Iran

Iran’s ambassador discusses MKO with UN envoy to Iraq

TEHRAN — UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Iraq, Staffan de Mistura, and Iranian Ambassador to Baghdad, Hassan Kazemi Qomi, met on Sunday to discuss the need for Iran’s ongoing and positive engagement with Iraq as well as with its other neighbors, UN news centre reported on Monday.

De Mistura and Kazemi also talked about possible increased support by Iran for Iraqi reconstruction under the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq.

The Iranian envoy raised the issue of the terrorist Mojahedin Khalq Organization (MKO) and asked whether the UN has a position on the legality of the presence of MKO members in Iraq.

De Mistura did not comment on the issue, but stated that he has no plans to meet with the organization.

However, Iranian state radio said the UN envoy said that MKO was a terrorist organization and any activity by this group was illegal in Iraq.

The MKO was set up in the mid-1960s to oppose the U.S.-backed dictatorship of the late Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. It participated in the country’s revolution but soon launched a campaign of assassinations and bombings in Iran.

The group moved to Iraq in the early 1980s and it fought Iran from there until the United States invaded in 2003. The Americans have since disarmed thousands of the group’s members and confined them to a camp near Baghdad.

Tehran Times ,December 5, 2007

   

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The Ideology of the MEK

The Role of Strategic Stalemates in MKO ideological Shift 2

Failure in overthrowing the regime

The short-term plan to overthrow the Iranian regime announced by Rajavi at the peak of MKO’s wave of internal terrorist actions, such as the explosions in the central office of the Islamic Republican Party and the Prime Ministry Building, constituted the most controversial issue that challenged the Mojahedin’s leadership. Believing that these bloody terrorist deeds would lead to destabilization of the regime, Rajavi declared that it ultimately took six months to finalize the collapse.

The prime aftermath of the declared phases of armed warfare following Khordad 30th (20 June 1981) was that Rajavi’s promise proved to be a chimera. Although insignificant at the beginning, after a while and following the military failures and stalemates, the challenge turned into serious crises within MKO.

Again and again Rajavi, overconfident of terrorist actions that he referred to as ‘great operations’, predicted a short time overthrow in his press interviews. He even classified the definite time of overthrow into three periods: short, mid, and long and finally fixed the exact date in a 5 year span. A review of Rajavi’s position taking reveals the fact that after 20 June, he began to evade determining an exact date for the overthrow. Finally he postponed his promise until the death of the leader of Islamic Republic.

From the phase of 20 June on, followed by the formation of NCR, Rajavi promoted himself atop of both MKO and NCRI as the egocentric decision-maker. Although everybody was aware that he was the one to say the last word, later on, and in the course of ideological revolution, Mehdi Abrishamchi referred to the decisive role of Rajavi in critical decisions such as that which initiated the armed phase. Even the Western media were interested in his hegemonic leadership atop of the organization in those years. Many of them asserted that he cleverly dodged the reporters’question and in one case, Jean Gueyras tells the story of Rajavi and his misuse of power for his personal ambitions:

Hidden away in his country bunker in Auvers-sur-Oise, Mr. Massoud Rajavi, the leader of the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI) has mastered the art of allying the useful with the pleasurable. He sugar coats his decisions, even those about his private life, with politico-ideological statements of considerable grandiloquence. Thus, in October 1982, to justify his marriage to Firouzeh Bani Sadr, daughter of the former President of the Islamic Republic only eight months after the tragic death of his first wife, Ashraf Rab’i (killed on 8 February 1982 by the Pasdaran); he published a joint bulletin of the PMOI’s Politburo and Central Committee in which his marriage was presented as ‘one of the most important revolutionary decisions ever taken by the Mojahedin’ and as an initiative which would help consolidate the unity of the Iranian nation’. (1)

Antoine Gessler’s Autopsy of an Ideological Drift well explains that Rajavi and his organization are badly in need of being at the center of the world’s attention and are very afraid of being sunk into oblivion. Rajavi’s promises of victory to motivate his forces have never come true:

It involves an organization in permanent panic of being forgotten, a threat that grows day by day, and must, therefore, motivate its militants who have never witnessed the victory announced thousands of times in the past (2).

Such evidences prove the fact that even years before the ideological revolution and his promotion as the ideological leader, Rajavi had succeeded to maintain his unbeatable authority over the organization. After a while, the internal crises were well controlled but unsolved question of overthrow, in spite of the heavy responsibility of rampant terrorist operations, remained as an internal challenge that negatively affected Mojahedin’s relations. Then the circumstances lead to a condition in which Mojahedin were forced to deny the possibility of short- and mid-term overthrow. The critical situation of Mojahedin on the one hand and Iran’s prevailing over internal crises on the other hand corroborated fallacy of MKO’s promise of short-term overthrow. Although the leadership never acknowledged the fact openly, the analysis of the ideological development confirmed it. Niyabati’s outspoken fashion leaves no doubt that the leadership was convinced of the fact that the organization was structurally no match to cause regime’s downfall:

A summary of the political, military, organizational, and ideological aspects in fall 1984 made one point clear to Mojahedin, that was, the short-term overthrow of the regime was impossible due to the ideological-organizational structure on the one hand and outer-organizational political relations with various political trends active inside and outside of the country. (3)

According to Niyabati, such a particular phase was in fact the turning point of internal challenges Mojahedin had encountered. He refers to two years earlier when Mojahedin took the wrong path of the so-called phase of armed struggle that founded the background to such challenges. He further elaborates on two strategic solutions of Mojahedin in this regard and writes:

The year 1984 was a determining phase to reach a final settlement in political, military, strategic, and ideological scenes. The political and military impasse of armed resistance as well as the failure in short-term overthrow of the regime that came to light at the end of 1982 and became a proven fact at the beginning of 1983, led Mojahedin into a dilemma. (4)

Mehdi Khanbaba-Tehrani, an NCRI ex-member, in his review of the phase refers to failures and their aftermath within MKO and NCRI and concludes that the ideological revolution worked as the decisive solution to the desperate question of overthrow that was pressing hard on Rajavi and NCRI:

In my opinion, MKO has met serious crises due to the failure of the short-term plan of overthrow and its aftermath that has gravely questioned the organization’s leadership. Actually, the ideological revolution was the manifestation of such internal conflicts. To keep the integrity and life of the organization, Mojahedin’s leadership arrived at a compromise that resulted in pluralizing the leadership by means of adding a woman atop who had to change her name and get married to Rajavi. (5)

Hadi Shams-Haeri, another former member, considers the strategic stalemates and failures of MKO to be a result of Rajavi’s ineptitude, having no realistic appraisal of the situation inside Iran, and finally continuation of keeping the insiders in dark about the realities and insisting on the futile tactic of overthrow:

Of the Rajavi’s betrayals was advertising the overthrow of the Islamic republic as a possibly easy and quick task. In this regard, Rajavi never referred to the real problems and shortcomings that would be encountered on the route. (6)

Haeri also has the opinion that Rajavi is the sole responsible for the wrong decision of overthrow and the move on 20 June. He writes:

In fact, the armed warfare that initially aimed at overthrowing the regime in short-term and assuming the political power lasted not more than 1.5 years and ended in a complete strategic failure. The pioneer forces not only lost the ground but were strangled due to adverse circumstances. It happened as a result of inadequate and incorrect appraisal of forces’capacity on 20 June. (7)

As such, the issue of overthrow which acted as a motivator for winning the support of opposition groups, as well as some states standing in shadow, gradually turned into a factor arousing opposing reactions within MKO and NCRI.

 

References:

1. Gessler, Antoine; Autopsy of an Ideological Drift, Chapter 22.

2. ibid, chapter 19.

3. Niyabati, B. A different look at the ideological revolution within MKO. Khavaran publication, p.16.

4. ibid, p.16.

5. An inside look at left movements in Iran, some interviews with Mehdi Khanbaba-Tehrani, the interview 17.

6. Shams-Haeri, H. The swamp, Khavaran publication, p.35.

7. ibid.

 

Bahar Irani,Mojahedin.ws,December 6, 2007

 

 

   

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UK

POAC Judgment and the alledged Renunciation of Terrorism by Mojahedin K

The political life of Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO), especially after Rajavi’s retreat to hideout to let his phoenix of democracy, Maryam Rajavi, to hold sway a democratic tactic after a long frantic phase of terrorism, heavily depends on propaganda ploys. Following a rather long propaganda doldrums, the UK court ruling, seemingly in favour of MKO, granted the organization  propaganda machine a recovering opportunity.

It started all with celebrating the court ruling along with Maryam Rajavi who in turn began extravagant performances of welcoming the decision and sending messages of congratulations. The scenario continued with repetitive, lengthy TV shows and analysis programs with a variety of analysts who suddenly turned to be experts in law and judiciary affairs. It is all to justify what has long remained controversial and even the court left it unsolved.

Mojahedin insist to prove that the organization has forsworn terrorism since 2001. They mean to say, the organization has stopped engaging in militarism and terrorism only for five years after maintaining a terrorist structure and aggressive nature in a span of at least twenty years according to the essential grounds set out in the court’s judgment:

23.1. Whatever the accurate characterisation of the organisation’s activities between 1980 and 2001, the position in 2006-2007 is radically different, and has been so since 2001.

23.2. That the PMOI has conducted no military activity of any kind since about August 2001, whether in Iran or elsewhere in the world.

Although nothing is said about countless terrorist operations of the group inside Iran, even based on what is stated above, the Secretary of State could in no way trust the temporary cessation of MKO’s terrorist activities without an officially announced denunciation of terrorism endorsed by the leaders. In a letter dated 1 September 2006 sent to the applicants of the appeal that is included in page 9 of the court’s judgment, the Secretary of State has concluded;

“Accordingly, even though there has been a temporary cessation of terrorist acts, I am not satisfied that the organisation and its members have permanently renounced terrorism (para 22)

and:

“Mere cessation of terrorist acts do not amount to renunciation of terrorism. Without a clear and publicly available renunciation of terrorism by the PMOI, I am entitled to fear that terrorist activity that has been suspended for pragmatic reasons will be resumed in the future” (para 23).

Even the accuracy of such remarks that “the PMOI has conducted no military activity of any kind since about August 2001 is dubious and questionable. Corroborated by Mojahedin’s own official communiqués published in the group’s official organ, Mojahed, MKO has certainly conducted terrorist operations inside Iran. Only one of these cases, the Ferdows operation, is referred to in the appeal as the “glorification” of terrorism. Existing evidences confirm that at least until 22 August 2002, MKO had been ceaselessly engaged in terrorist operations. Here is Evidences Dismissing MKO’s Disclaim of Terrorism to substantiate the claim.

No doubt, MKO has a military structure and its inherent aggressive characteristic endorsed by its declared strategy of armed struggle classifies it as a terrorist organization that has justly been proscribed. Actually, to de-proscribe a terrorist organization, there should be factual basis presented to a state and upon which a decision might be made. There is no need to justify renunciation of terrorism by inferring from reports and statements published here and there. The first evidence any court needs in the first stage to decide de-proscription of a terrorist organization that has been conducting terrorist deeds at least for forty years is an official declaration of renouncing violence and terrorism as did an Irish group in May.

The Irish paramilitary Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) through an officially issued statement declared that “as of 12 midnight, Thursday 3 May 2007, the Ulster Volunteer Force and Red Hand Commando will assume a non-military, civilianized, role”. The UK Secretary of State has the right “to reject or cast doubt on the evidence presented to him that the MKO had renounced terrorism and rejected violence”.

To deracinate the malign roots of terrorism, especially a dangerous terrorist cult like MKO, special care should be taken to avoid harm that might come from the snakes in the grass. The problem is that the majority of the group’s advocates have been kept in dark about its overtly atrocious terrorist operations on which it has dodged to contribute facts.

As in the case of the judgment of the Court of First Instance of the European Communities released on 12 December 2006, nothing will come out of the judgment of POAC for Mojahedin. The only advantage out of it is its use as a vehicle of widespread, ceaseless propaganda, something MKO badly need instead of being removed from the list of proscribed organizations.

 

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The Ideology of the MEK

Masud Rajavi’s timetable for destruction – January 2008 or 2009?

 

Immediately after the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 Massoud Rajavi, guru of the Mojahedin Khalq cult went into hiding. After three years incommunicado, a statement was issued in 2006 in his name. In it Rajavi announced his timescale for toppling the Iranian regime: "in the next two years". Little attention was given at the time. Rajavi has made this kind of claim frequently over the past 30 years without effect.  

Information from inside the cult, however, indicates that the specific deadline of January 2009 is part of a more sinister plan by the cult leaders. Following the announcement of this date, every member was required to sign a piece of paper giving their oath that they will not leave the cult until January 2009 – by which time, according to Rajavi, the regime must be toppled.

Rajavi’s message states that when the deadline of January 2009 arrives: ‘anyone who wants to can leave, and I will myself throw out all the useless ones. I will keep the rest who are pure, and I will tell them then what they have to do for me’. Experts on the MKO’s cult jargon interpret this as Rajavi’s intention to have his followers ‘wreak havoc’; the most predictable scenarios being mass suicide in Camp Ashraf and/or attacks on external interests with suicidal intensity in other parts of the world where the MKO cult has bases. That is, the ‘pure’ MKO operatives will kill all Rajavi’s opponents in Europe and then kill themselves.

The 2006 US State Department Country Reports on Terrorism, which describes the Mojahedin as a terrorist entity with cult-like characteristics, warned: "Many MEK leaders and operatives, however, remain at large, and the number of at-large MEK operatives who received weapons and bomb-making instruction from Saddam Hussein’s regime remains a source of significant concern."

A similar plan was previously exposed by Iran-Interlink [see links below]. On November 3rd 2001 in response to 9/11, Rajavi announced the Black Phase – if US forces attacked Iraq, the MKO would launch an all-out attack on Iran.

http://www.iran-interlink.org/files/child%20pages/pending_human_rights_disaster.htm

http://www.iran-interlink.org/files/info/brief_3.htm

Over thirty years, Rajavi has consistently sought conflict and chaos to keep his cult alive. Since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003 Rajavi has tied his fate to the US neo-conservative/far-right Israeli agenda of regime change. The MKO has repeatedly and emphatically offered itself to be used as an agent for regime change.

Banking on an aggravated standoff between Iran and the USA, Rajavi had hoped the US (or Israel) would attack Iran before the end of the Bush administration. But by 2006 the MKO leadership had grasped that after January 2009 the current Bush Administration would lose any possibility of starting a war with Iran, and any successor would be unlikely to start a war soon after. Ordering his followers to adhere to his deadline serves to ensure that the cult does not disintegrate from within before that date. The deadline is also a warning to western governments, the MKO will wreak havoc in the cities of Europe if I, and my cult, are not supported.

Now with the US National Intelligence Estimate report on December 3rd effectively removing any reason for war with Iran for the foreseeable future, there is nothing left for Rajavi to fill the void between now and January 2009. His deadline for destruction appears to have arrived sooner than he anticipated.

ENDS

Contact

Anne Singleton, Iran-Interlink

editor@iran-interlink.org

www.iran-interlink.org

Iran-Interlink

PO Box 148

Leeds LS16 5YJ

UK

 

Iran Interlink Brief, December 08, 2007

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USA

Iran moves to pull a troublesome thorn

The November 15 report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on Iran’s nuclear program indicates that Tehran is still violating existing United Nations Security Council resolutions by continuing the construction of a heavy reactor and installing a total of 2,952 centrifuges needed for uranium enrichment.

International pressure on the Iranian government to cease such work is likely to increase in the following months. The present stalemate on the nuclear negotiations coincides with a tougher

US strategy toward Iran, which includes designating the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organization and implementing a new round of unilateral sanctions.

While military action is still not seen as a viable option by the Department of Defense, there are certainly many within and without the White House who are growing increasingly restless about the seeming futility of sanctions. The most vocal advocate and perpetrator of violent regime change in Iran is the Mujahideen-e-Khalq organization (MEK), an Iranian opposition group designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the United States (Executive Order 13224, Department of State, 2003) and the European Union.

A 2007 German intelligence report from the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution called the MEK a”repressive, sect-like and Stalinist authoritarian organization which centers around the personality cult of Maryam and Mas’ud Rajavi”.

During the initial phase of the Iranian Revolution, the MEK was significantly influenced by Marxist theories and concepts of exploitation and class struggle, and particular emphasis was placed on Ho Chi Minh and Che Guevara and their ideas of guerrilla warfare. Besides these foreign Marxist influences, the MEK’s ideology was also heavily informed by Islamist/Marxist scholar Ali Shariati (1933-1977), who wrote many treatises on the idea of suffering and eternal struggle in Shi’ite doctrine, combining it with socialist ideas of class emancipation vis-a-vis secular tyranny.

When the Peoples’ Mujahideen were excluded from power sharing after 1979 and thousands of its members were executed under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s orders, their struggle turned against what was to become the Islamic Republic. To date, the MEK’s structure is heavily dominated by a socialist outlook coupled with an Islamist veneer, highlighting the concepts of justice in reference to Shi’ite doctrines. The latter serves to legitimize the MEK in the eyes of Iranians at home and helps foster full commitment to the cause.

In October, the 4,000 residents of the MEK’s”Camp Ashraf”in Iraq staged a spectacular large-scale festival that included extensive military style parades, martial arts performances and a display of unarmed combat units. Video excerpts of the festivities were posted on YouTube. The festival was as much a display of military strength and the MEK’s ongoing commitment to fight the regime in Iran as it was a homage to the two leaders of the MEK.

One of the lingering questions surrounding the group’s continued existence is why it has not been disbanded.

Following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the group was disarmed and many of its members were questioned by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Soon after, US Major General John D Gardner confirmed the status of the residents of Camp Ashraf as”protected persons”under the 4th Geneva Convention, stating that”the coalition remains deeply committed to the security and rights of the protected people of Ashraf”.

Evidently, one of Iran’s key demands to the US government is the closure of Camp Ashraf and the subsequent expulsion of all MEK members. Despite demands by the International Committee of the Red Cross that residents of Camp Ashraf”must not be deported, expelled or repatriated”, Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari said in April that the Iraqi government intended to resettle MEK members in European countries and set a deadline of six months for the move. The resettlement is unlikely to materialize given the EU’s tough stance toward the group and its umbrella organization, the National Resistance Council for Iran, but it still indicates that the MEK’s host country is becoming increasingly restless over its presence.

By and large it seems that the Iranian government is following a two-track strategy with regards to the MEK base in Iraq. Iranian diplomats in Iraq are putting increasing pressure on Baghdad to expel the group from Iraqi territory and to actively prosecute leading MEK operatives. At the same time, Iranian authorities continue to offer amnesties for members who cut their ties with the group and return to Iran. The MEK still creates serious security problems for Iran; according to a recent speech by Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki, the group has killed over 16,000 people in and outside Iran, including one president, one prime minister, four ministers and dozens of members of parliament.

Most recently, Iranian authorities arrested a group of MEK operatives for the assassination of Sheikh Hashem Samiri, a Friday prayer leader in the city of Ahwaz. The crime was linked to the earlier September shooting of Sheikh Samir Durak, Friday prayer leader in the Koy-e Alavi district.

Following numerous consultations with Iraqi authorities, Tehran’s lobbying efforts seem to be paying off. Citing evidence of MEK involvement in the current insurgency as well as atrocities committed against Iraqi citizens, Ja’afar al-Musawi, chief prosecutor of the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal, issued arrest warrants for 150 MEK members, including the group’s leaders Maryam and Mas’ud Rajavi. Though insisting that all of them would be tried under the criminal jurisdiction of Iraq and not be handed over to Iran, Musawi indicated that extradition agreements with Iran will be concluded in the near future.

At the same time, authorities in Iran are wooing residents of Camp Ashraf to come back by offering amnesty and re-socialization programs. Since 2003, over 500 MEK members have returned to Iran, been officially pardoned by Supreme Leader Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and extensively debriefed by Iranian intelligence. Iran’s judiciary officials continue to emphasize that defectors from Camp Ashraf will not be prosecuted on their return to Iran.

Though such amnesty initiatives prove to be useful incentives for disaffected members and their families, they fall short of genuinely addressing Iranian security concerns over the group’s ongoing activities in Iraq. The most urgent issue for Tehran is what Mohammad Jafari of the Iranian National Security Council described as intelligence cooperation between US forces in Iraq and MEK operatives sent across the border to spy in Iranian territory.

Though such accusations are difficult to verify, demands by the Iraqi government to dismantle Camp Ashraf and prosecute those charged with crimes have not yet been met. Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, head of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, claims these efforts are actively prevented by the United States. The recent propaganda festival staged in Camp Ashraf has only fueled Iranian suspicions that the MEK is still considered by the United States as an effective ally against Iran.

 there is no evidence that the MEK enjoy any high-profile support in the State Department or Pentagon, there are certainly some on Capitol Hill who consider any enemies of Iran as friends of the United States. Most notably, congressmen Michael McCaul, Nick Lampson and Brad Sherman have repeatedly asked the US government to remove the MEK from the terrorist list.

Echoing such demands, the White Paper published by the US pressure group Iran Policy Committee in 2007 perceives the MEK in Iraq as”very useful for providing intelligence for border controls and operations”and, because of their”extensive network within Iran”and their”excellent record of revealing key intelligence about the IRGC proxies’ infiltration routes into Iraq”, the MEK is seen as a viable”interlocutor”between Washington and Sunni groups to quell Iraqi sectarian violence.

Given Camp Ashraf residents’ legal limbo under the 4th Geneva Convention, the United States is faced with the highly complex decision of whether to hand over MEK militants to Iraq or Iran, or arrange asylum in a third country. Each choice carries consequences for US-Iranian relations. Although denied by US authorities, keeping the MEK in Iraq may still be seen by some policymakers as providing an effective bargaining chip in the nuclear weapons negotiations.

Dr Bernd Kaussler holds a MA and PhD from the University of St. Andrews and is currently assistant professor in political science at James Madison University. As associate fellow at the Institute for Iranian Studies at St Andrews, he is involved in various research projects on contemporary Iranian politics and foreign policy.

By Bernd Kaussler,

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Mujahedin Khalq 's Function

The Terrorist’s Challenged Intelligence

The existing tension between the United States and Iran has compelled the US in the past years to collect intelligence on Iran from various exile organizations including Mojahedin-e Khalg Organization (MKO) that has long been leading a violent struggle against the Iranian regime and was even aligned with Saddam ‘s regime that was at war with Iran. Although its ideology is a blend of Marxism with Islam and from the very initiation strongly advocated an anti-American policy, but in recent years, having taken a 180 degree turn, has begun trying to put forward a thousand and one arguments to prove that it has dropped its Marxist rhetoric and is an apostle of democracy for Iranians.

In December 2002, in spite of being listed on the State Department’s list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, MKO informed the US government of the existence of two nuclear sites in Iran. However, Sy Hersh later revealed in”The New Yorker” that Israel had provided the group with the information that it boasted as its own piece of intelligence to reveal Iran’s nuclear threat. From then on, it worked as a good subject to feed the group’s propaganda machine, an alibi to advance its own cult-like ambitions that had nothing to do with Iranian’s true wills. But the machine seems to be dropping as of the Monday.

The latest release of a collective study by all 16 US intelligence services, known as the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), reveals that Iran has turned its back on its nuclear ambitions since 2003. It is a great disappointment to MKO that a big bulk of its propaganda activities concentrates on Iran’s nuclear threat. Of course, MKO has nothing to lose as an opposition group that hardly respects political ethics in its struggle. It is much a new challenge for the US for having put any trust in a proscribed terrorist group that is heavily built on the structure of a cult of personality.

In a recent article entitled Intelligence on Iran Still Lacking, it is explicitly stated why the US has to remain skeptical of expatriate groups like MKO, aks MEK and NCRI.

Perhaps the MEK’s greatest claim to fame was its discovery of clandestine enrichment activity at Natanz in 2002. Shortly thereafter, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) pressed Iran to open the facility up to international inspectors. The U.S.-based Iranian expatriate community and MEK also provided useful intelligence on the existence of Arak, a heavy-water research reactor in Iran. With the State Department now having a more pronounced role over Iran policy, some experts expect Washington to work less closely with Iranian exile groups like the MEK. Paul R. Pillar, a career CIA officer and professor of security studies at Georgetown University, says it’s wise to remain skeptical of expatriate groups. “Iran has its Chalabis, too,” Pillar says. Ahmed Chalabi, briefly a deputy Iraqi prime minister after Saddam Hussein’s ouster, is widely criticized for providing faulty intelligence to the United States about Iraq’s weapons programs and exaggerating his own ability to win support inside Iraq. “There are some lessons to be drawn from having your intelligence coming from some quarters and not others,” Pillar concludes.

Sattar Orangi comments on Coucil of Foreign Relations Article, December 5, 2007

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Nejat Publications

Pars Brief – Issue No.37

1.    Professor Paul Sheldon Foote visit to the British Parliament

2.    When Raymond Tanter turns out his wife to please a cult

3.    Woman brainwashed into staying at guerrilla camp, lawyer says

4.    Rajavi’s latest statement: I am not a terrorist but I am going to kill you all

5.    Mujahedin Khalq Cause of Problems in Iraq

6.    Mojahedin Khalq Organisation (Rajavi Cult) exposed on French TV

7.    Momentum built for Cheney impeachment

8.    Why are MKO terrorists supported by Neocons and Israelis?

 
Download Pars Brief – Issue No.37
Download Pars Brief – Issue No.37

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UK

UK rejects lifting ban on Mojahedin Khalq (MKO) terrorist group

The British government rejected a ruling Friday that the anti-Iran Mujahideen-e-Khalq terrorist organisation (MKO) should be removed from the UK’s proscribed groups.

“I am disappointed at this judgement. We don’t accept it and we intend to appeal,”Home Office Minister Tony McNulty said.

He added that the MKO would remain on the UK’s list of banned terror organisations during the appeal.

The government’s rejection came after the Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission in London ruled that the terrorist sect, which is also banned in Europe and the US, should be removed from Britain’s blacklist.

The MKO, which has carried out wholesale terrorist acts in Iran since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, was among the first organisations to be formally outlawed under Britain’s Terrorism Act 2000

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UK

British Govenment: Mojahedin Khalq Remain in the List of Terrorism

LONDON, Nov 30 (Reuters) – A British tribunal ruled on Friday to remove Iran’s main opposition movement from a government a list of proscribed terrorist organisations.

The People’s Mujahideen Organisation of Iran, a resistance group, said it was a "magnificent victory for justice", after a six-year battle to annul the listing. But Britain’s government said it was "disappointed" and it intended to appeal.

The group will stay on the proscribed list until the matter is resolved. The organisation is the armed wing of the France-based National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), which says it renounced military activity in 2001.

Following the judgement, Maryam Rajavi, president-elect of the NCRI, called on the European Union (EU) to echo the appeal verdict and remove the group from its blacklist.

"We have always said and repeat again that the fundamental solution to the Iranian crisis is neither foreign military intervention nor appeasement," she said in a statement.

"The solution is democratic change by the Iranian people and resistance, making it imperative to remove the barriers placed in the path of this resistance."

Britain’s Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission ruled there was "no evidence that the PMOI has at any time since 2003 sought to re-create any form of structure that was capable of carrying out or supporting terrorist acts".

Its 144-page final judgement document said there was no evidence of any attempt by the PMOI to "prepare" for terrorism or encourage others to commit acts of terrorism.

"Nor is there any material that affords any grounds for a belief that the PMOI was ‘otherwise concerned in terrorism at the time of the decision in September 2006," it said.

GOVERNMENT DEFIANT

In a letter to the PMOI last year, Britain’s home secretary said he recognised there had been a "temporary cessation of terrorist acts" but was "not satisfied that the organisation and its members have permanently renounced terrorism".

Home Office Minister Tony McNulty said on Friday the government did not accept the ruling.

"The government adopted a cautious approach in relation to the de-proscription of the People’s Mujahideen Organisation of Iran," he said in a statement.

"I remain convinced that where terrorism is concerned, the rights of the law abiding majority and the overriding need to protect the public, both in the UK and abroad, must lead us to take such a cautious approach."

The PMOI, known as "the Mujahideen-e-Khalq", was added to Britain’s list of proscribed organisations under the Terrorism Act 2000 in March 2001. It first applied to be de-proscribed in June that year.

Earlier this year, it launched legal action to annul its listing as a terrorism group by the EU and to win damages.

The EU blacklist also includes the Palestinian Hamas group, Sri Lanka’s Tamil Tigers and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party. Blacklisting means groups are banned and have assets frozen.

The PMOI, which has bases in Iraq, began as a leftist-Islamist opposition to the late Shah of Iran, but fell out with Shi’ite clerics who took power after the 1979 Islamic revolution.

It is said by Western analysts to have little support in Iran because of its collaboration with Iraq during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war. (Editing by Steve Addison and Michael Winfrey)

Reuters News, Jennifer Hill, November 30, 2007

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Mujahedin Khalq Organization as a terrorist group

MKO would remain a proscribed organisation

Tribunal rejects Iran group ban The People’s Mujahideen Organisation of Iran (PMOI) is illegal in the European Union and the United States. But the Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission in London ruled ministers must remove it from their blacklist.

After the verdict, Home Office Minister Tony McNulty said: "I am disappointed at this judgement. We don’t accept it and we intend to appeal."

The Home Office said that the PMOI would remain a proscribed organisation during the appeal by the government.  Launch attacks  The PMOI, or Mujahideen-e Khalq, which operates in exile, says it has renounced violence since 2001. The opposition group has been a thorn in Tehran’s side for more than two decades.

A militant organisation, whose ideology combines elements of both Marxism and Islam, the group based itself in Iraq after being expelled from Iran.

For more than 15 years before the fall of Saddam Hussein, it used bases in Iraq to launch attacks against Iran.

Sixteen MPs and 19 members of the House of Lords appealed against the proscription in the first case to be heard by the POAC.

They argued that there rights to support and promote what they said was a democratic and peaceful opposition to the regime in Tehran had been infringed.

Lord Corbett, chairman of the Committee for Iran Freedom, claimed the banning had been tied up with international diplomatic attempts to stop Iran developing nuclear weapons.

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