worked as a key to open those closed boxes which the leadership had failed to open up to that time:
The year 1985 is to accomplish the integrity of Mojahedin organization. The arranged regular revolutionary sessions that were held at the beginning among the top layers of the organization, at the end of the year began to encompass even the most distant spheres of the organization. The doubtful sympathizers who expected inevitable demise of their ideal organization were suddenly coming face to face with scenes that had never been imagined before. Surprisingly in these sessions, they were witnessing both men and women expressing their feelings and emotions openly before hundreds of people disregarding what would be thought of them or happen to them in the future. In such sessions, it was for the first time that some closed boxes were opened; boxes that neither wives nor husbands had ever opened for each other. [4]
Both Niyabati and Abrishamchi acknowledge the fact that ideological revolution in fact was an instrument to unlocking the concealed interior chaotic situation. It was a risk that in the most optimistic presupposition culminated in organizational schism or absolute demise if one was pessimistic. Niyabati speaks more frankly than Abrishamchi when he acknowledges the marriage as the first stage of the ideological revolution:
To unlock the boxes [minds of members] is the main theme and the first stage of ideological revolution. [5]
A larger number of MKO’s separated members especially in recent years have exclusively focused on the ideological revolution and the internal objectives Rajavi sought. In his review, Hadi Shams Haeri writes:
The so-called ideological revolution in 1985 that was much a cover for the strategic failure of the organization and a move aimed at averting accusations posed against Rajavi could not achieve all its objectives and acquit Rajavi completely. Therefore, it deemed necessary to find a scapegoat for the organizational failures and the strategic impasse. The plotted conspiracy against [Ali] Zarkesh was the continuation of the conspired [ideological] revolution in 1985. As such, we come to the conclusion that the other consequent ideological revolutions were in fact conspiracies in order to overcome the challenges at hand in every stage. [6]
A number of other former MKO members also evaluate the ideological revolution in the same way and believe that the ideological revolution was based on the mechanism of externalizing the internal contradictions within the organization and delineating a new line of relation based on an all-encompassing and blind obedience to Rajavi.
As pointed before, Niyabati and Abrishamchi have referred to the objective in their writings. It is worth noting that nearly two years before the development of the ideological revolution and obligatory divorces, Rajavi held a completely different idea on intra-organizational marriages and the concept of family. Believing to be modeling on some legal, Islamic ideological creeds, he encouraged marriage and foundation of family as a revolutionary act. In summarizing his one-year struggle in armed phase, Rajavi has said:
In organizational reports, there are cases in which those members who have lost their wives or husbands in armed operations are so emotionally depressed that have declared they prefer to remain single for ever… But this is not a perfect and revolutionary idea since the Prophet, Islamic Imams and also all the reformers and revolutionary leaders of the world have denounced it. Therefore, the organization advises such members, and also the unmarried, to get married to anybody they will if possible. According to the Holy Quran and the doctrines of our ideological leaders, we have to consider the marriage as a part of our struggle not something to be thrown away. [7]
Resources:
1. the delivered lecture by Mehdi Abrishamchi on the internal ideological revolution within MKO, [1985].
2. Ibid
3. Niyabati, Bijan. A different look at the internal ideological revolution within MKO, Khavaran publication, p.38.
4. Ibid, p.42
5. Ibid, p.44
6. Shams-e Haeri, Hadi; The swamp.
7. Summary of one-year armed struggle, p.186
Mojahedin.ws
A Masqueraded Partisan of Democracy Preaching War
In contrast to its widespread propaganda to have adopted a strategy of pro-democracy in its struggle, MKO’s bellicosely terrorist nature pops out of its leader’s messages. In most of speeches delivered by Maryam Rajavi after the organization’s great shift following the fall of Saddam, she has put forth the third option of democratic change in Iran. The organization has also expressly renounced all military activities since June 2001, as stated in the judgment of the Court of First Instance. The spell seems to have worked on some European lawmakers and American congressmen since they might have been kept in dark about the true nature of the organization that for solid evidences occupies a permanent position on global terrorist lists.
While in Western countries MKO’s appointed agents are in a ceaseless attempt to remove the terrorist tag from the group through advertising pseudo-democratic claims, the leader’s message to the insiders residing in Camp Ashraf, and of course the sympathizers throughout the world, aims to bolsters the members’ combative morale and contains military threats against Iran. The gist of Massoud Rajavi’s latest message issued from his hideout on 29 October is that the organization never withdraws from its long-advocated policy of resorting to terrorism and militarism to assume political power. Addressing Iranian statesmen Rajavi concludes:
But if you paid no heed and fancied that there would possibly be no war and no land forces,… the final rendezvous of the National Liberation Army (NLA) with you would be in Tehran.
It is an evident fact that Mojahedin adopted the policy of armed struggle not since it was deemed to be a necessity but much because it is innately instituted in its ideology. A review of the organization’s early pamphlets and publications proves that resort to militarism and armed warfare before delineating the struggle strategy is a solution to the vital question of to be or not to be. Renunciation of terrorism and militarism, although MKO has refrained to denounce publicly, first needs a through ideological polish, something MKO has dodged to go through at least up to now.
The main problem lies in the fact that many have failed to grasp the seriousness of the threat. By taking advantage of the global underestimation, Mojahedin play for time through a disguise of pro-democracy. The world has the right to know, so as to be protected against the horrors and atrocities of terrorism, that what the organization advertises and practices in the face of the public is in total contradiction with its ideological bindings. And the world has the right to know why Massoud Rajavi’s messages, originally in Farsi, are rarely translated into other languages while his wife’s speeches are translated into many languages before they are delivered!
Mojahedin.ws, November 9, 2007
http://www.mojahedin.ws/news/text_news_en.php?id=1464
As mentioned in the previous article, exaltation of self-immolation in the messages of MKO’s leaders is in fact an applied ploy to encourage members to commit suicidal operations for cult causes. The causes displayed as holy, their accomplishment requires ceaseless sacrifices on the part of members. Eric Hoffer, explaining on the glorification of terror acts by the cults states: “The holy terror only knows no limit and never flags”.
Terror-exaltation is not the chief approach manipulated by certain cults and Mojahedin in particular. In his few messages delivered from his hideout in the past recent years, Rajavi has particularly provoked continuation of suicidal operations as an emergency exit from the raised crisis. The self elected leader of Mojahedin has mainly focused on the preservation of two cult dynamics as the strategic guidelines in his messages, namely, Maryam Rajavi and Camp Ashraf. Calling on all the sympathizers of Mojahedin to fight in a united front against the EU for the removal of the terrorist tag, Rajavi in his message of March 25 stated:
At the present, it is a national duty on any Iranian and especially on our victorious opposition forces throughout the world to preserve two things which have turned to be two sides of the same coin. On one side rests a portrait of Maryam and on the other side, a perspective of Ashraf. I urge you one by one to struggle like Maryam and along with her day and night to mint the coin and achieve the end. [1]
There seems to be no need to explain what crucial and strategic roles Maryam and Camp Ashraf play in Mojahedin’s explicit cult relations. Regardless of their political potentialities to motivate and push the insiders forward, they represent the unequivocal manifestations of a much transcendental entity, Massoud Rajavi, who can never be fathomed unless through a deep comprehension of Mojahedin’s internal ideological revolution. It does require a high price which the members have to pay. He patterns Ashraf as a model for all European sympathizers to follow:
Adhere to Ashraf’s resistance forces and rise up ahead in line with phoenix of liberty (Maryam Rajavi) in any region in the country. [2]
It might seem too exaggerating an idea that a geographically isolate military camp might maintain so dynamic prerogative to instigate a national uprising. Beyond a geographical location, Ashraf has to be regarded as Mojahedin’s ideological receptacle or a synagogue of organizational teachings whereto all the sympathizers have to inevitably turn their attention to be ideologically inspired. In fact, Maryam and Ashraf have impressions far beyond two names; they are instruments with two internal and external functions. Internally, they are concepts to convey the cult commands concealed from the eyes and notice of the west. Externally, they are manipulated to keep the cult’s ideology dark to buy political legitimacy. Theorizing the external aspect, Mehdi Abrishamch explained:
Internationally, we intend to convince countries that we are the ones who represent Iranian people. Of course, in none of the international scenes the issue of ideology and political stances is ever discussed. Of the importance is to impose ourselves, on account of a sea of blood, as representing Iranian people. In the accomplishment of this strategic line, we must incubate how to benefit the existing conflicts between the imperialists. [3]
The organized gatherings and extravaganzas in Camp Ashraf with Rajavi’s coincidently delivered messages entirely rotate around cult and ideological instructions. In his latest message, Rajavi called on all sympathizers to adapt themselves to Ashraf’s capacities. It is a command for any sympathizer to be detached from his/her personality and to develop a personality of absolute devotion to the organization and leadership. Rajavi’s messages work as a powerful magnet to associated scattered particles of the cult, a common procedure in most cults of personalities. Expounding on the effacement of individual separateness, Eric Hoffer writes:
The effacement of individual separateness must be thorough. In every act, however trivial, the individual must by some ritual associate himself with the congregation, the tribe, the party, etcetera. His joys and sorrows, his pride and confidence must spring from the fortunes and capacities of the group rather than from his individual prospects and abilities. Above all, he must never feel alone. Though stranded on a desert island, he must still feel that he is under the eyes of the group. [4]
Then, the insiders’ submission to the leader and whatever he demands them in his presence and absence is the result of his full authority over them. The sympathizers’ ideological dependence on the organization has convinced them that there are eyes watching them all the time and they must be in constant association with other particles to form a whole. Now in the absence of the leader, Maryam and Ashraf are considered the pivotal axle around which the whole body of Mojahedin rotates; they are the strategic red lines that nobody is permitted to transgress.
Sources:
[1]. Massoud Rajavi’s Message delivered on March 25.
[2]. Ibid.
[3]. Revolutionary Diplomacy vs. Liberal Diplomacy and open, anti-revolutionary policies, p. 12.
[4]. HOffER, ERIC; The True Believer, Harper &. Row Publishers, New York, 1966, p. 61.
Bahar Irani, Mojahedin.ws, October 19, 2007
Following the released reports of two Mojahedin-e Khalq members going on trial before a French court for allegedly helping a third member burn herself to death during a 2003 protest, the Mojahedin-run media are engaged in a vast propaganda blitz to disclaim allegations. The two are charged with ‘provoking suicide’ and allegedly providing gasoline for a woman to set herself on fire in broad daylight. The propaganda machine of the organization, by furnishing details from the trial, attempts to instill that:
– the committed self-immolations in Paris were unorganized but self-initiated deeds
– the deeds were carried out in opposition to the members’ presumed expulsion from France
– Mojahedin disclaim allegations of involving in terrorist acts against civilians and masterminding self-immolations
– the presence of at least one of the victims of the self-immolations, Marzieh Babakhani, in the course of the trial to announce that her self-burning was a self-decided act is a ploy to vindicate allegations of ‘provoking suicide’ and that, suicides were not pressured by the organization
– although not indicated in the file in the process, defendants insist to disapprove allegations of the group’s being engaged in cult-like activities
Any of the above cases can be discussed in detail, but of the importance is the absence of any acceptable evidence to acquit the defendants of the allegations. According to the existing videotaped evidences, the prosecution can charge that the two were not only aware of the suicide’s intention but also provided for her to commit self-burning. It alleges that the two men on trial were filmed on June 18, 2003, buying fuel from a gas station in the vicinity of the scene where she was abetted to set herself on fire.
In none of the defendants’ defences, as reported by Mojahedin-run media, there can be found evidences in relation to the file in process. For instance, the defense argues that Sediqheh Mojaveri, one of the two women who died of self-burning injuries, set herself ablaze because she had been threatened with expulsion from France to Iran. Not only there exists no evidence to her claimed cause of self-immolation, but in no way such defense acquits the suspects of their allegations. In fact, Mojahedin intend to distract the social opinion of the main issue for which the trial is set. Furthermore, they can present no proven evidence that the French government at the time had reversed her right to asylum.
Her expulsion as a refugee required certain procedures and her political condition as well as any possibility of risking her life would be taken into consideration. Besides, unless she had violated the regulations, the French government had no alibi for her expulsion. Indeed it raises a question that how two people contribute to the act of suicide for their third colleague to save her on the poor supposition that her life might be at risk.
The engagement of the refugees, being known as the members of a notorious terrorist cult, in such appalling activities in opposition to what is not beyond mere supposition indicate that Mojahedin hardly respect the regulations of the country wherein they have been granted asylum. It can also be concluded that they resort to cult-like practices against the civil and democratic laws of a country even before they are put into practice for any justifiable reason.
The propaganda scenario prepared by Mojahedin also attempts to clean Maryam Rajavi’s name of the allegations that her arrest was the cause to initiate such cult-like suicidal operations. But it is so easy a task to prove that encouragement of the members to commit self-immolation was an exalted strategy in the process of the organization’s ideological revolution as a working leverage against any made restriction by France. To wash Maryam Rajavi’s hands of the perpetrated self-immolations following her arrest, Mojahedin’s media quotes Pierre de Bousquet, the DST’s director at the time, saying “unfortunately, Mrs. Rajavi, because of the custody conditions, lost the opportunity of being immediately informed of the events happening outside to stop them”.
Such claims further prove the key role of Maryam Rajavi as Mojahedin’s she-guru to instigate or frustrate these cult activities. Even at the same time, Pierre de Bousquet had said the organisation could no longer claim that its aim was to defend human rights and bring about democracy. He said, as reported by the Observer, “The attempts at self-immolation to protest against the arrest of Madame Radjavi are proof of a new fanaticism. Auvers was to become the Mujahideen’s world headquarters after the loss of bases in Iraq.”
Stated in Mojahedin leaders’ messages at least in the past four years, suicidal activities have been advocated as working leverages against French legal bodies’ verdicts especially after the ruling of the European Court of Justice on December 12, 2006 to unfreeze the organization’s assets. Although the court has never ruled that MKO should be removed from the list of banned organisations, but under the pretext of the ruling, the organization chances orchestrating other activities.
How Mojahedin’s leaders accredit suicidal operations as solutions to encountered problems while denying cult allegations is a matter of consideration. The evidences being so evident, how can they convince the court that the committed self-immolations were the result of an abrupt and self-initiated outburst for personal reasons? And how do they justify their paradoxical mannerism of calling the victims of the immolations as heroes and martyrs?
Regardless of any verdict that the two suspects might face if convicted, for those who have developed a deep understanding of Mojahedin’s internal relations within Camp Ashraf and their European headquarters there remains no doubt that such suicidal activities are provoked by the organization itself. The two on the trial are not the only indictable suspects of the alarming elf-immolations. None of them can truly exemplify the model of the cult and terrorist entrepreneurs who, in both hideout and broad daylight, encourage and provoke such inhuman, undemocratic practices for ambitious, cult causes. They are the chief indictable villains escaping the law.
From the beginning (1965) up to the time being, the issue of leadership in MKO, in spite of stressing on democratic centralism, has actually faced sever challenges. During the early formation years, from 1965 to 1972 when Mohammad Hanifnejad was executed, Hanifnejad’s hegemonic political leadership was known to be the main cause behind the demise of almost 80 percent of the organization’s cadres. So crushing was the strike over the body of the organization that, as Meisami explains, he was held responsible and was inter-organizationally sentenced to death. Concurrently, a court martial sentenced him to death and it was all settled. In the second phase, 1972-75, following the first ideological revolution that led to the ideological schism of the organization, Taqi Shahram assumed Mojahedin leadership; it was due to a power vacuum and his personal potentialities that he could succeed to an autocratic leadership.
In the third phase, 1975 up to now, Rajavi has occasionally ignored the council leadership and developed his hegemonic leadership. Rajavi was regarded as the political leader of Mojahedin before the ideological revolution in 1985 but since then he has been appointed as both the political and the ideological leader of MKO. From the beginning, such a process in the internal relations of MKO has been criticized by the members. After the ideological revolution that started Rajavi’s autocratic political and ideological leadership, a greater number of MKO members, including Parviz Yaqubi and Saeed Shahsavandi, quitted the organization compared with the earlier two phases.
The aim here is, based on the organization’s own sources and acknowledgments made by defectors, to investigate the process of the appointment of the ideological leadership, the reasons behind members’ separation and the disposition of the ideological leadership. Democratic centralism was regarded as the best approach for leading MKO as asserted in the organization’s original documents and sources:
The complexity of social issues and the fundamental differences between a revolutionary organization and society necessitates a council leadership particularly when the organization aims at bringing about fundamental changes within social institutions. In such a situation, an individual can not resolve all the problems. Moreover, council leadership prevents the interference of an individual’s shortcomings to have any impact on the organization; in council leadership an individual’s weakness is thwarted by others’ talent which reduces any possible risks. [1]
As such, some factors such as the complexity of social and political conditions as well as individual features make council leadership to be the first priority. The internal ideological revolution within Mojahedin replaced council leadership, both theoretically and politically, with that of Rajavi’s autocratic ideological leadership. As admitted by a majority of defectors, it was modeled on the Soviet Union’s Communist Party in the reign of Stalin. As Saeid Shahsavandi elaborates:
The Ideological revolution began in 1985. As I said before, I worked in the political department up to 1986 coincident to the transitions made in the Soviet Union. Since I had lived in France for many years, I could read French books and be informed of the events. Then I found that the course of events in our organization was in fact a miniature model of Soviet Union’s communist party particularly during Stalinism reign following the war. Such a mental awareness got me into more problems since I began holding inter-organizational discourses and expressing limited oppositions and finding some other like-minded. [2]
Interestingly, Abrishamchi has the same opinion when justifying the ideological revolution:
It is a reality that in MKO Massoud’s thoughts is problem solving ideologically and determine the ideological boundary. It is not surprising since every ideology has its own ideologue. For all Marxists, there can be found a person’s name next to their ideology; then for Leninists, Maoists and much more. [3]
According to Niyabati and other MKO ex-members, such a leadership as well as the ideological revolution, in contrast to internal discourses that ideological and political leadership is sequel to an evolutionary course, were the outcome of Rajavi’s subsequent strategic failures and were aiming at thwarting probable organizational split. In such a system, leadership is deified. Niyabati considers ideological revolution and the issue of leadership as the upshot of the political and strategic failures of the organization. He believes that the solution to such failures is either retreating from armed warfare or, as he calls it, resorting to ultra-left and revolutionary radicalism:
We had to either submit to the existing conditions and resort to politics or, by embracing all internal, external, and international consequences of resorting to armed warfare and violent overthrow of the regime, lean to the left and yield to radicalism. [4]
According to him, leaning toward the left and radicalism before anything necessitates a fundamental change of mentality on the issue of the leadership. He believes that the status of the leader should be beyond the reach of any criticism and challenge:
In the ancient grasp, Hanif and Massoud are the first founders of the organization, but here Massoud is the connecting point. In the ancient grasp, leader is so accessible that could be easily challenged. But here the ideological leadership is out of reach and to access him, one needs passing through Maryam who is a warrant. [5]
Niyabati resorts to imamate theory in Shiite in order to justify the state of the leadership of Mojahedin:
The core of the ideological revolution was to resolve Massoud’s ideological leadership. The sole solution to the issue which has long been the Achilles’ heel of all the contemporary movements and revolutions lied in the development and the maintenance of the theory of imamate in the organization. [6]
Furthermore, he makes it clear that the leader is held only accountable to God:
For the first time in the history of contemporary revolutions an organization disclaimed its adopted principle of democratic centralism, a several hundred year-long achievement of the organized revolutionary struggle, and (correctly or incorrectly) hands over the leadership to a leader who is accountable only to God. [7]
Mehdi Abrishamchi expounds on the theory of leadership in much simpler words:
The leadership bears no accountability downward. His accountability is determined by the ideological-political principles of the organization. [8]
Unlike Niyabati, Abrishamchi denies Rajavi’s being even accountable to God:
Everybody in the organization is a subordinate except for the leader. Neither is Maryam who is not inferior to Massoud. Both of them are responsible for themselves and not accountable to anybody. They solve problems relying on ideology and their own power of reflection. [9]
All the statements made by MKO ex-members in addition to that of the theoreticians of the ideological revolution and Abrishamchi denote the same fact: denying the council leadership and democratic centralism and the acceptance of the ideological leadership of Rajavi as the symbol of the organizational, ideological and political legitimacy. In a nutshell, Shahsavandi describes the ideological
revolution and the ideological leadership of Rajavi in the following terms:
The ideological revolution aims at proving the fact that it makes no difference who you are, who you were, what you did, how long you spent in the prison, what torments you suffered, and how long you were active in the organization; if you are not connected to Mr. and Mrs. Rajavi and fail to be their believers and absolutely committed to them, whatever you have done is worth nothing. Thus, Massoud can easily demote or promote ranks overnight. [10]
Resources
1. Investigation of the possibility of deviation in democratic centralism (1979), Mojahedin Publication, p. 43.
2. Interview by Saeid Shahsavandi: Radio Voice of Iran.
3. The lecture delivered by Mehdi Abrishamchi on the internal ideological revolution within MKO. Taleqani Publication, 1985.
4. Niyabati, Bijan; A Different Look at Ideological Revolution within MKO, Khavaran Publication, 17.
5. Ibid, 57.
6. Ibid, 90.
7. Ibid, 35.
8. 3. The lecture delivered by Mehdi Abrishamchi on the internal ideological revolution within MKO. Taleqani Publication, 1985.
9. Ibid.
10. Interview by Saeid Shahsavandi: Radio Voice of Iran, session 123.
Bahar Irani – Mojahedin.ws – Sep. 30, 2007
The friction between Mojahedin’s leadership and its rank and file, critics, as well as dissident members is totally idiosyncratic among all political organizations. The mannerism, due to the dogmatism that is infesting MKO’s methodology, is the outcome of the group’s totalitarianism in terms of political power and aims at elimination of all opposition forces or movements that might be a challenge to the organization. NCR was a turning point in the history of MKO that promised a peaceful coexistence of Mojahedin with other political movements. Unfortunately, after a short while and due to MKO hegemonic ambitions of Rajavi, the NCR failed to preserve its coherence and suffered a crushing dissolution. A brief look at the course of events of MKO up to 20 June 1981 and its continuous friction with other political movements is an evidence of the organization’s incompetence to establish durable contact with the outsiders. Such a reactionary feature has its roots in the fact that Mojahedin consider themselves an exception amongst others; an illusion that resulted in their total social and political isolation. Even they consider all political movements and internal and external opposition forces to be indebted to them for their existence.
Rajavi has his own opinion toward detached members that well represents his reactionary mentalities. Explaining on the emergence of critics and opponent members, Rajavi identifies them as such: “Biological actions and reactions of all living organisms involve absorption as well as excretion. As such, dissident members constitute the excrements of Mojahedin e-Khalq”. It is such a viewpoint that regulates the orientation and relations of Mojahedin with the outside world, critics, dissident members and even former members. The turning point of such a relationship was parallel to the development of the ideological revolution in MKO when, according to many former MKO members and Niyabati, the organization underwent fundamental changes. Prior to the ideological revolution, Mojahedin based their external relations on the necessity for overthrowing Iranian regime by the means of armed warfare; however, after the ideological revolution what determined the internal and external relations of MKO was the degree of blind obedience toward ideological leadership of Maryam and Massoud Rajavi. Such an ideological criterion made the internal relation of the MKO suffer an absolute metamorphosis. Niyabati elaborating on such a metamorphosis writes:
After the initiation of the ideological revolution, Mojahedin’s relations underwent a complete metamorphosis. Mojahedin’s quadrilateral relations changed into a trilateral one. On one side was situated Mojahedin-e Khalq Organizatio, at another stood Massoud and on the third was whatever refuted the two formers. Noting in between the two ends was legitimized. Here, an element of Mojahed was recognized by one criterion through which everything was assessed. From this point on, Mojahedin’s friends and enemies were not bilateral but trilateral. Friends of Massoud were friends of Mojahedin and his enemies were theirs (p.112).
The new criterion made former criteria, through which organizational qualifications of members were assessed, fade away. In fact, the organizational promotion that was based on the members’ past campaign records and their practical as well as theoretical qualifications was replaced by the blind submission to the ideological leadership:
He (a member metamorphosized by revolution) is nobody representing no individual value. Neither imprisonments under Shah or Sheikhs qualifies him nor the blood and smock of the internal combats. He is neither a fine orator nor has multitudes of academic degrees. He is not even a man! In a nutshell, he is devoid of former values for which Mojahedin considered themselves capable of leadership after the development of anti-monarchic revolution in Iran (p.115).
After such a fundamental metamorphosis, members criteria of qualification underwent a qualitative change. No longer was the criterion of qualification to bear with the problems and challenges of revolution but it was the degree of unquestionable demand of obedience to the leader:
Since then, the difference between a volunteer and an ordinary member was far more than that of the latter and a member of executive committee. Since then, organizational ranking was restricted to executive cadres. Since then, promotion was not via political and organizational qualifications but to prostrate before a woman. She was the first woman appointed as imam in the history of the Shiism and who was about to replace Hanif’s ideology with her own. (p.55)
Niyabati further elaborates:
From this point on, Mojahedin’s process of relations underwent a qualitative change. Prior to the ideological revolution, the ideological capabilities within MKO were defined in a hierarchical frame of relations. (p.116)
The approach inevitably resulted in the domination of a personal authority that led to a phase of gradual split the in organization:
The sole outcome and the logical result of such an valuable revolution was replacing the essentiality of recruiting forces with a policy of continuous repelling of forces as a result of Maximalist conduct towards members. The revolution discriminated between the revolutionary and mass forces and did its best to establish a micro ideological society. (p.116)
Of course, the inevitable internal backlashes necessitated especial techniques of control for the advancement of the process:
It goes without saying that without the fulfilment of the internal revolution and its specific controlling mechanisms, Mojahedin would be annihilated under the intolerable pressures during the recent years. (p.116)
However, Mojahedin in an attempt to maintain its hegemonic control over opponents and critics apply a variety of instruments and levers such as launching aggressive attacks against dissidents’ gatherings, spreading disinformation, and even indulges in acts of labeling, harassment and intimidation. Massoud Rajavi’s latest massage delivered nearly two months ago obviously represents MKO’s belligerent attitude adopted for controlling the opponents and former members. The red line Rajavi delineates to distinguish between a sympathizer and an opponent is not the Iranian regime but the extent of rejecting or submitting to his hegemony.
References
All quotations are from Bijan Niyabati’s” Different Look at Mojahedin’s Internal Revolution”.
Saeed Shahsavandi’s interview with the Voice of Iran recently has focused on the subject of the ideological revolution within MKO. The details given by Shahsavandi well assert that the theatricalised ideological revolution was a plot for Rajavi’s hegemony that transformed a political group into a destructive cult of personality. The organization follows no logic in its relation with the insiders and the outsiders and the session 125 of the interview examines the group’s undemocratic practices with Rajavi atop who exemplifies the model of a cult entrepreneur:
Mojahedin, from the higher to the lower ranks, when driven to logical discourse indeed have nothing to say and fall back on badmouthing. When man has no evidence to corroborate his claim, then, he resorts to monologue rather than dialogue. That is what their media pursue.
Shahsavandi believes that the ideological revolution was the start of denying council leadership and democratic centralism, the basic principles of organization:
Transformation of the organization’s leadership from a classic-leftist organization preferring democratic centralism to an ideologically religious organization long chanting anti-imperialism slogans violated the basic principles of council leadership and democratic centralism.
In fact, the ideological revolution completely transformed MKO to Massoud Rajavi’s organization:
From this phase on, the Mojahedine Khalq Organization was permuted to the organization of Massoud, radio of Massoud and the media of Massoud.
He also points out to the heavy pile of ostensible letters and lists of signatures published in support of the ideological revolution:
The pile of signatures targeted the minds of the lower ranks to imbue them that the ideological revolution was a serious incident. The published signed-list of the 550-member leadership council aimed at the same purpose. That is while even the China’s Communist Party has not such a big crowd at its leadership council.
However, the growing number of dissatisfied members exposed a great threat against the organization and the dissidents had to be liquidated. The organizational trial of Ali Zarkesh portended the similar destiny that awaited other dissidents. Once a trusted friend of Rajavi, he was promoted to the commander of operation inside Iran sitting next to Rajavi’s room in Auvers sur Oise. Giving evidences from Zarkesh’s videotaped trial shahsavandi explains:
He was no more the same Ali Zarkesh we knew him for long before in Auvers sur Oise decision-making meetings. He resembled a wretched man whose nose, believe me, drivelled.
Of accusations posed against Zarkesh was that his proposal of Massoud and Maryam’s marriage was much a plot to discredit Rajavi in order to repel him and succeed to the position of leadership. Quoting Rajavi accusing zarkesh, Sahsavandi said:
“It was Ali’s mischief when proposed the marriage. He intended to disparage me through my marriage with Maryam to supersede me. Rajavi even overstepped to claim that Ali had proposed the ideological revolution to dismiss him.
Zarkesh was also accused of plotting to assassinate Rajavi. All evidences being against Ali, Rajavi said nothing of his execution. But the majority of those members present at his court demanded his execution; rajavi, however, as the authoritative leadership sentenced him to life imprisonment in Camp Ashraf to intimidate the other dissidents. Zarkesh was transferred to Iraq to be held in room 7 of a building called Baqai and was under intense control to avoid possible attempts to instigate a tense atmosphere. He was finally dispatched as a veteran to Iranian borders to take part in the Operation Eternal Light, where he was destined never to return.
www.mojahedin.ws – 27/08/2007
The translated text of an article presented at the Symposium of the Link between Cults and Terrorism held in Isfahan.
MKO defined as a cult
The original meaning of the term cult, derived from the French word "culte", comes from Latin noun "cultus" which is related to the Latin verb "colere" meaning "to worship or give reverence to a deity". The term has originally a positive, religious connotation but in recent years, it has turned to be a widely used popular term, usually connoting some group that is at least unfamiliar and perhaps even disliked or feared. This latter use of the term has gained such credence and momentum that it has virtually swallowed up the more neutral historical meaning. The term can be defined either sociologically, concerned with behavior, or theologically, concerned with doctrine. “Sociological definition Include consideration of such factors as authoritarian leadership patterns, loyalty and commitment mechanisms, lifestyle characteristics, [and] conformity patterns (including the use of various sanctions in connection with those members who deviate)”. [3]
Authoritarian leadership is the most domineering characteristics of a cult leader and most ex-members of a cult enumerate the hallmarks of a cult leader as follow:
– single authority
– questionable credentials
– requirement for unconditional trust
– they always claim to be in unique direct contact with God
– sexual misconduct
– grandiose promises
– they demand major ongoing financial contributions from members
– they claim that evil sinister forces attempt to subvert them [4]
Besides these characteristics of a cult leader, a cult, regarded destructive, has its own characteristics. Dr. Robert Jay Lifton’s criteria for a destructive cult run as follow:
1. Authoritarian pyramid structure with authority at the top
2. Charismatic or messianic leader(s) (Messianic meaning they either say they are God or that they alone can interpret the scriptures the way God intended.
3. Deception in recruitment and/or fund raising
4. Isolation from society — not necessarily physical isolation, but this can be psychological isolation.
5. Use of mind control (Mileu Control, Mystical Manipulation, Demand for Purity, Confession, Sacred Science, Loading the Language, Doctrine Over Person, Dispensing of Existence) [5]
MKO portraits two completely different images; its relation with the world outside and its internal structure. Duped by its heavy propaganda blitz, most people in Western countries, unaware of its terrorist nature, take it for a revolutionary, freedom-seeker, and pro-democratic organization. The group ‘s internal structure, totally concealed from the eyes of the outsiders, nearly shares all of the characteristics of a destructive cult with added emphasis on the authoritarian pyramid structure and mind control techniques. Massoud Rajavi, the long self-appointed leader, is known to be the mastermind of MKO. Released from Shah’s prison after revolution, Rajavi took up the responsibility of acting as the organization’s spokesman that awarded him an opportunity to develop authority both within the organisation and in the public’s perception.
How did the Mujahideen become a cult? The principal lever for the transformation of the organization from a mass movement to a cult was Rajavi’s “ideological revolution” in January 1985. The first phase of this revolution basically involved Masoud Rajavi marrying Maryam Qajar Azdanlou, the wife of Mehdi Abrishamchi, Rajavi’s most trusted lieutenant. The marriage was an overt violation of Islamic marriage rituals and a majority of ranking members saw the whole affair as an ugly and bizarre form of cuckoldry. The event, more regarded as an internal coup d’ata, promoted the husband to the rank of a guru and the wife to the rank of the joint leader of the organization. Massoud Rajavi indoctrinated the ideological revolution as a purging process saying “Those Mojahedin members who pass through this furnace, are more steadfastness, more steel like person, and have more future in the resisting’ [6]
Masoud Rajavi was exalted as a charisma and some subservient considered the historic achievement as an outcome of an ideological genius in Massoud Rajavi. Bijan Nyabati, a devoted a partisan, in adoring Massoud Rajavi’s personal charisma states:
In the front of revolution and progressiveness, you would not find two people with the same political and organizational potentialities of Massoud Rajavi among all the opposition. [7]
Nyabati abruptly changes the position of Rajavi from a leader to that of a religious, Shi’it imam:
The main core of Mojahedin’s ideological revolution was to solve the issue of leadership. It could put an end to a problem known to be the Achilles’ heel in most contemporary revolutions and movements; only a stabilized theory of imamate inside the organization could lead the new revolution. [8]
Many of his messages imply that he has a close relationship with Imam Zaman (the last and still awaited Imam in Shiite Islam) and therefore he has direct contact with God. Under Rajavi’s instructions as an ideological leader, members began to give up Islamic practices and rituals because, as stated by their chosen ideological leader, they were no longer individually responsible; they were only responsible to Rajavi and he was responsible to God. Later on, especial prayer texts were devised to praise him and his wife, Maryam.
The ideological metamorphosis opened a new gate onto a path where, in the first place, the rationality and even the social-political understanding of individuals were targeted. In other words, individuals would be transmuted into obedient and subjugated creatures serving the wills of the ideological leader. The whole idea can be concluded as:
That is clear that such process could pursue in no rational route. The dominant element in the process is “love” and “emotion” that bypass logic and reason. The means are not those of polemics and persuasions but self-devotion. That is the point where Massoud claims Mojahedin’s heart. [9]
A wave of advertising total devotion to the ideological leader began to be imposed on the minds of the insiders to indoctrinate that the ideological leader had an ideological vision which was broader and more universal than understanding and vision of an ordinary follower. He could see things and think in a way that seemed illogical and irrational at the time but proved to be correct at the end. Hence the followers had to follow the leader not on the basis of understanding, but on the base of total trust.
The second phase of the full transition to the status of a cult started after the Iran-Iraq cease-fire in 1988. Rajavi launched thousands of his warriors on ”Operation Eternal Light” across the border to capture Iranian territory. It was a total military failure. The operation before anything was a resolution of Rajavi’s own volition, a proven suicide operation excluding the leader himself. The failure proved to be a victory for Rajavi; the made amendments to the ideological revolution after the operation guaranteed his position as a hallowed figure with the sole authority to question anybody while the members were not in the least permitted to violate the leader’s sacramental sphere. To create a compelling control atop, all the individual attachments and values had to be detached. The detachment did not include physical spectrum, but above that, psychological scopes.
In a general meeting, Rajavi announced that as the ideological leader, he had issued the divorce of all the members from their spouses and asked all to hand over their marriage rings. The physically divorce of spouses and, consequently, children was the first taken steps; the world outside with all its attractions and emotional attachments had to be cleaned of the mind and devalued. One had to replace them with an alternative that was no one but Massoud and Maryam Rajavi.
Anne Singleton, a separated member of MKO in her book so describes manipulation of the members within the cult:
The psychological manipulation of members springs from Rajavi’s avid interest in using psychology as a means of controlling people. He has read voraciously from the time that he left prison, books on politics, psychology and history etc. His ideology is a mishmash of all these books, and not a single part of it derives from original thinking. Rajavi uses psychological manipulation to control people. The massuls [responsible ranks] are instructed to behave in particular ways towards individuals according to what is required of them or in response to a problem they might have. On a simple level, the warmth and affection shown to newcomers is a basic method of attracting them, fulfilling a basic need, which they lack. The person is told – and this is the ideological element – that if they look for love and affection outside Maryam they will become corrupt and ‘nothing’, they will be condemned to a life of obscurity, drudgery and meaninglessness. A picture of ordinary married life is portrayed as a hellish prison for both sexes. Children are the ultimate burden, removing the person further and further from the glorious joy and happiness that could be theirs if they give all their love to Maryam. She will return their love a hundred fold, and only inside the Mojahedin will they be able to fulfil their true potential as a human being. [10]
During the first Gulf War and the US attack to Iraq, MKO leaders enforced separation of the members’ children residing in Iraq-based camps. The children, about 800 including little babies, were sent to different Western countries for some purposes. First they could be abused as potential fundraising instruments to collect large amounts of charity money on pretext of Iranian homeless children. On the other hand, the children could be trained as the next generation of MKO soldiers. Nadereh Afshari, an ex-member of MKO and who was posted in Germany and was responsible for receiving children during the gulf war, has revealed that when the German government tried to absorb Mojahedin children into their education system, the organization refused. Many of these children were sent to Mojahedin-run schools, particularly in France. She has elaborated that Rajavi ”saw these kids as the next generation’s soldiers. They wanted to brainwash them and control them. Every morning and night, the kids, beginning as young as 1 and 2, had to stand before a poster of Massoud and Maryam, salute them and shout praises to them “. [11]
In June 2003, people in some Western cities were shocked to witness one of the most appalling cult potentialities of MKO. On 17 June 2003 more than 1.200 France police and gendarmerie forces raided 13 MKO-run offices in Paris districts and arrested 164 suspected Mojahedin cadres as well as Maryam Rajavi on charges of terrorist activities. In the next few days, to carry out premeditated missions, a number of the group’s members immolated themselves in public to protest Maryam Rajavi’s arrest. According to reports issued by the group itself, ‘œ16 people attempted to set themselves alight in three days in Paris, Berne, Rome, London, Ottawa, Athens and Nicosia’. The human tragedy ended with two deaths; two women, Sediqeh Mojaveri, 44-year-old, and Neda Hassani, 19-year-old, died because of the self-immolation injuries. [12]
Besides old members joining the organization for political causes, a large number of the members are the young Iranian people who have been deceived to join the group. These young, unaware recruits fall into the trap of the middlemen who by false promises of good job, high salary and residence in Western countries paralyze their rational minds and send them to MKO’s camps in Iraq. Undergoing brainwashing methods in the camps, they rarely dream to return to Iran because they are unnerved and intimidated by the threats of being tried and even executed for having connection and cooperating with a counter-revolutionary group.
The members who try to leave the MKO or criticize it in any form have to pay a very heavy price. In a 28-page report released by Human Rights Watch in May 2005 entitled ‘œNo Exit: Human Rights Abuses Inside the MKO Camps,’ shocking details about inhuman behaviors and control of the insiders of MKO was published for the world. The facts revealed how dissident members were tortured, beaten and held in solitary confinement for years at military camps in Iraq after they criticized the group’s policies and undemocratic practices, or indicated that they planned to leave the organization. The report is based on the direct testimonies of a dozen former MKO members, including five who were turned over to Iraqi security forces and held in notorious Abu Ghoraib prison under Saddam’s rule.
A common, routine procedure in MKO is self criticizing and confession sessions. The members have to write detailed daily reports of activities, their previous night’s dreams, their thoughts, and even love and emotional daydreams. In some cases, they are forced to read their reports before other members and suffer humiliation. Ali Qachqaoui, a separated member, reveals: ‘œThey remote controlled us, like robots. They told us, ‘If you have sexual fantasies, even a dream, you must report it in writing in order to exorcise it’. In a speech repeatedly broadcast in video, Maryam Rajavi told the Mojahedin: ‘80% of your energy should be used in the fight against your sexual instincts’. Many of the organization’s officers, who protested against this sudden authoritarian and sectarian change of course, paid a heavy price for their insubordination. They were humiliated, tortured and imprisoned. [13]
As a closed cult, the members receive any information through a biased channel. No form of news and information, movies and even the group’s own TV productions is presented unless reviewed and censured beforehand. Even the members active in Western countries are severely prohibited to have direct access to the media and have to attend periodical controlling meetings, write reports, and listen to direct or televised addresses of the high ranking members and leaders.
MKO has long been using a lexicon of its own. The terms they use inside the organization have their own connotations different with those used outside. The followings are examples of a more than 1200 terms lexicon volume:
– Alternative: meaning MKO as the sole alternative for Iran’s current ruling power
– To become ‘˜H’: used when demoting a rank
– Organizational marriage: forced inter-organizational marriages ordered by leaders
– Food echelon: a food menu that qualitatively and quantitatively is prepared according to hierarchical posts
– Ideological pride: Massoud and Maryam’s marriage known to be a glorious hallmark of the organization
– Active: a member who well accomplishes the issued orders
– Ring of connection: meaning Maryam Rajavi. Members are not capable to unite with Massoud unless through Maryam
– The host: meaning Iraq
– The guesthouse: the jail where protesting members and quitters were held
– ‘¦. And more
To determine how dangerous MKO cult might be, ‘œthe Advanced Bonewits’ Cult Danger Evaluation Frame’ can be a good help. As Bonewits explains, ‘œThe purpose of this evaluation tool is to help both amateur and professional observers, including current or would-be members, of various organizations (including religious, occult, psychological or political groups) to determine just how dangerous a given group is liable to be, in comparison with other groups, to the physical and mental health of its members and of other people subject to its influence’. [14]
The Advanced Bonewits’ Cult Danger Evaluation Frame
Factors: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Low High1. INTERNAL CONTROL: Amount ofinternal political power exercisedby leader(s) over members. 1. _________________________ 2. WISDOM CLAIMED by leader(s);amount of infallibility declaredor implied about decisions or doc-trinal/scriptural interpretations. 2. __________________________ 3. WISDOM CREDITED to leader(s)by members; amount of trust indecisions or doctrinal/scripturalinterpretations made by leader(s). 3. _________________________ 4. DOGMA: Rigidity of reality con-cepts taught; amount of doctrinalinflexibility or "fundamentalism." 4. __________________________ 5. RECRUITING: Emphasis put onattracting new members; amountof proselytizing. 5. __________________________ 6. FRONT GROUPS: Number of subsid-iary groups using different namesfrom that of main group. 6. _________________________ 7. WEALTH: Amount of money and/orproperty desired or obtained by group;emphasis on members’ donations;economic lifestyle of leader(s)compared to ordinary members. 7. ________________________ 8. POLITICAL POWER: Amount ofexternal political influencedesired or obtained; emphasis ondirecting members’ secular votes. 8. ________________________ 9. SEXUAL MANIPULATION: of membersby leader(s); amount of controlexercised over sexuality of members;advancement dependent upon sexualfavors or specific lifestyle. 9. _________________________ 10. CENSORSHIP: Amount of controlover members’ access to outsideopinions on group, its doctrinesor leader(s). 10. ________________________ 11. DROPOUT CONTROL: Intensity ofefforts directed at preventing orreturning dropouts. 11. _________________________ 12. VIOLENCE: amount of approval whenused by or for the group, itsdoctrines or leader(s). 12. _________________________ 13. PARANOIA: amount of fear con-cerning real or imagined enemies;perceived power of opponents;prevalence of conspiracy theories. 13. _________________________ 14. GRIMNESS: Amount of disapprovalconcerning jokes about the group,its doctrines or its leader(s). 14. _________________________ 15. SURRENDER OF WILL: Amount ofemphasis on members not having tobe responsible for personal deci-sions; degree of individual dis-empowerment created by the group,its doctrines or its leader(s). 15. __________________________ 16. HYPOCRISY: amount of approval forother actions (not included above) which the group officially considersimmoral or unethical, when done by or for the group, its doctrines or leader(s); willingness to violate group’s declared principles for political, psychological, economic,or other gain. 16. ___________________________ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Low High
A precise evaluation of MKO well crystallizes it as one of the most destructive and visible examples of a group intermingling the characteristics of a terrorist group and a cult to be nominated a terrorist cult. A terrorist cult poses a greater danger because of the growing use of mind control and cult control techniques. Most terrorist organizations actively study and use mind control and cult control techniques to indoctrinate members into committing the horrific acts of terrorism that shock our senses. The real cause of much of today’s terrorism is not what the terrorists themselves advertise and claim in their publicly stated agendas and rationalized causes. The real cause of acts of terrorism is how these agendas and ideas were implanted into the minds of the members with mind control and cult control techniques by their handlers. The responsibility lies on the shoulders of the responsible minds and elites of a society to illuminate the naïve minds and depict a clear-cut image of a destructive cult to stop any further jeopardizing the young generation’s career.
Sources:
[3]. A Guide to Cults and New Religions; ed. Ronald Enroth, Downers Grove, Ill, InterVarsity 1983, p14.
[4].www.phact.org
[5]. www.refocus.org
[6]. www.banisadr.infoideologicalChapter Five.htm
[7]. Bijan Nyabati interview with Zari Isfahani, Taliah-Sepidedaman.com
[8]. Nyabati Bijan; ‘œA distinct look at Mojahedin’s internal revolution, slightly from inside, slightly from outside’, 113.
[9]. Ibid.
[10]. Singleton Anne; Saddam’s Private Army, Iran-Interlink, 2003.
[11]. www.rickross.comThe Cult of Rajavi.htm
[12]. www.mojahedin.ws
[13]. www.mojahedin.wsbooksThe People’s Mojahedin of Iran: A struggle for what?
[14]. www.qed.net/bonewits/ABCDEF.HTML
Nejat Association – Translated by mojahedin.ws -August, 2007