Story

June 17th, 2003, a Counterproductive Event for the MEK

The self-immolations by MEK supporters in Europe in June 2003 are best understood as a mix of extreme political theater, coercive group dynamics, and leader-centered devotion. Two women – Neda Hassani in London and Sediqeh Mojaveri in Paris – died after setting themselves on fire during protests over Maryam Rajavi’s arrest in France. Rajavi had been arrested on 17 June 2003 along with many other MEK members in a French anti-terrorism operation.

European citizens where shocked to see MEK supporters set themselves ablaze as a form of protest to their leader’s arrest. This was considered by the MEK as an act of martyrdom. Since then, the two above-mentioned women are glorified as martyrs of the group and the others who were paralyzed by the fire they set on themselves, are over-valued as role models for the entire members of the group. What it suggests about the MEK?

The most striking feature is the intensity of personal loyalty to the leadership. In ordinary political movements, arrests trigger petitions, rallies, legal defense funds, or strikes. Self-immolation is something else: it suggests an environment where followers saw the leader’s detention not merely as a political setback but as an existential, sacred crisis.

That does not prove that leaders directly ordered anyone to die. But it does strongly suggest an organizational culture capable of producing self-destructive acts in defense of leadership. When members are socialized to treat obedience, sacrifice, and total commitment as moral duties, the boundary between “voluntary protest” and psychological coercion gets blurry. In case of the MEK, members had been coerced to do so according to the testimonies of former members.

Signs of a destructive cult

Therefore, many critics call the MEK cult-like. Calling a group a cult is often imprecise, but in this case, critics point to recognizable features:

-Charismatic, centralized leadership focused heavily on Massoud and Maryam Rajavi.

-Demand for total commitment, where personal identity becomes subordinate to the organization.

-Emotional absolutism, dividing the world into pure supporters and evil enemies.

-Readiness for self-sacrifice framed as proof of sincerity and loyalty.

-Suppression of internal dissent, reported by many former members over the years.

The 2003 self-immolations became one of the strongest public signs supporting that critique, because they looked less like spontaneous democratic activism and more like leader-fixated martyrdom.

Neda Hassani and Sediqeh Mojaveri

The deaths of the two women matter not just as isolated tragedies but as evidence of how vulnerable adherents can become inside highly controlling movements. Several layers are worth separating to interpret the deaths of the two women.

Individual agency: the women physically carried out the act themselves.

Organizational responsibility: if a movement creates intense pressure, glorifies sacrifice, and equates devotion with suffering, it bears moral responsibility even without issuing explicit instructions.

Symbolic messaging: self-immolation is designed to shock witnesses and force attention. In this case, it also signaled that Rajavi’s supporters understood her detention as worth dying for.

So, the deaths can be analyzed as both political communication and human exploitation.

The outcome of self-immolations for the MEK

Politically, the tactic was counterproductive outside the committed base. For sympathizers already deeply attached to the MEK, it may have reinforced solidarity. But to broader European audiences, it confirmed fears that the organization had fanatical or cultic tendencies. A movement trying to present itself as a democratic alternative usually benefits from showing discipline, public legitimacy, and respect for life. Supporting self-immolations do the opposite.

Ethically, this is hard to view as a legitimate form of protest in any positive sense. Self-immolation can sometimes be framed historically as a desperate act against overwhelming oppression. But here the trigger was the arrest of a political organization’s leader in a democratic country with legal procedures available. That makes the act look less like the “voice of the voiceless” and more like extreme leader worship under conditions of ideological control.

The key moral point is this: when people die for a leader’s prestige or freedom rather than for their own immediate survival, one should examine the structure of influence around them, not romanticize the sacrifice.

The 2003 self-immolations indicate that the MEK had, an intensely authoritarian internal culture with the power to drive followers toward lethal acts of devotion. The two deaths are best seen as tragic outcomes of manipulation, autocratic ideology, and leader-centered mobilization, not as healthy political resistance.

This event is one of the clearest cases critics use when arguing that the MEK functioned less like a normal opposition movement and more like a high-control organization built around the Rajavis, a cult of personality with a past record of acts of violence.

Mazda Parsi

June 17, 2026 0 comments

Open letter of Nejat CEO to Emmanuel Macron

France

Letter from Ebrahim Khodabandeh to the President of France

Your Excellency Emmanuel Macron,

Honorable President of the Republic of France

With greetings and respect

While commemorating the martyrs of Iran’s national defense against the US and Zionist aggressor enemy, on behalf of a group of grieving families of members of the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK, MKO) and members who have separated from this organization, I would like to inform and notify you that holding a propaganda rally of this terrorist organization in your country, on Saturday June 20 of this year, is not in the best interest of the national comforts and the domestic and foreign image of the government of the French Republic, and it is inferred that your country has become a haven for terrorists and traitors.

Throughout history, France has always tried to portray itself as a cradle of freedom and human rights, while with the presence and free activities of the MEK; it has become a safe haven for fugitive terrorists and traitors to the country.

In the eyes of the Iranian people, this organization is considered a traitor to the highest national interests in cooperating with the aggressor enemy (Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq), and its hands are stained with the blood of the Iranian and Iraqi people, as well as its own members, and this treacherous and criminal process continues in various forms at the present time.

The MEK has a dark and indefensible background, which is why it is highly hated by the Iranian people. However, by holding such meetings and instilling this illusion that it is supposedly supported by the French and other European governments, it is trying to gain a new image, while it will have no other result but to bring disrepute to the relevant governments.

If the French government allows the MEK to operate and hold propaganda programs against the country and the people of Iran, it is required to answer in return how it can give free rein to an organization that, according to the testimony of many of its former members, engages in inhumane acts that, in addition to its members being deprived of the right to a normal life, play a role in the chaos and disruption of the security and comfort of the Iranian people through real and virtual activities.

These points in themselves deserve a clear examination and response from the French government, which is a defender of security and human rights, which has allowed this organization to harm and target the material and spiritual integrity, as well as the physical and psychological security, of the Iranian people from France since 1981.

I am eagerly awaiting your response.

With regards

Ebrahim Khodabandeh

Tehran – Iran

June 14th, 2026

Copy to:

Honorable Ambassador of the Republic of France in Tehran

Honorable Minister of foreign affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran

The mainstream media

June 15, 2026 0 comments

Albania

The Kushner-Israel nexus behind the Albania ‘flamingo revolution’

Albania, a small Balkan nation on the Adriatic coast, seldom makes headlines. But protesters waving pink flamingo cutouts on an Albanian island the Trump family wants to turn into a resort, have recently attracted international media attention.

The dispute, which largely focuses on the threat the resort would pose to local wildlife, reveals more than meets the eye. Under the surface is an intricate set of problems related to Jared Kushner — President Donald Trump’s son-in-law and a close ally and confidante of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu — and the presence in Albania of an Iranian exile group opposed to the current government in Tehran. All that comes on top of the news that the Albanian anti-corruption authorities have launched a probe into Kushner’s deal with Tirana, which poses a direct test also for the European Union which Albania seeks to join.

The Vjosa-Narta Delta — home to rare flamingos, pelicans, and turtle hatcheries — became Europe’s first Wild River National Park in 2023. But after Trump’s 2024 reelection, Kushner unveiled plans for a multibillion-dollar resort on the protected island. Prime Minister Edi Rama’s government granted “strategic investor status” to a Kushner-linked firm, reportedly waiving taxes and tenders and bypassing environmental reviews. When construction recently began, a “Flamingo Revolution” erupted.

What’s really important here is the possible geopolitical ramifications of this real estate project. During Trump’s first presidency, Kushner promoted the Abraham Accords – so-called normalization deals between Israel and Arab nations, including the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. Netanyahu hailed those agreements as a great diplomatic triumph. Kushner and Netanyahu reportedly remain in close contact, even as Kushner negotiates with Iran on behalf of the Trump administration. Kushner’s investment firm, Affinity Partners, was explicitly created to deepen economic ties between Israel and the Arab world.

To understand the broader context, recall Israel’s classic “periphery strategy.” For decades, Tel Aviv has cultivated ties with non-Arab states on the edges of the Middle East — from the Caucasus to the Balkans to Africa — as a way to break its diplomatic isolation. Today, that strategy is alive and well. Israel has forged close relationships with Azerbaijan (a key energy partner and Israel’s intelligence foothold on Iran’s border), Serbia (which has significantly increased its arms imports from Tel Aviv), Romania (which announced it will move its embassy to Jerusalem), and now Albania.

Albania fits perfectly into this picture. Strategically located in the Balkans, it is a Muslim-majority but secular state, a staunchly pro-American NATO member, and an eager actor looking to prove its value to Western allies. Crucially, it is also a European Union candidate country. Having another friendly nation inside the EU — or at its doorstep — would be immensely helpful to Israel as public sentiment across Europe turns increasingly critical of Israeli policies.

With EU member states debating sanctions, the potential suspension of the EU-Israel Association Agreement, or bans on trade with the Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories, any sympathetic voice in the EU can be very helpful. Tirana is not yet a member, but its trajectory matters; and Prime Minister Rama has proved himself a strong ally.

Nowhere is Rama’s alignment with the Trump-Netanyahu tandem more visible than in his treatment of Iran. Albania is the country where thousands of members of the Mojahedin-e-Khalq (MEK), the exiled Iranian opposition group that was previously on the U.S. and EU terrorist lists, have relocated after leaving Camp Ashraf in Iraq in a deal brokered by the Obama administration in 2013.

The fact they found their new home in Tirana is mostly due to a refusal by most other nations approached by Washington to host them. The relocation was conceived as a humanitarian gesture, rather than the provision of a new operational base for the discredited group.

That arrangement was not fully respected; there is documented activity of MEK bots originating from Albania. But Rama has embraced the MEK nonetheless, using it as a cudgel against Tehran.

As the Flamingo Revolution spread, Rama publicly blamed Iran for stoking the protests. In a blistering statement addressed to the Islamic Republic, he accused Tehran of cyberterrorism, of targeting Albanian institutions, and of hostility “toward freedom itself.” He then pivoted to a full-throated defense of Albania’s decision to shelter the MEK (without naming it directly), framing its members as “Iranian men and women whom you sought to silence through intimidation, imprisonment and death.”

This is remarkable for two reasons. First, it effectively endorses the MEK as freedom fighters — exactly the language used by top officials of the first Trump administration, including former secretary of state Mike Pompeo and National Security Adviser John Bolton, who reportedly have been well compensated for their pro-MEK advocacy.

Second, it deflects entirely from the allegations of domestic corruption and environmental destruction at the heart of the protests. There is no evidence the protesters waving flamingos are Iranian agents. They are Albanian citizens worried about their coastline. But by blaming Tehran and wrapping himself in the mantle of resistance to theocracy, Rama seeks to transform a local scandal into a battle in a global proxy war — one that aligns perfectly with pro-Israel interests.

This raises the question of the extent to which Albania’s foreign policy is aligned with the EU as it seeks to join the bloc. Even as the EU relations with the Islamic Republic are arguably at their lowest point since 1979, the EU does not recognize MEK as a legitimate interlocutor; nor does it seek to endorse the group in any shape or form.

To accentuate the split with Brussels, Albania joined Trump’s so-called “Board of Peace” and even agreed to send peacekeepers to Gaza, as per Trump’s plan, endorsed by Netanyahu.

In a sign of a deeper alignment with Netanyahu’s Israel, Rama traveled to Jerusalem, spoke before the Knesset, and was praised by Netanyahu for his “moral conscience.” There, he blamed “no one else but Hamas” for the Israeli military retaliation for Hamas’ October 7 atrocities – even though that retaliation has killed over 70,000 Palestinians in Gaza in what the International Court of Justice, a U.N. rapporteur and numerous international legal experts have characterized as plausibly constituting a genocide or genocidal acts. Such alignment accrued Rama tangible benefits, such as arms deals with Israeli firms like Elbit Systems.

While this geopolitical divergence is concerning, foreign policy is still the preserve of member states and candidates to join the EU, and some EU members have strong ties with Israel anyway. However, the allegations of corruption against Rama are one dimension where Brussels can exert real leverage.

Since Albania received EU candidate status in 2014, and formal membership negotiations started in 2022, the EU has repeatedly expressed concerns over corruption and the weakness of the rule of law in Albania. When protesters ask basic questions about who benefits from a Trump-owned resort on a nature preserve, Rama not only accuses Iran of meddling but insists there is “absolutely no chance” the development will stop.

Brussels cannot afford to look away. The EU could hold the Albanian government accountable here by demanding transparency; conditioning enlargement funds on strengthening the rule of law and the fight against corruption; and, ultimately, putting the accession negotiations on hold if those conditions are not fulfilled.

What Brussels needs is political will to protect its own tattered reputation. The flamingo-wielding protesters are not Tehran’s pawns. They are citizens fed up with the political elite’s high-handed neglect and arrogance, of which the Kushner project is only the latest expression. Brussels should start listening — and acting.

By Eldar Mamedov, Responsible Statecrafts

June 15, 2026 0 comments

Albania

Albanians Say No to the Economy of ‘Yes’

In the last two weeks, the streets of Albania’s capital, Tirana, have been filled with thousands of flamingos — or, rather, cardboard cutouts of the cotton candy-colored birds that have come to be the unofficial mascot of massive protests against Prime Minister Edi Rama’s government. At issue is a deal the government struck with one of Jared Kushner’s companies to develop a previously untouched island off the country’s south coast into a massive luxury resort, bulldozing a nature reserve in the process.

In his 12-year run as prime minister, Rama has tried to drag his nation out of the depths of postcommunist depression through an economic policy of saying yes to just about any development that could bring in revenue, or what he calls “strategic investors.” Gulf and Western-backed projects have been given expedited approvals and government support. “With no industrial, financial or human capital to offer on the global market, the only thing left to sell is nature,” the Albanian author Lea Ypi wrote this week in The Guardian.

But the Kushner project is just one in a long line of unsavory and unpopular deals Rama has undertaken in a bid to curry favor with Western partners as he hammers home his “Accession before 2030” agenda — the campaign to join the European Union — which has been a key part of maintaining power.

Ivanka Trump may have been able to swim up to an island in the Mediterranean and scramble ashore barefoot, but thousands of migrants seeking refuge on European shores are now being warehoused in Albania, thanks to a five-year deal Rama signed with the Italian prime minister, Giorgia Meloni, that was roundly criticized by human rights groups but praised as “out-of-the-box” thinking by Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the EU Commission. In exchange for holding up to 3,000 people at a time while their asylum claims are being processed, Albania, which has lost 1.2 million of its own citizens to migration, received not much more than an assurance of Italy’s support in its EU bid.

In 2013, the United States came knocking at Rama’s door with a direct request: Take on the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons arsenal. The Balkan nation had successfully destroyed its own a few years earlier, and the U.S. couldn’t find another NATO country to play host to the more than 1,000 weapons, which included mustard gas and sarin gas. The deal was scuttled after it was leaked to the press and citizens complained, but the heart was willing, as it were.

It wasn’t the first time Albania was asked to take on an outsize risk as a favor for its supersized ally. Rama also expanded an arrangement, initially negotiated before his time, to host members of the Mujahedin-e Khalq — an Iranian movement that opposed both the Pahlavi monarchy and the Islamic Republic. Though it didn’t garner the same kind of public reaction the proposed chemical weapons dump did, some Albanians questioned why their country was taking on security risks for a conflict thousands of miles away. Their fears were confirmed when Iran began launching cyberattacks on critical government systems, including a crippling outage in 2022. The attacks haven’t let up; the most recent was in March.

In the past, opposition to Rama’s gambits was modest. Now thousands of people are on the streets with a single, unified slogan: “Albania is not for sale.” The growing disenchantment with the notion that the only thing the nation has to give is its land at bargain basement prices could be a tipping point for Rama and his economy of “yes.”

By Erin Clare Brown, New Lines Magazine

June 15, 2026 0 comments

A Ukrainian's account of attending the MEK demonstration

Mujahedin Khalq Organization

Ukrainians Should be Warned about the MEK’s Paris Free Iran Rally

Over the past few years, many Ukrainians living across Europe have been approached and invited to attend an all-expenses-paid political event in European cities such as Paris or Berlin. The organizers claim that the purpose of the event is to support, democracy, women’s rights, freedom and the liberation of Iranian people. They often approach people under various names and front organizations claiming to represent the Iranian so-called opposition: National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) but in reality, these groups are all linked to the very organization: the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK aka NCRI aka MKO).

The presence of Ukrainian refugees at rallies organized by the MEK has been a subject of investigation by several international media outlets, including Der Spiegel and The Guardian. Analyzing this phenomenon requires looking at the tactical objectives of the organization and the vulnerabilities of the refugee population.

Tactical Motivations for the MEK

From an analytical perspective, the recruitment of individuals who are not ideologically affiliated with the MEK to attend their events serves several strategic purposes:

Projecting Popularity: The MEK faces a long-standing challenge regarding its domestic support base inside Iran. By busing in participants, they create the visual impression of a large, diverse, and international movement, which is essential for maintaining their political relevance among Western policymakers.

Optics and Legitimacy: Large, crowded rallies provide high-quality photographic and video content for the group’s media wings. This helps project an image of an “Iranian government-in-waiting” that enjoys broad popular support.

Networking: By appearing to lead a multi-national coalition of supporters, the MEK aims to gain traction with European politicians and media who may not be aware of the crowd’s composition.

Why Ukrainian Refugees Participate

The participation of refugees is generally viewed by analysts not as a sign of ideological alignment, but as a byproduct of material necessity and outreach tactics:

Economic Incentives: For refugees living in precarious conditions, the offer of free transportation, food, and occasionally small stipends provides a tangible, albeit temporary, relief.

The “Gig” Economy of Protests: Recruiters often target refugee housing centers, framing these events as “pro-democracy” rallies or simply as an opportunity for a free day trip to a major city like Paris or Berlin. Many attendees reportedly have little to no knowledge of the MEK’s history, ideology, or specific political goals.

Lack of Awareness: Due to language barriers and recent arrival in a new country, many Ukrainian refugees may be unaware of the controversial reputation associated with the MEK and its past history as formerly terrorist designated organization. They may perceive the event as a generic human rights demonstration according to the MEK’s propaganda.

Ethical and Political Implications

The practice has drawn criticism from several angles:

Exploitation of Vulnerability: Human rights observers have noted that using refugees as “rent-a-crowds” leverages their economic instability to further a political agenda they may not even support.

Misinformation: By presenting these crowds as organic supporters, the MEK creates a deceptive narrative for the Western public and political figures, potentially influencing policy decisions based on inflated metrics of support.

Reputational Damage: Investigative reports detailing these practices have further isolated the MEK from mainstream Iranian opposition groups, who often distance themselves from the MEK’s organizational tactics.

This year, the MEK is once again holding an event in Paris on 20 June 2026, branded as the “Paris Free Iran Rally.” The date marks the beginning of the group’s armed struggle against the Iranian government over four decades ago. Due to its unpopularity among Iranian diaspora, the MEK often recruits financially stimulated non-Iranians, including refugees and foreign nationals like Ukrainians, to attend rallies to create the appearance of mass Iranian support. It pays all the expenses for the trip to Paris.

The participation of Ukrainian refugees in MEK rallies is widely interpreted by experts as a logistical maneuver rather than a political movement. It allows the MEK to maintain a facade of mass-scale support while exploiting the immediate material needs of displaced persons. This trend highlights the importance of distinguishing between a group’s curated image of “popular support” and the actual popular base they command. Media and human rights activists must take steps to inform refugees living in Europe so that the MEK does not succeed in using these people as a tool for propaganda.

Mazda Parsi

June 13, 2026 0 comments

Albania

The Sazan Island Project and the Business of Greed

Albania is not often featured in Australian news programs. However, this changed during the last couple of days because of major protests in the capital, Tirana, against the proposed development of Sazan Island, a pristine wetland environment where migratory birds flourish. Protestors have challenged the legality and transparency of the project and the government decisions that enabled it.[1] These issues have become even more prominent, considering that the proposed development is traced to companies controlled by Jared Kushner, the diplomatic son-in-law of US President Donald Trump. The protests focus on the age-old conflict between environmental protection and corporate greed.

The Sazan Island project and redevelopment of a former communist‑era military facility span the Vjosa‑Narta lagoon and surrounding wetlands, an ecologically sensitive area known for bird migration routes and marine wildlife such as sea turtles. Environmental groups warn that bulldozers and excavators have already begun clearing sand, pine forests, and coastal habitats.[2] The government’s decision in 2024 to grant “strategic investor” status to Kushner’s affiliated firm Affinity Partners allowed accelerated approvals, bypassing standard competitive bidding and streamlined land‑use permissions.[3] Critics argue this effectively circumvented normal legal safeguards.

The proposed development, tied to Kushner’s investment firm, envisions a massive transformation of Albania’s southern coastline. Plans reportedly include 10,000 hotel rooms and villas, along with a luxury resort on Sazan Island. Albania’s Prime Minister, Edi Rama, has defended the project as a strategic investment that could turn his country into a premier Mediterranean tourism destination.

But Albania’s Special Prosecution Office Against Corruption and Organised Crime (SPAK) has opened an inquiry into decisions made in 2024 that altered the legal status of land in the Vjosa‑Narta region and around Sazan. Authorities are examining whether protected areas were reclassified specifically to enable the Kushner‑linked project.[4]

Public anger intensified when heavy machinery began carving access routes and fencing off land. In Tirana, thousands of protesters marched for consecutive days, carrying pink flamingo cutouts, a symbol of the threatened lagoon ecosystem.[5] They challenge the legality of land‑status changes, the granting of “strategic investor” privileges, and the absence of completed environmental impact assessments. Demonstrations have turned confrontational with protestors breaking through police cordons and necessitating the deployment of water cannons to disperse hostile crowds. Viral videos showed security forces dragging away demonstrators at the construction site.

The continuing protests reflect not only environmental concerns but also broader frustration with perceived corruption, lack of transparency, and the influence of foreign investors over public land. A central question fuelling public outrage is whether the land, especially Sazan Island, could legally be transferred to foreign interests, or leased for private development at all. According to officials, despite the scale of the project, final environmental impact assessments have not yet been completed. This raises questions about whether construction activity already underway is lawful.

Sazan Island’s historical status as a military zone and its ecological sensitivity complicate any private development. The environmental issue is that such projects often expose tensions between economic modernisation narratives and the institutional fragility of environmental oversight. The Sazan case fits this pattern, with critics arguing that the government’s accelerated approval process reflects broader concerns about transparency and political favouritism.

It is certain that the controversy surrounding the proposed development of Sazan Island by entities linked to Jared Kushner has drawn renewed attention to Albania’s long‑standing position at the intersection of regional politics, foreign influence, and global strategic interests. Indeed, while the current dispute is rooted in environmental, legal and governance concerns, it also resonates with earlier episodes in Balkan political history, including the recently cancelled Kushner‑associated development project in Serbia, the 1935 Zionist exploratory mission to Albania and Albania’s contemporary role as host to the Mujahedin‑e Khalq (MEK), an Iranian opposition group. Taken together, these episodes illustrate how Albania’s geography and political orientation have repeatedly placed it within broader geopolitical currents.

The Albanian controversy closely parallels events in Serbia, where the government recently cancelled a Kushner‑associated real‑estate development involving the former Yugoslav military headquarters in Belgrade. Public opposition in Serbia centred on concerns about non‑transparent negotiations, the valuation of state property and the symbolic implications of transferring historically and architecturally significant property to politically connected foreign investors.[6] The main spark that ignited the public protest against the Kushner-associated real estate was the fact that the Yugoslav military headquarters was bombed twice by the United States Air Force during the NATO campaign in 1999, and that the American investor, ironically, promised to build a memorial for people who died in the bombing of the buildings.

Political analysts have argued that the Serbian government’s reversal reflected a combination of public pressure, legal uncertainty and political risk, particularly given the sensitivity of the 1999 illegal NATO campaign.[7] The Serbian case has since been invoked by Albanian civil society groups as evidence that such agreements can be halted when institutional accountability mechanisms function effectively.

The parallels between the two cases reveal a pattern of public distrust, environmental concerns and political sensitivity surrounding foreign mega‑projects tied to politically influential figures.

While the development is simply a business project driven by profit, politically influenced but not politically motivated, the Sazan Island debate has revived scholarly interest in a lesser‑known episode of interwar history: the 1935 Zionist exploratory mission to Albania. During this period, Zionist leaders, facing British restrictions in Mandatory Palestine, examined several alternative sites for potential Jewish settlement. Albania’s religious tolerance, low population density, and Mediterranean access made it an intriguing candidate for resettlement. Although the proposal never advanced beyond preliminary discussions, it foreshadowed Albania’s later role during the Holocaust, when the country became the only Nazi‑occupied territory in Europe where the Jewish population increased, due to widespread adherence to the Albanian code of besa. The Albanian code of besa, a customary ethic of honour and protection, played a significant role in motivating Muslim and Christian families alike to shelter Jewish refugees. This legacy has become a foundational narrative in modern Albania–Israel relations, frequently invoked by both governments as evidence of a historically rooted moral affinity. Contemporary Albanian and Israeli diplomatic discourse frequently mentions this historical legacy, framing it as evidence of a long‑standing empathy between the two nations.

The Prime Minister’s defence of the Sazan project on the ground that it offers long-term gains for the Albanian tourism sector is symptomatic of the influence of foreign political considerations on domestic policy decisions. For example, Albania’s acceptance of the Mujahedin‑e Khalq (MEK), an Iranian opposition organisation exiled originally from Iran and later from Iraq, adds an instructive dimension to the country’s geopolitical positioning. The MEK’s presence has been the subject of controversy, given its contentious history and the Iranian government’s designation of the group as extremist. Hosting the MEK has placed Albania at the centre of a sensitive geopolitical triangle involving Iran, the United States, and Israel. Albania’s decision reflects its broader strategy of aligning with Western security interests, particularly in the post‑2014 period.

The convergence of these episodes, the Sazan Island dispute, the 1935 Zionist mission and the MEK’s presence, highlights a recurring theme in Albanian political history: the country’s strategic location has repeatedly made it a site of external interest, geopolitical experimentation, and contested sovereignty.

While the specific actors and circumstances differ across decades, the underlying dynamics remain consistent. Albania’s political choices, whether concerning land use, foreign investment or security partnerships, are shaped by the interplay between domestic governance structures and broader international pressures. The outcome of the Sazan Island controversy will therefore not only determine the fate of a single development project but will also signal how Albania navigates the complex geopolitical landscape of the 21st century.

But the main message to take away from this controversy is that sometimes corporate greed trumps even well-intended political intentions. Indeed, the Sazan project proves the veracity of Mahatma Gandhi’s statement that the “Earth provides enough to satisfy every man’s needs, but not every man’s greed.”

[1] Anna Skinner,’ Ivanka Trump, Jared Kushner Island Resort Project Under Scrutiny – Here’s Why’, Newsweek, 2 June 2026, at https://www.newsweek.com/jared-kushner-trump-albania-resort-environmental-corruption-protests-12021501.

[2] Urooba Jamal, ‘Kushner Island? Why a planned resort has provoked protests in Albania’, Aljazeera, 5 June 2026, at https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/6/5/why-the-kushners-plan-to-build-an-albanian-resort-has-sparked-protests.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Anna Skinner,’ Ivanka Trump, Jared Kushner Island Resort Project Under Scrutiny – Here’s Why’, Newsweek, 2 June 2026, at https://www.newsweek.com/jared-kushner-trump-albania-resort-environmental-corruption-protests-12021501.

[5] Zana Cimili, ‘What to know about the growing opposition to Trump family-linked resort in Albania’, AP, 4 June 2026, at https://apnews.com/article/albania-kushner-trump-development-protest-tourism-sazan-8d7d0e216c28d23fe1b2e51cbb05b926.

[6] Petrović, M., ‘Urban Redevelopment and Political Economy in Belgrade’, Southeast European Studies Quarterly, vol. 9, no. 2 (2024): 77–101.

[7] Vučinić, D., ‘Foreign Investment and Public Resistance in Serbia.” Balkan Policy Forum Papers 2024.

Dejan Hinic is a financial and investment expert operating from Belgrade, Serbia He received his law degrees from the University of Belgrade and the University of Queensland.

Gabriël Moens AM is an emeritus professor of law at the University of Queensland where he served as the Garrick Professor of Law. He also served as pro vice-chancellor and dean at Murdoch University. He is the co-author of The Legal Right to Disobey Law, Sidestream Press, 2026.

By Dejan Hinic and Gabriël Moens, Canberra Daily

June 10, 2026 0 comments

Albania

Will the Protests in Albania Expand to MEK’s Controversial Presence?

Thousands of Albanian citizens took to the streets of Tirana to pretest the construction of a luxury seaside resort linked to US President Donald Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner amid mounting calls for the project to be blocked.

The protests are primarily about environmental concerns, land ownership, transparency, accountability and alleged preference toward foreign investors connected to Trump family. Many protesters are using slogans such as “Albania is not for sale” and are criticizing what they see it as an opaque government decision-making.

However, Albanian prime minister Edi Rama on Friday accused the Iranian government of stirring the ongoing rallies in Tirana. He claims that Iran is behind protests against Kushner resort using disinformation.

Albania’s close alignment with US policy preferences, particularly regarding the hosting of the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), contributed to a significant recalibration of Tehran’s stance toward Tirana. This process accelerated the diplomatic breakdown and culminated in cyberattacks attributed to Iran against Albanian state institutions, in past years.

Iran was aware of the Western Balkans’ strategic sensitivity and the dominant influence of Western institutions in the region but its limited engagement in bilateral cultural ties became increasingly strained following Albania’s decision to host the MEK, a formerly designated terrorist group with a long record of acts of violence against Iranian civilians as well as officials.

The relocation of MEK members to Albania, strongly supported by the USA on the alleged humanitarian and security grounds, marked a critical turning point in bilateral relations. For Tehran government, the presence of an organized opposition group operating from Albanian territory was perceived as a direct challenge to its political and security interests.

Nevertheless, while Edi Rama is trying to project his political and economical issues onto Iran, the protests in Albania are primarily domestic in nature, according to the mainstream media such as Reuters, The Guardian and AP. The protesters’ call is centered on environmental concerns, allegations of corruption and broader dissatisfaction with the government. Protesters have even called for Rama’s resignation.

Rama’s accusations on Iran seems to be a political attempt to reframe a domestic controversy in national-security terms. The MEK’s presence in Albania itself can become a major protest demand. A protest movement focused on transparency and accountability could easily expand into other demands. This would fit naturally into a broader movement criticizing opaque decision making and insufficient public consultation.

If public attention shifts towards government transparency, the political outcome can be that more Albanians begin asking why such an important foreign policy and security decision –sheltering thousands of members of a cult-like extremist group– has received limited public scrutiny or parliamentary debate. The MEK may become one of several examples cited by activists who seek greater disclosure and public oversight of major government decisions. Thus, wider concerns will be raised by civil society and governance observers about transparency, consultation and accountability in Albania.

Mazda Parsi

June 8, 2026 0 comments

USA

Library of Congress on the MEK

On 25th February, 2025, Clayton Thomas, a Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs at the Congressional Research Service (CRS), published a report titled “The Mojahedin-e-Khalq (MEK) or People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI)”.

Congressional Research Service (CSR) is a nonpartisan public policy research institute under the Library of Congress of the United States Congress that serves the Congress throughout the legislative process by providing comprehensive and reliable legislative research.

The above-mentioned research provides background on the MEK, including its origins, its 1997 designation by the U.S. Department of State as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), its 2012 delisting as an FTO, and the current concerns of the US government about the MEK’s violence.

While the group is still embraced by some American politicians including Mike Pompeo and John Bolton, some keynotes from the report needs to be emphasized.

On the MEK’s terrorist background regarding US citizens and interests the report reads:

The MEK in the 1960s and 1970s sought the overthrow of the then-U.S.-backed Shah through guerilla attacks against the Iranian government and other targets. Some of these attacks killed U.S. military personnel stationed in Iran according to a 1994 congressionally mandated State Department report. The MEK participated in the 1979 Iranian Revolution and, after the fall of the Shah, supported the takeover of the U.S. embassy, and opposed the release of American hostages, according to the 1994 State Department report.

On Massoud Rajavi’s undemocratic approach in ruling the MEK and its political vitrine the so-called National Council of Resistance (NCR), Clayton Thomas quotes from the very DOS’s report:

According to the State Department report mentioned above, NCRI “disintegrated in the 1980s” as various partners “left the organization because of their objections to Rajavi’s dictatorial methods and his unilateral decision to ally with Iraq.

On the claims that the black listing of the MEK in 1997 was intended as a goodwill gesture to Tehran and its newly elected moderate president, Mohammad Khatami that has featured prominently in MEK efforts to portray the designation as baseless and politically motivated, the CSR report states:

A 1999 State Department report announcing the redesignation of most of the original designees (including the MEK) featured several frequently asked questions, including, “Why was the MEK designated?” The report answered: We have sufficient grounds for concluding that they are a terrorist organization and continue to engage in terrorist violence. The designation is based on activities much more recent than the takeover of our embassy. Additionally, directing terrorism against a government or entity with whom we have differences does not exclude an organization from designation as an FTO. MEK is designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization because of the acts they commit, not who they act against and not who they are. In 1999, the State Department also added “National Council of Resistance” and NCR as aliases of the MEK.

On the MEK’s delisting under the order of the then US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, in September 2012, the author of the report clarifies that the MEK’s removal from the FTO list did not mean that the DOS ignored the group’s past activities:

On September 28, 2012, the State Department announced the MEK’s delisting as an FTO. In the announcement, the Department said, “With today’s actions, the Department does not overlook or forget the MEK’s past acts of terrorism, including its involvement in the killing of U.S. citizens in Iran in the 1970s and an attack on U.S. soil in 1992. The Department also has serious concerns about the MEK as an organization, particularly with regard to allegations of abuse committed against its own members. The Secretary’s decision today took into account the MEK’s public renunciation of violence, the absence of confirmed acts of terrorism by the MEK for more than a decade, and their cooperation in the peaceful closure of Camp Ashraf, their historic paramilitary base.

On the MEK’s propaganda about their so-called pubic support among Iranians, the report is pretty cautious to prove the opposite:

The MEK claims to be a focal point for broad-based opposition to the Iranian government. To bolster the group’s claims that it has support within Iran, the MEK has argued that it has received information from domestic sources on the government’s nuclear program and crackdowns on public protests. Limited public opinion polling suggests the group may not have broad popular support in Iran or within the Iranian-American diaspora.

And, the report once more emphasizes the concerns of the US government over the MEK’s abusive conduct against its own members:

In a 2022 statement to Foreign Policy, a State Department spokesperson was quoted as saying that “the United States does not see the MEK as a viable democratic opposition movement that is representative of the Iranian people.” The spokesperson also reportedly relayed that the State Department “continues to have serious concerns about the MEK as an organization, including allegations of abuse committed against its own members.” The group has long faced accusations that it holds members against their will and commits torture—allegations the group denies.

Nejat Society

June 1, 2026 0 comments

USA

FBI Document Confirms: MEK Killed Americans

A declassified 2004 FBI document from 2004 details how the MEK was responsible for the killings of multiple American citizens and U.S. military personnel in Iran during the 1970s. The document titled “Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) Criminal Investigation” was published on November 29^th, 2004.

According to the FBI report, the American victims of the MEK included: 

• U.S. Army Colonel Lewis Hawkins 

• U.S. Air Force officers Paul Shaffer and Ja Turner 

• Three American Rockwell International employees: William Cottrell, Robert Krongard, and Donald Smith 

• American executive Paul Grimm

The document also references attacks against U.S. interests, including the U.S. Embassy in Tehran.

Yet today, the same organization desperately tries to present itself as “pro-American,” democratic, and aligned with Western values.

The irony is unbelievable: a group once investigated by the FBI for murdering Americans now attempts to market itself as a trusted ally of the United States and the West.

Amir Yaghmai

June 1, 2026 0 comments

Women in the MEK: Trapped, tortured, and silenced

Human Rights Abuse in the MEK

Injustice in the MEK as told by a former child soldier

Perhaps no organization among the Iranian struggle movements has spoken of “justice” as much as the MEK. “A classless, monotheistic society” was an ideal that the early MEK leaders used to coerce many supporters, and for a while it was effective in attracting supporters. But gradually, and with changing patterns of governance, the MEK tried to embellish the ideal with the terms like “democracy” and “pluralism.” In recent years, the organization no longer speaks of a classless, monotheistic society, and instead constantly repeats that it seeks to replace the Iranian government with a “democratic and pluralistic state, based on the separation of religion and state.”

Pluralistic democracy is, by definition, a political system in which there is more than one center of power. Modern democracies are pluralistic by definition because democratic systems allow freedom of associations and parties. But the half-century history of the MEK’s activities has shown that there is only one center of power in the group, and that is Massoud Rajavi, who is at the top of the organizational pyramid, followed by Maryam Rajavi and then some higher-ranking members of the group’s hierarchy.

Establishing justice in a society is not possible without deepening democracy, and in an organization like the MEK, which is run hierarchically, democracy is sacrificed first and then justice is gone. Discrimination is one of the definitive consequences of such a structure. Although the MEK, with its uniformed forces and the use of titles such as “Sister Mujahed” and “Brother Mujahed,” tries to hide its structural injustices, members who have left the group have repeatedly testified about the severe inequalities between the higher-ranking members and commanders of the group compared to the lower-ranking members and subordinate forces.

Aylin Moghadam, a former member of the MEK, was a child soldier who served the MEK for many years. In her posts on her X social media account, she writes about the extreme injustices and the discriminating system of access to facilities in Rajavi’s cult:

The authorities of the MEK eat well, but the rest of the ranks eat beef. Mehdi Abrishamchi and his daughter Ashraf Abrishamchi have natural fruit juice for breakfast. Of course, high-ranking officials like Faezeh Ranjkar, Sedigheh Hosseini, and Zohreh Akhiani all have special diets and are never the subject of any criticism session. And whether in Ashraf Iraq or Ashraf 3, they always stay in air-conditioned rooms, but the rest have air conditioning for just a few hours of the day and are mostly in the sun and in the heat, with terrible nutrition and $8 a month, the equivalent of Albanian money, with which they really can’t buy anything.

But in the wallets of the commanders there is at least a thousand dollars in cash. I said at least. In the wallets of people like Fahimeh Arvani there is even three thousand dollars in cash apart from credit cards. It is up to you!

In addition, having a phone is free for the leadership council and high-ranking brothers, but it is forbidden for low-ranking forces!!

From these few lines written by Aylin, we can see that inequality in the MEK dominates all aspects of its members’ lives. As can be seen from the memories of other former members, this injustice in terms of nutrition, medical treatment, use of urban facilities, and enjoyment of entertainment has created a deep class gap between high-ranking and low-ranking members.

Also, in terms of enduring psychological pressure and organizational coercion, low-ranking members are greater and more numerous victims. In the pluralistic democracy claimed by the MEK, the number of underprivileged individuals is much greater than that of the well-off commanders and leaders.

Mazda Parsi

May 30, 2026 0 comments

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