Mohammadreza Kolahi

Mujahedin Khalq Organization as a terrorist group

Who was Mohammadreza Kolahi?

Mohammad-Reza Kolahi was a member of the People’s Mujahedin of Iran (MEK) that was responsible for planting a bomb at the headquarters of the Islamic Republican Party (IRP) Party in Tehran in which 72 high-ranking politicians and party members were killed in 1981.
In 2015, in the Netherlands, Mohamad Reza Kolahi was killed by a criminal gang on the order of MEK. Two Amsterdam criminals have been jailed for the 2015 murder of Kolahi Samadi, who lived in the Netherlands hiding behind the false name of Ali Motamed.
Massoud Khodabande writes his experience with Kolahi as:” I knew Kolahi personally. I received him in Kurdistan when he ran away from Iran. (I had transferred a 10 KW radio transmitter and other American made transceivers from Munich to MEK bases just outside Sardasht city and was there to undertake the assembly and commissioning). He worked with me for the next two years (he was an undergraduate Electronics Engineering student) and was then moved to maintenance work at Rajavi’s Camp Ashraf (Saddam’s private army) near Baghdad.

I knew then that he was not a member of MEK or even remotely connected to their ideology when he came to me, and I knew later in Iraq that he could never accept the cultish teachings of Rajavi thereafter (the Ideological Revolution, divorces …), and would remain an outcast with nowhere to go. And this is what happened. Whether he was fooled by MEK to carry out this terrorist act, or whether he was pushed directly by other intelligence agencies which pulled MEK wires in Tehran at that time is a mystery to me. But what is clear is that although he was not a person close to MEK, the task of taking him out of Iran and saving him (and at the same time confining him) was the job assigned to the MEK.
It is inconceivable that Kolahi, with the information that he had, and the danger he could pose to the MEK and their variety of masters if brought in front of a camera, would go to the Netherlands, get married, get a job and start a new life without the help and the blessing of the MEK (Maryam Rajavi). It is also inconceivable that the MEK (or their masters) would have not have a 24/7 control of every aspect of his life (including every telephone conversation) and simply let him go unmonitored.”

June 30, 2021 0 comment

Mujahedin Khalq Organization's Propaganda System

MEK Invent Conspiracy Theories for Survival

From deep inside its rabbit hole in Albania the MEK has created yet another Alice in Wonderland style fairy tale about Iranian spies and agents coming to get them. In doing so, Maryam Rajavi reminds us exactly why the European Union expelled her and her lieutenants from Europe and sent her into exile in Albania. The MEK presence – a magnet for trouble – presents an unacceptable national security risk to any country. From bomb plots in Paris and Belgium, the assassination of their own man Mohammad Reza Kolahi in the Netherlands, mysterious assassinations of other MEK critics, a violent attack outside the European Parliament, and self-immolations, the MEK are implicated in many violent incidents on European territory. In 2018, their presence finally became untenable. Sadly, Albania, under the American heel, is now forced to host this dangerous group.

And with this latest statement, Rajavi also reminds us of the damage the MEK has already caused to Albanian civic life and its institutions. It appears that many Albanian politicians, police and the security services have become enthralled by the MEK mind control methodology. Not only has MEK unduly influenced Albanian foreign policy against Iran, the cult has also exerted unaccountable influence over the country’s internal security, without doubt using American pressure as backing.

Bijan Pooladrag

Here’s an example: In recent days, Albanian police arrested an Iranian man, Bijan Pooladrag, with links to the MEK. The MEK immediately issued a statement disowning him and labelled him “an agent of the Iranian regime’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS)”. In fact, according to eyewitnesses Pooladrag was arrested straight after coming out of the MEK offices in Tirana where he had gone to get his salary. This is because, although still working for MEK, he refused to live inside their camp. In special circumstances and on a needs-must basis MEK allows members to live outside the compound on condition that they do not speak publicly about their experiences with MEK. The financial allowance they give is conditional on the subject continuing to work for MEK on computer messaging and trolling.

Bijan Pooladrag

The arrest came about when Pooladrag’s landlady and her daughter became suspicious that he was using their phones and computers without their knowledge. The Prosecution case states that he is “suspected of committing the criminal offense of ‘Illegal interception of computer data’, ‘Interference in computer data’, ‘Misuse of equipment’ and ‘Interference in computer systems’ provided by Articles 293 / a, b, c, of the Criminal Code.” Pooladrag allegedly utilized unauthorised phones to open accounts on Instagram, Facebook, WhatsApp, Messenger and Telegram, which were used in Farsi language. This exactly matches with the MEK demand that members like Pooladrag who live outside the camp continue with social media work to get paid. It is also clear to those who know him that Pooladrag is not computer literate enough to set up his own networks and systems. These will have been done for him by MEK at some stage. Clearly, Pooladrag was engaged in clicking for Heshmat Alavi.

For the absence of doubt, Pooladrag is a hardcore MEK member. He was injured in the September 1st massacre in 2013 in Iraq (number 24 on this list) as one of the 100 special members tasked with holding Camp Ashraf, willing to die for their leader. Since arriving in Albania, although he lives outside the camp, Pooladrag has made no attempt to contact his family in Iran (number 34 on this list), a requirement of MEK membership. His sister is still searching for contact.

According to former MEK members who knew Pooladrag, he was warned several times by MEK about his behaviour outside the camp. He was told ‘you can’t go to the seaside and post ‘naked’ pictures of yourself and expect us not to do something’. It seems that MEK have involved SHISH to set him up for punishment. Ironically, the punishment for these alleged crimes in Albania is 7 years imprisonment. The same sentence with which the courts of Saddam Hussein threatened those who wanted to leave MEK – seven years in Abu Ghraib prison for entering Iraq illegally. Interesting how quickly and seamlessly the Albanian judicial system has taken over this role of punishing MEK’s enemies.

Anyone who thinks that the MEK’s words are not full of lies and misinformation is sadly naive. MEK is one of those strange entities that not only invent their own conspiracy theories but wholeheartedly believe in them too.

Evidence of MEK influence over police behaviour can also be found in the statement about Pooladrag. As though to deliberately confuse the issue, among its list of “MOIS agents” who live in Albania, MEK has included one Italian Iranian Daniel Kasraei who is well known as a MEK go between, deported back to Italy for ‘spying’. However, the others listed are genuine former members of MEK, who have since denounced the group for its human rights abuses. Their backgrounds are interesting of themselves. Take the case of Ehsan Bidi. The MEK claim he was deported earlier this year. In fact, Bidi was, at the behest of the MEK, subject to illegal detention for a year, illegal trafficking by Albanian police over the Greek border in August this year, followed by a hasty return to Tirana with an apology by the chief of police after lawyers intervened. He was happily living in Tirana with his friends until the MEK again issued a statement on October 14th that Bidi had been deported. Three days later, Albania’s police again placed Bidi in a detention centre “for a few days” and asked him to sign deportation papers. The MEK’s interference in the internal situation of Albania is becoming untenable.

Another former MEK member mentioned in the statement is Hassan Heyrani who, according to the MEK, ‘hangs out’ at a café in Tirana. In fact, Heyrani is manager of the Faranak Café. Like Ehsan Bidi, Heyrani represents the MEK’s worst nightmare: a former member who is successfully recovered and standing on their own feet, working and living a free life since escaping the cult.

Since Ehsan Bidi was freed, another former member has been targeted by MEK for police intervention. Gholamreza Shekari, again arrested solely on claims made by the MEK of criminal activity, has been detained since September while investigations take place. MEK’s accusation of ‘people trafficking’ is corrected by Olsi Jazexhi – a well-known media personality and historian who has been following the MEK’s activities since their arrival in his country in 2016 – “Golam Shekari did not send the Iranian refugee to the borders of Albania. He sent him to a bus station”.

Elsewhere Jazexhi says Rajavi has “declared war on any Iranian that steps in Albania” and has had influence over the deportation of 80 Iranians from the country. Ironically, Rajavi has said nothing about the arrest of two Iranians at Rinas Airport two days previously, attempting to smuggle £30,000 in old £20 notes on a flight to Luton, UK. Anyone who knows anything about MEK knows, of course, that it is standard MEK activity to transfer large amounts of cash from place to place for money laundering purposes. We do not know for certain that they are linked to MEK, but there is no other reason the organisation has not spoken a word about them, while demonising any and every other Iranian who has set foot inside the country.

As usual, the MEK reveal much more about themselves and their current predicament in their public statements than they realise or intend. There is a sense of desperation to recent MEK outpourings. In the run up to the US Presidential election, and amidst the devastation wrought by the coronavirus pandemic, nobody is paying attention to them at all. Isolated and abandoned in a small country, Maryam Rajavi has tried to push the US to force the EU to allow her to go back to Paris or Brussels for even just a couple of hours to show she is still welcome there. This has been rejected. The EU contact simply advised, ‘take them to Washington’. Documents were put on the table showing cases of the MEK working for the Americans against the EU – the assassination of Kolahi in the Netherlands, the false flag Paris bomb threat and payments to the extreme right-wing VOX party in Spain.

Faced with this failure to re-enter Europe, Rajavi has resorted to using another layer of MEK loyalists – those posing as independent analysts – to keep her cult relevant. This explains the flurry of shock revelations promoted by MEK veterans Ali Safavi, Alireza Jafarzadeh and Sona Samsami in the USA. The use of Arab News to launch this campaign signals that not only is Rajavi desperate for attention but that the Saudis are very concerned about a Biden victory which would put a halt to the free rein enjoyed under Trump. The mercenary MEK are happy to jump on this bandwagon as a means to trumpet their presence in the anti-Iran regime change political arena.

This contrasts with actual MEK activity in Albania where it is clear they are resigned to remaining. Information from inside the camp reveals that a public relations department has been formed from the so-called Leadership Council which has been tasked with distributing goods to the local population around the camp. The Mayor of Durres is being ‘bought’ as the Mayor of Auvers sur Oise was ‘bought’ previously. Locals are being recruited as the MEK are gaining control over the Durres citizenry.

However, in the last analysis it may be too late for the MEK to exert control over the external environment. From inside the camp, word is that the body of the camp is in chaos. Every day people are shouting and screaming and rebelling. They imprison someone and next day someone else kicks off. Dissent is getting out of hand. And the more this happens the more they are moving people into the centre of the camp so they won’t be heard or seen from the outside. Layers of surveillance and security are in place to prevent outbreaks of trouble.

Certainly, as bad as things for her in the outside world, Maryam Rajavi’s worst threat is coming from her disaffected membership. With nothing but punishments and crackdowns to offer and no political wins to boast of beyond self-publicity, it is hard to see how she can recover the morale of the members. And as a lot of political leaders are discovering now, once you lose the trust of your people to lead you, there is nowhere to hide and nowhere to go but down.

https://iranian.com

October 21, 2020 0 comment

Mujahedin Khalq Organization as a terrorist group

Why did Netherlands approve asylum for a terrorist?

Mohammad-Reza Kolahi was not only a terrorist but an MEK agent who blew up a meeting of 70 top Iranian officials in 1981, killing them all.

[Editor’s Note: Mohammad-Reza Kolahi was not only a terrorist, but a big one. As an MEK agent he had penetrated a meeting of 70 top Iranian officials in 1981. Under the cover as the event production sound man he had literally mined the entire meeting hall with explosives in the speakers the night before.

During the meeting he set the timer and then excused himself to go get some ice cream, and blew everybody up, including the Chief Justice, a decapitation strike on the Iranian revolution.

For his reward Kolahi was spirited away into Holland for a quick asylum by a MEK friendly Western intelligence agency, and lived happily ever after until someone tracked him down and using local thugs sent him on his merry way into the hereafter on December 15th, 2015.

From Wikipedia:
Kolahi the bomber, in 1981

In 2018, it was revealed that Kolahi had been living in the Netherlands as a refugee under the false identity of Ali Motamed (Persian: علی معتمد‎) and had been murdered in December 2015.[3] Kolahi was married to an Afghan woman and had a 17-year-old son.[3] He had avoided events organised by his Afghan wife’s family for fear of images of his face emerging on social media.[8]

According to Het Parool, two men suspecting of killing Kolahi were identified as 28-year-old Anouar Aoulad-Buochea and 35-year-old Moreo Menso, “Both suspects have a criminal record and come from the same Bijlmer neighborhood of Amsterdam.” Several sources accused the Iranian government of being behind the assassination.[4]

Kolahi has been joined this past week by a bunch of Idlib jihadis, sent on their way meet Allah by the SAA and its anti-terrorism allies in the battle to rid Syria of Western and Persian Gulf state proxy terrorists. There is much work still left to do … Jim W. Dean ]

The mausoleum built for all the victims of this attack. If you look closely on the floor you can see the raise name stone rows.

– First published … February 23, 2020 –

Association for defending victims of terrorism’s public relation section reported in 17 February that, third session of “legal capacities in access to justice for victims” held in Allame Tabatabei University. University professors and prominent human rights activists, law students and lawyers and some victims’ families were attendances.

As first speaker, Mr. Jafar Kousha, Professor of law in Beheshti University, said:

“When a crime happens the community waits for a good and appropriate response to it, so, no response can bring negative consequences. We should pay attention to goals, roles and effects of punishments. In this regard, safeguarding values is the base of punishments and security is the most important value in the society. So we must oppose anyone who wants to put in danger the security of society.”

This prominent professor who was delivering about “non-punishment as a cause of spread of crimes” added that: goals of punishments are deterrence and compensation and without consistency between crimes and punishments, we face with negative effects.

He continued: “Our question is that what is the consequences if culprits or someone who put security in danger became unpunished?”

Professor Kousha said about the case of Hafte Tir terrorist incident in 1981 that in Iran, we have not any criminal code for terrorism and this is a major problem.

Professor of law in university of Beheshti asserted on the necessity of having professional structures and judges and said: the obstacles should be lifted. Political calculations and relations hinder judicial processes. Judicial branch is independent.

Our problem is the security and authority of judiciary branch. If we impose suitable punishments on culprits there will be tranquility in victims and society will be in order and anyone who wants to do terrorist crime will be faced by a powerful judicial process and will be deterred from doing so.

Another speaker in this session was Doctor Zamani, professor of Law and Political Sciences in Allame University. He talked about international responsibility of the state of Netherlands. He thanked Association for Defending Victims of Terrorism for its essays to deliver this sort of issues and wished that these actions prevent the victims of Hafte Tir terrorist incident to become forgotten.

Doctor Zamani added: all the victims of Hafte Tir terrorist incident are voiceless. Netherlands has a powerful judiciary system and bringing its state to the court is very tough goal but we should pay attention to two issues:

First, state of Netherlands has approved asylum and residency for Ali Motamed. Is there any international commitment for states to investigate about background of whom been accused of terrorism and disapproving asylum for them?

Do the families of victims, who are present in this session, have the right of pursuing legal process about Hafte Tir terrorist incident in Netherlands’ judiciary authorities? Why the asylum been approved for Ali Motamed? Is there any lawsuit in this regard?

He added: terrorist attacks have public dimension and it is on all states to investigate about it. We want from the state of Netherlands to afford necessary judicial assistance for victims’ families.

Doctor Zamani in other part of his speech said that: commitment of state is commitment for result and not the commitment to mere a try. State of Netherlands should act transparent and committed. Independency of judiciary system should not be a reason for not assigning the judicial procedures to the state as a whole. State is integrated.

He added: after 2001 we saw a wave of change in the approach of states toward asylum seekers and due diligence had been added. It should be announced that how Mohammad Reza Kolahi acquired asylum and why his past was unknown for the state of Netherlands.

At the last part of his speech, Mr. Zamani, professor of international law said: traditional principle is that state must avoid in being a base for terrorists or attacking other states. We don’t know that Mr. Kolahi had acquired citizenship or residency. State of Iran should insist for the truth. All the states have duty to background check for anyone who wants to enter to that country.

Then, Ms. Anicée Van Engeland, a senior lecturer in International Security and Law at Cranfield University, made a video conference. Her topic was France and its measure to enable victims of terrorism in access to justice.

She said, “France has been presented a success model when it comes to enabling victims of terrorism accessing to justice. There is, first of all, a governmental body called the interministerial support unit for victims (CIAV). That body takes care of everything that’s outside the law, which is medical support, psychological support, coverage of medical cost, and access to social benefits. There are also several associations that are there to support the victims of terrorism.”

The professor of Cranfield University said in another part of her speech,

“The rules also state that protection of victims need to be adequately recognized in the criminal proceeding. While in France there is no definition of who is a victim of terrorism, per se there is certainly a position that is adequately recognized in criminal proceedings.

Once the victims of terrorism have filled the complaint and their complaint is being processed, they can have access to the compensation fund for victims of act of terrorism in other offences. They will support them with psychological and physical support.

During that time the prosecutor of Paris will start drafting a list of people who have been the victims. And the victims need to bring evidence that they were actually in the location and they were injured during the terrorist action. It’s extremely important as a lot of people have tried to claim for compensation by being pretending victims.”

Pointing out the long procedure of French courts, she said, “One of the victims had said lodging a complaint is pointless, it just adds one bad thing to another. They kill you once with the offender, and the justice system doesn’t kill you once but a thousand times.” She added that, but we know also some reports of the people who are accessing to justice.

The next speaker was Dr. Fahim Danesh, a university lecturer and researcher of international, law pointed out the existence of international courts in the Netherlands which make the country as a symbol of law and justice. He and stated that, nevertheless, with a thorough and accurate knowledge of the Dutch legal system we can lodge a complaint.

In one part of his speech, he said,

“One of the most important rights of the victims is that they should be recognized. In international instrument it was emphasized that these people are victims and domestic courts are responsible to recognize them. Being a victim can be addressed and reflected psychologically.

A fund has been established at the International Criminal Court for supporting victims. Different states donate a lot of money to this fund and there are plans to normalize the situation of victims.” He added that one of the main demands of the Hafte Tir victims is that they are recognized.

The international law researcher referred the case of Mothers of Srebrenica who sued the Dutch government and they could eventually obtain compensation from the Dutch government although they faced a lot of problems. He continued,

“We are in favor of such judicial system. Following the file case be an opportunity. The Dutch have, in their legal structure, accepted that the families of the victims should be theoretically included. This entry can be called “Amicus Curiae” (Court Friend). On this basis, we can submit our considerations to the court. We just have to show that we are neutral and third party and that we are amicus curiae.

The next speaker of the meeting was Dr. Nargesian, the Assistant Prosecutor of International Affairs of Tehran’s court. He pointed out some of the aspects in the case, such as the absence of a contract between the government of the Netherlands and Iran, as well as passing 38 years of the case made it difficult to address the issue. “The 1951 Convention states that terrorist offenders should not be granted asylum”, he emphasized.

He continued “We have a legal gap in our country, and terrorism has not been criminalized in our criminal law. But the Dutch government must be accountable for granting asylum, and we are ready to hear legal advice from lawyers.

The next speaker at the meeting, Dr. Nejandi Manesh, a professor at Faculty of Law and Political Science of Allameh Tabataba’i University, said in one part of his speech, “We demand the Dutch government the right to know the truth. Why the word “Martyr” is written on the tomb of Ali Motamed?

If the murder was a normal case, why is the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization’s (the Hypocrites) sign is on his tomb? Why the Dutch government has granted asylum to a terrorist? There were cases in which a person seeking asylum was a driver of a forbidden party who has not been granted asylum. Why has Mohammad Reza been granted asylum?

In another part of his speech, Allameh Tabataba’i University Professor said:

“Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization was designated as a terrorist group from 2002 to 2009. Why no measure was taken regarding the case? Removing the group from the terrorist list, must have done with prior consent of the victims. Perhaps the lawsuit against the Hypocrites in Albania will challenge the country’s judiciary, and all of these require the right question and what answer we are looking for.”

Dr. Nezhandi Manesh, spoke about the grief of Mr. Pakenjad, son of the martyr of Hafte Tir and said, “Another right that families have is to find a suitable way to compensation. Perhaps the bitterest moments I met was when Mr. Pakenjad was talking near the grave of his father and uncle’s killer. It was very heartbreaking.

In the end, he expressed his hope that within the legal framework, regardless of political discussions, the issue of litigation of the victims of the Hafte Tir bombing would be brought before the Dutch court and the victims get the desired result.

After discussing the legal issues, the families of the martyrs of Hafte Tir bombing expressed a part of their sufferings which still continue after many years. They urged the legal authorities and the attendees to pursue this issue diligently so that the desired result in the punishment of offenders can be achieved and the truth about the incident is clarified.

In the end of the meeting, Ms. Arjang, M.Sc. Student of International Law at Allameh Tabataba’i University, discussed the role and status of the United Nations in accessing justice for victims of terrorism.

At the same time, the exhibition “Who is Ali Motamed?” was held and welcomed by visitors and students.

According to the media in the Netherlands, two Amsterdam criminals have been jailed for the 2015 murder of an Iranian, Mohammad Reza Kolahi Samadi, who lived in the Netherlands hiding behind the false name of Ali Motamed.

More background on the attack

June 28, 2017 (Persian calendar 1396/4/7) On 28 June 1981 the Hafte tir bombing occurred killing the chief justice and party secretary Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti, four cabinet ministers (Health, transport, telecommunications and energy ministers), twenty-seven members of the Majlis, including Mohammad Montazeri, and several other government officials.

[Ayatollah]Khomeini accused the PMOI to be responsible and, according to BBC journalist Baqer Moin, the Mujahedin were “generally perceived as the culprits” for the bombing in Iran. The Mujahedin never publicly confirmed or denied any responsibility for the deed, but stated the attack was ‘a natural and necessary reaction to the regime’s atrocities.’

The bomber was identified as a young student and Mujahedin operative by the name of Mohammad Reza Kolahi, who had secured a job in the building disguised as a sound engineer. He was never found and no group or person has ever accepted the responsibility or been put on trial for this bombing.

This has led to conspiracy theories by some who claim that the bombing was motivated by an internal power struggle and perpetrated by a faction within the Iranian ruling party. IRP was eventually dissolved because of these polarizations. Another conspiracy theory maintains that only state-backed organizations could ever acquire such a powerful bomb and points the finger at Israel’s Mossad.

Assassinations of “leading officials and active supporters of the regime by the Mujahedin were to continue for the next year or two,” though they failed to overthrow the government. Two months after Hafte tir on August 30, another bomb was detonated killing the President Rajai and Premier Mohammad Javad Bahonar.

An active member of the Mujahedin, Massoud Kashmiri, was identified as the perpetrator, and according to reports came close to killing the entire government including Khomeini. The reaction following both bombings was intense with many arrests and executions of Mujahedin and other leftist groups.

To commemorate the event several public places in Iran including major squares in Tehran and other cities are named “Hafte Tir”.

By
Jim W. Dean, Managing Editor – from the Association for Defending Victims of Terrorism, Iran

February 24, 2020 0 comment

Mujahedin Khalq Organization as a terrorist group

The case of MEK operative Mohammad Reza Kolahi’s murder didn’t need to be a mystery

In July 2018 I wrote an article for the Balkans Post titled ‘MEK rebrands by assassinating unwanted members’ in which I brought up the case of Mohammad Reza Kolahi Samadi as one of many examples in which the Mojahedin Khalq have got rid of an affiliated disaffected operative to

1- Cleanse themselves of their terrorist history by eliminating the operatives;

2- Get rid of someone who has gone rogue and may potentially damage the MEK legally and socially if he decided to talk;

3- Make an excuse to attach yet another murder in the west to Iran.

In that article I wrote:

“In 2015, in the Netherlands, Mohamad Reza Kolahi was killed by a criminal gang on the order of MEK. Investigators confirmed that Kolahi was responsible for the 1981 bombing of the headquarters of the Islamic Republic Party in Tehran in which 72 high-ranking politicians and party members were killed.”

In January 2019 I wrote a short blog (in Persian) titled ‘Why is no one asking Maryam Rajavi about the fate of Kolahi?’, in which I begged the question, why have the investigators (and the relevant CIA connected Persian speaking media outlets in Prague and Washington) gone well out of their way to attach the murder to Iranian diplomats in Amsterdam and have repeatedly announced that the Iranian embassy in Amsterdam “is not giving a clear answer” as to the reasons behind this murder (as if they could or should). But why does not a single person want to investigate or even ask questions of Maryam Rajavi and her fugitive husband Massoud who was the leader of the Mojahedin Khalq Organisation at the time Mohammad Reza Kolahi carried out his terrorist act in 1981. Kolahi planted the bomb in the HQ of a political party (rivals of the MEK at that time) in the middle of Tehran which killed ten people.

I begged the question, is this because Maryam Rajavi had not told the Netherlands intelligence service of Kolahi’s whereabouts? Or did she tell them (presumably through her CIA contacts) but the Netherlands intelligence service did give him enough protection? Or is it that the Netherlands security service are too afraid of the CIA and Mossad to even question Maryam Rajavi? Or it is simply convenient for them to play the game and accuse Iran in the series of Iran bashing scenarios (presumably planned by Prince Turki bin Faisal Al Saud and carried out by MEK) that signal the change of direction for the MEK from Saddam-Massoud-military to Turki-Maryam-intelligence.

I knew Kolahi personally. I received him in Kurdistan when he ran away from Iran. (I had transferred a 10 KW radio transmitter and other American made transceivers from Munich to MEK bases just outside Sardasht city and was there to undertake the assembly and commissioning). He worked with me for the next two years (he was an undergraduate Electronics Engineering student) and was then moved to maintenance work at Rajavi’s Camp Ashraf (Saddam’s private army) near Baghdad.

It is inconceivable that Kolahi, with the information that he had, and the danger he could pose to the MEK and their variety of masters if brought in front of a camera, would go to the Netherlands, get married, get a job and start a new life without the help and the blessing of the MEK (Maryam Rajavi). It is also inconceivable that the MEK (or their masters) would have not have a 24/7 control of every aspect of his life (including every telephone conversation) and simply let him go unmonitored.

I am not an investigator but even I can see that all the elements of “means, motive and opportunity” are pointing directly at the Mojahedin Khalq and Maryam Rajavi in person for his murder. What I can’t see is what is it that prevents European judiciary and law enforcement agencies from even approaching the idea of considering Maryam Rajavi as a material witness never mind, God forbid, a suspect.

Massoud Khodabandeh, Middle East Strategy Consultants

April 15, 2019 0 comment

Mujahedin Khalq Organization as a terrorist group

MKO relocates terrorists to Europe

The 200 members of the terrorist Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO) who disappeared from the notorious Camp Ashraf in Iraq in past months have been reappearing in European countries.

Nine Massoud Rajavi loyalists, who had been taken to Camp Ashraf from Canada, have once again returned to the North American country.

With the help of the Zionist lobby, the group has been tasked with contacting Canadian politicians and convincing them the situation in Camp Ashraf is exactly as the Rajavi cult has described.

Another four Rajavi acolytes have gone to Washington and filed a lawsuit against the Iraqi government, which has decided to close the camp. This is while the Iraqi judicial system is currently investigating the Iraqi people’s complaint against organized crimes carried out by the terrorist cell.

Three Rajavi acolytes who have recently arrived in Europe are expert bomb makers trained by Saddam Hussein’s army.

Kashmiri and Kolahi, who masterminded the assassination of a former Iranian president and prime minister in the 1980s, have both been sighted in the suburbs of Cologne, Germany.

Analysts maintain that Rajavi will not hesitate to use such MKO operatives to attack Iranian and Iraqi embassies in Western countries in order to stoke tension in political relations.

The US and Iraq’s intelligence services agreed last week to get Massoud Rajavi out of the camp so that the Iraqi government would be able to close it.

Rajavi will be taken to the second major base of the terrorist group in the suburbs of Paris.

The Iraqi government has made clear its plans to close down the notorious Camp Ashraf, located about 120 kilometers (74 miles) west of the border with Iran.

On November 27, the US government announced it is mulling removing the anti-Iran organization from its terrorist blacklist and giving refuge to its members, a move which many believe is an indication of Washington’s support for terrorism.

The MKO is designated as a terrorist organization under United States law, and has been described by State Department officials as a repressive cult.

The group fled to Iraq in 1986, where it enjoyed the support of Iraq’s executed dictator Saddam Hussein, and set up the camp in Diyala Province, near the Iranian border.

MKO is also known to have cooperated with Saddam in suppressing the 1991 uprisings in southern Iraq and the massacre of Iraqi Kurds. The group has carried out numerous acts of violence against Iranian civilians and government officials.

Iran has repeatedly called on the Iraqi government to expel the group, but the US has blocked the expulsion by mounting pressure on the Iraqi government.

January 9, 2012 0 comment