Search results for

"ideological revolution"

Rajavi, archetype of a cult leader

In describing the characteristics of cult leaders, their anomalous skills and potentiality to enslave recruits, it is commonly referred to as complimentary factors closely related to their charisma. Cult leaders make use of their charisma as well as other psychological and thought-reform techniques in order to control their followers. However, these levers and techniques are to be parallel to the belief system of their followers and is of utmost effect. In fact, cult leaders hold grab to members’ background and misuse through weird means to deprive members of their systems of values and beliefs and to replace them with heretical ones. However, it is not clear whether they believe in their magic power or just use it for deceiving members. According to a researcher working on cults:

Harder to evaluate, of course, is whether these leaders’ belief in their magical powers, omnipotence, and connection to God (or whatever higher power or belief system they are espousing) is delusional or simply part of the con. Megalomania–the belief that one is able or entitled to rule the world–is equally hard to evaluate without psychological testing of the individual, although numerous cult leaders state quite readily that their goal is to rule the world. In any case, beneath the surface gloss of intelligence, charm, and professed humility seethes an inner world of rage, depression, and fear. 1

Although this evaluation seems to be paradoxical, but well illustrates the complex personality of cult leaders. They pretend to act as a savior and a social reformist, while are well aware of the egocentric motives behind their actions and behaviors. According to Weber, an expert on cults, cult leaders in general and political cult leaders in particular, aim to propagate a new religion. He believes that they spread anarchy in the world and exhibit highly destructive behaviors. There are also other features distinguishing political cult leaders from other parallel cases:

Charismatic leader is "a sorcerer with an innovative aura and a personal magnetic gift, [who] promoted a specific doctrine…. [and was] concerned with himself rather than involved with others….[He] held an exceptional type of power: it set aside the usages of normal political life and assumed instead those of demagoguery, dictatorship, or revolution, [which induced] men’s whole-hearted devotion to the charismatic individual through a blind and fanatical trust and an unrestrained and uncritical faith. 2

In the morphology of the leadership of MKO as a political cult, almost all above features are found. The following classification of cult leaders’ characteristics may give us a better understanding of the issue.

1. Believing pretentiously in God,

2. Showing narcissism and megalomania,

3. Aiming to rule the world and develop a global revolution,

4. Fostering innovation and fabricating false religious interpretations,

5. Adopting unusual and unique procedures and approaches,

6. Trying to convince and control individuals,

7. Leading to destruction and anarchy using all possible means,

8. Seeking personal interests.

All these features can be traced in Masoud Rajavi, the leader of MKO, a notorious cult blacklisted in the terrorist list. It has to be noted that he got a number of these features after the development of the ideological revolution of Mojahedin in MKO. However, it is not our intent here to identify the above factors and their instances in Rajavi. Although it is difficult to make a generalization on whether all cult leaders believe in their own magic power and connection to God or not but there can be a clear-cut judgment on Masoud Rajavi in this regard. Taking a closer look at his past history clarifies his inconsistent personality and traits and his grabbing at cultic relations in order to conceal his problematic personality.

Rajavi’s paradoxical personality is apparent where he makes an attempt to stabilize his position by all means either by resorting to the religion or by opposing it

Rajavi’s paradoxical personality is apparent where he makes an attempt to stabilize his position by all means either by resorting to the religion or by opposing it. In other words, Rajavi is not even an out-and-out cult leader yet has grabbed at cultic relations and techniques in order to achieve his personal and totalitarian ambitions. Having some features of cult leaders like megalomania and narcissism as well as borrowing cultic thought-reform techniques facilitated his furthering of personal interests. Therefore, he has a more complex personality compared to other cult leaders. His charisma is not an inherent feature but is an instrument intentionally used to subordinate members. In fact, it is a combination of charisma and psychopathy that is common in most cult leaders:

In the case of cults, of course, we know that this induction of whole hearted devotion does not happen spontaneously but is the result of the cult leader’s skillful use of thought-reform techniques. Charisma on its own is not evil and does not necessarily breed a cult leader. Charisma is, however, a powerful and awesome attribute found in many cult leaders who use it in ways that are both self-serving and destructive to others. The combination of charisma and psychopathy is a lethal mixture. 3

It seems that the complexity of Rajavi’s personality cannot be understood without taking general cult leaders’ characteristics into consideration.

References:

1. Madeline, Tobias and Jania Lalich; Captive hearts, Captive minds, Halter House, 1994

2. ibid

3. ibid

December 30, 2008 0 comments

Massoud Rajavi

Rajavi’s new version of his cult history

Rajavi and his catalysts have misused the history of the organization and its founders in order to justify members that early founders of MKO, and Mohammad Hanifnejad in particular, have appointed Rajavi as the next leader of the organization. In this regard, a number of Rajavi’s fellows have fabricated some statements and have attributed them to Hanifnejad in order to legitimize the ideological leadership of Rajavi. Following the previous articles on the statements made by Lotfollah Meisami and others, here we take a look at those made by Mehdi Abrishamchi and one of the MKO former members. Abrishamchi summarizes all we mean by his manipulation of the history of the organization in one sentence, sacrificing all the alive and dead of the organization to Rajavi and says:

When Masoud speaks, it seems as if he speaks as the representative of all the alive and dead of the organization. 1

He further shows the spirit of Hanifnejad full of praise for Rajavi and makes an attempt to raise the status of Masoud, stating:

Evidently, no one but Masoud is aware of his own status, and hardly anybody can grasp that Masoud has arrived at the high summits of our ideals and has developed our revolution, ideas, and organization to a point that would for sure elevate the soul of Hanifnejad to appreciate. 2

Although the organizational principles of MKO are opposed to centering on just one individual, he introduces Rajavi as the history of the organization and says:

Our greetings and songs, cries and slogans, love and affection, will and determination, poems and stories, all aim to imply the fact that if Mojahedin have reached the present position and have developed their revolution up to this point, serving the humanity and achieving many honors, they owe all these to the ideological leadership of Masoud. Also, we owe our recent ideological revolution to Masoud and Maryam. 3

Manipulating the history of the organization and its victims in Rajavi’s favor is so disgraceful and repulsive that Anne Singleton, an MKO former member, refers to Rajavi as misusing the members’ ignorance, writing:

Rajavi is very good at spending from other people’s pockets, especially in using the deaths of his followers. 4

She further expounds on the fact that Rajavi consents to subordinate all the historical achievements of the organization obtained as a result of so much blood shed for achieving his personal ambitions:

Rajavi clearly wanted power and was prepared to subordinate the whole organisation and all its members into a means for him to achieve this. 5

Interestingly, Rajavi and his fellows claim that he is inheritor of all the ideological principles and the history of the organization. However, the fact is that the ideological principles of the organization have been manipulated, distorted, held in archive and even eliminated under the command of Rajavi and in his favor whenever necessary:

It is worth mentioning Rajavi’s other motive for removing and then burning all of the books from the camp libraries and safe houses abroad, (libraries which incidentally only had approved books in them anyway), and that is that these books and documents were in contradiction to having an ideological leader. Even his own speeches in Tehran University in the political phase before 30th Khordad were destroyed. These speeches had been published and avidly read at the time. Their essence was taken from Marx and Mao and was to compare the evolution of species with the evolution of society and, of course, Islamicise it. Another reason was that these books and documents were very much in contradiction with capitalism and harmful to Rajavi’s new approach to his new Western masters. Until now, the whole ideology and activities of the Mojahedin, including the killing of Americans, all their songs etc, had been built on Maoism and the fight against the West and imperialism. 6

She further elaborates on perverting the ideology of the organization by Rajavi for instrumentalizing the ideology:

Rajavi perverted the ideology of the Mojahedin from its original conception to something, which allowed him total control of all aspects of the organisation including the personal lives of the members. Alongside this internal change, the organisation also lost its direction in the political scene. 7

It has to be pointed out that the history of the organization, its founders and its ideological principles, are of no significance for Rajavi. Their value depends on the extent to which Rajavi can abuse them for the achievement of his ambitions and stabilization of his cultic leadership in the organization. He has attempted to fabricate some memories and accounts to present himself and pretend to be the sole inheritor of the organization and its principles to which he is not hew. He has exploited all the resources of the organization for the fulfillment of his personal interests at the hands of a number of his ignorant fellows.

References:

1. The lecture of Mehdi Abrishamchi on the ideological revolution, Mojahed journal, no. 255

2. ibid

3. ibid

4. Singleton, Anne, Saddam’s private army.

5. ibid

6. ibid

7. ibid

December 27, 2008 0 comments

Massoud Rajavi

The instrumental misuse of MKO history – part 2

The instrumental misuse of MKO founders and history – part 2

Of the current issues prevalent in the world of politics regarding the challenges MKO has risen to is that Rajavi has manipulated the history of MKO and its founders. It is said that he and his fellows have made an attempt to misuse the history of the organization in a way to legitimize his unauthentic leadership imposed on the organization and its members. Here a number of fabricated memories made by a number of self-seeker MKO members are reviewed in order to bring the matter to light. In this regard, Mohammad Hayati, one of the theoreticians of the ideological revolution introduces Rajavi as the sole advisor of Hanifnejad and says:

I saw no one closer and more active than Masoud in discussion and negotiation with Mohammad [Hanifnejad], no one even Saeed [Mohsen] and Asqar [Badizadegan]. 1

Mehdi Khodaee-Sefat who has not met Hanifnejad grabs at other techniques in order to exalt Rajavi, saying:

Once in 1972, I met Masoud in cell No. 3 in Qasr prison and discovered the mysteries of life in him. Again, in 1975, in the cell No. 6 when I heard his voice for the second time, it was as if I got everything in a blink of an eye and considered the tortures of prison and Savak unimportant. 2

Hamid Asadian, Mojahedin’s poet, makes a generalization and states:

Masoud represents the revolutionary values of a generation who had a historical presence in the political, social, and cultural scene of Iran since 1965. 3

He adds:

All resistances, solution findings, victories and in a nutshell the survival of Mojahedin depends on one person who represents the ideals of Mojahed generation. He is the story of Mojahedin and Mojahedin are his story. 4

And Abrishamchi introduces Rajavi as the sole discoverer of Hanifnejad, stating:

His role [Hanifnejad] was a unique historical and ideological one which was unknown at his time. Just one person, Masoud, discovered it and made a close relationship with him and paid a considerable cost for doing so. 5

In order to check the truthfulness of these statements, we’d better take a brief look at the statements made by Lotfollah Meisami, one of the closest cadres to Hanifnejad, and raise the question that why all these fabricated memories have been recalled simultaneously and after a number of decades and all have a similar theme and form.

Meisami expounds on some points in contradiction to those mentioned before. In contrast to what Rajavi’s allies mean by fabricating theses memories, he says that the main reason Hanifnejad paid more attention to Rajavi was the flaws he had had noticed in Rajavi including selfishness, vanity, egoism and so forth. Thus, Hanifnejad always had him under full control and warned him of his flaws. According to Meisami:

It has to be pointed out that everyone has some traces of egoism and vanity. Yet, in a well-formed organization, all these defects can be surmounted. It was so for Rajavi too and whenever he was in their companion, Mohammad and Saeed kept close to him and controlled him fully. 6

Or:

In the same period of time, the personality of Masoud Rajavi came under question and there appeared many quotations from Hanifnejad. For instance, Hanifnejad was quoted saying that the prevalent egoism in Masoud would be destructive for the organization. The members of central council of leadership were well aware of this statement. 7

Interestingly, in these memories there are some individuals who took a hostile position toward Rajavi at that time and now have changed their mind and come to remember, or better to say fabricating, memories in Rajavi’s favor:

After the schism of 1971 and its consequences, the issue of the leadership was raised in Qasr prison. There were seventy members therein and they needed to be organized so Masoud was already in charge of solving problems. For example, if someone or something was snitched he informed those outside and also made us aware of the outside news. After the imprisonment of Bahman Bazargan, they cooperated with each other, yet when the number of members increased and almost all Mojahedin came to prison, Masoud came under question to some extent. Some members like Musa Khiabani, Fathollah Khamene’i, Kazem Shafiee, Nabi Moazemi, Ebrahim Avoukh, and those gone to Palestine criticized Masoud for his flaws. 8

Furthermore, Meisami points out that Rajavi was so isolated in goal and neglected by MKO prisoners that despite assuming the leadership of the organization, prisoners formed a council of leadership in the prison and conducted polls in which Rajavi was defeated:

There were a lot of members in Qasr prison and it seemed that nothing could fill the void left by the martyrdom of the founders. Also, members were unsure of Rajavi. It was said that there had to open polls for selecting the central cadre in which Musa Khiabani and two other candidates were at the lead; but Rajavi got no vote. 9

In another part of the memories of Meisami, it has been stated that:

Members refrained to accept a fixed leadership. So polls were carried out in which Fathollah Khamene’i, Kazem Shafiee and Musa Khiabani were elected for the first central cadre in the prison yet Rajavi got just a single vote. 10

Most important of all, Meisami believes that Rajavi followed a different path after the execution of founders and even considered them as outsiders:

After the martyrdom of the founders, some members like Masoud Rajavi had a different viewpoint against the early founders and even refrained to consider the former members of the organization as true insiders. 11

References:

1. The book of founders, MKO publications, p.121.

2. ibid, p.138

3. ibid, p.160

4. ibid, p.161

5. ibid, p.87

6. Meisami, Lotfollah; Degeneration of a Mojahed, Mojahed journal, No. 32.

7. The memoirs of Lotfollah Meisami, 2003, p.74

8. ibid, p.194

9. Meisami, Lotfollah; Degeneration of a Mojahed, Mojahed journal, No. 32.

10. The memoirs of Lotfollah Meisami, 2003, p.194.

11. ibid, p.157

December 23, 2008 0 comments

The Ideology of the MEK

Versatile ideology of Rajavi’s Cult

Once forming the very fundamentals and organizational principles of Mojahedin, ideology turned into a paradoxical lever in the hands of Masoud Rajavi after he usurped leadership of MKO. Although Rajavi extracted the necessity of armed struggle against the global imperialism from MKO ideology, after a while he manipulated it in a way that the very ideology made the background for siding with imperialism, ignoring the bloods shed for the sacred cause they were fighting to fulfill. Drifted to the left, it was the fundamental objective of MKO to confront US-led imperialist policies in Iran. In other words, ideology worked a two-fold function for Rajavi. On the one hand, it was aimed at invoking social movements and political trends and on the other hand, it was believed to be an instrument justifying the organization’s short-term compromise with the US, a government once damned by MKO. By the same token, Rajavi declared the initiation of the phase of armed struggle in 1980s grabbing at the ideology:

In a gathering with the council of leadership and Masoud, it was concluded that we had to wage armed struggle even though it resulted in the overall disintegration of the organization. It was no exaggeration, we believed that in the existing conditions, our passivity might lead to disintegration of the organization as well as defamation of our ideology giving an end to the ideology of the organization… in that historical period in Iran. 1

In fact, ideology may be considered an instrument for Mojahedin to find a way out of their political and strategic impasses as well as shaping the final destiny and existence of the organization. Taking this into mind, the following statements made by MKO members are better understood:

As theists consider the existence of God as the main pillar of their beliefs, ideology is the main pillar of a revolutionary organization. In fact, the organization owes its existence to ideology. Ideology is the theoretical base of its development and the sole solution for its challenges. 2

Although Rajavi pretended that he deemed the development of the ideological revolution necessary for keeping the integrity of the organization, it is evident that the real intention behind his decision was carrying out considerable modifications in the ideological principles and doctrines of the organization in a way to make them fully in accord with his personal ambitions. Hence, he paved the way for testing his personal, cultic theories within the organization as he justified the compulsory in the framework of ideology.

The statements made by many MKO members imply the fact that Rajavi played the key role in the initiation of the ideological revolution within the organization completely disregarding views of other members at the leadership council. For example, Mehdi Abrishamchi asserted that the ideas of Rajavi would determine the ideology of MKO. He further referred to the necessity of an interpreter to analyze the ideology and concluded that nobody but Masoud was capable of serving this role in MKO and considered him as the sole solution for removing political and strategic stalemates that the organization would come to encounter. However, the fact is that Rajavi misused ideology and used it as a pretext to justify all his decision-makings, defeats and wrongdoings even those obviously opposed to law, logic, ethics, and religion. He even dissolved the democratic council of leadership due to ideological concerns. Evidently, the ideological revolution was put into effect to stabilize Rajavi’s leadership and hegemonic authority over MKO. To put it simply, ideological revolution allowed Rajavi to take the place of ideology in MKO. Mehdi Abrishamchi refers to this process of substitution by saying:

As much as a revolutionary organization is concerned, for the clarification of ideological boundaries, an ideological interpreter is to be introduced, a person who says the last word in the organization… It is Masoud who expounds on the ideology of the organization and thinks up novel ideas. 3

Therefore, all those witnessing the ideological revolution of Rajavi are unanimous that:

Settlement of leadership issue constitutes the heart of the ideological revolution. 4

Anne Singleton expounds on the primary motivation behind Rajavi’s labeling his revolution an ideological one and says:

The ideological revolution corresponds to the Rajavi’s objective for taking the position of an absolute totalitarian leadership within the organization. 5

She further explains the meaning conotated by the terms “ideology” and “ideological leadership”, stating:

They mean that the leadership dictates everything. Also, he is supposed to be spiritually free from errors in order to guarantee the absolute obedience of members and fulfillment of rules and regulations. 6

References:

1. Mehdi Abrishamchi’s lecture on the ideological revolution of Mojahedin. Muslim students association. 1985, p.6.

2. ibid

3. Ibid

4. Niyabati, Bijan. A different look at the ideological revolution of Mojahedin, p.21.

5. Mahan Abedin’s interview with Anne Singleton, January 6, 2005.

6. ibid

December 15, 2008 0 comments

The Ideology of the MEK

Ideology interpreted for ambitions

Of the most repeatedly used terms in the publications of MKO in addition to lectures made by its leader, Masoud Rajavi, is “ideology” to the point that it has turned to be an emblematic term in Mojahedin’s literature. Rajavi has justified all his wrong doings and political and strategic errors by grabbing at the ideology and referring to the necessity of adhering to it as a multipurpose factor. It has to be pointed out that the organization’s manifestos and doctrines have been based on the ideology and its function in a variety of social and political grounds. For instance, in the history of the organization written by Rajavi, the significance of ideology has been elaborated on in this way:

Nowadays, a theory or pre-determined program is an inevitable necessity for those familiar with the science of struggle without which achieving victory is impossible. The founders of the organization have been well aware of this issue when they adopted the Islamic ideology as the base of theory and instruction for their anti-imperialist struggle. Therefore, from the beginning, they have compiled a new version of Islamic ideology to efface ethnic and class blemishes. 1

The focus of the present article is not on the way the early Mojahedin dealt with ideology and its relationship with armed struggle since it is an issue spelled out previously. The point is that from the early days of formation, the organization has been distinguished from other parallel groups and trends holding grab at the factor of the ideology. Furthermore, Mojahedin have made an attempt to introduce their own interpretation of the religion and religious issues as the ideological framework of their social and political relations. In other words, Mojahedin have made borderlines with outsiders and their dissidents under the pretext of ideology and hence have a ready-made justification for all their activities even cultic and terrorists ones. In this regard, even the organizational obedience is allowed as long as ideological fundamentals of MKO are kept intact:

As long as the organization adheres to ideological principles and there can be seen no drift and deviation, that is to say, as long as we hew to the correct ideological and political (strategy and tactics) lines, it is a revolutionary task to accept its centralism and make efforts to strengthen it. 2

Mojahedin are of the opinion that holding onto their ideological values requires heavy costs which they have to pay. The price could even be pretentious political drifts or making claims of having taken a different struggle strategy until the appropriate time and the golden opportunity knocked. Seizing the political opportunities could hardly be working in the same way of keeping to the ideology and sometimes they preferred to sacrifice temporal political interests for the cause of ideology. As once stated in one of their published booklets:

Evidently, measures taken and decisions made for keeping ideological values have a certain cost to be paid, that is to say, they may entail some losses. For instance, we may be deprived of some supports and even be isolated in short time. 3

Generally speaking, Mojahedin never in the past sacrificed their ideology nor misused it for the fulfillment of selfish objectives up to the leadership of Masoud Rajavi. However, since then ideology has been turned into a paradoxical instrument in the hands of the leadership in order to instill his pragmatic, hegemonic, and totalitarian ambitions into an organization that soon metamorphosed into a cult of personality. After the change of monarchical regime in Iran and Rajavi’s failure to secure a share of political power, he shifted the order of Mojahedin ideology and challenged the religious issues once respected by Mojahedin. He also made new recruitments claiming to be in full opposition to global imperialism and the newly established regime in Iran. He would predict that finally the regime along with imperialism and the world’s superpowers would collapse before MKO’s ideology came to glamorize. Then it will be the initiation of a so-called political phase in which an internally intensified chaos instigate discordance among political parties inside Iran that pushed Mojahedin onto the power. In fact, he had a prejudicial and incomplete understanding of Islam and disguised his personal ambitions as the revolutionized ideology of MKO that eroded the last social support among Iranian.

It was the ideology that set the turning point for entering the armed phase and perpetrating terrorist attacks. Ideology may be considered to be a pretext for Rajavi to make the grounds for his anti-social and inhuman activities. In fact, he theorized and justified his decision-makings, terrorist activities, moving to Iraq and cooperating with Saddam, developing the ideological revolution in MKO, forming a cult of personality and many more by means of ideology. He also openly considered his opposition to Iranian regime as a result of anti-imperialist ideology of Mojahedin against traditional bourgeoisie politics of the latter. As a result, he managed to pave the way for the development of insecurity, anarchy, and terror inside Iran by clinging to his widely despised, self-fabricated ideology.

References:

1. The history of MKO, from the beginning up to 1975. Tehran: Mojahedin Press, 1979, p.12.

2. Investigation of the possibility of deviation in democratic centralism, Tehran: Mojahedin Press, 1979, p.15.

3. Pragmatism, Tehran: Mojahedin Press, 1979, p.43.

December 1, 2008 0 comments

The Ideology of the MEK

Eclectic ideology of a terrorist cult

Ideology constitutes one of the main levers at the hands of Mojahedin leadership for the fulfillment of his political and cultic objectives. It has played a crucial role in the development of the organization up to now and has served a variety of historical, social, and political purposes. It is a good idea to take a Ideology constitutes one of the main levers at the hands of Mojahedin leadership for the fulfillment of his political and cultic objectives look at the early years of MKO to have a better understanding of the function of ideology. From the beginning, science, ideology, and religion were the main pillars on which Mojahedin founded its political struggle:

In the same way as today’s revolutionary concepts that are the product of bloody struggles of men to change the world’s order, the Divine Revelation through the Holy Qur’an disclosed to man truths that unraveled the secrets of his life and solved the most complex philosophy of existence. 1

Mojahedin from the very beginning have put emphasis on having adopted a religious ideology; however, it was mainly due to the specific social, political and religious conditions of their society not their firm belief in religious values. In fact, the early Mojahedin were very anxious to create an ideology that justifiably approved armed struggle. This claim can be proved easily by means of the analyses made and published by the organization itself. The reason may be the occurrence of the ideological schism of the organization into Islamic and Marxist wings due to the fact that some members came to believe that religion in itself was not capable to solve all social and political challenges of the society. Therefore, it was deemed necessary to replace the Islamic ideology of the organization with an eclectic one.

It has to be pointed out that the ideology of the organization in any phase depended much on the main objectives it pursued and functioned as a pretext for the fulfillment of those objectives. We are not here to make a definitive judgment on whether the founders of the organization have misused ideology or not since religion has been treated in a variety of ways by Mojahedin in the last decades. On the one hand, they looked at it instrumentally with regard to political and social conditions of the society; on the other hand, some others have extracted the necessity of struggle from religious doctrines. However, religion has been considered mainly as a means to achieve political goals.

Many MKO former members have acknowledged that from the early years of the formation of MKO, religion has been considered to be a must but merely with regard to political and social issues of the society. They have asserted that Islamic ideology was adopted at that time since it was supposed that Islam was closely related to class struggle and Marxist ideology. In addition, since Iranian culture was intermingled with Islamic values, Mojahedin made an attempt to blend Islam with their own favorite ideology, Marxism. One of the members witnessing the ideological schism of Mojahedin refers to various interpretations made of religion and ideology and says:

At that time, religious concerns were necessarily in force. In other words, Mojahedin tried to confirm the fundamental concepts of their ideology by means of religion that was intermingled with [Iranian] culture. Therefore, they had to be cautious about whatever could be regarded as anti-religion and reason their words according to Quran. For example, if members theorized that working was of great value, they had to provide evidence from Quran. There were some Marxist books, e.g. Lenin and Mao, as well as other books materially discussing formation of the world among the pamphlets of the organization but Mojahedin leaders were cautious not to target members’ Islamic beliefs and therefore, novel and deliberate interpretation of Quranic verses were presented. 2

This was the starting point for turning religion into an ideology ignoring the real conditions of the society and which aimed at fulfillment of social and political values and norms of Mojahedin. Taking this viewpoint, religion turned to be an instrument at the hands of Marxist Mojahedin. It took at least one decade to turn an idealist political organization into a religious and political cult. Mojahedin justifiably argued that religion by itself and shared in an eclectic ideology has to be at the service of a struggle to constitute a classless society. The world view continued up to Rajavi’s absolute domination over the organization, but underwent a great change especially after the collapse of the Socialism camp that led to a global power imbalance.

No doubt, the process enforced changes that placed the organization in the abyss of a paradoxical ideology. Unlike the earlier days when ideology played a crucial role in class struggle, now it is abused as an instrument to advance certain non-collective interests and to secure authoritarian hegemony of Rajavi. A brief look at the course of events after the development of ideological revolution within MKO well clarifies the raveled facts. Rajavi in all these years misused ideology as well as science and religion in order to justify his egocentrically made decisions that led to strategic defeats and failures.

The ideological marriage of Rajavi and Maryam Azodanlu may be considered to be another turning point in the history of the organization that led it onto the abyss of a cult. Rajavi made numerous justifications for this event with a focus on religious values. It seems that Rajavi tried to misuse all religious creeds in order to safeguard his selfish objectives. He even compared Maryam Azodanlu to Virgin Mary and her sufferings, stating:

In defense of Maryam, the most pure and virtues Mojahed woman against all accusations and insults leveled against her, I have to say that a whirlwind blows first over the highlands and crushes the flowers atop the branches, that is to say, Maryam, the symbol of freedom of Iranian women. She is a thunderbolt against aggression, a loud roar against oppression, pure and innocent, manifestation of the angel of freedom, the heroine of all Mojahedin victories, beyond any epic and the song of freedom. 3

Rajavi exploited religion and the ideology that was intended to help advance a struggle for a certain cause for the establishment of a most anti-social modern phenomenon, a cult. He accredited himself a god-like and prophetic status whose mission was, and still is, to guide not only his followers but the world. The mere claim of being a cult’s maharishi with a developed eclectic ideology is enough to jeopardize the security and well-being of any society. The problem is even greater with MKO and the Rajavis at the lead; they have developed traits and characteristics of a notorious terrorist organization synthesized with that of a dangerous cult.

References:

1. MKO, raah-e Hossein [The way of Hossein], p.204

2. Parviz Ghelichkhani interview with Torab Haqshenas.

3. Rajavi’s lecture on the ideological revolution, Mojahed, No. 253

November 27, 2008 0 comments

MEK Camp Ashraf

Dislocation of Ashraf; the sole solution to set victims free

Niyabati’s article “The necessity of releasing Mojahedin forces” in answer to Farrokh Negahdar’s article “Mojahedin must depart Camp Ashraf” contains some interesting and paradoxical points to which due attention is to be paid. It is somehow paradoxical since on the one hand, Niyabati has repeated the statements made by Farrokh Negahdar and on the other hand, he has drawn a border and red line between his own statements and those of Mr. Negahdar and has even threatened him of deserving trial and punishment by Mojahedin. First, it has to be pointed out that his article is a verification of Mojahedin’s typical insulting and offensive behavior against their critics that bears no rationalism and reasoning. On the one hand, he states:

It is simplistic if we seek a devil intention and political prejudice behind all dissidents’ position takings all the time. For sure it is not always so. 1

On the other hand, he is irritated by the statements made by Mr. Negahdar and writes:

If all those who have witnessed his betrayals pass away or forgive him, on the promised day of judgment the organization will not for sure leave him alone. 2

The reason why he takes a more aggressive attitude against Mr. Negahdar compared to other sympathizers of Mojahedin is pertinent to his past history. We have elaborated on the relationship between Niyabati and Mojahedin previously. It seems that his past semi-intellectual and megalomaniacal gestures insisting to show his superiority over Mojahedin and their leadership has been faded away and now he has turned to be a simple errand for Mojahedin. However, there are some significant points in his article. For example, he refers to Camp Ashraf and says:

The current issue is releasing Mojahedin and transferring them to a safe refuge. Nobody cares to ask Mojahedin if they are willing to leave Camp Ashraf or remain there. 3

The point is that even Mojahedin leaders refrain to pay attention to the will of Ashraf residents and ignore the fact that they have to let them choose their own destiny. In recent years, many have repeatedly focused on the necessity of holding a free referendum in Camp Ashraf. In this way, nobody would criticize Mojahedin leaders as for the decision made based on the demands of Ashraf residents and it will pave the way for Mojahedin to petition international bodies in order to achieve their demands. Earlier, Niyabati had elaborated on the psychological levers and factors aiming at convincing members to remain in the organization and made his attempts to justify the necessity of these factors; therefore, he dares not claim that all Ashraf residents are willing to remain in Iraq in the existing conditions. The main challenge of Mojahedin leaders at the time being is that MKO members cannot be transferred to another location as long as they are labeled as a Mojahed and are members of MKO due to their terrorist label. In fact, they would be recognized refugees if they declare their separation from MKO as did many former members who are now living freely in European countries. Niyabati writes:

In fact, there is not a country where they may ignore the terrorist list to consent giving asylum to residents of Camp Ashraf. 4

However, he desist to refer to the fact that there are many former members of MKO living freely in European countries and running an ordinary life. Niyabati has no doubt in the necessity of the transfer of Camp Ashraf residents to another country. Yet, his only disagreement with Mr. Negahdar is that the latter truly believes that there is no country at the time being to let Ashraf residents in due to their terrorist repute. He has indirectly implied that transferring Mojahedin members to another country even as MKO members, results in the loss of Camp Ashraf, i.e. the strategic and ideological bastion of Mojahedin. He has also focused on the significance of camp Ashraf in his book and elaborated on the close relationship between Ashraf and the ideological revolution of Mojahedin, writing:

There is no doubt that the remarkable resistance of [Camp] Ashraf under the hegemony of Mojahed women has its roots merely in the internal ideological revolution of Mojahedin. 5

Evidently, Niyabati is well aware that the sole solution for the survival of Mojahedin is keeping Camp Ashraf ongoing. Therefore, it seems that Mojahedin prefer not to be removed from the terrorist list since in that case they would have no excuse to remain in Camp Ashraf and have to leave it and lose their organizational unity. Now the US presidential election coming to an end, the two-year pledge of Rajavi to overthrow the Iranian regime proves futile once more. These events have intensified Mojahedin crises. According to Niyabati:

I have no doubt … that deserting Camp Ashraf and compulsory transfer of Mojahedin, would be more advantageous for keeping the security of [Iranian] regime rather than that of Mojahedin. 6

In a nutshell, Niyabati and Mojahedin sympathizers’ insistence on keeping MKO members in Camp Ashraf aims mainly at maintaining the ideological and strategic container of Mojahedin and has nothing to do with posing a threat for the Iranian regime.

References:

1. Niyabati, Bijan, The necessity of releasing Mojahedin forces, two different view points

2. Ibid

3. Ibid

4. Ibid

5. Niyabati, Bijan, A different look at the internal ideological revolution of Mojahedin

6. Niyabati, Bijan, The necessity of releasing Mojahedin forces, two different view points

November 24, 2008 0 comments

Former members of the MEK

Unsaid stories on a castle called Ashraf

Memories of Batoul Soltani – Part Four

SFF: Mrs. Soltani, we would like your mind to get back to Ashraf where you had difficulty to escape from. We would like you describe the internal relations in MEK that caused you run away?

Batould Soltani: I was actually in the MEK for two decades so I know about the MEK’s internal relations very well. When in 1986 I entered the organization, The Mujahedin Khalq OrganizationThey used any practice to bring the people to the cult in Iraq. For example they managed to send smugglers, financing them, to take the people out of their families and bring them to Iraq. the most convenient houses and hotel were dedicated to the families. It was the time when Masud and Maryam Rajavi came to Iraq from France. The MEK had used all its strength to recruit members and all IRI opponents from all over the world. There was a tension among supporters in abroad. Rajavi was using his entire wisdom to get the supporters out of their normal life and bring them to the organization and of-course the prison of Ashraf. They used any practice to bring the people to the cult in Iraq. For example they managed to send smugglers, financing them, to take the people out of their families and bring them to Iraq.

The other activity they were also busy of, was to found National Liberation Army and the deals with Iraqi Regime like the meetings with Iraqi ministries or deputies and then with Saddam Hussein who offered them bases, weapons, military trainings. The focus was on recruiting members for the so called NLA. At that time the Iraqi military organs were launching intelligence operations together with the MEK elements to succeed their attacks against Iran. The MEK was taking care of such affairs. Everyday there was a new crisis, a new adventure. So the supporters were busy enough.

After some time they spoke of NLA and military uniform and boots and things like that. Later in 1989 the second phase of Ideological Revolution (after the first phase which was operated in 1985 when the couples were forced to divorce.) was started by MEK that claimed that the first phase was not completed and the divorces should be perfect for ever; this time the divorces should be real and there is no return and anyone who wants to enter the organization must divorce. Since that time divorce became a condition for membership in the MKO.

They named this revolution as “whirl-wind” in which they filtered the devotees from the opponents. Several meetings were arranged by Masud and Maryam Rajavi who brought members group by group there; where they set the situation so artificially that the members became obliged to take out their wedding rings and divorce their spouses. I was in the last group of MKO members who divorced.

They held the meeting for a group of members. From the beginning moments the members were so worried of being called, then they called a person who went to deliver all his responsibilities… then we saw Maryam and Masud cheering made an atmosphere and asked the person:” Ok, now what must you give?” Or “what have you hidden?” they pressured the member mentally and at the end he was prepared for divorce. The person had to write and sign the feature of his dependence on his spouse, his problems and thoughts. Then he had continual meetings so as he can ideologically divorce the marriage in his mind. Thus the leaders could have a better control on the members’ emotions and feelings. The next step was to cut the remaining emotional point: children.

They sent the children to places, they know themselves, and for example they sent my son to a country and my daughter to another one and I had no idea of where they were. I remember they used the opportunity of war in 1991 and said: “Due to the war, we can not keep the kids here”, so they arranged another chantage and separated the children from their families. That was a treacherous plan that was executed. They even said themselves:” That’s a good pretext to get rid of children.”

The evil Masud had calculated everything; he knew that the presence of children would take a lot of energy. Now they had members who were completely and professionally at Masud‘s service. They sent the children to places, they know themselves, and for example they sent my son to a country and my daughter to another one and I had no idea of where they were.

I couldn’t ask, in any case, where my kids are. They would punish me using their manipulation techniques …

Then, they determined a criterion which was ‘’Maryam ‘’who divorced from her husband for Masud’s sake, married him ideologically and her whole existence has become Masud! In a new scenario, she came said:” I leave all my organizational duties” and Masud said the same thing and introduced Maryam as the first authority of the organization because she was the only one who was joined to Masud and all the others had to be dissolved in and dedicated to Maryam, if not they were called anti-woman, non-revolutionary … this was their new story to seize the members soles and minds.

The bottom line of the story is that Masud is only the ideological leader. If you want to analyze the MEK, you should work one two dimensions; one: the strategic and military dimension and two: the ideological and organizational dimension. The strategic aspect included the departure from France and arrival to Iraq to from NLA. The ideological aspect began with the ideological revolution in 1984. Following the defeat in the “Eternal Light” operation, they concluded that the failure happened because the ideological revolution hasn’t performed perfectly so the fighters haven’t fought well. The discussions on the ideological revolution ended with the divorces saying that the emotions are illegal.

After Maryam Rajavi became the first authority of MEK, Masud left all his organizational responsibilities. They wanted to open their way to European countries, so they established “Presidential Offices” in European countries. A new series of stories began with the name of “President Elect” ( Maryam Rajavi),calling for opposition groups to come under MEK’s hegemony and form National Council of Resistance to abuse them.

Then they continued with equipping their NLA by Saddam Hussein’s aid. Rajavi always was proud of the gifts granted to him by Saddam Hussein. For any operation they launched inside Iran, Saddam praised them with his offered weapons and tanks.

Translation: Nejat Society

November 23, 2008 0 comments

Former members of the MEK

Mujahedin Organizational Contradictions

Mrs. Sho’le Shadram, former member of MKO, who is now residing is Sweden, had an interview with Nejat Society during her trip to Iran. The following is an extract of her speech at Tehran branch of Nejat Society:

Mrs. Sho'le Shadram, former member of MKO, who is now residing is Sweden, had an interview with Nejat Society during her trip to Iran I am Sho’le Shadram. I was born in 1966 in Lahijan, Gilan. In 1985, when I wanted to join MKO I went to Turkey from where I was sent to Iraq. When I fled Iran, I was in age of 17 and I was a MKO supporter. After I arrived in Iraq, Camp Ashraf, gradually I began to doubt what the organization was saying. I couldn’t trust them. When I was in Iran I was very sympathic and serious supporter of MKO but when I got in to a close relationship with them, I felt that they have another face which never looks like what they say.

The peak of the internal contradiction was that my first marriage was organizational [dictated by the organization] and my first husband was killed in the group’s attack to Iran [Eternal Light Operation]. My second marriage was also organizational which ended to the mandatory divorce dictated after the ideological revolution!

How do the cult leaders allow themselves to enter the individuals’ private personal space and manipulate them by psychological methods? I didn’t agree the divorce and marriage of Maryam Rajavi (the basic contradiction that everyone has question on but no one dares to express)

They wanted to convince me and the others to accept it.Under their hysteric peer pressure we had no way except accepting the controversial divorce and marriage of Maryam Azdanlou[Rajavi].

Basically I didn’t believe in going to Iraq and cooperating with Saddam Hussein, considering it treason against Iran and Iranians (this was the second basic contradiction, contrary to the principals) but the ruling atmosphere was so controlling that I didn’t have the courage to express my idea. No one had the courage to even think about defection because they had made it a taboo: the highest treason. I never accepted a responsibility so I was all the time reproached. I was ready to suffer the worst condition to find a possibility to leave the camp and never get back.

In 1990, when I was in Camp Ashraf I stated my defection from MKO, so I was immediately taken to the group’s prison in Debes in Northern Iraq. After two and a half years of living in refugee camp in Turkey, I was granted refugee status by Sweden where I got married and became the mother of three children After a year, they sent me to the refugee camp in Romadi where the condition was very bad but of-course better than that of MKO. Once I escaped from the camp to go to Jordan but the Jordanian police arrested me and handed me to Iraq. The news of my escape was published, so the organization became obliged to send me to another country. First they transferred me to Baghdad and then in 1991 Turkey where I went to the UN’s High Commission of Refugees. After two and a half years of living in refugee camp in Turkey, I was granted refugee status by Sweden where I got married and became the mother of three children.

As soon as I got to Sweden, the MKO agents came to me continuously asking me to do fundraising activities in the streets. I resisted firmly and didn’t obey them. Finally, they stopped bothering me.

For along time, after my residence in Sweden, I had terrible nightmares. I had the feeling that I was still captured in the organization. I wondered how I was deceived by the cult and how I could waist my life in a cult. At nights I had nightmares of Ashraf Camp, I shouted in sleep. A few years passed and I could find a normal status.

In Sweden there was a group that helped the people who had gone to the war and had mental problems. They also helped the defectors of MKO psychologically to return them to the society. They had experts who aided the survivors of the cult. In Sweden, I had financial problem, I was homesick and I had problem with the language but I was never willing to have the least contact with MKO.

After some time, I contacted my family who were unaware of my condition for years. I wanted to go to Iran to visit them. I got married. I got three kids and I came to Iran to make my disagreement with MKO concrete. For the time being, I have no concern except my concern for those who are still captive of Camp Ashraf and I know them.

I appreciate the efforts of Nejat Society that tries to link the captured ones of the cult of Rajavi with their families in Iran. I hope that the entire captives of Camp Ashraf and Auver Sur d’Oise can soon get back to their families and society.

November 5, 2008 0 comments

Mujahedin Khalq Organization's Propaganda System

The Irony of a Safe World

Using its large propaganda and lobby campaign in Europe and America, MKO has always wanted to convince the West to remove the group’s name from the list of terrorist entities, The NCRI website states that

“to remove the PMOI from the terrorism list would make the world a safer place.”

The question is: How could the world become a safer place with a de-listed terrorist Marxist cult?

The irony is also here:”A safer Place”. To clarify the item you should answer the preceding question. You might be willing to analyze the consequences of being a terrorist, Marxist and cult-like group, at the same time.

Since its foundation as an opposition to the regime of Shah of Iran, MKO has always been engaged in the armed struggle and has never denounced violence officially. What can MEK do with that long (more than 4 decades) history of bombings, assassinations and military operations mostly against innocent people? The background has been reported several times by various international bodies including the annual report of the State Department in 2007– according to the same organizations the victims of MKO’s terror activities has been mounted as to be countless. They were killed in the numerous bombings, mortar attacks, military operations of the group in Iran and also Iraq. Besides, the group assassinated 7 American military personnel and civilians in 1970s. During the post revolutionary terrorist acts of MKO in 1980s, they bombed various places including streets and even public transportation buses. In one case a 2-year old baby named Leila Nourbakhah burned completely. To check MKO’s chronology of terrorist activities would take plenty of time. Only to name a few of a large number will illuminate the broad-minded brains. Thus how can the world be a safer place with de-listed MKO terrorists who celebrated the tragic catastrophe of September 11^th in 2001?

The Marxist aspect of MKO should also be considered carefully. When the primary founders of Mujahedin-e-Khalq founded the organization in the 1960s, the Iranian political activists were seriously influenced by leftist communist opinions. Therefore the basis of the group was based on a mixture of Marxism and Islamism ideology (the two very controversial ideologies). The flag of the organization represented the both tendency. In all the group’s manifests in Mojahed Journal you could find the traces of Marxism of which all the world has tired the disasters as the equivalent of dictatorship in the Animal Farm.

Professor Paul Sheldon Foote gives an appropriate nickname to Rajavi; Pol Pot of Iran and his neo-conservative supporters are called neo-Trotskyites.

So can the removal of Mujahedin from the list make the world a safer place?

According to Human Rights Watch MKO is a destructive cult due to many reasons that are stated by all former members. All the characteristics of a cult are seen in MEK: the isolated atmosphere, the absolute leadership, and the indoctrination system as well as manipulation techniques ruling the group.

The cult trains the members up to the absolute devotion level where they are at any time ready to die for the leaders as what the members did in June 2003 when Maryam Rajavi was arrested by French Police. They launched a wave of self-immolation throughout Europe creating tragic scenes before the citizens’ eyes to protest the arrest of the leader!

The threat of the cult is not limited to the short-term disasters but it has long-term consequences too, such as the Ideological Revolution that forces the couples to divorce and give their children to the organization.

These children will grow up as they are trained by the cult practices. They won’t have any feeling or emotion except the hatred towards Islamic Republic.

The manipulation techniques are functioned so exactly that the actual members and future militia cannot make the least basic decision of their lives. They only obey the orders of their authorities.

Therefore, by de-listing the PMOI if the world doesn’t become a more dangerous place, it surely won’t be a safer place.

October 26, 2008 0 comments

Newer Posts

Older Posts