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Former members of the MEK

Suicide operation, a lever to defend Camp Ashraf

An interview with Batool Soltani on MKO self-immolations – Part seven

Sahar Family Foundation: If you will, Mrs. Soltani, let’s have a talk over claimed challenges that presses the organization to react by suicide operations. I mean, what are the threats that concern the organization to prescribe suicide operation to confront? Is there actually any objective worth of concern or claims are merely grounded on propagation or a falsely intensified atmosphere?

Batool Soltani: It can be argued from many angles; one, the actual and objective backgrounds that lead to the possible perpetration of operations and second, operations merely planned to keep members in a status of readiness and to isolate them from passivity. Members have to be always kept busy doing something while raising in them a high morale of obedience and submission. Members in Camp Ashraf are on alert of committing mass suicide on the grounds that there are many blind spots round the camp through which outsiders might easily infiltrate to either kidnap the members of the Leadership Council and use them as hostages or kill them. The possible reaction to these threats could be a mass suicide of the insiders.

SFF: Were there just conjectures or there were some truth in what they claimed?

BS: Both of them. In some cases there were well grounded reasons but sometimes they fabricated things. Once, I remember, they distributed cyanides among the members of the Leadership Council after they had collected them all. No clear reason was presented but soon we came to know the cause. One of the members who had left for the American-run camps had informed that the organization had built secret jails just where our base was situated. So, one night American forces entered the camp in an attempt to discover the secret place. Of course, the report was one of many dubious ones already reported to Americans. But the organization had smelled a threat, a warning to something that could hit unexpectedly and thus, it distributed the cyanides to react immediately if needed.

SFF: You mean any entrance to Camp Ashraf for whatever reason is looked on as a threat against which the sole solution is suicide?

BS: Exactly. That is what, for instance, they mean by referring to the human tragedy in the issue of their expulsion from the Camp Ashraf and Iraq. By human tragedy they mean a mass protest through a mass-immolation. They are so resolute that they will deliberately set the reluctant ones on fire on pretence of willing actions since the dead never speak. What Rajavi stresses on as human tragedy should have broader dimensions but the least they can do and will impose on others can be nothing but the working means of a mass suicide.

That is what they exclusively argued on in the level of the Leadership Council. Among the rank and file it was deeply instilled that defense of Ashraf was a matter of life and death and all members had to become human shield to defend it. The issue of human shield was discussed with the members one by one in 2006. The protest against general relocation could be shown either by individual self-immolation or mass suicide. The question was first put forward by Rajavi himself that how members would react were the Iraqis to transfer Camp Ashraf altogether. The presented solution was human shield as a defensive measure since all knew about the Iraqis’ felt hatred towards Mojahedin because of their collaboration with Saddam and their effective role as his private army. Mojahedin were present wherever Saddam needed them to suppress his dissidents.

Therefore, Mojahedin have no other way but to think of a working means to confront any posed threat against their bastion by the Iraqi new government’s resolutions. The Fall of Saddam has led them to a dire situation with no authoritative protector and they have to think of a defensive vehicle for themselves. They even devised an organizational hierarchy entitled the organizational pyramid to protect Camp Ashraf. However, the foremost priority was to protect the members of the Leadership Council since it is the pivotal issue for Rajavi, that is to say, protection of the members of the Leadership Council equals to protection of Camp Ashraf. Here again, as you see, anything revolves round a strategic axis contrived by Rajavi and whatever he conjures is somehow entwined with this organizationally devised Leadership Council.

SFF: Then, Rajavi believes that protection of Camp Ashraf is strategically possible through suicide operation and human shield. Will you explain to what degree such lever can actually work as a protecting means?

BS: to understand to what extent it is working, we have to refer to already occurred instances. Following Maryam Rajavi’s arrest the organization proved its seriousness and persistence in carrying out such operations. So far it has proved that it can persuade or coerce insiders, willingly or unwillingly, into committing whatever it deems necessary to achieve its ends and the insiders’ will has actually no effect in the accomplishment of the organization’s demands. The sole way to avoid being an accomplice in the organization’s plots is to take your courage to escape by a well drawn plan, as I did. Now with the withdrawal of the American forces, the sole hope of easy escape to the TIPF has actually vanished and hardly members find an easy way out. Even in the time of Saddam it was impossible and, if anybody insisted, cost members a lot to get themselves out of the organization; it was only through the notorious Abo-Ghorib prison and other places that someone could manage to detach. That is why I insist on saying that members have no other choice but to consent to whatever the organization demands them to do and under no condition they follow a will of their own.

SFF: Then, you believe that any attempt by Iraq to expel or relocate Mojahedin will lead to such activities (suicide operation).

BS: Certainly.

SFF: What factors can you exclusively refer to now talking over human shield and tragedy?

BS: You know, following the incident of 17 June, we received piles of letters by rank and file volunteering for suicide. The act was later hallmarked as an indicative of devotion and they began to closely examine to see who among the ranks had dodged devotion. I was among those who had not volunteered for suicide but they reproached me as a ranking member and I volunteered reluctantly; otherwise I would be suspected to be at odds with the organization. However, the organization insisted that none of these volunteers had to engage in self-instigated suicides since no individual had the right to spill a drop of his/her blood unless approved by the organization. Any form of suicide or self-immolation uncoordinated by the organization is considered to be a useless, unproductive act. So sensitive is the organization about these suicide acts that they say commission of any suicide legitimizes only after we organize them and issue orders. So it becomes clear that self-immolations in France were all organized as a political lever. To make sure, I had an argue with Mojgan Parsai (in Camp Ashraf). I told her as I had volunteered for suicide, I wanted to set myself on fire before the American’s base there. Of course, it was only to see what her reaction could be. She took me to her office and talked to me for two hours saying that it was a useless act there while Sedigheh (Mojaveri) and Neda Hassani’s acts of self-immolation were politically worthwhile in France. She said if I committed suicide in the camp nothing changed but the organization lost a member of the Leadership Council, not even a slight report of my suicide would be published in the local papers let alone being mentioned in an international scale. The act could be exploited to the maximum degree for political and propaganda purposes in France or England. That is why I emphasis that Mojahedin encounter no obstacle in creating a human tragedy as it has already displayed its potentiality following the arrest of Maryam Rajavi; the organization has many volunteers who have signed to commit suicide whenever and wherever commanded.

To be continued

Translated by Mojahedin.ws

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Former members of the MEK

Interview with Hadi Negravi

Q. Would you please introduce yourself and explain why you joined and defected from MKO?

A: I am Hadi Negravi. In 1989, I got familiar with MKO in Turkey where I was trying to immigrate to Mr. Hadi Negravi - MKO ex-member in Nejat Society officeGermany. The organization promised to help me go to Germany, so I was recruited by their agents. In 2004,I left the organization and after living in American Camp for about one year, I returned to Iran voluntarily.

Q: How did you evaluate the internal relations in MKO during the years of your membership?

A: When I joined the organization, I didn’t have any idea of the ruling atmosphere in it, particularly because they behaved so friendly in Turkey, always speaking of freedom but after a few months of residing in Camp Ashraf, all my presuppositions was ruined by the organization which was totally controlled by the Regime of Saddam Hussein, as their commandant.

The organization was so closed that nobody could express his idea freely. Everything was decided in the hierarchy of the organization’s leaders. The members didn’t have the absolute right to choose their own fate (whether to stay or to leave the organization). They didn’t possess their own personal life, the right to marry or divorce; the most natural rights of a civilian.

Q: Regarding that you are completely aware of the terrorist acts of the group and experienced it; do you think the organization could basically renounce violence and armed struggle?

A: Not at all. Arm and armed struggle and spreading violence are the most basic principles of MKO‘s ideology. When Rajavi considers arm as his most cherished thing saying that “we cannot survive in our organizational form without arms”, do you think that such an organization can leave armed struggle.

They also use weapons and culture of violence to suppress the internal forces, so they are not able to survive in a liberal democratic atmosphere based on free will, logic and tolerance.
They have to be armed to be able to spread their believes since their inhuman nature meets no common sense in today world.

Q: Mr.Negravi, eight months after your return to Iran, the cult of Rajavi [MKO] declared that you were killed by the Islamic Republic in Iran. How can you reply such nonsense?

A: When I heard the news, I laughed. I have to tell them “shame on you, you were the ones who ruined me.”Due to the psychological torture I suffered for 15 years, I was under psychiatrists’ treatment to rebuild my spirit. Now I have torn the so-called revolution of Maryam Rajavi: I got married, I have a kid and I’m living a happy life with my family. Since my return all Iranian authorities had human respectful behavior towards me. To reassure anyone who doubts about it, I can announce my address and phone number, via this media, to contact me and make sure about my health.

Q: You might have heard the news on MKO cult’s involvement in turmoil after the Iranian Presidential election and that its agents have launched some terrorist acts. As a person who had been in Ashraf for years what do you think of their recent acts?

A: Yes, Definitely, this is exactly what is expected from an organization with such nature and characteristics like MKO. I can remember, the eighth presidential election, when they sent their terror teams to disturb the elections. In MKO, election is a meaningless phenomenon and the leaders of MKO know well that in each Iranian election large numbers of people give their votes. MKO has been far from Iranian political and social scene for years so they have no idea about Iranian society.

In fact MKO is an isolated cult with a much closed perspective. The surprising fact is that the ones in MKO, who call for free elections, have never held an election in the whole history of their organization.

Although they claim for democracy and human rights, they label the dissident members in the group as the agents of Islamic Republic Intelligence Ministry and traitors and send them to Abu Quraib. In MKO, we never had the right to think.

Q: How did the cult treat those who didn’t want to stay in the cult and sought to live a free life? For instance, in your own case, how did they react?

A: I’d say that using the word “life” is considered as a big sin in the organization. They always told us:”You chose your path the first day, so you have to stay until the regime is overthrown”. Of course they don’t have the power to overthrow the regime so the membership in the group is long-life.

The least punishment is being insulted by your colleagues in a peer pressure open meeting. The other ways to suppress the opponents is force them for TV interviews to confess their alleged spying role for IRI. In my case, they beat me up to Ashraf Gate.

Q: Mr. Negravi, what message would you like to give to those who are still captured in Camp Ashraf?

A: I hope they will be released as soon as possible, and choose their fate with their own free will. I hope they are not frightened by Rajavi’s fragile power show-off.

-Thank you very much for your time to attend the interview.
Nejat Society

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Former members of the MEK

The red-line discriminating between word and action in suicide operation

An interview with Batool Soltani on MKO self-immolations – Part six
Sahar Family Foundation: Will you please specifically recount instances of what can be defined as classified information?

Batool Soltani: Well, what can be specifically referred to are those information that supply details on the locations of headquarters within Auver-sur-Oise and Camp Ashraf. That is to say, any geographical, security detail about these and other camps mostly concerning the compounds of the leadership. There is much more related information; the extent of security measures for the entrance and the control of inter-organizational affairs, the whereabouts of cadres situated inside the camps and their hierarchical relations, and information about those organizationally permitted to pass in or out of these places. Regular and irregular visits of these places by the leadership, the setting plan of the buildings and the sections in the camps and the people positioned in them, how the security systems work to control the cadres’ shifts and what are the defensive measures, human or mechanically controlled, to reduce or counter threats from the outside are all instances of classified information. Of other instances to name are the existing differences within the Auver-sur-Oise and Camp Ashraf, the security check-points to ensure safe passage in and out, internal offices that verify the validity of the passports and visas, the rankings in the charge of controlling and issuing ID cards for individuals to enter the camps or the cadres who leave on missions. Anybody entering Mojahedin’s enclave is regarded to have passed over the red-line of a highly secretive boundary that is totally concealed from the outside world.

SFF: We will talk on the issue further later on. But now let’s have a look on the issue that any suicide operation inevitably has its own consequences. The aggressive kind, for example, will willingly or unwillingly lead to the death of some innocents in the vicinity. For instance, when the organization plotted suicide operations to assassin the leaders of Friday-Prayer, many other innocent crowds were perished along with the main target. I want to know how does the organization justify such deeds and who are in charge of deciding to stop or carry out these operations. Better to say, where lays the drawn red-line that justifies such operations?

BS: Your question can be answered from many angles. First, we have to ascertain how the organization and Rajavi in particular draw the red-line between the word and theory for carrying out these operations. Second, we have to see to what extent the words are actually practical, and third, what is the position of the leadership concerning what should not have actually happened and how he has treated with the disobedient. They are all related to understand the question and its different aspects. First of all, the red-line and instances are drawn just by the leadership and all operational ranks have to submit to it. Nobody dispatched for an operation can defy Rajavi’s drawn red-line and any operation team knows well that accomplishment of mission eclipses any other priority. Now, it is important to distinguish between Rajavi’s red-line of word and action. The red-line in Rajavi’s word is taking heed of protecting the life and property of the public who have no role in the operations as well as public buildings and passages. Interestingly, no saboteur is permitted to desist from the plotted operation just because he/she is overstepping the red-line. The only person with the authority to halt the operations is Masoud Rajavi himself.

Now, the question is, and only Rajavi can give a proper answer, how it is possible exactly to stop crossing the red-line in the course of an operation that has to be unquestionably performed and which only Rajavi himself can order to be halted. The context and setting of some of these operations invariably requires sacrifice of innocent people in the vicinity. Once, for example, when a terror team was sent to assassin Asadollah Lajevardi in Tehran’s bazaar, the role of crowds in the bazaar can never be underestimated since they play the role of a deterrent factor both while targeting the victim and when escaping from the scene; there are always people in the scene who may in an automatic reaction interfere or hinder and the assassins see no other way but to shoot at them to open the way or one may come between the assassin and the target. Naturally, there are two options; either you have to abandon the operation and escape or accomplish the mission regardless of violating the red-line with whatever casualty.

The latter requires that you have to be serious in completely obliterating any obstacle on the way. And Rajavi himself knows all these truths that it is impossible to carry out an operation of assassination without harming other innocents. It is the same case with suicide operations with the difference that the agent knows he/she hardly returns alive which greatly helps to violate the red-lines. But in the former, a hope fosters in the assassin that he/she may escape the scene with the aid of people, a hope instilled into him/her by the organization itself. As a result, the assassin tries to tie his/her destiny to a little of overstepping the red-line since the organization had falsely ensured him/her that people would create a protecting shield for a member of the organization to escape safely. But it differs in a suicide operation; here the accomplishment of the operation is of the higher significance than the number of the casualties present at the scene. Besides, the suicide is no more alive to be counted responsible for the innocent killed. Thus, this kind of operation is excluded from our issue of discourse and remains the kind after which the team has to necessarily return to its base after the operation.

When Rajavi plotted assassination of people like Lajevardi or the army commander Sayad Shirazi, he knew well that killing was an inseparable part of a planned operation which could never be fulfilled unless through homicide. Then, it is absolutely absurd if he maneuvers and insists on vocalized principles of his drawn red-line since the nature of these operations necessitate killing and blood-shed. Consequently, the assassin is not the authority to decide to stop or continue, he/she is only executing a killing plan drawn by somebody else watching the operation from many hundred kilometers away. It is really in absolute contradiction to Rajavi’s stated red-line and out of the control of the operatives. At the end, we see that there is nobody to be held responsible for violation of the red-line that has caused many innocent deaths; in fact, it is one of those Rajavi’s adopted childish tactics.

Now let’s see what are Rajavi and the organization’s reaction against operation teams that may have inadvertently violated the red-lines in the course of the operation. Here, the operatives may have been killed, arrested or returned. But, in any case, they are not the ones to be held responsible but their commander in charge of the operation. Rajavi severely reprimands them for the killings that are considered a violation of the stated red-lines. Of course, he is well aware of the fact that he is the sole one to be held responsible for the crime, but that is how he deals with the fallout and condemns others calling them inefficient and else. But nothing more happens and nobody is punished and all ends in a room in an outburst of humiliating words and sever reprimand because all know that Rajavi himself had practically a better understanding of what might happen and which he had implicitly given his seal of approval to cross his own drawn red-lines. But somebody has to be held responsible for mere formality who, of course, fails to be the leadership. I have to add that such a performance of formality runs only when the organization is disclosed by undeniable facts that tie it to the incident which it must be held accountable for. However, in many other cases, the success of the operation never lets anything else take a back seat and overshadows anything that more often fails to be ever mentioned and is of marginal interest to the organization.
To be continued
Sahar Family Foundation, Baghdad, July 08, 2009
Translated by Mojahedin.ws

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Former members of the MEK

Suicide, the ideal means to safeguard information

Sahar Family Foundation: Mrs. Soltani, let’s talk a little about defensive suicide operation, that is to say, when someone commits suicide only because of carrying sensitive or secrete information. Particularly, of what kind are these information and what are the means through which the individuals have to annihilate themselves when the time comes?

Batool Soltani: information can be divided in two. The first are those we carried when going from a place to another which mostly happened in Iraq. There were times when we drove from a base like Camp Ashraf to a second destination to meet leadership. We had also trips to France and other European countries from Iraq or even moved about in the Europe. In all these missions, protection of information had the highest priority. The second are the concentrated ones as we are settled in a place and there is a threat from without. It might be a regular inspecting measure done by the US forces in Ashraf for instance or by the Iraqi police for whatever security objective; all these were considered a threat against our community from outsiders. Or it happened that we were strolling about and police would simply suspect us which could lead to further problems.

It had turned to be a big concern especially after the 9/11 terrorist attack when counter-terrorist police had a free hand to arrest and interrogate whoever they came to suspect. It was really a hinder for members travelling in Europe. All the information stated were of the nature a member of the organization had instructions to deface before engaging in self-destroying. I intend to explain more for it is a matter of obscurity for people out of the organization.

I give an example of the year 2001 when the members of the Leadership Council were called to have a meeting with leadership in Parsian (where Rajavi held the meetings). Although it may seem a simple drive from Ashraf to the place, it required really complicated security measures. The main focus was on how to destroy the documents we carried if any challenge hit us en route. There was a general process to follow for destruction of documents before departure.

There was a head-responsible in charge of the security-check of information who at the time was Mohsen Niknami. He had other assistants who were in charge of smaller groups of cadres. Mohsen was the one who questioned me to ensure about my plans of destroying personal information now that I was included in the group about to set off for Parsian. According to already received instructions, I had to use a can of ethanol that I carried in forewarned circumstances like hearing gun-shots, tracking downs, sensing a siege and any fake accident or any other form that could be regarded a challenge to destroy my own documents and that of other members of the Leadership Council. That how these members were transported to the meeting place is another story.

The members had to be divided into small groups and drove on different buses at non-fixed intervals that sometimes took two hours. When the first bus left, the next waited to make sure its safe arrival which was the given green light for its own leave. It was the case with other waiting buses and all had to follow the rules. There were also strict rules for the group on each bus.

There was one in charge of destroying the bus in the event of any portentous sign of danger. Besides, one in any group of three was charged with the task of destroying his/her comrades’ documents that he/she was well aware of their hidden places. In spite of all these measures, we were individually responsible to destroy our documents and information as well as that of the one next to us if anything happened to our rankings in charge. The means to destroy them, as I pointed out, was the can of ethanol we all carried. The emphasis was on the destruction of the information before self-destruction. Now a question may form in your mind that of what significance were these documents and information that required such high precautionary measures to safeguard or destroy them before anyone could have access to them?

First of all, I have to point out that these documents contained none of the contents of the highly valued book of the Leadership Council. Nobody had the permission to have a record of its details in his/her notebook and all members had to read and memorize the contents while at the meeting. They distributed it in the course of the sessions and then it would be collected and thus, all information was in our mind and nothing on the paper to fear others lay hands on it. Neither did we carry any classified information. There Then, you may ask what all these security measures were for? All was done because of the private notebooks the members had with them in which they had noted down their daily affaires, the noted dates merely to do a task, a recorded detail of a task done, some verses of the Holy Quran and other ordinary and personal notes.

It also happened that we had written some notes while in a session, although it was absolutely forbidden, and they, with a member called Gity in the charge, would carefully explore our notebooks and personal belongings when we were about to leave the hall. But sometimes it happened that we managed to stealthy take the notes out; however, none of these notes could be considered classified information in its real concept. What they called secrete and classified information was absolutely different with its own special means of convey that we hardly knew anything about. Whatever means of transfer they used, for sure it was not by bus or other regular vehicles as they used for our transfer.

SFF: In fact, all these security measures that at end may lead to the destruction of a cadre and his/her information are due to these personal notebooks?

BS: Yes, they are. The contents of these notebooks, as I said, were nothing more than a few notes, dates, necessary phone numbers, or the date of a given pledge. I remember once in the Leadership Council I signed a paper that started with a verse from the Holy Quran which I noted down to memorize. Or details of a meeting that were of importance. The documents to be destroyed were all theses trivial notebooks containing worthless information. It was the same case even in the European countries when we were moving about and we had some written information with us. The information could be some phone number we had to contact if necessary. In our meetings there and when we were being transferred to a certain destination, it was forbidden to carry any paper or notebook that would indicate our membership in the organization or any relation with the people in our company.

The only thing we had permission to carry was some money and a phone number for an urgent call which all other companions knew where it was to destroy it if necessary. A phone number in a member’s pocket meant giving the police the opportunity to hook the first clue that well identified the connecting bridges. To thwart any attempt by police to obtain the very single phone number, we were instructed to tear it into small pieces or swallow it. It is how we destroyed information when out of Iraq. I mean to say that we were much cautious out of Iraq since at least in Iraq we had support of Saddam’s Estekhbarat (Intelligent and Information System) while we had restrictions in European countries especially after al-Qaeda’s terrorist attacks that had made police to become more sensitized to terrorist threats and consequently they intensified security measures. As a result, we had to follow strict precautionary measures to protect information and relations. However, the last solution was suicide according to organizational instructions.

SFF: Undoubtedly, there should have been real reasons under these practical circumspect.

BS: Yes, to some extents they had reasons to be cautious. Once, for instance, a member called Parviz Yaqubi escaped and surrendered himself to French police and informed on inter-organizational relations. He had asked to be granted asylum reasoning that his life was in danger. Of course, he returned to the organization and later separated again and now lives in total isolation. But his act of going and reporting to police had really frustrated Masoud Rajavi. It was in 1993 or 1994 I think and it cost the organization and Rajavi a lot. Consequently, it was decided that nobody in his/her travels out of Iraq had to carry passports and fake IDs cards and on the members’ arrival in the airport all their documents were collected and kept by the organization. Well, we thought it was well decided and, from then on, any member regardless of his/her rank had to hand over his/her passport on arrival to Europe.

To be continued
Translated by Mojahedin.ws

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Former members of the MEK

Suicide operation, an ultimate solution to security dilemma

Sahar Family Foundation: Can you elaborate on classified information in the organization, as it may have different definition in terms of use?

Batool Soltani: It is the kind and degree of information that every member of the organization Suicide operation, an ultimate solution to security dilemmacarries concerning himself, his responsibility and his relation with other cells. More specifically, there were other ranks who, because of their organizational responsibilities, knew the residence of the leadership and his/her visiting locations. Of course, this classified information vary in terms of sensitiveness and secrecy according to the responsibility of the members and their contact with higher rankings but the importance lies on the concentration of the information in the hands of the members who form the linking ring between others.

The operation teams who came to Iran for armed operation, for instance, carried some related information, or it was the same with members residing in other European countries out of the headquarters in Auver-sur-Oise. They knew details about the location of the camps, the members and their responsibilities and even information about the launched operations or those at hand. As a result, the organization emphatically required the teams about to embark on operations to swallow their cyanide capsules as soon as they felt a risk of arrest.
 
The emphasis got stronger especially after the 9/11 terrorist incident when the traffic in European countries were under heavy surveillance and there was a high possibility of arrest that could lead to extraction of information under investigations. We had strict order, especially the members of the Leadership Council who carried a high volume of information, to commit suicide if anyone came to be a suspect in confrontation with Interpol.
 
The rankings travelling between Iraq and the Europe or between Auver-sur-Oise and other countries had strict instruction for self-annihilation. It can be said that the most secure and safest measure of protecting information devised by the organization was suicide. The important point to consider here is the cheap value of man within the organization.

SFF: Will further explain the responsibilities of the members of the Leadership Council concerning the classified information?

BS: The information that the members of the Leadership Council carried were classified as secrete. It was because of their relation with the leadership which was systematically regarded very important. It meant that they had to take the ultimate precautionary measures to protect themselves not because of their own life but as they carried foremost organizational information which made them suicide vanguards. They had always a guard accompanying them who had the responsibility of finishing the job if he/she refrained to commit suicide or possibly thought of a mischief or escape. A member of Leadership Council had to have a ready scheme of suicide being it with cyanide, gun or any other way.

But the priority was always laid on the destroying of the carried documents before doing away with yourself. The means depended on the circumstance and how you could prepare them as easy as possible. There was a time when the organization possessed no gun and cyanide was the best choice, but the time came when it was vice-versa. I was one of those who always carried a gun when in Camp Ashraf or whenever I had a trip to Baghdad. We had strict orders to shot ourselves when sensing the minimal danger of being attacked or arrested. Once I was in England and although I was not yet a member of the Leadership Council, I had instruction of committing suicide since I had second hand but sensitive information like the location of headquarters where the Rajavis lived or moved and the security measures concerning them. It was the same with the information about the headquarters in Auver-sur-Oise and in possibly in other countries.

Of course, some information were declassified within the organization as they happened to lose their secrecy and importance, but they remained classified for the outsiders. In some occasions when the carried information were of a very high secrecy, the members carried a mixed means of suicide, that is to say, both gun and cyanide because in some cases the cyanide had failed to act. Later it was decided to carry two cyanide capsules to ensure that one at least would work.

That is how they emphasized on measures of protecting information and were sensitive about them. All this complicated, systematic deeds happened in an atmosphere as if they were living in a different planet. That is why far from any rationale and logic, to guarantee the protection of the information, the organization grabs at a most secure way, suicide and self-annihilation.

SFF: You said in some cases the cyanide had failed to act. Can you explain about them?

BS: As far as I can remember it record in the related report, it was the time when Arash Sametipour had been sent to Iran for operation. He broke his cyanide when he was on the verge of arrest but the capsule failed to work and he went into a coma only to revive after a while. It had critical aftermath for the organization. Unaware of the arrest of Marjan Malek, for example, the organization first announced her martyrdom in the course of her operation and even Rajavi himself appreciated her as a heroine but later, when it was revealed that she had failed suicide and was in custody inside Iran, anything changed overnight and she was declared to be an agent of the Islamic Republic. The failure of suicides was thus very crucial and cost the organization a lot; it was commitment to these suicides that decided the organizational identity and the status of the individuals in the organization.

Noteworthy, following the reported cases of failure, there established a section whose responsibility was to check over the vehicles of suicide to ensure its efficacy. There were two kinds of check up, routinely done or case related. The former was done in a frequent period of a few months while the latter was a test of an operative’s cyanides before his dispatch to the mission. Once in Camp Ashraf, before the presence of Americans and when they had no limitation, they exclusively provided two cyanides for each member of the Leadership Council. But then everything changed and there came a time when cyanides and guns were not as abundant as before; the cyanides were all collected from among those who once had to carry them.

Instead, they innovated a new way of controlling members with sensitive and secrete information and members of the Leadership Council in particular. Now there was a special division with the responsibility of constant monitoring and surveillance of the members with highly classified information; they had the responsibility of helping them through any available means to eliminate themselves in case of facing any risk of arrest or else; the means could be a gun, cyanide, petrol, ethanol or anything else.
Translated by Mojahedin.ws

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Former members of the MEK

No suicide operation unless commanded by the organization

Sahar Family Foundation: Will you explain when for the first time you came to know about the suicide operation in the organization and how did they justify it and give trainings?

Batool Soltani: The first time I was notified about the sacrosanct suicide operation was when I was under political-ideological trainings to be accepted within, to be exact, when I was a trainee member studying the history of the organization. In the course of the discourses it happened to talk about Reza Rezai, as the first martyr of the organization and the first reverent suicide. The organization highly termed it the sacrosanct suicide operation and tried to inspire us with it.

They explained that when Reza was ringed by police, he detonated a hand grenade killing himself along with a number of SAVAK agents. Then they began to give reasons for his daring act saying not only he eluded being arrested alive but also destroyed his arms, information and his body to frustrate the agents’ attempt to have access to them. He was presented as an organizational archetype for the members to follow, a hero whose adherents could never be hindered to accomplish organizational ends. In fact, by the story they intended to mark some points. First, the aspiring members had to bear in mind that a devoted Mojahed disappointed the enemy even in obtaining access to his body.

Second, it was a daring act that needed ultimate bravery one could ever achieve; in the course of trainings, recruits thought it was the last stage a combatant could make it through the stages of the struggle and thus, the trainings seemed much valuable and we tried to comprehend and learn them as fully as we could. In many occasion, for instance, Massoud Rajavi reiterated that Reza deprived the enemy of accessing his information and even his arms and body. Of course, his words were much influential to create a sacramental atmosphere to halo the act and Reza, in this particular phase of trainings, became the sole archetype that could well inspire the trainees with courage, and he did indeed.

SFF: what was specific in Rezai that they made an archetype out of him?

BS: As I pointed out, he was displayed a paragon in some manners especially in his confrontation with police and an example of one with many potentialities that could be followed as a model. Maybe they had anticipated that they could successfully meet organizational ends through these suicide operations and the forces had to be prepared psychologically to carry out the mission. Besides, any training requires a certain model and there was no better match in the organization than Rezai to exemplify for others. Another point about him was his mental potentiality as well as his physical. He was illustrated to be much active in his clashes but he was also mentally competent in analytical and theoretical issues. Perhaps they meant that a combatant had to attain a high versatility but easily sacrifice himself. That is to say, even the mental potentialities of a formidably intellect member hat to in no way interfere with the commitment to the suicide act. These were all aspects of the illustrated archetype that could practically influence the trainees.

SFF: In what level of background did they arrange for this discourse?

BS: Everyone in the organization has to necessarily undergo these instructions, even if some had already passed them. It made no difference; any recruit had to pass through these discourses which the suicide operation was an inseparable part. Even I, a ranking member of the leadership Council, was constantly exposed to these discourses. It was an issue of high priority on the agenda before the leadership when the organization reached a critical stalemate. In the process of dispatching operation teams across the Iranian borders to carry out operations inside Iran, the prerequisite was a proclaimed preparedness for committing suicide. They were thoroughly checked and approved by higher ranks before they were assigned for the mission. The responsible ranks tested them to make sure they would break and swallow their cyanide capsules or did other self-annihilation actions when sensing danger. The interesting point in all these was that a second fellow had to give a pledge that his comrade committed self-annihilation and promised that his comrade would certainly destroy himself in face of danger and in any possible way.

In general, it is a responsibility all have to assume in the organization. Before the invasion of the US against Iraq, for instance, all members took the responsibility of committing suicide by chewing their cyanide capsules if Camp Ashraf would be invaded by the US forces or any threat of arrest, security inspection or else would foreshadow the camp. We had also preplanned arrangements for committing suicide by Cyanide and spilling petrol or ethanol over bodies. We were told to kill or set ourselves on fire if the US forces ventured to enter the camp to start a house by house inspection. Even later and in course of the US’s deployment of forces in the region, we were routinely checked to make sure we were in the state of readiness. Even among the cadres of the Leadership Council they were making a firm stand on self-annihilation if any threat would be posed against the camp by any forces being them Iraqis, Americans, Iranians and Kurds. It was discussed in details how to perpetrate the deed when the right time came: the members had taken the responsibility of reciprocally setting each other on fire by the means of petrol, ethanol and other flammable substances.

In the Leadership Council we were frequently notified that anybody had to be prepared for being killed or suicide. It has always been a key point in varying phases of the organization. In the phase of venture operations, the operatives’ priority was to commit suicide by chewing the carried cyanides, a commitment that the members had to be again checked for its performance in the phase of the US invasion. It was exactly what happened in the case of the 17 June self-immolations; everything was already provided for the operations and the volunteers were only ready for the signal to begin.

SFF: How they assessed and discussed the suicide operations in the Leadership Council? In how many possible ways could they be committed and under what literature they could be justified?

BS: There was a certain book in which an article especially focused on the suicide operation and definitely on the issue of arbitrary suicides. It mainly argued that an act of suicide could be appraised worthwhile and valuable only if committed under some organizational instruction and command; otherwise it was worthless and liable to criticism and belittled by the organization. It was even worse if it was a suicide done in objection to the organization; the perished body was then nothing but a corpse on the hands of the organization.

Even the bodies of these opponent suicides were buried in a different graveyard outside far from Camp Ashraf. The suicides had to be justified according to organizational line of ideology and principles as stated earlier and the cadres of the Leadership Council were not exceptional but on the front-line with the priority of using guns and cyanides. Soon after guns and cyanides were collected and confiscated, petrol and ethanol were replaced as the alternate means. None of the self-burnings done in France were arbitrary but justified organizationally; otherwise they failed to be glorified as they did. In one case, inside Camp Ashraf, a member called Rasoul, blinded in one of military operations, set himself on fire in protest against one of the articles of the ideological revolution called ”article D” (it was about superiority of women over men in all levels of organizational relations and activities). His commission infuriated Rajavi who stated that his act done in opposition to such an issue was denigrated and did not qualify a devoted member to be buried in Ashraf graveyard where the martyrs had been buried. The news of his suicide was heavily censored and they belittled it as a contemptuous act in the organization.

SFF: When they began to collect cyanides?

BS: Once Marjan Akbari snitched the cyanide belonging to her responsible rank and killed herself. Her suicide was masqueraded and reported to be a heart attack but all cadres of the Leadership Council knew the truth about her death and from then on they collected all cyanides. In one occasion, the American forces got suspicious of existing cyanides in Camp Ashraf and began to search for them but they had all been already collected and hidden in a secure place. Of course, at the same time all cadres of the Leadership Council carried capsules.

SFF: Did not Americans know that the organization had cyanides?

BS: It seems that at first they did not, but later on they began to suspect and search for them. As a result, all cyanides were collected and delivered to Zohreh Akhyani and the members were told to seek for alternative working means of suicide. However, it was resolved that in case of any threat against Camp Ashraf, the cyanides had to be distributed among the cadres of the Leadership Council.

SFF: What was the substitute for the cyanides?

BS: Both petrol and ethanol. There were even some places where they distributed the flammable liquids for the purpose of suicide.

To be continued

Translated by Mojahedin.ws – July 1, 2009

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Former members of the MEK

Suicide operation; a solution or sidestepping it

An interview with Batool Soltani on MKO self-immolations – Part two

Sahar Family Foundation: Our greetings Mrs. Soltani. We are ready to continue the issue of suicide operation if you will. I will pose the first question unless you have some preliminary remarks to add.

Batool Soltani: before we continue with your question, I deem it necessary to add explanations on the previous session’s discourse. First, what motivates an operator to commit suicide when he happens to come face to face with the security forces and the police? Does it mean that there is absolutely no other way? Is it not really possible for a militiaman to strengthen himself physically and psychologically to bear pressures of probable tortures, prison and investigations instead of committing suicide as the last solution? It might be the easiest way to protect some information but for sure it fails to be equal to the value of a man’s life. Another point is that it may be regarded an act of bravery in itself, but can it not be considered an act of the ultimate weakness and a sense of inferiority? These questions may seem illogical in an obsessive atmosphere where anything is routinely scrutinized from a security point of view that may threaten the existence of the organization. But it does not mean that in no condition there is a logical and rational solution to any issue. Although a conjecture, I think it can be confirmed if discussed in detail with the wise and elite.

But how the organization justifies the suicide operation as the first and the last solution? What are its good reasons for exchanging such an easiest and simple way for a man’s life? Within the organization they say the capacity of enduring interrogational torture varies from person to person. I think I have read things in the organization’s sources about the applied inconceivable measures to assess the members’ resistance and response to the tortures by exposing them to a diversity of physical pressures like flogging, depriving them of sleeping, suspending them handcuffed from the ceiling in a variety of conditions and the like. Then they would conclude that in spite of varying degrees of resistance, it could be measured but the exact degree would always remain a matter of obscurity. In fact, nobody could stand the tortures that could continue to no definite degree. Of course, they knew that not all members would be put under the same tortures; it depended on the ranks and the extent of the information they held. Thus, an arrested key element and cadre to whom the survival of the organization depended would break in some point under the tortures, so suicide would be much more guaranteed than making a risk. It is instilled into him that suffering and torture are inevitably awaiting him and nothing is known to what degree he can hold out the arbitrary tortures that warrant the agents’ access to the concealed information. This is the angle of the organization’s look at the issue that needs to be studied in depth in itself.

As I pointed out earlier, the organization’s standards are absolutely different. The organization unrelentingly persisted that the ultimate solution to any problem was to offer a sacrifice. Somebody had to be sacrificed for the cause of the organization, which has been regarded more precious than the life of a militiaman, through suicide, self-harming operations or other similar acts. In one instance, as I remember, Rajavi in justification of the failure of the Operation Eternal Light stated that he had known from the very beginning that it was a futile operation from a military viewpoint, but he did it as it was tied to the survival of the organization that required so many lives. So worthless are evaluated the lives of the members that he sends them to their death in swarms to prove that the organization and the Rajavis are still breathing.

In a message he stated that if anybody set himself on fire in Camp Ashraf, it would be a cost paid to minimize the limitations imposed on the camp by the US forces. I mean the suicide case by Yaser Askari who was said to have committed suicide because of the imposed pressures on Camp Ashraf. The act is no more a countermeasure to protect the organization against any threat of annihilation but rather a means to further certain organizational, and even personal, ambitious objectives. Here the intention is no more measuring a member’s resistance degree in case of undergoing torture, rather suicide turns to be an imposed means to serve the survival of the organization, a purpose he, the member, has been destined from the very beginning to sacrifice himself for. I mean to say that the organization’s innovated self-burnings like that of 17 June and that of Yaser Askari in Camp Ashraf have been the easiest chosen solutions to overcome the crises. Even beyond that, the act is sanctified and glorified as a model for others to follow fervently instead of criticizing its exploitation for vague and hollow purposes. And as an alternative, the organization looks for belligerently innovated means that devour more sacrifices; crushed, scorched, crumbled bodies with no identity.

To be continued
Translated by Mojahedin.ws

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Former members of the MEK

A definition of suicide operations

An interview with Batool Soltani on MKO self-immolations – Part one
In the course of many separations, for the most part during the past two years, Mrs. Batool Soltani is known to be the highest ranking cadre detached from Mojahedin Khalq Organization (MKO).A definition of suicide operations She was a member of the leadership council and the closest to the organization’s power hegemony and, consequently, she can be regarded the most reliable source of information compared to other separated rank and file. The best evidence is the statements and disclosures she has made, and is still making, on multitudes of issues concerning the organization.

However, with respect to the complex, interlocking body of the organization’s cultic relations and techniques, it does not seem that what she is uncovering for the public is all she knows and can reveal. But her immediate and close contact with the Rajavis as well as her high potentiality for precise analysis that puts forward new discussions based on her personal observations can possibly open a new window for a further analysis and study of the untold about the organization. To accomplish the goal, we decided to take a new turn just along the currently running interviews, that is, to focus on specific issues of the importance. The themes of the priority have been classified which we prefer not to mention in whole at the present since they will be prepared and released according to the circumstances and particular incidents. The first of these themed interviews is on the issue of organizational self-immolations as we are on the threshold of the June 17 anniversary, when, following the detention of Maryam Rajavi by the French police, a number of members set themselves on fire.

It has to be pointed out that these statements contain some dramatic, first-hand details so far disclosed by a ranking member of the leadership council. The interview starts with a prefatory emphasis on the history of suicidal operations and continues up to the June 17 self-burnings. Of the importance in the issue at hand is the materialization of the suicidal operations as a working means in the organization, an adopted means committed in a variety of forms from the past to the present cultic form. The narrative by Mrs. Soltani presents an explicitly further account of what we have so far heard or read about the shocking incident. Looking at an issue from many different angles, her look seems to be novel in itself.
Part one: A definition of suicide operations

Sahar Family Foundation: Mrs. Soltani, our best wishes and compliments and we also thank you for accepting to continue a new series of interviews. In fact, we never thought the interviews would take for so long but it was much because of your own interest and your precise and analytical details you provided for each question and the issues in question. As a result, we came face to face with new ideas that could be well classified into different categories to be discussed in detail separately. We knew there would be problems but when you showed how interested you were, I decided that no problem could hinder. So as not to bother you with further problems, I have arranged not to prolong the interviews but to focus on themed issues besides the routinely conducted interviews. Once more I express my thanks for your remarkable endurance and we hope that your exposé will solve many problems on the way of social movements and expose an outlet for the victimized generation, still enslaved physically and psychologically, to take a sound decision for the future.

First, I need to explain about the subject before going into further details. Of the troubles and challenges the contemporary armed movements encounter with irreparable costs is a commitment to suicide operations. Of course, as you know, the phenomenon is not a working means adhered to by the Iranian guerrillas but imported into our country as the idea of the guerrilla warfare itself. I have to point out that the main motive behind all this is the detention of Maryam Rajavi in June 2003 and the consequent self-burnings, but I deemed it necessary to start a preliminary discussion before we involve in the main issue. I beg your pardon, but I think you got what I mean and so I demand you to feel easy to talk about the phenomenon to whatever extent you wish, that is, how you define suicide operations, what its forms are and in what circumstances they are plotted and carried out.

Batool Soltani: As I come to understand from your explanations and introductory words, the subject proves to require a lengthy discussion. I hope our discourse on the issue will be of use somewhere. Let’s first give a comprehensive definition of the term suicide operation from an organizational point of view and explain its difference with other kinds of armed operations. In every perpetrated operation possibly there are some percentages of killings and in suicide operation there is a possibility leading to the death of people. But the nature of suicide operations is totally different as defined by the current political and militia terminology. It is called suicide because here the perpetrator puts the priority on self-annihilation regardless of any consequent outcome, that is, he makes an attempt to guarantee the accomplishment of the end by his own life while in other forms of operations the death is always a fifty to fifty possibility. Suicide operations are mainly motivated under one of the two incentives, defensive or aggressive.

Before any further explanation let me point out that some people may say that it was Mojahedin Khalq who first engaged in armed and guerrilla warfare in Iran. Regardless of to what extent the claim is true but one thing is clear that the organization is the innovator of a third kind of suicide operation; sending ablaze human-torches onto the streets following the June 2003 detentions. I will give details on the operations. Now let’s see what is the difference between the two mentioned kinds of operations. I have to point that it is a personal categorization of the types and I do not know if there are such definitions in any reference and, thus, they may be prone to mistake.

The first type is the defensive one, that is to say, the main cause for this suicide operation is to safeguard the organizational secrets and information. When the operator faces a serious situation that may lead to his detention by the police or the enemy’s forces and which may consequently lead to extraction of his information he commits suicide as the organizational orders require. This is the point where one has to risk his life to safeguard and protect the information and secrets. By his life, he breaks the possibility of any access to the information that may jeopardize the life of the organization. During the past five decades of struggle in the contemporary history you may encounter many examples of such operations among both religious and non-religious, Marxist organizations and in Mojahedin particularly. Ahmad Rezai (an earlier member in Mojahedin’s central cadre) for example killed himself along with a number of SAVAK’s agent with a hand grenade to avert falling in SAVAK’s clutches alive. There are members like Mahmood Shamekhi and more others whose name I fail to remember who did the same. However, there are a few examples in Mojahedin who have committed this kind to defend the organization against the threats of the regime that had tried to uproot the militia and their movement in any possible way.

There is always a red-line in such organizations where the members have no other choice but to commit suicide. It does not mean that the self-annihilation is the first choice when a member happens to confront the enemy. The red-line means a reaction defined for certain circumstances when the arrest of a certain operator is a question of exposing the organization, information and cadres to irreparable damages. The defined parameter, however, is deliberately overlooked in the years of the organization’s strife with the Islamic Republic. A quantitative and qualitative comparison between the present forces of the organization and those active in Pahlavi’s regime indicate that such suicide operation naturally had to be more common since at that time the slightest leak of information meant a big strike against the entity of the organization and the cadres. But the amount of these operations is beyond of comparison with those of the past regime although there is a remarkable difference between the potentiality and capability of the present and the former forces.
 
At the present when the organization dispatches its operation teams from Iraqi soil to Iran, the red-line is a mere sense of danger and possibility of arrest while neither the organization has any establishment inside Iran nor its leader reside there and it has no legitimacy there at all. The red-line becomes the sense of danger and the operator has the orders to swallow the cyanide capsule as soon as he/she feels there is a likelihood of arrestment. That is in absolute contrast with the phase of struggle in Pahlavi’s reign when 90 percent of the members and the leaders got arrested and most of them had the opportunity to commit suicide and to swallow the cyanide capsules. Even inside the prison they could but did not.

I apologize for distancing from the main issue but I feel it is necessary to give further explanation to make things clear. Of course, it is a long organizational issue developed following a gained extensive struggle experience and the members easily consent to the instructions for they are organizationally and ideologically justified. Let me also explain about the red-line out of Iran. The organization had strict instruction that if the members with secret and classified information happened to be arrested by the police in the European countries, they had to commit suicide before they could speak under the investigations. I mean the red-line is completely redefined compared to the past and the members’ life as a veteran is assessed much cheaper.

Another form of the suicide operation is the aggressive one. Here the operator’s act of self-annihilation is not a spontaneous act but preplanned. There are some fundamental characteristics distinguishing it from the former one. First, it is a preplanned operation far from being restricted to a final choice in facing unexpected circumstances. Second, it is aimed to fulfill certain end/s, political, economic, ideological, or more, motivated according to the perpetrator’s intention. It might be a part of an organizational analysis of the circumstances or in line with a tactic of struggle. The third factor is that there is a volunteer who knows well there would be no return. In some cases, it is an organizational order rather than requiring a volunteer. In either of the cases, there need to be some psychological and ideological preparation before sending the operator on the mission and if any suspicion of unpreparedness is traced, as it may inflict irreparable costs on the organization, the mission is either cancelled or another prepared alternative is substituted.

In the former kind, there always arises a doubt in the operator and he may not be prepared thoroughly when he faces an unexpected situation when he has the orders to commit suicide. To speak about the examples of the latter form in the organization, it generally happens in the second phase of its armed struggle after the victory of the Islamic Republic. They took the form of suicide terrorism to assassinate the leaders of the ritual Friday prayer. An explicit example is al-Qaeda’s attack against the Twin Towers in 9/11 terrorist operation. There are much more examples of these suicide operations against European economic and political centers all plotted by al-Qaeda and other similar terrorist groups. These were the two types of suicide operations.

There is a third kind which can be referred to as countermeasure, threatening or protesting. I think Mojahedin can be named as the innovators of this form of operation although we have its instances in other parts of the world like protests made against the war in Vietnam just in front of the UN office and the US Embassies. But what happens in Mojahedin is absolutely different and unique in its own. This form guarantees the media coverage and its effect on the public opinion is so high as the protesters of the Vietnam War did; their protest was against an anti-human, aggressive and colonial war and because they could not demonstrate their protest in any other legal form or conduct through any humanitarian body.

An analytical study of this third kind of operation in the organization and its psychological aspects indicates how exclusively it is utilized by the organization as a systematically working means. The purpose here is neither defensive nor aggressive although some aspects of the both may be embraced. To talk about the intended objective of this kind of suicide operation, we have to develop a good understanding of the outcomes in different circumstances and how beneficial and worthwhile they can be for the organization. I believe this is a tactic utilized by an armed, non-democratic organization challenging a democratic society in general. I mean utilization of a primitively violent, aggressive manner where you have the opportunity and the right of defending yourself through legal systems; but of course neither you have the potentiality of abiding by the law nor do you ever think it is to your advantage.

As a result, you make an attempt to force the challenger retreat from the fulfillment of legal actions through threateningly non-democratic reactions. A look at the setting of these operations, the European countries and France in particular, and the standing of the organization there well indicate that these operations are the result of the dire situation the organization has faced there under a false pretense; naturally no other backlash can be expected of an organization with respect to its complicated internal relations, ideology and armed strategy of struggle. That is why I make the claim to say that this kind of operation is innovated by the organization and hardly can you find any parallel in other political or armed establishments in the world; it has to be recorded exclusively in the name of Mojahedin. I prefer not to explain any more until the right time when I am giving details on self-burnings that is the objective of our interview. I think I have answered your question to the extent of my information, that is, the definition and classification of suicide operation.
SFF: Sure you have done. But your answer breeds more questions which I will pose in next sessions.

BS: As you wish. 

Translated by Mojahedin.ws

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Mujahedin Khalq Organization as a terrorist group

MKO thirst for alliance with other terrorist groups

In an interview in relation with recent confessions of the gang leader of Jundollah terrorist group about cooperating with MKO Secretary General of Habilian Association said: Terrorist groups such as People’s Mujahedeen and Jundollah follow the same approach and some western countries like United States and Britain are never expected to put a stop to the criminal activities of such groups because the sponsorship of terrorism would be carried out by the same two countries.

Calling the Iraqi government and people’s desire for the expulsion of MKO from their country as logic Hashemi Nejad also said: Today MKO collaboration with many other terrorist groups is absolutely certain for the Iraqi government and the Iraqi people know it very well that the presence of this band inside the country is the basis of insecurity and unrest in Iraq, therefore the Iraqi government’s determination to expel this terrorist organization according to the Iraqi constitution is quite understandable.

In response to a question about the possibility of Jundollah presence on the western borders because of their cooperation with the MKO Secretary General of Habilian Association said: Masterminding such a mobility is beyond the abilities of MKO which is now in a very crucial status, besides groups like PJAK in western Iran and Jundollah in the east are directly backed by the United States and Israel and MKO is only a tool for the implementation of America’s plans.

Hashemi Nejad reiterated once again the critical situation of the People’s Mujahedeen and said: After the fall of Saddam, Mujahedeen have lost their major supporter and now seek to postpone the closure of camp Ashraf at any rate and their cooperation with Jundollah is in an attempt to describe the situation crucial so as to draw a part of the attention of Iran and Iraq to other things.

This expert in the affairs of the People’s Mujahedeen continued: The course of action of the terrorist MKO and Jundollah is almost the same and they have many things in common and today the cooperation between them reveals that their difference is merely about the names; yet they have undertaken the same approach.
Rejecting the existence of democracy in MKO cult Hashemi Nejad said: there’s no place for the group to portray itself a democratic organization because terrorism is in its theory structure struggle for creating discord and riot is in its nature.

In response to a question about the possibility of MKO return to the terror list of European Union due to their cooperation with Jundollah son of Ayatollah Hashemi Nejad also said: MKO rearrival at the European Union list of terrorist groups does not change anything and will make no difference in the EU attitude towards the rebel group, therefore there is no need for trying to enlist them again; because such lists are only symbolic and would do nothing to reduce their miseries.

Underlining that MKO supporters are countries and individuals who are never after the actual meaning of Human Rights Hashemi Nejad went on and said: Thos who claim MKO has renounced terrorism are the same ones who remained silent at the time this terrorist cult openly carried out terrorist operations across Europe.

At the end Hashemi Nejad stated: MKO has recently staged clandestine efforts for the release of Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, top MKO leader in Iraq, which indicates the high point of terrorism in this cult.

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Mujahedin Khalq; A proxy force

James Longley on his ‘MEK and US Relations’

An Interview with filmmaker James Longley – about his Special Report ‘MEK and US Relations’ 

We were honored when filmmaker James Longley offered LinkTV an exclusive window to bring blankyou his special report about The MEK (AKA the Mujahadeen-e-Khalq). James’s award-winning film ‘Iraq in Fragments’ made a profound impression on me so I was fascinated to see his Special report about this little-known organization and very proud to be able to bring it to you. You can watch the premiere of the report streamed here on LinkTV.org and it will also be airing on the channel on 25th September at 9pm Pacific/12 Eastern, and October 30 at 4pm Pacific/7pm Eastern.

According to the Council on Foreign Relations, ‘The U.S. State Department lists the Mujahadeen-e-Khalq as a terrorist organization for its association with Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi regime until the dictator’s ouster by the U.S.-led invasion in 2003.’ It also states that ‘the MEK was blamed for Western targets in the 1970s and for supporting the 1979 American embassy takeover in Tehran. Over the last two decades, however, the group’s continued presence on the U.S. terrorist group list primarily involves its activities directed from Iraqi territory against Iran. After the 2003 U.S.-led invasion, the MEK was disarmed and confined by American forces to the grounds of a former Iraqi military base. Still, the 2007 State Department report says that MEK maintains “the capacity and will” to attack “Europe, the Middle East, the United States, Canada, and beyond.”
We talked to James earlier today about his film:

Why did you make the film?

First of all, I don’t really look at this project as a “film” per se — this is more like a special report, made exclusively for TV broadcast and Internet. I made the decision to put this report together because I think the subject matter is important; it has a strong impact on US-Iran relations although it’s a subject of which few in the United States are aware.
Are these former MEK members who gave interviews in any danger?

I was able to make contact with the former members of the MEK through an NGO in Tehran called the Nejat Society, which is an officially-sanctioned organization that helps the families of MEK members currently in Iraq and also provides support to former MEK members who have returned to Iran. Though I am sure the MEK itself might pose a danger to former members who speak about their experiences inside that organization, it’s important to recognize that I made these interviews with the blessing of an official organization in Iran, and not in secret. None of the participants in my report expressed any fear about giving interviews, since the Iranian government is already fully aware of their identities and history.

From what I can gather, it is now the position of the Iranian government to allow former MEK members to return to Iran without charging them with any crime, except for those who were in leadership positions inside the MEK or personally carried out terrorist acts – and there are relatively few of these people. In this way, the Iranian government hopes to dissolve the organization by allowing most people to leave it easily, and making it more feasible to shut down the main MEK Ashraf base in Iraq.
How did you come across the characters?

I contacted most of the former MEK members through the Nejat Society in Tehran. The journalists and historians I interviewed because of their published work on the MEK. People like Hans von Sponeck, who had been working for the UN in Iraq in the 1990s, I was able to interview just by chance. I was also able to interview the FBI agent in charge of investigating the MEK in the United States during the 1980s, though it took a long time to arrange this interview. I also contacted pro-MEK organizations such as the Iran Policy Committee, but after initially agreeing to an interview they eventually refused to go on the record. I also contacted Ali Reza Jafarzadeh – the former spokesperson for the MEK who now works for Fox News – to request an interview, but he never responded.

What are the characters in the film up to now?

Arash Sametipour, the main character in the report, finished his prison sentence and has been married for several years, living in Tehran where he works in a private company that teaches English to Iranians. Ronak, who was held against her will by the MEK in Ashraf base from the age of 14, is now in her early twenties and lives with her mother in the Kurdish area of Iran. Babak Amin, who carried out a number of terrorist operations in Iran including firing an RPG at the Ministry of Defense building, served a prison sentence and is now pursuing an engineering degree in Tehran. Yavar, the former MEK member who killed a young security guard in Esfahan after the 1979 revolution, served a long prison sentence and was saved from the death penalty by clemency granted by the guard’s mother, according to the Iranian legal system which allows family members of murder victims to pardon the murderer. Yavar adopted two young girls orphaned during the Iran-Iraq war and raised them as his own.

Have the MEK acted on any recent threats to the Iranian government?

During the 1980s and 90s the MEK carried out a number of terrorist operations against Iran, and even launched a land invasion in 1988, at the end of the Iran-Iraq War. However, since the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, the MEK has been largely disarmed and is no longer in a position to carry out large operations against Iran. Instead, they have been lobbying the US government to take military action against Iran, hoping to inspire a “regime change” that would allow themselves to come to power.

Has the U.S. government’s policy changed at all concerning the MEK?

My understanding is that there are deep divisions of opinion inside the US government regarding the MEK. On the one hand, the State Department, CIA and FBI all seem to regard the MEK and its lobbying efforts with a great deal of skepticism, because they understand the history and nature of the organization. After all, the MEK remains on the State Department list of designated foreign terrorist organizations, and they continue to be investigated by the FBI up to the present day. However, it is also clear that the MEK has managed to gain some favor both inside the White House and the Pentagon. Because of this overt and less-overt support, the MEK – a terrorist organization, according to the US government – is able to continue operating a base in Iraq under US military protection, and is able to continue fund-raising and lobbying efforts in the United States. So the MEK has come to represent a kind of hypocrisy on the part of the US government, because of their inconsistent enforcement of US anti-terrorism laws when it comes to the MEK.

Is the MEK an Islamic fundamentalist group like the Taliban?

No. The MEK can not really be compared to the Taliban – they are very different. Prior to the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, the MEK was a pro-revolutionary group that used many methods, including bombings and assassinations, to advance their goals. They espoused a philosophy which they called “Revolutionary Islam” which combined Marxist ideology with Islam. After the revolution when the the MEK was forced into exile, they became a personality cult under the leadership of Massoud and Mariam Rajavi, the husband and wife duo that has led the MEK since the 1980s. At that point, the actual political ideology of the group became secondary to the personality cult of the Rajavis.

Why isn’t the MEK well known in the United States, especially in the press?

Though the MEK has maintained an organized presence in the US since the 1980s and been under almost constant investigation by the FBI, they are not well known in this country since most of their activity has been focused inside their base in Iraq and their operations into Iran. The face they have presented in the United States is one of a democratic opposition group fighting for human rights in Iran, and they have been able to sell this image successfully among many members of Congress. The MEK has received some occasional press attention, but I think they are generally ignored because their story is quite complex and requires a great deal of explanation and background to tell properly, and US journalism tends to shy away from stories that cannot be told in sound-bites.

Why is it important for our viewers to see your film now?

Right now the US is faced with two vastly divergent paths that it can follow in terms of policy toward Iran. We can either go down the road of diplomacy and negotiations with Iran, or continue to build up a policy of sanctions and threats, and possibly war. The MEK is very much bound up in this choice, since if we choose to go down the diplomatic road with Iran then clear decisions have to be made to end all support for the MEK, whose main goal is the overthrow of the Iranian government, and to continue tacit support for the MEK clearly worsens relations with Iran and makes diplomatic efforts more difficult. To take a clear position to end US support for the MEK would ameliorate US-Iran relations and make negotiations on other issues far easier.

From an interview with James Longely, September 23rd, 2008. LinkTV.

For additional information on the subject of the film, the MEK, go to: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PMOI
Also, James has put up additional video and audio about the group here: http://www.daylightfactory.com/MEK/

James Longley Biography

James Longley was born in Oregon in 1972. He studied Film and Russian at the University of Rochester and Wesleyan University in the United States, and the All-Russian Institute of Cinematography (VGIK) in Moscow. His student documentary, Portrait of Boy with Dog, about a boy in a Moscow orphanage, received the Student Academy Award in 1994 by the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences.

After working as a film projectionist in Washington State, an English teacher in Siberia, a newspaper copy editor in Moscow, and a web designer in New York City, James traveled to Palestine in 2001 to make his first feature documentary, Gaza Strip. The film, which takes an intimate look at the lives and views of ordinary Palestinians in Israeli-occupied Gaza, screened to critical acclaim in film festivals and U.S. theaters.

In 2002, James traveled to Iraq to begin pre-production work on his second documentary feature, Iraq in Fragments, which was completed in January 2006 and premiered at the Sundance Film Festival, where it was awarded prizes for Best Documentary Directing, Best Documentary Editing, and Best Documentary Cinematography – the first time in Sundance history a documentary has received three jury awards. Iraq in Fragments went on to win the Nestor Almendros Award at the Human Rights Watch Film Festival, the Nesnady + Schwartz Documentary Film Competition at the Cleveland Intl Film Festival, the FIPRESCI International Critics Award at Thessaloniki, and the Grand Jury Award at the Full Frame Documentary Film Festival, and was nominated for an Academy Award in 2007.

James Longley’s short film, Sari’s Mother, premiered at the 2006 Toronto International Film Festival, and was nominated for an Academy Award in 2008.

James is currently working on projects in Iran.
Posted September 24, 2008 by Lorraine Hess with contributions from Deepak Unnikrishnan

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