Former members of the MEK

MKO former members

Hajipur Ex-member of Rajavi’s Cult Welcomed by Nejat Families

According to Nejat Society’s President at Gilan Office, Hamid Haji pur who spent twenty years of his life in MKO succeeded to defect from the cult a few months ago and return to his hometown in Gilan, Iran.

Following his return, a lot of families who are members of Nejat Society in Gilan office, contact the office in order that they can get news about the health of their beloved ones in Camp Ashraf.

To facilitate Mr. Hajipour’s visit with Nejat families, Gilan office held a meeting where the families welcomed Mr. Hajipour and asked about the condition of their children who are still captured in Camp Ashraf.

The president of Gilan office added that Mr. Hajipur described the mental and physical pressure he had suffered as a member of Rajavi’s cult. Impressed by Hamid Hajipur’s story in MKO, the families showed concern about the release of their beloved ones and their return to Iran.

The meeting lasted two hour. At the end the families took some photos together with Mr. Hajipur and his family.

July 22, 2009 0 comments

Former members of the MEK

Mr. Hamid Hajipur,MKO ex-member joined his family

Mr. Hamid Hajipur who has experienced the bitterness of being captive in exile for more than 20 years, managed to release himself from the bars of Rajavis’ Cult and returned home and joined his family in Nejat Society office, Gilan Branch.

Declaring his separation from MKO and expressing his hatred towards the organization’s compulsory work camp; Camp Ashraf, Mr. Hajipur returned to his homeland and to his warm family center to shape his own life as he wishes.

July 21, 2009 0 comments

Former members of the MEK

Rajavi and The Leadership Council

Memoirs of Ms. Batoul Soltani – Part 19

As I described in previous parts of my memoirs, I felt that Rajavi liked the women to be around him and he couldn’t bear the presence of even one man in his surroundings. But there were apparently other factors to select these women for the leadership council. There were some individuals who were so devoted to the ideas of the leadership and they were so eager to work hard but they didn’t succeed to be a member of the Council due to the lack of some factors. There were too many arguments on these cases. For example they said: ”Although, she (a particular person) has ideologically reached an acceptance level, she cannot be a member of the leadership council because she doesn’t have the skills to take responsibility to carry out the organizational tasks, she cannot manage well or she cannot speak fluently.”

Being a good speaker or having executive skills was prior to ideological competence of the member. I remember when they selected Sediqe Husseini, they always told her: ”we assign you as a member of the leadership council but you have to increase your knowledge and correct your mistakes [remove your negative points] .

I don’t think that appearance is a factor but there are some examples that raise the doubt that personal appearance matters in selection of some female members. For instance in the case of Maryam Rajavi when she was selected as the first secretary of the organization she was actually the most beautiful woman among high-ranking members. Or, about Fahime Arvani who was at that time the prettiest woman in the organization. She was really beautiful. So her selection caused too many accusations and protests. Members were implicitly complaining to the authorities: ”You select the beautiful ones.” This was a question in member’s minds that they stated it indirectly, for example they stated it as if it was an accusation against Rajavi or Mojahedin from outside the organization.

Even Rajavi tried to answer the question saying “we are accused of such affairs”. He emphasized that the selections were not based on beauty or appearance. Then he made some examples including Mozhgan “that she was selected although she was not beautiful.” He tried to prove that sections were just based on organizational rules and regulations. Actually he made the most use of these accusations to condemn the dissidents and he had also his own expression: ”our job is to close corrupt businesses” he meant that people who made such accusations have opened corrupt businesses.

Another accusation was that they select educated people. Rajavi tried to justify it by saying “for example Nasrin was not educated but she was selected as the first secretary of the organization. So these examples challenged the claims. But I think these people were just selected to remove such label inside or outside the organization. Therefore, I can say that at least the selection of Maryam Rajavi and Fahimeh Arvani was based on their beauty. Maybe, when they elected a person who was not so beautiful among 4 or 5 people who were the most devotees to the leadership, they wanted to remove such a label.

About the relationship between Rajavi and women of the leadership Council, I would say that it was so friendly and comfortable that if a stranger came in their meetings, he thought that this guy was all these women’s husband. I mean that the meetings in the level of the Leadership Council, was completely different from regular meetings that were held in the public hall.

Within the Leadership Council, Rajavi talked about the most personal affairs with the women trying to use his sense of humor. He apparently showed a lot of respect for these women and gave them compliments like:”You are all my hopes”,”I only rely on you”. These compliments made the members to become self-centered. The relations in the Leadership Council were totally different. As I said the relation between Rajavi and women of the Leadership Council was so comfortable that the women told him words like: ”we love you, we are your devotees..” such words basically showed the close relationship.

Rajavi sent presents for these women. I remember a few times that he specifically sent some presents for women, they tried their best to get closer to him and tell him that they are in love with him. I remember a woman of the Leadership Council who justified such relations by saying “I have read in a lot of books that the women at prophet Mohammad‘s (peace be upon him) era, in order to draw prophet Mohammad’s attention to themselves, tried to show off in his way or even they tried to marry him in order to wipe out their sins. All prophets’ wives tried to get a better position before him.” In fact, by the comparison that they made between Masud Rajavi and Prophet Mohammad, they wanted to justify their strange relationship with Rajavi. Also through these arguments, they tried to heighten Rajavi’s position to the level of a prophet.

On the other hand, Rajavi’s reaction to the compliments was arranged in a way that no opposition was stated. I remember an example of his reaction to the compliments: Dr. Yahya [Hussein Forsat] who was a dentist, in a meeting flattered Masud Rajavi by saying that: ”what you are saying is beyond our time and the world would see its result in the future” and then he concluded that “You [Rajavi] are Imam Zaman” (Shiite’s absent twelfth Imam). Now look at Rajavi’s response to such a compliment, he said: ”Yahya what do you say? I will pull out your teeth”. So he indirectly encouraged him to continue his compliments. Sometime, he took a special gesture and pretended to disconnecting the person’s microphone.

Indeed he was really happy with the situation. They had succeeded to manipulate the members in order to put them into this illusion. When the members started their compliments, Maryam and Masud Rajavi waited for their words to be listened completely and the atmosphere of the hall be influenced by the compliments. Then they apparently complained that they were not glad with such a compliment. Sometimes some fanatic members interrupted the discussion by saying “You are Imam Zaman yourself; the messiah of our time!”
Translated by Nejat Society

July 19, 2009 0 comments

Former members of the MEK

Suicide operation, a lever to defend Camp Ashraf

An interview with Batool Soltani on MKO self-immolations – Part seven

Sahar Family Foundation: If you will, Mrs. Soltani, let’s have a talk over claimed challenges that presses the organization to react by suicide operations. I mean, what are the threats that concern the organization to prescribe suicide operation to confront? Is there actually any objective worth of concern or claims are merely grounded on propagation or a falsely intensified atmosphere?

Batool Soltani: It can be argued from many angles; one, the actual and objective backgrounds that lead to the possible perpetration of operations and second, operations merely planned to keep members in a status of readiness and to isolate them from passivity. Members have to be always kept busy doing something while raising in them a high morale of obedience and submission. Members in Camp Ashraf are on alert of committing mass suicide on the grounds that there are many blind spots round the camp through which outsiders might easily infiltrate to either kidnap the members of the Leadership Council and use them as hostages or kill them. The possible reaction to these threats could be a mass suicide of the insiders.

SFF: Were there just conjectures or there were some truth in what they claimed?

BS: Both of them. In some cases there were well grounded reasons but sometimes they fabricated things. Once, I remember, they distributed cyanides among the members of the Leadership Council after they had collected them all. No clear reason was presented but soon we came to know the cause. One of the members who had left for the American-run camps had informed that the organization had built secret jails just where our base was situated. So, one night American forces entered the camp in an attempt to discover the secret place. Of course, the report was one of many dubious ones already reported to Americans. But the organization had smelled a threat, a warning to something that could hit unexpectedly and thus, it distributed the cyanides to react immediately if needed.

SFF: You mean any entrance to Camp Ashraf for whatever reason is looked on as a threat against which the sole solution is suicide?

BS: Exactly. That is what, for instance, they mean by referring to the human tragedy in the issue of their expulsion from the Camp Ashraf and Iraq. By human tragedy they mean a mass protest through a mass-immolation. They are so resolute that they will deliberately set the reluctant ones on fire on pretence of willing actions since the dead never speak. What Rajavi stresses on as human tragedy should have broader dimensions but the least they can do and will impose on others can be nothing but the working means of a mass suicide.

That is what they exclusively argued on in the level of the Leadership Council. Among the rank and file it was deeply instilled that defense of Ashraf was a matter of life and death and all members had to become human shield to defend it. The issue of human shield was discussed with the members one by one in 2006. The protest against general relocation could be shown either by individual self-immolation or mass suicide. The question was first put forward by Rajavi himself that how members would react were the Iraqis to transfer Camp Ashraf altogether. The presented solution was human shield as a defensive measure since all knew about the Iraqis’ felt hatred towards Mojahedin because of their collaboration with Saddam and their effective role as his private army. Mojahedin were present wherever Saddam needed them to suppress his dissidents.

Therefore, Mojahedin have no other way but to think of a working means to confront any posed threat against their bastion by the Iraqi new government’s resolutions. The Fall of Saddam has led them to a dire situation with no authoritative protector and they have to think of a defensive vehicle for themselves. They even devised an organizational hierarchy entitled the organizational pyramid to protect Camp Ashraf. However, the foremost priority was to protect the members of the Leadership Council since it is the pivotal issue for Rajavi, that is to say, protection of the members of the Leadership Council equals to protection of Camp Ashraf. Here again, as you see, anything revolves round a strategic axis contrived by Rajavi and whatever he conjures is somehow entwined with this organizationally devised Leadership Council.

SFF: Then, Rajavi believes that protection of Camp Ashraf is strategically possible through suicide operation and human shield. Will you explain to what degree such lever can actually work as a protecting means?

BS: to understand to what extent it is working, we have to refer to already occurred instances. Following Maryam Rajavi’s arrest the organization proved its seriousness and persistence in carrying out such operations. So far it has proved that it can persuade or coerce insiders, willingly or unwillingly, into committing whatever it deems necessary to achieve its ends and the insiders’ will has actually no effect in the accomplishment of the organization’s demands. The sole way to avoid being an accomplice in the organization’s plots is to take your courage to escape by a well drawn plan, as I did. Now with the withdrawal of the American forces, the sole hope of easy escape to the TIPF has actually vanished and hardly members find an easy way out. Even in the time of Saddam it was impossible and, if anybody insisted, cost members a lot to get themselves out of the organization; it was only through the notorious Abo-Ghorib prison and other places that someone could manage to detach. That is why I insist on saying that members have no other choice but to consent to whatever the organization demands them to do and under no condition they follow a will of their own.

SFF: Then, you believe that any attempt by Iraq to expel or relocate Mojahedin will lead to such activities (suicide operation).

BS: Certainly.

SFF: What factors can you exclusively refer to now talking over human shield and tragedy?

BS: You know, following the incident of 17 June, we received piles of letters by rank and file volunteering for suicide. The act was later hallmarked as an indicative of devotion and they began to closely examine to see who among the ranks had dodged devotion. I was among those who had not volunteered for suicide but they reproached me as a ranking member and I volunteered reluctantly; otherwise I would be suspected to be at odds with the organization. However, the organization insisted that none of these volunteers had to engage in self-instigated suicides since no individual had the right to spill a drop of his/her blood unless approved by the organization. Any form of suicide or self-immolation uncoordinated by the organization is considered to be a useless, unproductive act. So sensitive is the organization about these suicide acts that they say commission of any suicide legitimizes only after we organize them and issue orders. So it becomes clear that self-immolations in France were all organized as a political lever. To make sure, I had an argue with Mojgan Parsai (in Camp Ashraf). I told her as I had volunteered for suicide, I wanted to set myself on fire before the American’s base there. Of course, it was only to see what her reaction could be. She took me to her office and talked to me for two hours saying that it was a useless act there while Sedigheh (Mojaveri) and Neda Hassani’s acts of self-immolation were politically worthwhile in France. She said if I committed suicide in the camp nothing changed but the organization lost a member of the Leadership Council, not even a slight report of my suicide would be published in the local papers let alone being mentioned in an international scale. The act could be exploited to the maximum degree for political and propaganda purposes in France or England. That is why I emphasis that Mojahedin encounter no obstacle in creating a human tragedy as it has already displayed its potentiality following the arrest of Maryam Rajavi; the organization has many volunteers who have signed to commit suicide whenever and wherever commanded.

To be continued

Translated by Mojahedin.ws

July 18, 2009 0 comments

Former members of the MEK

Interview with Hadi Negravi

Q. Would you please introduce yourself and explain why you joined and defected from MKO?

A: I am Hadi Negravi. In 1989, I got familiar with MKO in Turkey where I was trying to immigrate to Mr. Hadi Negravi - MKO ex-member in Nejat Society office Germany. The organization promised to help me go to Germany, so I was recruited by their agents. In 2004,I left the organization and after living in American Camp for about one year, I returned to Iran voluntarily.

Q: How did you evaluate the internal relations in MKO during the years of your membership?

A: When I joined the organization, I didn’t have any idea of the ruling atmosphere in it, particularly because they behaved so friendly in Turkey, always speaking of freedom but after a few months of residing in Camp Ashraf, all my presuppositions was ruined by the organization which was totally controlled by the Regime of Saddam Hussein, as their commandant.

The organization was so closed that nobody could express his idea freely. Everything was decided in the hierarchy of the organization’s leaders. The members didn’t have the absolute right to choose their own fate (whether to stay or to leave the organization). They didn’t possess their own personal life, the right to marry or divorce; the most natural rights of a civilian.

Q: Regarding that you are completely aware of the terrorist acts of the group and experienced it; do you think the organization could basically renounce violence and armed struggle?

A: Not at all. Arm and armed struggle and spreading violence are the most basic principles of MKO‘s ideology. When Rajavi considers arm as his most cherished thing saying that “we cannot survive in our organizational form without arms”, do you think that such an organization can leave armed struggle.

They also use weapons and culture of violence to suppress the internal forces, so they are not able to survive in a liberal democratic atmosphere based on free will, logic and tolerance.
They have to be armed to be able to spread their believes since their inhuman nature meets no common sense in today world.

Q: Mr.Negravi, eight months after your return to Iran, the cult of Rajavi [MKO] declared that you were killed by the Islamic Republic in Iran. How can you reply such nonsense?

A: When I heard the news, I laughed. I have to tell them “shame on you, you were the ones who ruined me.”Due to the psychological torture I suffered for 15 years, I was under psychiatrists’ treatment to rebuild my spirit. Now I have torn the so-called revolution of Maryam Rajavi: I got married, I have a kid and I’m living a happy life with my family. Since my return all Iranian authorities had human respectful behavior towards me. To reassure anyone who doubts about it, I can announce my address and phone number, via this media, to contact me and make sure about my health.

Q: You might have heard the news on MKO cult’s involvement in turmoil after the Iranian Presidential election and that its agents have launched some terrorist acts. As a person who had been in Ashraf for years what do you think of their recent acts?

A: Yes, Definitely, this is exactly what is expected from an organization with such nature and characteristics like MKO. I can remember, the eighth presidential election, when they sent their terror teams to disturb the elections. In MKO, election is a meaningless phenomenon and the leaders of MKO know well that in each Iranian election large numbers of people give their votes. MKO has been far from Iranian political and social scene for years so they have no idea about Iranian society.

In fact MKO is an isolated cult with a much closed perspective. The surprising fact is that the ones in MKO, who call for free elections, have never held an election in the whole history of their organization.

Although they claim for democracy and human rights, they label the dissident members in the group as the agents of Islamic Republic Intelligence Ministry and traitors and send them to Abu Quraib. In MKO, we never had the right to think.

Q: How did the cult treat those who didn’t want to stay in the cult and sought to live a free life? For instance, in your own case, how did they react?

A: I’d say that using the word “life” is considered as a big sin in the organization. They always told us:”You chose your path the first day, so you have to stay until the regime is overthrown”. Of course they don’t have the power to overthrow the regime so the membership in the group is long-life.

The least punishment is being insulted by your colleagues in a peer pressure open meeting. The other ways to suppress the opponents is force them for TV interviews to confess their alleged spying role for IRI. In my case, they beat me up to Ashraf Gate.

Q: Mr. Negravi, what message would you like to give to those who are still captured in Camp Ashraf?

A: I hope they will be released as soon as possible, and choose their fate with their own free will. I hope they are not frightened by Rajavi’s fragile power show-off.

-Thank you very much for your time to attend the interview.
Nejat Society

July 16, 2009 0 comments

Former members of the MEK

MKO key Formula: Why Maryam … Because Masud

Memoirs of Ms. Batoul Soltani – Part 18
Supposedly Rajavi has always tried to manage his behaviors and relations like the ones of Imam Ali (the first Imam of Shiites and the fourth Caliph of Sunnis). He didn’t declare this claim orally, but implicitly it was obvious he acted in a way that his tendency was to represent such a personality.

He led the affairs in such a direction that his followers or Maryam were made to emphasize on this aspect of his personality.

Rajavi smartly showed off these distinct aspects of his personality through main arguments in the group. He tried to represent the patterns as theoretical and instructional while he was actually leading the audience to view him as the real example of those patterns or personalities [like Imam Ali]. For example, in case of his marriage with Maryam, he arranged the scene so skillfully that everyone believed he was the main person who accepted all the heavy accusation of the marriage due to ideological and political necessities. He or Mehdi Abrishamchi set the table very well that we couldn’t see behind the scene. Finally people like Abrishamchi or Davari (Pins of MKO) arranged a scenario implying that they were inspired Masud was the only one to bear all charges against him after Maryam Rajavi divorced Abrishamchi.

They tried to confirm that such devotion needs an extraordinary super-natural capacity. For instance, when Rajavi spoke of Spiritual Struggle [Jihad Akbar] he said: ”once fighting and martyrdom was the highest level of faith in the struggle, but today honesty and devotion are higher than martyrdom. He categorized them as holy warriors and revolutionary people. He said that Imams were pious men and prophets were sincere men. In fact he wanted to categorize himself in the group of Imams and prophets which are in a higher level than martyrs stand.

Following his interpretations, others were supposed to evaluate his ranking based on what they received from his words. The pins (like Maryam Rajavi) had the responsibility to introduce Masud Rajavi according to the interpretations he gave from Quran. Therefore, gradually they could give him the position of Imam Ali or Prophet Mohammad (peace be upon him).

When he wanted to form the leadership Council consisting of female members, he stated viewpoints on woman claiming that these are of Prophet Mohammad (peace be upon him) that he couldn’t perform them at his era due to the ignorance ruling his time, and now he [Rajavi] is accomplishing the Prophet’s task.

He claimed that one of the ideas of Prophet Mohammad (peace be upon him) and Imam Ali was that all political and administrative systems be based on women but they couldn’t actualize it. And now he is fulfilling their wish.

To choose the members of the leadership Council, the main criterion for Rajavi was how much they are devoted. There is a formula in MKO discussions:
They ask:”why Maryam” and then they answer: “because Masud”.
It means that Maryam is the first woman linked with Masud.

Maryam, herself asked:”why Maryam?” and then she answered herself:”because I love Masud more than anyone else does, because I was the first person who melted into Masud, I was unified in Masud, and I was just for Masud.”

In our ideological discussions, we tried to step forward after Maryam (following Maryam’s path) and talk about this kind of relationships. Every man or woman had to follow the same way to be melted into the leadership.

Following this argument, she said that we should love Masud instead of our husbands. If the members could have the same emotions and feelings for Masud as they have for their spouses, they could be true revolutionary fighters. This showed the extent of your devotion to Masud. Naturally, they chose the members of the leadership council according to this criterion.

About my own selection as a member of the leadership council, Maryam asked me: ”Do you know why you are selected despite the fact that you have recently entered the organization? Why we didn’t choose other people who have a longer period of membership?”

She made too many arguments and reasoning to prove that they have chosen me because I could comprehend the essence of revolution very well. She meant that I was totally melted into the leader’s ideas, because I could pass over my husband and children. The best criterion for MKO leaders was that a member could solve his problems and obstacles and could reach Maryam and Masud.

Any selection in MKO is based on the fact that how you have solved your contradictions: this measures your absolute devotion to the leaders.
Translated by Nejat Society

July 15, 2009 0 comments

Former members of the MEK

The red-line discriminating between word and action in suicide operation

An interview with Batool Soltani on MKO self-immolations – Part six
Sahar Family Foundation: Will you please specifically recount instances of what can be defined as classified information?

Batool Soltani: Well, what can be specifically referred to are those information that supply details on the locations of headquarters within Auver-sur-Oise and Camp Ashraf. That is to say, any geographical, security detail about these and other camps mostly concerning the compounds of the leadership. There is much more related information; the extent of security measures for the entrance and the control of inter-organizational affairs, the whereabouts of cadres situated inside the camps and their hierarchical relations, and information about those organizationally permitted to pass in or out of these places. Regular and irregular visits of these places by the leadership, the setting plan of the buildings and the sections in the camps and the people positioned in them, how the security systems work to control the cadres’ shifts and what are the defensive measures, human or mechanically controlled, to reduce or counter threats from the outside are all instances of classified information. Of other instances to name are the existing differences within the Auver-sur-Oise and Camp Ashraf, the security check-points to ensure safe passage in and out, internal offices that verify the validity of the passports and visas, the rankings in the charge of controlling and issuing ID cards for individuals to enter the camps or the cadres who leave on missions. Anybody entering Mojahedin’s enclave is regarded to have passed over the red-line of a highly secretive boundary that is totally concealed from the outside world.

SFF: We will talk on the issue further later on. But now let’s have a look on the issue that any suicide operation inevitably has its own consequences. The aggressive kind, for example, will willingly or unwillingly lead to the death of some innocents in the vicinity. For instance, when the organization plotted suicide operations to assassin the leaders of Friday-Prayer, many other innocent crowds were perished along with the main target. I want to know how does the organization justify such deeds and who are in charge of deciding to stop or carry out these operations. Better to say, where lays the drawn red-line that justifies such operations?

BS: Your question can be answered from many angles. First, we have to ascertain how the organization and Rajavi in particular draw the red-line between the word and theory for carrying out these operations. Second, we have to see to what extent the words are actually practical, and third, what is the position of the leadership concerning what should not have actually happened and how he has treated with the disobedient. They are all related to understand the question and its different aspects. First of all, the red-line and instances are drawn just by the leadership and all operational ranks have to submit to it. Nobody dispatched for an operation can defy Rajavi’s drawn red-line and any operation team knows well that accomplishment of mission eclipses any other priority. Now, it is important to distinguish between Rajavi’s red-line of word and action. The red-line in Rajavi’s word is taking heed of protecting the life and property of the public who have no role in the operations as well as public buildings and passages. Interestingly, no saboteur is permitted to desist from the plotted operation just because he/she is overstepping the red-line. The only person with the authority to halt the operations is Masoud Rajavi himself.

Now, the question is, and only Rajavi can give a proper answer, how it is possible exactly to stop crossing the red-line in the course of an operation that has to be unquestionably performed and which only Rajavi himself can order to be halted. The context and setting of some of these operations invariably requires sacrifice of innocent people in the vicinity. Once, for example, when a terror team was sent to assassin Asadollah Lajevardi in Tehran’s bazaar, the role of crowds in the bazaar can never be underestimated since they play the role of a deterrent factor both while targeting the victim and when escaping from the scene; there are always people in the scene who may in an automatic reaction interfere or hinder and the assassins see no other way but to shoot at them to open the way or one may come between the assassin and the target. Naturally, there are two options; either you have to abandon the operation and escape or accomplish the mission regardless of violating the red-line with whatever casualty.

The latter requires that you have to be serious in completely obliterating any obstacle on the way. And Rajavi himself knows all these truths that it is impossible to carry out an operation of assassination without harming other innocents. It is the same case with suicide operations with the difference that the agent knows he/she hardly returns alive which greatly helps to violate the red-lines. But in the former, a hope fosters in the assassin that he/she may escape the scene with the aid of people, a hope instilled into him/her by the organization itself. As a result, the assassin tries to tie his/her destiny to a little of overstepping the red-line since the organization had falsely ensured him/her that people would create a protecting shield for a member of the organization to escape safely. But it differs in a suicide operation; here the accomplishment of the operation is of the higher significance than the number of the casualties present at the scene. Besides, the suicide is no more alive to be counted responsible for the innocent killed. Thus, this kind of operation is excluded from our issue of discourse and remains the kind after which the team has to necessarily return to its base after the operation.

When Rajavi plotted assassination of people like Lajevardi or the army commander Sayad Shirazi, he knew well that killing was an inseparable part of a planned operation which could never be fulfilled unless through homicide. Then, it is absolutely absurd if he maneuvers and insists on vocalized principles of his drawn red-line since the nature of these operations necessitate killing and blood-shed. Consequently, the assassin is not the authority to decide to stop or continue, he/she is only executing a killing plan drawn by somebody else watching the operation from many hundred kilometers away. It is really in absolute contradiction to Rajavi’s stated red-line and out of the control of the operatives. At the end, we see that there is nobody to be held responsible for violation of the red-line that has caused many innocent deaths; in fact, it is one of those Rajavi’s adopted childish tactics.

Now let’s see what are Rajavi and the organization’s reaction against operation teams that may have inadvertently violated the red-lines in the course of the operation. Here, the operatives may have been killed, arrested or returned. But, in any case, they are not the ones to be held responsible but their commander in charge of the operation. Rajavi severely reprimands them for the killings that are considered a violation of the stated red-lines. Of course, he is well aware of the fact that he is the sole one to be held responsible for the crime, but that is how he deals with the fallout and condemns others calling them inefficient and else. But nothing more happens and nobody is punished and all ends in a room in an outburst of humiliating words and sever reprimand because all know that Rajavi himself had practically a better understanding of what might happen and which he had implicitly given his seal of approval to cross his own drawn red-lines. But somebody has to be held responsible for mere formality who, of course, fails to be the leadership. I have to add that such a performance of formality runs only when the organization is disclosed by undeniable facts that tie it to the incident which it must be held accountable for. However, in many other cases, the success of the operation never lets anything else take a back seat and overshadows anything that more often fails to be ever mentioned and is of marginal interest to the organization.
To be continued
Sahar Family Foundation, Baghdad, July 08, 2009
Translated by Mojahedin.ws

July 9, 2009 0 comments

Former members of the MEK

Suicide, the ideal means to safeguard information

Sahar Family Foundation: Mrs. Soltani, let’s talk a little about defensive suicide operation, that is to say, when someone commits suicide only because of carrying sensitive or secrete information. Particularly, of what kind are these information and what are the means through which the individuals have to annihilate themselves when the time comes?

Batool Soltani: information can be divided in two. The first are those we carried when going from a place to another which mostly happened in Iraq. There were times when we drove from a base like Camp Ashraf to a second destination to meet leadership. We had also trips to France and other European countries from Iraq or even moved about in the Europe. In all these missions, protection of information had the highest priority. The second are the concentrated ones as we are settled in a place and there is a threat from without. It might be a regular inspecting measure done by the US forces in Ashraf for instance or by the Iraqi police for whatever security objective; all these were considered a threat against our community from outsiders. Or it happened that we were strolling about and police would simply suspect us which could lead to further problems.

It had turned to be a big concern especially after the 9/11 terrorist attack when counter-terrorist police had a free hand to arrest and interrogate whoever they came to suspect. It was really a hinder for members travelling in Europe. All the information stated were of the nature a member of the organization had instructions to deface before engaging in self-destroying. I intend to explain more for it is a matter of obscurity for people out of the organization.

I give an example of the year 2001 when the members of the Leadership Council were called to have a meeting with leadership in Parsian (where Rajavi held the meetings). Although it may seem a simple drive from Ashraf to the place, it required really complicated security measures. The main focus was on how to destroy the documents we carried if any challenge hit us en route. There was a general process to follow for destruction of documents before departure.

There was a head-responsible in charge of the security-check of information who at the time was Mohsen Niknami. He had other assistants who were in charge of smaller groups of cadres. Mohsen was the one who questioned me to ensure about my plans of destroying personal information now that I was included in the group about to set off for Parsian. According to already received instructions, I had to use a can of ethanol that I carried in forewarned circumstances like hearing gun-shots, tracking downs, sensing a siege and any fake accident or any other form that could be regarded a challenge to destroy my own documents and that of other members of the Leadership Council. That how these members were transported to the meeting place is another story.

The members had to be divided into small groups and drove on different buses at non-fixed intervals that sometimes took two hours. When the first bus left, the next waited to make sure its safe arrival which was the given green light for its own leave. It was the case with other waiting buses and all had to follow the rules. There were also strict rules for the group on each bus.

There was one in charge of destroying the bus in the event of any portentous sign of danger. Besides, one in any group of three was charged with the task of destroying his/her comrades’ documents that he/she was well aware of their hidden places. In spite of all these measures, we were individually responsible to destroy our documents and information as well as that of the one next to us if anything happened to our rankings in charge. The means to destroy them, as I pointed out, was the can of ethanol we all carried. The emphasis was on the destruction of the information before self-destruction. Now a question may form in your mind that of what significance were these documents and information that required such high precautionary measures to safeguard or destroy them before anyone could have access to them?

First of all, I have to point out that these documents contained none of the contents of the highly valued book of the Leadership Council. Nobody had the permission to have a record of its details in his/her notebook and all members had to read and memorize the contents while at the meeting. They distributed it in the course of the sessions and then it would be collected and thus, all information was in our mind and nothing on the paper to fear others lay hands on it. Neither did we carry any classified information. There Then, you may ask what all these security measures were for? All was done because of the private notebooks the members had with them in which they had noted down their daily affaires, the noted dates merely to do a task, a recorded detail of a task done, some verses of the Holy Quran and other ordinary and personal notes.

It also happened that we had written some notes while in a session, although it was absolutely forbidden, and they, with a member called Gity in the charge, would carefully explore our notebooks and personal belongings when we were about to leave the hall. But sometimes it happened that we managed to stealthy take the notes out; however, none of these notes could be considered classified information in its real concept. What they called secrete and classified information was absolutely different with its own special means of convey that we hardly knew anything about. Whatever means of transfer they used, for sure it was not by bus or other regular vehicles as they used for our transfer.

SFF: In fact, all these security measures that at end may lead to the destruction of a cadre and his/her information are due to these personal notebooks?

BS: Yes, they are. The contents of these notebooks, as I said, were nothing more than a few notes, dates, necessary phone numbers, or the date of a given pledge. I remember once in the Leadership Council I signed a paper that started with a verse from the Holy Quran which I noted down to memorize. Or details of a meeting that were of importance. The documents to be destroyed were all theses trivial notebooks containing worthless information. It was the same case even in the European countries when we were moving about and we had some written information with us. The information could be some phone number we had to contact if necessary. In our meetings there and when we were being transferred to a certain destination, it was forbidden to carry any paper or notebook that would indicate our membership in the organization or any relation with the people in our company.

The only thing we had permission to carry was some money and a phone number for an urgent call which all other companions knew where it was to destroy it if necessary. A phone number in a member’s pocket meant giving the police the opportunity to hook the first clue that well identified the connecting bridges. To thwart any attempt by police to obtain the very single phone number, we were instructed to tear it into small pieces or swallow it. It is how we destroyed information when out of Iraq. I mean to say that we were much cautious out of Iraq since at least in Iraq we had support of Saddam’s Estekhbarat (Intelligent and Information System) while we had restrictions in European countries especially after al-Qaeda’s terrorist attacks that had made police to become more sensitized to terrorist threats and consequently they intensified security measures. As a result, we had to follow strict precautionary measures to protect information and relations. However, the last solution was suicide according to organizational instructions.

SFF: Undoubtedly, there should have been real reasons under these practical circumspect.

BS: Yes, to some extents they had reasons to be cautious. Once, for instance, a member called Parviz Yaqubi escaped and surrendered himself to French police and informed on inter-organizational relations. He had asked to be granted asylum reasoning that his life was in danger. Of course, he returned to the organization and later separated again and now lives in total isolation. But his act of going and reporting to police had really frustrated Masoud Rajavi. It was in 1993 or 1994 I think and it cost the organization and Rajavi a lot. Consequently, it was decided that nobody in his/her travels out of Iraq had to carry passports and fake IDs cards and on the members’ arrival in the airport all their documents were collected and kept by the organization. Well, we thought it was well decided and, from then on, any member regardless of his/her rank had to hand over his/her passport on arrival to Europe.

To be continued
Translated by Mojahedin.ws

July 8, 2009 0 comments

Former members of the MEK

Suicide operation, an ultimate solution to security dilemma

Sahar Family Foundation: Can you elaborate on classified information in the organization, as it may have different definition in terms of use?

Batool Soltani: It is the kind and degree of information that every member of the organization Suicide operation, an ultimate solution to security dilemma carries concerning himself, his responsibility and his relation with other cells. More specifically, there were other ranks who, because of their organizational responsibilities, knew the residence of the leadership and his/her visiting locations. Of course, this classified information vary in terms of sensitiveness and secrecy according to the responsibility of the members and their contact with higher rankings but the importance lies on the concentration of the information in the hands of the members who form the linking ring between others.

The operation teams who came to Iran for armed operation, for instance, carried some related information, or it was the same with members residing in other European countries out of the headquarters in Auver-sur-Oise. They knew details about the location of the camps, the members and their responsibilities and even information about the launched operations or those at hand. As a result, the organization emphatically required the teams about to embark on operations to swallow their cyanide capsules as soon as they felt a risk of arrest.

The emphasis got stronger especially after the 9/11 terrorist incident when the traffic in European countries were under heavy surveillance and there was a high possibility of arrest that could lead to extraction of information under investigations. We had strict order, especially the members of the Leadership Council who carried a high volume of information, to commit suicide if anyone came to be a suspect in confrontation with Interpol.

The rankings travelling between Iraq and the Europe or between Auver-sur-Oise and other countries had strict instruction for self-annihilation. It can be said that the most secure and safest measure of protecting information devised by the organization was suicide. The important point to consider here is the cheap value of man within the organization.

SFF: Will further explain the responsibilities of the members of the Leadership Council concerning the classified information?

BS: The information that the members of the Leadership Council carried were classified as secrete. It was because of their relation with the leadership which was systematically regarded very important. It meant that they had to take the ultimate precautionary measures to protect themselves not because of their own life but as they carried foremost organizational information which made them suicide vanguards. They had always a guard accompanying them who had the responsibility of finishing the job if he/she refrained to commit suicide or possibly thought of a mischief or escape. A member of Leadership Council had to have a ready scheme of suicide being it with cyanide, gun or any other way.

But the priority was always laid on the destroying of the carried documents before doing away with yourself. The means depended on the circumstance and how you could prepare them as easy as possible. There was a time when the organization possessed no gun and cyanide was the best choice, but the time came when it was vice-versa. I was one of those who always carried a gun when in Camp Ashraf or whenever I had a trip to Baghdad. We had strict orders to shot ourselves when sensing the minimal danger of being attacked or arrested. Once I was in England and although I was not yet a member of the Leadership Council, I had instruction of committing suicide since I had second hand but sensitive information like the location of headquarters where the Rajavis lived or moved and the security measures concerning them. It was the same with the information about the headquarters in Auver-sur-Oise and in possibly in other countries.

Of course, some information were declassified within the organization as they happened to lose their secrecy and importance, but they remained classified for the outsiders. In some occasions when the carried information were of a very high secrecy, the members carried a mixed means of suicide, that is to say, both gun and cyanide because in some cases the cyanide had failed to act. Later it was decided to carry two cyanide capsules to ensure that one at least would work.

That is how they emphasized on measures of protecting information and were sensitive about them. All this complicated, systematic deeds happened in an atmosphere as if they were living in a different planet. That is why far from any rationale and logic, to guarantee the protection of the information, the organization grabs at a most secure way, suicide and self-annihilation.

SFF: You said in some cases the cyanide had failed to act. Can you explain about them?

BS: As far as I can remember it record in the related report, it was the time when Arash Sametipour had been sent to Iran for operation. He broke his cyanide when he was on the verge of arrest but the capsule failed to work and he went into a coma only to revive after a while. It had critical aftermath for the organization. Unaware of the arrest of Marjan Malek, for example, the organization first announced her martyrdom in the course of her operation and even Rajavi himself appreciated her as a heroine but later, when it was revealed that she had failed suicide and was in custody inside Iran, anything changed overnight and she was declared to be an agent of the Islamic Republic. The failure of suicides was thus very crucial and cost the organization a lot; it was commitment to these suicides that decided the organizational identity and the status of the individuals in the organization.

Noteworthy, following the reported cases of failure, there established a section whose responsibility was to check over the vehicles of suicide to ensure its efficacy. There were two kinds of check up, routinely done or case related. The former was done in a frequent period of a few months while the latter was a test of an operative’s cyanides before his dispatch to the mission. Once in Camp Ashraf, before the presence of Americans and when they had no limitation, they exclusively provided two cyanides for each member of the Leadership Council. But then everything changed and there came a time when cyanides and guns were not as abundant as before; the cyanides were all collected from among those who once had to carry them.

Instead, they innovated a new way of controlling members with sensitive and secrete information and members of the Leadership Council in particular. Now there was a special division with the responsibility of constant monitoring and surveillance of the members with highly classified information; they had the responsibility of helping them through any available means to eliminate themselves in case of facing any risk of arrest or else; the means could be a gun, cyanide, petrol, ethanol or anything else.
Translated by Mojahedin.ws

July 5, 2009 0 comments

Former members of the MEK

Mr. Fallah joined his family

Coming Back to Life
Mr. Afshin Qare Tappe from Golestan Province joined his family.

After years of sufferings and being captive behind the bars of Rajavis’ Cult, Mr. Fallah could manage to release himself from that infernal organization and returned to his homeland and family.

Mr. Afshin Fallah went to Turkey to find a job in 1999.
In Turkey the MKO elements tricked Mr. Fallah into recruiting him. Then he was sent to Camp Ashraf, Iraq by a person called Ali Ankara.

Nejat Society – Golestan Branch

July 2, 2009 0 comments

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