What Rajavi reiterated after the fall of Saddam as Mojahedin’s main patron in the region is the resistance of Camp Ashraf and he has repetitively stated that the resistance of Ashraf means a global resistance. He has, however, realized that, according to the existing agreements, he has to sooner or later evacuate Ashraf to move to another country. The retreat to submit to the legal demands, although there were threats of some human tragedy to some extent, indicates that Rajavi has at last come to be logical and reasonable although hard to believe.
 
Regardless of all merits, there are inevitable consequences but one thing is for certain that one can be optimistic about the political, ideological and strategic outcomes of departure from Ashraf. Rajavi’s consent denotes that nothing will change in the world whether Ashraf residents resist or leave and that, he has to submit to Iraqi Government’s determination to carry out its decision; a complete negation of his chanted slogans calling Ashraf the ideological bulwark of the organization. Our concern here is not the negative consequences but how a promising prospect can it be for Rajavi if he yields to the opportunity.

Evacuation of Ashraf is tantamount to an end to the adopted strategy of the liberation war to overthrow the regime. To put it in a nutshell, Rajavi insisted to preserve Camp Ashraf as he believed it was the main concentration of the forces ready for the ripe time to overthrow the regime. He put his theory into practice through a number of military operations, namely Chelcheragh (Blazing Light), Aftab (the Sun) and Forugh Javidan (the Eternal Light). Although none of them brought the least success for him, this was the main reason that made him move and settle in Iraq close enough to the borders for the purpose. Consequently, relinquishing the possession of Ashraf implies that the organization has reached the end of a 24 year-long propagation attempt of legitimizing the strategy of the liberation army. And the paid price has been the life of at least half of the members for no gain. How will Rajavi accept his errs and sit to a self-criticism is a matter of future but of course nobody expects him to feel under any obligation to reveal truths and facts.

Thus, the armed strategy of liberation hitting its end, since the organization must abandon its concentration camp, what will Rajavi’s alternative will be? Relocation of Ashraf to any other land necessarily means that an alternative is crucial to the survival of the organization. Can it be a thorough negation and renouncement of the ideologically inwoven armed strategy to replace it with a purely political one identical to other active opposition in abroad? An irrevocable decision as it may seem, it is far more logical for Rajavi to concede rather than to engage himself in any violent backlash to counteract the crises before him.

He must adapt himself to the situation willingly or unwillingly though not entirely unexpected. No doubt, he cannot establish a similar military camp anywhere and no land will admit his companions unless Rajavi has absolutely renounced armed strategy and violent struggle and completely disarmed. He has to make it clear about his alternative method of struggle now that he has decided to abolish the ideologically militarist centre.
 
It is the prerequisite of settlement in the US or any other European or non-European country since no land permits the seeds of violence and discord sown on its soil unless it is itself an advocate of violence and a danger to the global peace. Even if an adopted tactic, the consequent impact on the organization will not be something of trifle; the minimum of this will be an avalanche-like separation and desert of the insiders or possible inter-organizational schisms.

The last point, Rajavi’s decision should not receive remonstrant and scornful responses since any wise and logical decision deserves encouragement be it from Rajavi’s part or else. The least one can expect is a remarkable decrease in possible, consequent costs of such relocation.