In the last six years, mountains quaked yet Camp Ashraf stood stable. This is the chorus of mottos, messages, guidelines, victories, and hopes fabricated by Rajavi to foster hope in MKO members held captive in Camp Ashraf. The rationale behind considerable emphasis given to keeping Camp Ashraf, and its strategic advantage for Rajavi are evident and have to constitute one of the major issues to be elaborated on. It has been pointed out repeatedly that Camp Ashraf is the ideological bastion of Mojahedin and Iraqi soil is its strategic lever and instrument. Rajavi is well aware that its destabilization may result in the disintegration of the organization in ideological, political, and military aspects.
Rajavi’s problems have their roots in his tying Mojahedin destiny to the existence of Camp Ashraf; however, it was so at a time when Saddam was the dictator leader of Iraq and as Rajavi repeatedly asserted in his meetings with Saddam and Iraqi officials, he was out-and-out hopeful to Saddam and their ideological and even family ties and relations. Upon entering Iraq, Rajavi called his settlement there a historical event paving the way for immediate overthrow of the Iranian government. Now, after 20 years he still insists on his never-achieved promise and idea that Iraqi soil is the sole solution for furthering his so-called liberating war. The fall of Saddam was considered a turning point in his strategy enforcing him to run off to another region to evade the encountered cul-de-sac. His running away might result in the annihilation of his organization hence he attracted the attention of the world to a secondary issue, i.e. that of the necessity of keeping the integrity of Camp Ashraf for humanistic causes.
How long the process of Rajavi’s resorting to various subterfuges may last and what are his final objectives is unclear since Rajavi is always hew to the strategy of grabbing at the opportunity and now is after misusing the historical conflict of Iran-US to achieve his totalitarian and egocentric objectives. He assumes that the US-Iran conflict may lead to military conflicts that pave the way for Rajavi’s compensating his failure in forming a so-called liberation army in the reign of Saddam. Two years age, Rajavi put the termination of Bush’s taking office as the deadline of the fulfillment of the promise of overthrow and asked Ashraf residents to wait until then when they could decide on their destiny freely. Now, Obama’s anti-war policies has made Rajavi keep silent on his unfulfilled promise holding grab to the claim that even mountains quaked but Ashraf stood stable. In other words, he considers keeping Ashraf as his biggest political and strategic achievement in recent years. He considers the time being as a starting point in the history of MKO.
He still follows his past policies yet refrains to determine a deadline for his false promises. He seeks the sole solution to MKO challenges in two main factors. First, he attempts to keep Camp Ashraf as the ideological stronghold of Mojahedin and the sole factor securing the political and military integrity of Mojahedin in international scene. Second, he aims to use Camp Ashraf and its residents as a pretext to avoid taking a final decision concerning the destiny of the members kept there. It seems that he is waiting for troubled waters in the region to fish as he wishes.
The emphasis of Rajavi on keeping Camp Ashraf running implies that he equals its relocation to the disintegration of Mojahedin entity that also means his own degradation as the leader, another loser added to many other political losers. The sympathy of the world for an opposition that considered itself as the sole alternative for the Iranian government is but a complete defeat for Rajavi. It is likely that Rajavi’s undergoing relocation to another country works as a psychological and mental shock for Ashraf residents to overcome their deep frustration and disappointment but the fact is that the sole achievement of Ashraf for Rajavi is its overhanging role in postponing his answering to all his failures.