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MEK Camp Ashraf

Why is Rajavi holding onto Camp Ashraf?

In the last six years, mountains quaked yet Camp Ashraf stood stable. This is the chorus of mottos, messages, guidelines, victories, and hopes fabricated by Rajavi to foster hope in MKO members held captive in Camp Ashraf. The rationale behind considerable emphasis given to keeping Camp Ashraf, and its strategic advantage for Rajavi are evident and have to constitute one of the major issues to be elaborated on. It has been pointed out repeatedly that Camp Ashraf is the ideological bastion of Mojahedin and Iraqi soil is its strategic lever and instrument. Rajavi is well aware that its destabilization may result in the disintegration of the organization in ideological, political, and military aspects.

Rajavi’s problems have their roots in his tying Mojahedin destiny to the existence of Camp Ashraf; however, it was so at a time when Saddam was the dictator leader of Iraq and as Rajavi repeatedly asserted in his meetings with Saddam and Iraqi officials, he was out-and-out hopeful to Saddam and their ideological and even family ties and relations. Upon entering Iraq, Rajavi called his settlement there a historical event paving the way for immediate overthrow of the Iranian government. Now, after 20 years he still insists on his never-achieved promise and idea that Iraqi soil is the sole solution for furthering his so-called liberating war. The fall of Saddam was considered a turning point in his strategy enforcing him to run off to another region to evade the encountered cul-de-sac. His running away might result in the annihilation of his organization hence he attracted the attention of the world to a secondary issue, i.e. that of the necessity of keeping the integrity of Camp Ashraf for humanistic causes.

How long the process of Rajavi’s resorting to various subterfuges may last and what are his final objectives is unclear since Rajavi is always hew to the strategy of grabbing at the opportunity and now is after misusing the historical conflict of Iran-US to achieve his totalitarian and egocentric objectives. He assumes that the US-Iran conflict may lead to military conflicts that pave the way for Rajavi’s compensating his failure in forming a so-called liberation army in the reign of Saddam. Two years age, Rajavi put the termination of Bush’s taking office as the deadline of the fulfillment of the promise of overthrow and asked Ashraf residents to wait until then when they could decide on their destiny freely. Now, Obama’s anti-war policies has made Rajavi keep silent on his unfulfilled promise holding grab to the claim that even mountains quaked but Ashraf stood stable. In other words, he considers keeping Ashraf as his biggest political and strategic achievement in recent years. He considers the time being as a starting point in the history of MKO.

He still follows his past policies yet refrains to determine a deadline for his false promises. He seeks the sole solution to MKO challenges in two main factors. First, he attempts to keep Camp Ashraf as the ideological stronghold of Mojahedin and the sole factor securing the political and military integrity of Mojahedin in international scene. Second, he aims to use Camp Ashraf and its residents as a pretext to avoid taking a final decision concerning the destiny of the members kept there. It seems that he is waiting for troubled waters in the region to fish as he wishes.

The emphasis of Rajavi on keeping Camp Ashraf running implies that he equals its relocation to the disintegration of Mojahedin entity that also means his own degradation as the leader, another loser added to many other political losers. The sympathy of the world for an opposition that considered itself as the sole alternative for the Iranian government is but a complete defeat for Rajavi. It is likely that Rajavi’s undergoing relocation to another country works as a psychological and mental shock for Ashraf residents to overcome their deep frustration and disappointment but the fact is that the sole achievement of Ashraf for Rajavi is its overhanging role in postponing his answering to all his failures.

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Auver-sur-Oise

A terrorist camp at the heart of Europe

Camp Ashraf has recently attracted the attention of the world due to the presence of MKO members therein. Years after its allocation to Mojahedin by Saddam, now it has grown to be one of the main challenges posed to the Iraqi government and people. Generally known as a heavily protected military citadel in the midst of a desolate desert, Mojahedin are making a vain attempt to homologize it to a city since it avails some facilities people need to live in any commune. However, the significance of Camp is pertained to individuals living inside it and their relations with the world outside rather than its structure and appearance. Despite numerous writings on the substantial differences between Camp Ashraf and other cities, it seems that its real nature has been concealed to the eyes of the outsiders or it may be subject to a deliberate negligence due to the propaganda blitz of Mojahedin as well as the type of their relations with Iraqi people and the European sympathizers.

But the story of Camp Ashraf and its significance as the main abode of Mojahedin does not end here. It continues just a few hundred miles over there in the heart of Europe on the green banks of the Oise in France. Although Mojahedin refrain to release information on their dwelling in Val d’Oise, the statements made by many MKO former members living there implies that Mojahedin have managed to build another Camp Ashraf in France.

DST (France’s Direction for the Surveillance of the Territory) broke into the headquarters of MKO in June 17, 2003 and seized almost 200 parabolic antennas and a hundred computers, radio scanners tuned to police frequencies and a fortune in dollars that were considered illegal in France. The existing condition of Mojahedin now on the brink of being expelled from Iraq, maintained on the global terrorist lists, their failure to secure refugee status in other countries, as well as their widespread campaign and organized rallies in Geneva necessitate a more in-depth study of Auvers-Sur-Oise, the small town that houses a dormant terrorist organization and an active cult of personality. 

Nobody ever thought Ashraf in Iraq the HQs in Auvers-Sur-Oise would become the cultic bastion of Mojahedin. In order to depict a clear picture of Mojahedin dwelling in France we need a source of information. The lack of information in this regard means that Mojahedin aim at keeping it as a confidential issue not to be unveiled by outsiders. The use of modern security and controlling systems therein, forcing some members live there for many years as well as the type of relation it has with the world outside banning the free presence of interviewers and reporters may remind us of the measures taken in Iraq in Camp Ashraf. In addition, Mojahedin try to gain the confidence of their neighbors and the local officials by participating in social services in the region and providing monetary support for its residents; much the same as what has been accomplished in the surrounding areas of Camp Ashraf in Iraq. 

These activities suggest that Mojahedin have access to sufficient funds by which they have managed to run propaganda and cultic projects in camp Ashraf as well as in Auvers-sur-Oise. Mojahedin are well aware that they need greater security in Auvers-sur-Oise in comparison to that of Camp Ashraf due to their June 17th dossier in France and the watchful control of France police on their activities. Therefore, it is predicted that Mojahedin in France would follow the same route they do in Iraq.

Despite the Iraqi government has repeatedly asked Mojahedin to quit the Iraqi soil, they have rejected so far since they believe to be legitimized landlords of a piece of land entrusted to them by an illegitimate, self appointed ruler. Likewise, it is highly probable that Mojahedin take the same route in France and avoid deserting their headquarters in Auvers-Sur-Oise. In addition, they may also transfer some of their qualified members from Camp Ashraf to Auvers-Sur-Oise illegally as practiced before but ignored by officials. Whatever the reason for this negligence, it seems that Auvers-Sur-Oise is a suitable alternative for Camp Ashraf.  

Just as Saddam is now blamed for supporting and giving refuge to a notorious cultic organization, in the near future the France government may be subject to the same accusation. However, there is a great difference between the two. Saddam was a notorious dictator himself and could be best known by the company it kept, hardly it can be said that he was unfamiliar with the real terrorist nature of MKO. France on the other hand is well known for developing the embryo of democracy and can plainly distinguish false, pretentious claims of pro-democracy. Therefore, France bears a heavier responsibility if it is beguiled by a handful of disreputable cultist whose ideology is intertwined with violence and terrorism. The Europe in the past has had enough of terrorist nightmare to let more germs of terrorism grow on its soil. But the question is why it procrastinates to deal with the dynamite that might suddenly explode next to its heart. Of course, we hope that the France government has taken precautionary measures to prevent the occurrence of tragic events whose sole victims are innocent civilians.

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MEK Camp Ashraf

Dislocation of Ashraf; the sole solution to set victims free

Niyabati’s article “The necessity of releasing Mojahedin forces” in answer to Farrokh Negahdar’s article “Mojahedin must depart Camp Ashraf” contains some interesting and paradoxical points to which due attention is to be paid. It is somehow paradoxical since on the one hand, Niyabati has repeated the statements made by Farrokh Negahdar and on the other hand, he has drawn a border and red line between his own statements and those of Mr. Negahdar and has even threatened him of deserving trial and punishment by Mojahedin. First, it has to be pointed out that his article is a verification of Mojahedin’s typical insulting and offensive behavior against their critics that bears no rationalism and reasoning. On the one hand, he states:

 It is simplistic if we seek a devil intention and political prejudice behind all dissidents’ position takings all the time. For sure it is not always so. 1 

On the other hand, he is irritated by the statements made by Mr. Negahdar and writes: 

If all those who have witnessed his betrayals pass away or forgive him, on the promised day of judgment the organization will not for sure  leave him alone. 2

The reason why he takes a more aggressive attitude against Mr. Negahdar compared to other sympathizers of Mojahedin is pertinent to his past history. We have elaborated on the relationship between Niyabati and Mojahedin previously. It seems that his past semi-intellectual and megalomaniacal gestures insisting to show his superiority over Mojahedin and their leadership has been faded away and now he has turned to be a simple errand for Mojahedin. However, there are some significant points in his article. For example, he refers to Camp Ashraf and says:  

The current issue is releasing Mojahedin and transferring them to a safe refuge. Nobody cares to ask Mojahedin if they are willing to leave Camp Ashraf or remain there. 3 

The point is that even Mojahedin leaders refrain to pay attention to the will of Ashraf residents and ignore the fact that they have to let them choose their own destiny. In recent years, many have repeatedly focused on the necessity of holding a free referendum in Camp Ashraf. In this way, nobody would criticize Mojahedin leaders as for the decision made based on the demands of Ashraf residents and it will pave the way for Mojahedin to petition international bodies in order to achieve their demands. Earlier, Niyabati had elaborated on the psychological levers and factors aiming at convincing members to remain in the organization and made his attempts to justify the necessity of these factors; therefore, he dares not claim that all Ashraf residents are willing to remain in Iraq in the existing conditions. The main challenge of Mojahedin leaders at the time being is that MKO members cannot be transferred to another location as long as they are labeled as a Mojahed and are members of MKO due to their terrorist label. In fact, they would be recognized refugees if they declare their separation from MKO as did many former members who are now living freely in European countries. Niyabati writes:  

In fact, there is not a country where they may ignore the terrorist list to consent giving asylum to residents of Camp Ashraf. 4

However, he desist to refer to the fact that there are many former members of MKO living freely in European countries and running an ordinary life. Niyabati has no doubt in the necessity of the transfer of Camp Ashraf residents to another country. Yet, his only disagreement with Mr. Negahdar is that the latter truly believes that there is no country at the time being to let Ashraf residents in due to their terrorist repute. He has indirectly implied that transferring Mojahedin members to another country even as MKO members, results in the loss of Camp Ashraf, i.e. the strategic and ideological bastion of Mojahedin. He has also focused on the significance of camp Ashraf in his book and elaborated on the close relationship between Ashraf and the ideological revolution of Mojahedin, writing:  

There is no doubt that the remarkable resistance of [Camp] Ashraf under the hegemony of Mojahed women has its roots merely in the internal ideological revolution of Mojahedin. 5

Evidently, Niyabati is well aware that the sole solution for the survival of Mojahedin is keeping Camp Ashraf ongoing. Therefore, it seems that Mojahedin prefer not to be removed from the terrorist list since in that case they would have no excuse to remain in Camp Ashraf and have to leave it and lose their organizational unity. Now the US presidential election coming to an end, the two-year pledge of Rajavi to overthrow the Iranian regime proves futile once more. These events have intensified Mojahedin crises. According to Niyabati:  

I have no doubt … that deserting Camp Ashraf and compulsory transfer of Mojahedin, would be more advantageous for keeping the security of [Iranian] regime rather than that of Mojahedin. 6

In a nutshell, Niyabati and Mojahedin sympathizers’ insistence on keeping MKO members in Camp Ashraf aims mainly at maintaining the ideological and strategic container of Mojahedin and has nothing to do with posing a threat for the Iranian regime.

 

References:

1. Niyabati, Bijan, The necessity of releasing Mojahedin forces, two different view points

2. Ibid

3. Ibid

4. Ibid

5. Niyabati, Bijan, A different look at the internal ideological revolution of Mojahedin

6. Niyabati, Bijan, The necessity of releasing Mojahedin forces, two different view points

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The cult of Rajavi

A Call To Disclose Cult Abnormalities

More than two decades ago when Massoud Rajavi informed of the great change and ideological revolution within Mojahedin Khalq Organization (MKO), still believing to be active as a political group, hardly anybody first came to assume that it was actually the beginning of a long path leading the organization into the abyss of internal and external challenges. Although Rajavi’s marriage with his comrade’s wife received appreciations of a novel move in the group’s internal relations, soon the magnitude of the marriage itself was faded in comparison with other significant consequences of the move that required time to be actualized. The intended personality change in the insiders could not take effect overnight ant it really consumed time to accomplish Rajavi’s plotted ideological principles. Even Rajavi himself anticipated prolongation of the process when he said: “If you fail to comprehend now, be patient. I do not know, maybe you come to understand in one, five or ten years”. 

It was in no way an overstated assertion since he knew well what would come out of his initiated revolution. Still many aspects of his devised ideological ploy and its profound effects remain concealed and beyond the scope of the world. Only in the recent years, and following the disclosures made by many defected members, the outside world has been to some extent informed of the organization’s cultic aspects and internal human tragedies. Interestingly enough, the modern world was even shocked to a great degree to learn about horrible, deplorable stories related by the ex-members about what passes inside the organization.

Of the most outrageous, scandalous cult records recently revealed are hysterectomy operations and Rajavi’s sex scandal, his polygamous marriage with the female cadres of the Leadership Council. Being under the constant influence of cultic behaviors that show most abnormal to the outsiders, the insiders and even the separated members consider them as typically normal. As expounded by Thaler Singer “If you spend enough time in any environment, you will develop a personal history of experience and interaction in it. When that environment is constructed and managed in a certain way, then the experiences, interactions, and peer relations will be consistent with whatever public identity is fostered by the environment and will incorporate the values and opinions promulgated in that environment”. 1

It is of great importance to perceive to what extent the detached members of MKO have come to incorporate abnormal experiences and interactions of the group’s cultic environment now out of that milieu. Long being engaged in cooperative activities with other comrades in an environment that hardly could they realize its cultic structure under the cover of political campaign, these members fail to perceive that they had been coerced into many abnormalities. It has to be pointed out that it is a fact most cult members have experienced and as Singer explains “when you engage in cooperative activity with peers in an environment that you do not realize is artificially constructed, you do not perceive your interactions to be coerced. And when you are encouraged but not forced to make verbal claims to "truly under- standing the ideology and having been transformed," these inter. actions with your peers will tend to lead you to conclude that you hold beliefs consistent with your actions. In other words, you will think that you came upon the belief and behaviors yourself”. 2

So explicitly explained by cult experts, the insiders and newly defected members are unaware of the change in them while in the cult and which are regarded bizarre behaviors by the outside onlookers. The defectors should know that whatever they consider as the mist ordinary, normal and unimportant are much objectionable, bizarre and abnormal to the outside societies. Then, it is best recommended that the defected members of MKO be sensitive to whatever monotonous regularity they were putting up with in the cult and to disclose them to the world to judge for itself.

References:

1.    Thaler Singer, Margaret, Cults in our midst, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass; A Wiley Imprint, p.76.

2.    Ibid.

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Auver-sur-Oise

Auvers-Sur-Oise; Mojahedin dead-end in France

Of the main cause behind intensifying security measures in Auvers-Sur-Oise and concealing it from the focus of the media may be the fact that Mojahedin are highly concerned about the rumors running rampant that insiders are deserting. Majority of those who have defected from the organization are known to be quitters, but to be a deserter is absolutely intolerable. Being a highly closed cult of personality, Mojahedin Khalq Organization disapproves either of the two groups of the quitters and deserters, but, according to many MKO former members, Rajavi discriminates in favor of the former. He is quoted to have reiterated that he prefers to have a member quitting every day to having even one deserter in a year since the cost the latter imposes on the organization is irreparable.

Now this question arises that why a quitter is supposed to impose lower costs on the organization? As a former MKO member explains, when a member declares his willingness to separate the organization, he has to account for some ambiguities, such as being the enemy’s accomplice, and undergo some process. First, the dissident member has to sign papers that his separation is a willful act due to individual frailty and failing to keep on his past enthusiasm for struggle as a freedom fighter. Then, he is forced to sign to discredit any criticism of the organization at any time in future done in his name. Thus, the quitters are careful about whatsoever they say about the organization lest it should make public their signed papers which might indicate that they have talked under outside pressure and discredit whatever made testimonies. That is just what happened in the case of Marzieh Qursi who quitted MKO last year and tried to unveil some of its cultic activities and features.

Mojahedin justify that the process at least works as a barrier for possibly further collaboration of separated members with the other oppositions in general and the Iranian regime in particular hence cutting costs to the possible extent. However, those members who manage to escape from or desert MKO impose a greater cost on the organization since they are under no obligation and have signed no particular paper. They freely take the opportunity to disclose whatever the organization tries to keep concealed about its cultic relations and scandals. In the same way, it is evident that the members’ slinking away from Auvers-Sur-Oise would be in no way tolerable and is incomparable with escapes made from Camp Ashraf.

There are evidences that disclosures of members deserted while in Europe have been much more effective compared to those escaped from Camp Ashraf. The reason may be their familiarity with the Western culture and knowledge of appropriate terminology and the ways in which the real nature of Mojahedin can better be publicized. For example, Masoud Banisadr’s “The memoirs of an Iranian rebel” has been much more successful than oral statements and testimonies made by other separated members. Also, the fact that Auvers-Sur-Oise has drawn the attention of France security agencies is another impetus for Mojahedin to maneuver on Camp Ashraf than Auvers-Sur-Oise and its occupants.

It has to be also pointed out that there are countless instances of complaints and objections made by local citizens who are disturbed by living in the vicinity of Rajavi gang’s residence; as it was one of the reasons for Rajavi’s expulsion from France when protests were made that he was shattering peace and security in the suburbs of Paris. However, at the present Mojahedin run two strategic strongholds which are under the threat of disintegration and dissolution. They know well that collapse of Ashraf may lead to their strategic blockade in Auvers as well, so they reluctantly abide by the imposed rules of being under the control of outsiders as done in Iraq.

Wherever they are, Mojahedin necessitate a camp-like location to run a collective life. Contrary to their phase of armed struggle which bore no settlement, now they are highly in need of a dwelling to survive. Unlike the past, they are in need of securing a permanent setting to run a seemingly pro-democratic struggle. That is why Auvers-Sur-Oise is of great strategic and political significance for Mojahedin. They are willing to turn it into a legalized refuge of their political struggle in Europe. In fact, they try to model Ayatollah Khomeini whose settlement in Paris suburbs was the climax of his political, anti-monarch struggle conducted from France and initiation of his Islamic regime. But there is one exception. Looking it from an impartial angle, Khomeini’s residence was open to the world to visit.

As pointed earlier and verified by many reporters visiting Auvers-Sur-Oise, it has been turned into a strategic fortress and cultic bastion guarded under strict security measures. Generally, it has to be a location for all opposition groups dissenting the present Iranian ruling and a place where people of all classes can attend freely to express their ideas and take part in collective political activities to achieve a joint objectives.

The reason why Mojahedin have established another camp in France is a matter of consideration to which France government has to pay due attention. If it is an ordinary camp of some political refugees, why it is so unusual? The fact is that despite pro-democratic and peace-seeking gesture of Mojahedin leaders, Auvers-Sur-Oise is a cultic bastion and an assembly of terrorist plotters set in the heart of Europe. It might well answer the question that why Mojahedin refrain to admit anyone to Auvers-Sur-Oise while they insistently invite their Western advocates to visit Camp Ashraf. The duality may be the ground for the West to take a closer look at the course of events therein.

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Auver-sur-Oise

Auvers-Sur-Oise, the blind spot in the Val d’Oise

In an interview with VOA, Alireza Jafarzadeh, the diplomatic activist of MKO, released some statistics on Camp Ashraf. He raved about the number of Ashraf members as well as entertaining, educational, health, and medical centers therein. Likewise, Mojahedin-run TV is engaged in broadcasting programs on the significance of Camp Ashraf and its residents giving repeatedly cliché, inflated information on the structure and facilitations of Camp. It is evident that the demagoguery is aimed to cover the truth about what really passes within Ashraf under a cover of heavy media propaganda. However, many believe that it is a tactic through which Mojahedin attempt to distract the attention of the public opinion to effortlessly continue with their main job in Auvers-Sur-Oise quarters.

As a terrorist cult, the organization has developed sophisticated techniques to twist the mind of its listeners from among a range of sympathizers, advocates and ordinary run of people uninformed of the facts. It well recognizes the effect of propaganda in how to defend peace and freedom by appealing to patriotism, nationalism and humanitarian sentiments to continue with its violent plans.

Camp Ashraf is now considered as the mainstay of Mojahedin with regard to the practice of their cultic relations. After the Fall of Saddam in Iraq and the takeover and siege of Ashraf by the U.S. forces, Mojahedin have actually lost the opportunity of using the camp as the command center of plotting and launching over the border terrorist operations. Therefore, it has no strategic significance for the time being and has turned to be a spot merely keeping the cultic relations of the organization ongoing and intact. Now this question arises that in spite of overexposure of Camp Ashraf, why Mojahedin keep silent on releasing the least amount of information on their main quarters in France where the leaders, on whom the survival and life of the cult depend, are residing and making decisions?

Except the local residents of Auvers-sur-Oise, hardly any visitor to the calm town is conscious of a globally proscribed terrorist cult having situated its citadel there. Reported by New York Time’s correspondent Craig S. Smith going there on an arranged interview with Maryam Rajavi:

The sleepy town of Auvers-sur-Oise, 20 miles northwest of Paris, is best known as the place where van Gogh lived the last months of his life. Japanese and American tourists wander uncertainly down its main street, peering at reproductions of his paintings in front of the buildings that they portray. Few of the tourists are aware that the town is now home to an almost cult-like Iranian opposition group, some of whose members have divorced their spouses as an act of loyalty to the cause and whose armed wing is on the State Department’s list of foreign terrorist organizations. The group’s devotion to Mrs. Rajavi is so extreme that some members set themselves on fire when she was briefly detained by the French police two years ago. 1

It has to be pointed out that Auvers-Sur-Oise is not an ordinary site; on the contrary, it is well guarded by means of numerous controlling and security systems to the point that they have caught the attention of all interviewers and reporters arriving there. Almost all individuals meeting the residence of leaders and ranking Mojahedin in France unanimously focus on its complexity and high level of security. According to an Italian reporter once coming to have an interview with Massoud Rajavi:

His [Rajavi’s] dwelling in Auvers-sur-Oise, in the Parisian suburbs, is much like a fortress. There is a high wall keeping it concealed from suspicious looks. There are high voltage barbed wires around as well as searchlights on the walls illuminating the surroundings. The road to Massoud Rajavi’s villa (leadership centre) is controlled by two French check-points equipped with machine guns. The only entrance to villa is guarded by Mojahedin forces themselves. 2

Also, the Germany national broadcasting writes:

There were some impedimenta in our path to his [Rajavi’s] dwelling, 4 kms to northwestern Paris. The park therein was not well landscaped; the area was surrounded by barbed wires charged with high voltage. There were a number of French police officers at the entrance door to settle the possible disputes. 20 men always accompany Massoud Rajavi. His political assistants live outside his small fortress. 3

As noted by another Italian reporter, the main residence of the Rajavis and the highly imposed drastic security measures even for the group’s members is described as:

A place where no one (even the insiders) can enter unless fully inspected and under highly control measures. 4

The use of controlling systems fails to be productive in itself; however, the act of Mojahedin in misusing the facilities provided for them by the West is a matter of consideration. They make attempt to abuse these facilities for the achievement of their cultic and terrorist objectives and according to D.S.T report, they have established another cultic-terrorist haunt in France. The western political analysts have come to the point that ‘the Rajavis misuse the surprising laxity of the European governments by living in Auvers-Sur-Oise luxuriously for many years.’

There are evidences that Auvers-Sur-Oise is known at the present to have become the main strategic base for Mojahedin and they abuse it in different ways in order to pursue the totalitarian objectives. According to D.S.T report:  

We have been able to identify numerous PMOI members recruited and housed in France, making regular trips to Iraq… They also follow several different routes to Iraq: passing through Jordan, Egypt, or Turkey. They make their connections through different European countries, such as Belgium and the Netherlands… Once in Iraq, the militants undergo various levels of political and military training. The NLAI fighters coming from Iraq regularly visit PMOI HQ in Auvers-sur-Oise, while veteran soldiers are installed in France and remain continuously active in promoting the organization. 5

In addition, a fact is acknowledged that Mojahedin aim to establish another Camp Ashraf in the Europe:

The Mojahedin’s aim was to move their "world operational centre" -previously based in Baghdad -to the Val d’Oise. 6

Interestingly, Mojahedin broadcast the majority of their television programs from Camp Ashraf and refrain to give any information about Auvers-Sur-Oise while almost all their political contacts and activities are conducted from the HQs there. It is much surprising that at a time when Mojahedin petition the West to remove their name from the terrorist list, what really panics them to let a free entrance into their dwelling. What is really different about Camp Ashraf and the camp in Auvers-Sur-Oise with the former being the focus of the media and propaganda while the latter remains off the air.

References

1. New York Times, September 24, 2005

2. Massoud Rajavi’s interview with Corriere della Sera Daily.

3. Massoud Rajavi’s interview with Deutschlandfunk.

4. Massoud Rajavi’s interview with Italian News agency (Ansa).

5. Gessler, Antoine; Autopsy of an Ideological Drift, chapter 14, DST report on MKO.

6. ibid.

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Massoud Rajavi

Rajavi’s lingering promise

It has been assumed that the US presidential election might bring about dramatic effects on the final destiny of Mojahedin. In this regard, Masoud Rajavi and his theoretician in shadow, Bijan Niyabati, have made false predictions about the occurrence of fundamental changes in the Middle East turning it to the Great Middle East under the control of the US. They have also taken it for granted that there would be a fateful decision making on the US policy in dealing with the Iranian government. However, contrary to their naïve remarks, there appeared faint traces of Iran-U.S relevant détente.   

Here we avoid reflecting upon the foolish delusions of Mojahedin leadership, as it is a common practice committed in MKO. However, keeping silent on the fantastic and simplistic views of Masoud Rajavi is highly favored by Mojahedin at the time being so as to conceal their low level of political awareness. 

It has to be pointed out that the main strategy of Mojahedin leadership in recent years has been grabbing hold of empty promises to keep on his illegitimate hold over the body and soul of a number of deceived and ill-fated individuals. Two years ago, Rajavi promised to make the grounds for the overthrow of the Iranian regime up to the U.S presidential election; otherwise, members would be free to either remain in Camp Ashraf (dwelling of Mojahedin rank-and-files in Iraqi soil) or quit the organization. Now the countdown reaching the zero, Mojahedin members, advocates, and sympathizer are expected to bring into question Rajavi’s last unfulfilled promise and make a just analysis of his rhetoric the true nature of his cultic and totalitarian leadership.  

At the time being, Rajavi would certainly seek another excuse at least to keep his control over the remnants of his cult. He is well aware of his lack of the least social support inside Iran due to his disloyalty to his own country in cooperating with Saddam in invading the Iranian soil in 1980s. Also, he has encountered an impasse in Iraq pretending to stop armed warfare. Being blacklisted as a terrorist organization is another challenge worsening the state of affairs for Rajavi. A strong reaction to the present critical conditions is expected of him by those familiar with his manner of conduct. It may be an imminent statement or a message issued by him.     

What is of interest here is speculating the content of Rajavi’s forthcoming message.  The justifications he would give as for the reasons why he has been wrong in his predictions once more is of no importance since they are the result of a psychopathic personality that grabs at cultic, brainwashing techniques and thought reform to lead the organization that is no more considered a political but notorious terrorist cult having secured a position among global terrorists. Therefore, we are more concerned with the new plot he has contrived to distract the world’s attention away from his last blunder. The removal of the name of the organization from terrorist list of the EU seems to be the focus of his next message.     

Despite anti-imperialist and anti-American nature of MKO reflected in its principles and creeds, as well as its assassination of American employees and military personnel and its active participation in the US Embassy hostage-taking crisis, Rajavi’s new remedy to pass over the critical situation has proved to be the White House. Maybe he intended to lead the way of the new president to achieve his political objective and make his way of assuming political power in Iran. He may also be under the illusion that once “imperialist and enemy’s of the nations” proceeds to recognize it as an alternative. In any case, many are still laughing at his naïve remarks while others are waiting to see how he will let his followers free to choose their own destiny now that the time has drawn to its limit.   

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Mujahedin Khalq Organization as a terrorist group

Terrorist option of Mojahedin in the West

According to many MKO ex-members as well as political activists, terrorist and suicidal attacks ordained by Mojahedin leadership constitute an integral part of the cult approaches adopted by the organization. A brief look at the Mjahedin activities in recent years clarifies the fact that they have resorted to all means and strategies in order to achieve their main objective, i.e. seizing political power. Although they abuse international levers like human rights declarations and democracy to win legitimacy on the part of western countries, their true cultic and terrorist nature is fully disclosed when reaching political impasses.

The messages sent by Rajavi in recent years on the potentialities of Mojahedin to carry out terrorist attacks all around the world parallel to that of Al-Qaeda as well as his statements on the degeneration of a number of European MPs aim to pave the way for the initiation of terrorist actions therein. Likewise, Maryam Rajavi has repeatedly declared that Mojahedin can tear into the Europe by means of suicide actions in case Masoud Rajavi issues an order to do so. June 17th self-immolation of MKO members in Paris is convincing evidence confirming the anti-social and defiant nature of Mojahedin.

Mojahedin made use of unique self-destructive tactics in their early years of struggle against Pahlavi regime in Iran. They all carried cyanide capsules to use if arrested alive and being defendants, they struck an aggressive attitude in the regime’s courts to be sentenced to death believing that it might result in their political victory. In addition, in early 1980s, when the organization entered a new phase of armed struggle, this time against the new established regime in Iran, its terrorist activities reached their peak. Not the key figures but the innocent citizens were also killed and injured in terrorist attacks. There are evidences that Mojahedin have been moving on the armed tactic for more than four decades especially whenever they faced a critically political and strategic failure or stalemate. Interestingly, Mojahedin as well as their advocators are proud of having staged terrorist operations they refer to as revolutionary activities inside Iran.

Recently, Bijan Niyabati, one of the major spokesmen and theoreticians of MKO, in an interview with Khabargah, has referred to the fact that Mojahedin have been the founder of suicidal operations in the contemporary Iran at a time when no political trend or individual was even thinking of it. When asked to elaborate on the probability of Mojahedin’s committing terrorist and suicidal actions against Western countries and citizens, he replied, ‘It is unlikely as long as the Mojahedin leadership is not intruded.’

These statements on the part of political advocates of Mojahedin imply the extent to which they hope to misuse democratic potentials of the West for the fulfillment of their totalitarian objectives. The point worthy of note is that Niyabati openly refers to the ultimate target of their terrorist actions in the Europe. In a doublespeak, he makes an attempt to deny the accusations made against MKO on their terrorist nature and at the same time lets the outside world know the serious danger of Mojahedin, stating:

Self-immolations in France revealed that if the organization had terrorist intentions, it was much simpler for its members to destroy the Europe by suicide bomb attacks instead of setting themselves on fire.

This is considered to be a real threat for the west implying the fact that the deliberate negligence of Westerners and the advocates of Mojahedin due to some political considerations may inevitably lead to considerable costs to be paid by the global community. The extent to which Western countries realizes the danger of MKO depends on their unbiased investigation on the real nature of the organization just by reflecting upon the assertions of MKO theoreticians. Westerners have repeatedly acknowledged the fact that Mojahedin lack any social support inside Iran, therefore it may not be considered a threat for the Iranian regime. In that case, would not the Western citizens be the main target of brutal actions of this cultic terrorist group living among them?

A close study of the statements made by Masoud Rajavi in his lecture in 2007 as well as the clear warnings of Niyabati on the consequences of violating the sanctum of the leadership gives us a deeper understanding of the threat of the organization against the global community in general and Western countries in particular. He even refrains to specify what he means by MKO leadership: the ideological leader living in the hideout or the main suspect of France June 17th case, Maryam Rajavi.

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Terrorist groups and the MEK

11 September and MKO’s Tactic of Duplicity

Hardly anyone doubts that al-Qaeda perpetrated 11 September attacks had a great impact on Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization, or Mojahedin cult, to make a11 September and MKO’s Tactic of Duplicity shift in its terrorist conducts. The global reaction against the attacks and a shown decisiveness to combat against the abominable phenomena of terrorism made MKO to denounce armed activity if not in nature but provisionally in words. 
 

The US invasion of Iraq as 9/11’s aftermath and the consequent fall of Saddam actually deprived MKO of a bountiful, reliable strategic ally. Not only Saddam granted Mojahedin soil and abode, but also supplied them with logistics and arms, espionage equipments, training and abundant dollars. In fact, Mojahedin’s greatest enthusiasm to overthrow the Iranian regime came all from Saddam’s support. Saddam’s fall absolutely disappointed MKO of further availability of the precious opportunity that destined the group’s survival or demise.

The global war on terrorism turns to be an internationally sensitive issue at the present. Consequently, Mojahedin had to start a new phase to avoid coming under the central focus of anti-terrorism moves as well as enabling them to take a different step and a new democratic array in its struggle against the Islamic Republic. It was impossible unless Mojahedin could be adopted inside a new sphere of power and influence that was dominating the region. Fortunate enough for Mojahedin, the long friction between the new authoritative power in Iraq and Iran’s ruling power was at its climax.

 But there existed an impediment; MKO was on the State Department’s FTO since it was initiated. Now the blacklisted group had to convince the invader-host that it no more advocated armed and aggressive means and sought democratic approaches. The first steps were taken by its novel proposition of the “third option” and establishment of a “Solidarity Front”. Such moves were much the outcome of its lost military equipments and potentialities that were indispensables of armed struggle rather than a fundamental shift to democracy in its strategy of struggle.

 The ECJ’s lower court ruling wherein it was stated that MKO had denounced terrorist deeds since June 2001 emboldened the group to start an overall propaganda blitz to get rid of the terrorist tag and draw supports especially among the Americans. However, neither the US nor the EU paid were duped by what they concluded to be a new tactic by a terrorist group. One of the reasons contradicting MEK’s claim of renouncing terrorist activities since June 2001 was presented by the State Department’s April 30 report releasing the list of designated terrorist organizations:

In 2003, French authorities arrested 160 MEK members at operational bases they believed the MEK was using to coordinate financing and planning for terrorist attacks. Upon the arrest of MEK leader Maryam Rajavi, MEK members took to Paris’ streets and engaged in self-immolation. French authorities eventually released Rajavi.”[Rajavi was released on bail and is currently awaiting trial on terrorism charges].

 Furthermore, in an unprecedented move, the report branded MKO as a “cult of personality”. It happened at a time when Mojahedin eluded to show a clear position concerning 9/11 plots and maintained a meaningful silence over a most lambasted terrorist deed that exemplified the highest threat of terrorism which demanded a global move to confront. Developing a deep comprehension of Mojahedin’s terrorist nature, America is well aware that MKO cannot change a terrorist mentality it has preserved for nearly forty years. As asserted in the State Department’s report, MEK leadership and members across the world maintain the capacity and will to commit terrorist acts in Europe, the Middle East, the United State, Canada, and beyond.

MKO seems to be the sole terrorist group on the State Department’s list that has been carefully scrutinized to be found that it would undergo no fundamental and strategic change unless it reconsidered its ideology whose infrastructure is aggressive confrontation of global imperialism embodied in America. Thus, MKO’s refuge in liberalism stronghold in no way indicates that it has submitted to an ideological shift but rather parlaying circumstantial opportunities to break out of its complete isolation, a result of a universal combat against terrorism, from the political stage.

Americans in particular and the West in general have discerned that although al-Qaeda and Mojahedin-e Khalq show slight differences in interpretation of Islam, in contrast to al-Qaeda, Mojahedin appear more dogmatic in confrontation of America, the West, and the camp of capitalism. Once al-Qaeda formed a short-lasting alliance with America against the threat of communism in the world of Islam; Mojahedin, because of its ideological collectivity, played the same role for the camp of socialism.

Mojahedin’s immediate, explicit reaction to al-Qaeda’s terrorist attacks was its extravagant banquet and cries of jubilance at Camp Ashraf. Instead of taking a strong position against al-Qaeda operations at least as a proof of their own claims of renunciation of terrorism, Mojahedin began condemning Iranian regime and proposing seemingly pro-democratic solutions in a new turn of phony democratic struggle after long advocating the violent overthrow of the clerical regime. Before going any further in propagation of democracy, to convince the suspicious eyes surveying their slightest terrorist attitudes, Mojahedin should have a revision of their ideological bigotry and exhibit a clear stance toward the globally despised terrorist al-Qaeda.

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The Ideology of the MEK

The ideological revolution, a solution or the critical episode

In a series of articles entitled”The Role of Strategic Stalemates in MKO ideological Shift”, mechanisms of the ideological revolution, its effects and consequences were studied according to the statements made by Bijan Niyabati and some former MKO members. It was concluded that the ideological revolution was the leadership’s sole solution for numerous political, military, and strategic failures of armed phase adopted by the organization in order to save it from the danger of split and even disintegration. It is worth mentioning that Bijan Niyabati made his utmost effort to imply the meaning that the ideological revolution was an inevitable reaction to Mojahedin impasses. He considers it as a reasonable answer to the challenges Mojahedin had encountered and the sole resolution for the dilemma to survive; the organization had to either follow the past route or suffer another schism. However, trying to underline the role of Rajavi in internal revolution, he regards the survival and improvements of Mojahedin indebted to Rajavi and his talents.  Also, he refers to the potentiality of Mojahedin to overthrow the Iranian regime under the leadership of Rajavi. As such, reviewing the course of events of Mojahedin in the past and their split in 1975 in particular, he considers reorganization of MKO under the leadership of Rajavi a great success that was fulfilled with the development of the ideological revolution. What is worth thinking is his insistence to prove that Mojahedin in either phases were radically leftist. In this regard he writes: While in prison, Masoud Rajavi issued a message entitled”Islam, Left Marxism to initiates an all-out struggle against the coup d’état within the organization. His brilliant 12-clause declaration message not only determines the identity of Mojahed-e Khalq and draws the borders between left and right, but also stabilizes the element of anti-Imperialism, i.e. the main element of the ideological revolution of Hanif, and creates a new Khalq. [1]  He insists on saying that at the peak of these events is Rajavi’s full leftist orientation as a factor of revolutionary, Islamic, and anti-imperialism nature of MKO. As such, he does his best in order to make a left assessment of the 1984 ideological revolution:  The year 1984 was the decisive year in all political, military, strategic, and ideological stages. The encountered cul-de-sac in political, military, and armed resistance as well as the proven inability to overthrow the regime in short-term … forced two options on Mojahedin. It had to either submit to the existing conditions or resort to politics or, by embracing all internal, external, and international consequences of resorting to armed warfare and violent overthrow of the regime, lean to the left and yield to radicalism. [2]  Then, he refers to the equal role of Rajavi in both phenomena and regards it as a key factor and writes: Following the internal coup d’atat within MKO and Masoud Rajavi’s unbeaten political-ideological victory in keeping the plotters in isolation and continuing to safeguard the ideology of Hanif that resulted in reorganization of Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization stabilized his already unrivaled status among Mojahedin. [3] Rajavi’s reorganization required the essential prerequisite of purging already joined members and enhance a new round of recruitment: Masoud Rajavi, disregarding the existing reactionary potentials, restructures the organization through purging the forces with any reactionary orientations and resorts to the incomplete plan of Hanif in training”versatile cadre”. All the prior recruitments were cancelled and new recruitments were made among the imprisoned Mojahedin. [4] Both Rajavi and Niyabati focus on two key points necessitating ideological revolution as a lever against the crises imposed on Mojahedin. 1. Rajavi’s revolution has been developed for the qualitative progress of Mojahedin aiming at fulfilling the promise of overthrow. In this regard, Rajavi points to the power of Mojahedin being hundredfold. 2. Though they were under the pressure to lean towards the right, the ideological revolution made them bend to extreme left and, even in Niyabati’s words, radicalized and vaccinated them: In order to safeguard the revolution against the social and imperialist offenses, there is no way but immunizing and vaccinating the organization against any split and total breakup. [5] It is worthwhile to investigate to what extent Mojahedin succeeded to gain desirable results with regard to the present status of the organization on the one hand and their distance to their main strategic objective, i.e. overthrowing the Iranian government on the other hand. Besides, the study of the political and ideological orientation of Mojahedin may clarify the extent to which their radicalized position toward left is pragmatically guaranteed. Although in order to get a true understanding of Mojahedin it is necessary to review cultist factors, we try to evaluate their ideological revolution on the basis of their own claims. As such, we have to review their position in relation to the past. Here, some questions are raised to compare the present situation of Mojahedin with that of critical phases before the development of the ideological revolution: *What is the present status of Mojahedin to fulfill the strategic promise of overthrowing Iranian regime? **Compared with their position in past, to what extent Mojahedin have been succeeded in winning the support of internal social factor, opposition groups, and international support.  With regard to destructive impacts of the ideological revolution on the internal relations of Mojahedin, the external relations are also subsequent of adverse internal impacts. Their most important challenge now, as the after-effect of the ideological revolution, is the lack of legitimacy among opposition groups and also international institutions as well as Western and European countries. Now Mojahedin are accused of a variety of charges and human rights violations they have failed to give any explanation. 1. Terrorist charges mentioned in the reports released by the US State Department, E.U., and other European countries and Canada. 2. Violation of human rights in their intra-organizational relations as publicized by the Human Rights Watch. 3. The accusation of establishing a cult of personality in the latest report released by the US State Department in April 2007. 4. Collaborating with Saddam in ethnic cleansing of Iraqi people. Besides, there are other met crises including internal split, expulsion from Iraq, and the case of 17 June self-immolations and more. Such consequences resulted from the internal activities of Mojahedin themselves but it suffered a lot of external problems at the expense of their deceptive bend towards right to take advantage of the strategic lever of the U.S to confront Iran. However, the U.S. is enough aware of the cultist and opportunistic nature of Mojahedin not to be duped by their tricks.  It has to be pointed out that after the ideological revolution, MKO turned into an anti-democratic cult of personality with a strategic and ideological leadership of its own. The internal shift has intensified although Mojahedin make great attempts to deny the charge in their media in order to win the support of western politicians. Offering a third solution, suggesting formation of solidarity front, pseudo-democratic activities in the Europe and the west, disavowing terrorism, supporting the human rights resolutions and opposing nuclear activities of Iran, … are instances of activities done in order to win the support of the West and the U.S in particular. That is all resulting from Mojahedin’s extreme hypocritical entity and Machiavellianism requiring them to adopt paradoxical approaches in internal and external relations. In fact, the Mojahedin after the ideological revolution are a by-product of strategic hypocrisy. The interesting point is that Niyabati believes hypocrisy is byproduct of a closed society:

Hypocrisy is the inevitable product of the paradox between mental values and the objective realities of a closed society. [6] Is it possible to consider the ideological revolution with such challenging achievements as the sole solution for Mojahedin’s crises? And is the insistence on highlighting the role of Rajavi to the point to regard him as a demigod and celestial creature anything but a process to hide the incompetence and flaws of Mojahedin leadership? A suggestion is to investigate the supposed achievements of the ideological revolution of Mojahedin from their own viewpoint, i.e. the inevitable reaction to strategic failures, impasses and radicalization and also the so-called genuine role of Rajavi.  It has to be investigated to what the extent the ideological revolution has succeeded to enhance Mojahedin and help them achieve their strategic objective of destabilizing and undermining the Iranian regime to cause its collapse. Has the organization ever been successful in implementing and practicing the chanted slogans of man’s freedom and emancipation of women who are claimed to have been suffering historical exploitation and slavery? No doubt, numerous evidences and testimonies made public by ex-members and victims of Mojahedin who found the opportunity to escape the cult can help better to fathom the threatening, malicious nature of Mojahedin cult masquerading as a pro-democratic political group.

 

References: 1. Niyabati, B. A different look at the ideological revolution within MKO, p. 3. 2. ibid, p.16.

3. ibid, p.7

4. ibid.

5. ibid, p.20.

6. ibid, p.35.

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