Did you know… that members of Mojahedin are obliged to kill themselves when they face arrest?
Why is it that no member of the Mojahedin is ever briefed as to what they should do if they fall into enemy hands?
From the time of the Shah, carrying a cyanide tablet and, where possible, a hand grenade has been a part of the everyday life of any member of MEK. To allow yourself to be arrested alive is regarded as a sin, as betrayal and as a crime committed against the organization and its leaders. Conversely, ‘martyrdom’ through suicide by any available means has been encouraged whenever and wherever a member has faced the enemy. During the era of the Shah, this enemy was the police or any other law enforcement agent. The idea had been originally taken from the revolutionary groups existing during the 1960s and 1970s in South America and other parts of the world which were engaged in guerrilla war against Imperialism backed by the communist Soviet Union. The explanation for this requirement was that it was “to protect information” and “to sacrifice yourself in a way that the enemy could not obtain any information from you under torture”.
A long time has past since then, but in the Mojahedin the idea of killing yourself in the event of facing arrest has not changed. It is an established fact that a Mojahed-e Khalq (People’s Warrior) will kill him/her self before being arrested. It is for this reason that no member of the MEK is ever advised what they must do if they are unable to kill themselves when they are arrested.
After the 1979 Islamic Revolution and the consequent sidelining of the Mojahedin in the establishment of the new Islamic Republic, Massoud Rajavi introduced a new phase referred to as “Lebanonisation”. This meant instigating antagonistic action which would lead to bloodshed. Any kind of conflict, any kind of riot, unrest, attack from any side… and especially having a supporter injured or, even better, killed, was a good point from which to fire up morale, to advertise the victimization of the organisation and in particular to ask for revenge.
Later, living on the blood of both friend and foe became an integral part of Rajavi’s strategy. The defeat of the tragic paramilitary assault on Iran in 1988, in which about 5,000 untrained civilians including old women, teenagers, PhD students from western universities and even disabled people, were asked to go to Iraq to fight against the Iranian Army with eight years’ war experience, was announced by Rajavi as “the insurance of the organization for years to come”. The ensuing massacre of about 3,000 untrained Mojahedin civilians and the deaths and injuries suffered by the Iranian Army created enough enmity between them to pave the way for acts of violence and vengeance for several years to come and to negate the emergence of any non-violent ideas which could have arisen. Rajavi’s concept of “insuring the future of the organisation” was that this fresh blood would halt the advance of any possible solution except that of the bloody take over of power – which, obviously, was reserved for the only force which enjoyed the use of Saddam Hussein’s tanks and guns.
Later this need for blood brought Rajavi to employ even more sinister and even nastier ways and tactics. In recent years there have been numerous cases in which individuals who had been sent to perform terrorist acts inside Iran had been sent deliberately to their death in order to provide fresh blood and increase the number of martyrs.
The majority of these individuals had been given just enough training and planning to carry out their terrorist operation and had been told nothing about what should happen afterwards. They were given no information about how to return or how to deal with arrest. The only possible interpretation of this was that they were not only expected to not come back, but were in fact not expected to survive.
The expectation was that if they faced arrest, they would fight to the last bullet, to kill or injure as many as possible and then kill themselves. The numbers of people who have used their cyanide tablet and/or exploded their grenade tight to their bodies are countless.
A few who have survived, like Mrs. Marjan Malek or Mr. Arash Sameti, or people like Ebrahim Khodabandeh and Jamil Bassam who did not have the opportunity to kill themselves, revealed later that they had been indoctrinated by the cult such that the torture they had been told would be inflicted upon them after their arrest was so terrifying that suicide seemed to be the only option.
But Rajavi’s quest for fresh martyrs did not stop here. Numerous cases have been recorded in which disaffected members have been taken to the Iraq- Iran border in the middle of the night and made to walk towards Iranian border posts. From behind them the MEK would shoot to prevent them turning back and to alert the Iranian border guards, who would in turn shoot at the advancing victim. There are also numerous cases in which someone has vanished, or has died in suspicions circumstances, but who has later been announced as a martyr killed by the Iranian regime.
The use of cyanide and grenades and the obligation to die before capture has continued from the time of Shah to the present, but the purpose of it has changed completely. It is no longer about protecting information (otherwise Maryam Rajavi and her cohorts would have killed themselves upon their arrest in Paris in June 2003). It is now about providing numbers to add to the list of Mojahedin Martyrs.
The purpose is to “insure” the organisation’s future since, in the atmosphere of bloodshed and revenge, no nonviolent alternative or opposition to the ruling regime could emerge.
One of the most deplorable ways of achieving this “insurance policy” has been where the terrorist teams sent for operations have been instructed that anyone who might suspect their identities while travelling should be killed. Behzad Alishahi explained one such incident in which his team mates killed an innocent worker who was in their way only because he had seen them and told them not to go through a factory.
Alishahi later was sent back to the camp and underwent all kinds of pressure for arguing against this cold blooded killing.
Fortunately since the fall of Saddam Hussein, although Rajavi has desperately tried every avenue to generate some killings and/or torture to produce fresh blood, the cult’s success has been minimal. Even the arrest of Khodabandeh and Bassam in Syria and their transfer to Evin prison, which Rajavi hoped would buy “new insurance” for the organisation, failed totally. During the past three and a half years, the only new blood they have achieved has been the deaths of two members and the permanent disability of several more who committed acts of self-immolation. Interestingly, the culture of carrying cyanide tablets, even in western countries, is encouraged more than ever. The cult leaders’ only hope for survival is linked to bloodshed, and they are impatiently waiting for any opportunity to kill any number of people no matter if they are friends, foes or even passers by.
Survivors’ Report/No. 20/January 2006