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Mujahedin Khalq Organization's Propaganda System

MKO’s Desperation

Terrorist group of MKO, when in the form of NCRI, claims to be the most inclusive collection of opposition groups and sometimes calls itself "Iranian resistance".

In a realistic view, this is an invalid claim than can get no attention and independent newswires, governments, political institutions and parliamentarians approach such claims with scoff.

On the other hand, MKO with a few non-MKO members of the council (called NCRI), faces a major problem: having no supporter in Iran.

When an organization expresses such claims, it should present examples of its influence on political and social scenes in Iran in order to get validity for its claims. However, we have seen in the past 18 years that it (MKO) has been able to perform a number of terrorist operations and in other cases, it has followed other political movements; movements that don’t accept MKO’s line. MKO has also tried stupidly to use Iran’s social events in order to feed it’s propaganda machine.

To cover political invalidity, lacking popular support and having no influence in political issues, MKO leaders claim that Iranian regime suppresses popular protests otherwise all Iranians will support the MKO!

This claim is also ridiculous, but the MKO even resorts to occasional reports in the Iranian press and present them in sarcastic way in order to prove it.

One such example can be seen in MKO’s recent statement:

"According to the state media, Morteza Talayee, the head of suppressing forces in Tehran said 6000 have been arrested in Tehran under the name of fighting drugs. He called the youths and opposition ‘hoodlums’ and reported of special operations to purify different regions in the following weeks".

To get the support of addicts by supporting smugglers, MKO’s propaganda system adds:

"These suppressing operations, that have wider range in Tehran, Azerbaijan, Sistan and Baluchistan, Khuzestan and Kerman, indicate that large mass protests and demonstrations have weakened mullahs’ medieval regime."

During 80s, when MKO members and supporters were arrested for terrorist operations and immediately expressed regret, addicts and smugglers protested that "why don’t they resist? We have fought for years and we have been jailed several times, but we don’t quit!"

Now, after 25 years, MKO leadership has got the message of those vets, promising of more "wider popular demonstrations".

However, in this case, it also seems that Mojahedin have been late because some of their competitors in the opposition movement have already taken advantage of the addicts!

Irandidban – 2006/08/05

August 13, 2006 0 comment

Daniel M.Zucker

Mr. Zucker, more Mojahed than Mojahedin

Daniel M. Zucker, a Chairman of Americans for Democracy in the Middle-East, in his recent article, Setting the Record Straight About the Mojahedin-e Khalq of Iran, which is more a comeback to Jay Solomon’s article published in the Wall Street Journal ("Iranian Exile Group Aims to Build Bridges; Some in Congress See a Role For an Organization Listed as a Terrorist Group", May 22, 2006), regards Solomon’s article valuable “as most Americans have no idea who and what the Mojahedin-e Khalq is, and for what it stands”. To the point, there is nothing wrong with the idea. The chief problem emerges at the point where Mr. Zucker, a partisan of Mojahedin, takes the responsibility to bring up “important errors and oversights in his essay that need correction and clarification”.

Enumerating these errors one by one to correct them, Mr. Zucker begins: “One of the errors about the MEK is the allegation that they were involved in assassinating U.S. Army personal and military contractors in the early and mid-1970’s. The accusation derives from the fact that little was known about the MEK by American intelligence at the time, and not much has been learned until recently”. He seems to have read Mojahedin’s Democracy Betrayed, a response to U.S. State Department on the Mojahedin and the Iranian Resistance, because his attempt to acquit Mojahedin of being involved in assassination of the American citizens follows the baseless justification of Mojahedin themselves. It is up to U.S. State Department to defend itself against Mr. Zucker’s allegations but, for sure, it has never refuted what it had acknowledged earlier about Mojahedin’s engagement in the murder of Americans. Here is the excerpt dealing with the issue:

MKO Assassinations

In the period leading up to the revolution and its immediate aftermath, the Mojahedin carried out their strategy of armed struggle. The results included the murder of Americans, support for the seizure of the U.S. embassy, and opposition to the release of U.S. hostages. The Mojahedin are known to have assassinated the following Americans in Iran during the 1970s:

Lt. Colonel Lewis L. Hawkins Killed: June 2, 1973

Air Force Colonel Paul Schaeffer Killed: May 21, 1975

Air Force Lt. Colonel Jack Turner Killed: May 21, 1975

Donald G. Smith, Rockwell International Killed: August 28, 1976

Robert R. Krongrad, Rockwell International Killed: August 28, 1976

William C. Cottrell, Rockwell International Killed: August 28, 1976

Reza Reza’i, a member of the Mojahedin’s Ideological Team, was arrested and executed by the Shah’s government for the murder of Colonel Hawkins. The attacks on the Rockwell employees occurred on the anniversary of the arrest of a Mojahedin member, Rahman vahid Afrakhteh, for the murder of Colonels Schaeffer and Turner. In addition. Air Force Brigadier General Harold price was wounded in a 1972 attack Planned by Mojahedin Central committee member, Kazem Zul Al-Anvar. Widely credited in Tehran for these attacks at the time, the Mojahedin themselves claimed responsibility for these murders in their publications.

While Mojahedin have recurrently insisted that they were among the firsts to support the occupation of the US embassy, their own published statements and evidences are more than enough, Mr. Zucker refers to the incident as the next error: “Another false accusation against the MEK is the allegation that the MEK supported the student takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Teheran in February 1979, and subsequent 444 day hostage crisis”.

At the time, Mojhedin even criticized the Iranian authorities for any probable future relations with the US. In “Mojahed” 18 issued on Jan.8, 1980 Mojahedin stated:

Recent recession in our anti-Imperialist struggle after the Shah’s downfall is one of (Mojahedin) Organization’s criticisms of government and officials. Of course, the reactionaries call this criticism, "uncalled for criticism" or "opposing revolutionary government". Fortunately by revolutionary move of the Students following Imam’s Line, and specially decisive position of Imam(Khomeini) to resist and face U.S. imperialism our revolution is about to get on the track.

From the very moment the U.S spy den was occupied, the organization welcomed the move and used all its facilities to mobilize masses. Especially the historical decree of Imam on general, politico-military mobilization, the Mojahedin sent their military units to support the Students following Imam’s Line, and to guard and monitor the Embassy round the clock.

Mr. Zucker fails to remember, or he may have never heard, that Mojahedin were the most enthusiastic in making anti-imperialism slogans and encouraged others to chant them as well as bearing tracts and banners. In “Mojahed” 10 issued on Nov.12, 1979 they admitted their role in making and chanting a variety of slogans:

The slogans before the American Embassy remind us of the days of the revolution.

Integral, joyful mottos of the people remind us of the days, we together with our martyrs shouted against the Shah’s dictatorship. The people and the students joint slogans like "Khomeini Combats, the U.S. retreats" could be heard in and out of the Embassy.

Expulsion of Americans is an act to follow Imam (Khomeini)’s "Death to Imperialism” which is the most beautiful slogan. We also chanted: “Extradition of traitor Shah is our people’s demand”, “Struggling with the U.S. builds our unity”, “Carter must be killed either by gun or by feast”, “Savage Imperialism is the enemy of the mankind”.

If Mr. Zucker is in any doubt about MEK unpopularity among Iranian people, we gladly invite him to have a short visit to Iran to writ down some notes for himself. Can he ever name the other Iranian opposition and diaspora talking in support of Mojahedin? The exaggerated numbers of the supporters he refers to are the same baseless statistics computed and advertised by Mojahedin’s own propaganda machine. We will be also pleased to see Mr. Zucker, on behalf of Mojahedin, exhibit the documents and evidences of “over 120,000 MEK members and sympathizers” claimed to have been tortured and murdered. At the present, MKO claims the Islamic Republic has so far executed 120,000 members of the group. Their claimed number of the executed in 1987, the year they settled in Iraq, did not exceeded 20,000 which was an overstatement at the time.

Mr. Zucker furthers to say “The MEK, under the leadership of theoretician Massoud Rajavi, did not take up arms against the Islamic Republic of Iran until June 21, 1981, the day after a peaceful demonstration of over 500,000 individuals in Teheran was attacked.… Following these incidents, the MEK leadership decided to take up arms against the Khomeini regime, launching attacks that killed several high officials of the regime”.

Every now and then, we hear the news of some dissidents in some countries, especially in developed Western countries, organizing protesting rallies in demand of some right or objection to an adopted policy or else. We are also disappointed to see some of these mobs are scattered by anti-riot forces’ violent crackdown that, in some cases, ends in some killings. Do all the organizers and plotters of these quashed rallies take up arms and announce armed struggle against the government or assassinate the authorities?

Furthermore, have you ever thought of the Mojahedin’s claimed number of over 500,000 sympathizers marching in Tehran’s streets and the destructive potentialities of such a crowd if they really existed? Sensibly, could such a big mob be easily dispersed by a number of not yet organized paramilitary forces as Mojahedin, and you as well, claim?

Mr. Zucker argues that “The MEK is the grandchild of Dr. Mohammed Mossadeq, the popular nationalist prime minister that the CIA toppled in 1953 so as to bring the shah back to power”. That is too amazing that the grandchild of a once popular figure toppled by a US orchestrated coup are urged to be de-listed and protected “to allow them to lead the Iranian people to make the necessary changes to bring about a secular democracy in Iran”. It seems that Mr. Zucker, one among many others, is misguided by Mojahedin’s expropriating Mosaddeq’s name and repute. Mojahedin’s present struggle manner might in no way beguile those who are familiar with Iranians contemporary history.

Last but not least, blacklisting Mojahedin is the result of no tradeoff between the US and Iran as Mr. Zucker believes. The political breach between the two countries is broad clear to the world and the US seems to be much more prudent not to trade the security of its nation for trifle advantages. Besides, the US is not the sole country to have blacklisted Mojahedin. Reading Mr. Zucker’s article one may conclude a question; is his commendation of terrorists a newly developed approach of establishing democracy, preferably in Iran?

A. Afshar – mojahedin.ws – August 9, 2006

August 13, 2006 0 comment

Mujahedin Khalq Organization's Propaganda System

MKO’s New Cause of Anger

The recently published book Mojahedin Khalq Organization; Arising & the End is a celebrated and collective work of some Iranian researchers unveiling many facts on the formation and activities of MKO. The three volumes work is mainly a research based on existing evidences many of which are included. The work is so telling that Mojahedin lost their rag and could keep silent no more.

Mojahedin-run TV station in its weekly “Direct Contact” program attended by two vehement Mojahedin propagandists, Mohammad-Ali Tawhidi and Hamid Assadyan, tried to justify what they referred to as distorted facts in the books. A documentary work to answer many questions formed in the minds of the sympathizers seems to be more hazardous than an activated time-bomb. Following their past method of responding to facts revealed about the organization, the two propagandists referred to the books as an act of Iran’s security system to counteract Mojahedin’s activities, a blacklisted terrorist group trying to posture as the main Iranian resisting group and threat against the ruling system.

mojahedin.ws – 10/08/2006

August 13, 2006 0 comment

Duplicity of the MEK nature

The Betrayers Who Posture as Heroes

Celebrating the century-long anniversary of the Iranian Constitutional Movement of 1905-9, Mojahedin Khalq Organization (MKO) avows to be the heir of the patriotic heroes and the Mojahed commanders of the revolutionary army like Sattar Khan. The term Mojahed was a label to some armed volunteers in the constitutional revolution that Mojahedin Khalq mischievously subsumed in their organizational label. Mojahedin conclude that the constitutional movement sustained a failure more because some pro-British elements betrayed and deserted Sattar Khan.

They call themselves “the main Iranian Resistance” representing a nation that has, since inception of republic system after monarch’s downfall, labeled them hypocrites. the crimes and atrocities which they have perpetrated hits such a big record in history and they are so execrated among their people that no pro-Monarchists nor other Iranian dissident groups, and diaspora would wish to be thrown in with Mojahedin in anyway at all.

One may ask what are they doing all these for? The explanation for their actions is quite obvious: they’re willing to give away Iran in bits and pieces to those who are waiting to devour it granted half a chance as long as they might be provided with an opportunity to come to power. The only thing Mojahedin care not the least for is people.

Mojahedin culminate against pro-British traitors who had deserted Sattar Khan while they have overstepped the limits of betraying a commander; they betrayed the whole nation. They have developed a lexicon of their own with the altered connotations. When Rajavi fled from Tehran to Paris, hidden in women’s clothes aboard a hijacked aircraft, he referred to his escape as "the most courageous act of heroism", and when he signed a "treaty" with Tareq Aziz, then one of Saddam’s top aides, to help Iraq in the war against Iran, the Mujahedin hailed the move as "a great patriotic act".

Mojahedin are perpetrators of high treason besmirching the reputation of the true Iranian patriots and Mojaheds. What Mojahedin did against Iranian people in the past and are doing at the present under whatever pretext is totally unforgivable. If Mojahedin are opposed to the current ruling system and government of Iran some other different people and groups might share the same opinion. But none of the other groups and individuals betrayed and deserted the nation. That was hardly a justification for Mojahedin to go and side with an enemy at war with the nation besides masterminding terrorist operations.

Now enjoying the full hospitality of the Western patrons, Mojahedin, under the full command of the hosts feeding them, have accomplished violation of allegiance toward their country’s sovereign and betrayal of the nation by consciously and purposely acting to aid the enemies through inciting and waging war against Iran. The very same countries supporting and hosting Mojahedin have passed sever laws for charges of treason. Even in the US, providing "material aid and comfort to the enemy during wartime" is treason and also punishable by death. The question is why, then, these countries support and nurse the terrorists and betrayers who deserve to be punished for their treasonous deeds?

A big number of disappointed Mojahedin members are living in Camp Ashraf under hard condition at the present. They have been unnerved by never-ending intimidations of being tried for treason if they returned to Iran. The common sense approves the process but the Iranian authorities have issued a general amnesty for those Mojahedin members whose hands are clean of peoples’ blood. Naturally, the offer doses not apply to MKO ringleaders who have directly been involved in terrorist operations and crimes against the Iranian people. If Mojahedin ever care to be relieved of the ignominy of betraying the nation, they have to return to take side with people against whoever might pose a threat.

mojahedin.ws – By Sattar Orangi – August 7, 2006

August 9, 2006 0 comment

Mujahedin Khalq 's Terrorism

Iranian exile group aims to build bridges

As tensions between the U.S. and Iran continue to mount, an Iranian exile group viewed here as a terrorist organization is lobbying to play a greater role in the struggle against Tehran. And it is winning some support in Congress.

The Mujahedeen-e Khalq, or People’s Mujahedeen of Iran, was formally listed as a terrorist group by the State Department because of its attacks on American military personnel and Iranian officials. It fiercely opposed the Shah and his supporters during the 1970s and allied with former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein in his 1980-88 war against Iran.

But today, the MEK and its supporters say the organization should be supported by the Bush administration as part of a broader effort to promote regime change in Tehran. They say the group has developed among the most-sophisticated intelligence operations covering Iran’s leadership and nuclear operations, and it has networks inside Iran that can spread propaganda on democracy and on the need to remove the mullahs. The MEK also has 4,000 fighters that can target Iran from Iraq, though they have been demobilized by U.S. military commanders and held in a kind of house arrest.

As the White House deploys $85 million this year to promote pro-democracy groups in Iran, the MEK says it can support this campaign without receiving a penny. "We seek neither money nor weapons from the U.S. We just want our legitimate right to resist tyranny in our country," says Mohammad Mohaddessin, a Paris-based member of the MEK who serves as foreign-affairs chairman of its affiliated organization, the National Council of Resistance of Iran. "Let the Iranian people deal with the mullahs."

Mr. Mohaddessin and other MEK leaders say they want the U.S. to remove their organization from the terrorism list so that they can more easily raise money and support globally. They also want their fighters released in Iraq.

For more than a decade, the MEK has been employed as a political football in the diplomatic games played between Washington and Tehran, say current and former U.S. officials. The Clinton administration placed the MEK on the State Department’s terrorism list in 1997, as Washington sought to appeal to moderate leaders inside the theocratic government in Tehran. A blacklisting of the MEK was among the actions the Iranians sought in exchange for better relations, these officials say.

The State Department’s 2006 terrorism report says the MEK has been launching attacks on Western and Iranian targets since the 1970s. In the last years of the Shah’s rule, elements of the MEK assassinated U.S. security advisers and military contractors, and assisted in the takeover of the American Embassy in Tehran. It subsequently turned on Iran’s new theocratic government due to ideological differences and launched bombing campaigns against senior Iranian officials.

Under pressure inside Iran, MEK fighters shifted their base to Iraq, conducting operations from there against Iran’s Islamic government throughout the 1980s and ’90s. Most of their activities were concentrated on Iranian military installations and commanders. But the U.S. also accuses the MEK of conducting terrorist strikes outside of the Middle East, including simultaneous attacks in 1992 on Iranian embassies and installations in 13 countries.

Some U.S. diplomats say that to delist the MEK now would make Washington appear inconsistent on terrorism and could further incite Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. They also believe Iran’s leadership could use U.S. support of the MEK to further strengthen Mr. Ahmadinejad’s position, due to what is perceived as widespread antipathy toward the MEK inside Iran. "It could be incredibly provocative in Iran’s eyes," a U.S. official said.

In 2003, the Bush administration also placed the National Council of Resistance of Iran on the terrorist list, as U.S. military planners sought assistance from Iran in stabilizing post-Saddam Iraq. Among the issues the Iranians and Americans discussed that year, said officials involved in the talks, was a plan to swap MEK members it was detaining in Iraq for al Qaeda leaders hiding inside Iran. But the talks ultimately bogged down, as American commanders grew increasingly convinced Tehran was working to destabilize Iraq.

"Iran wanted the MEK first" before they would hand over al Qaeda leaders, says Michael Rubin, an Iran specialist who served in the Pentagon’s Office of Special Plans in the first Bush term. "We made it clear to Iran, that if al Qaeda planned an attack, they’d be held responsible."

The MEK, however, has used the Iraq invasion to try to build bridges to the Bush administration. U.S. officials say the MEK has largely cooperated with U.S. military commanders in agreeing to disarm their troops based in Camp Ashraf, which sits about 100 kilometers north of Baghdad. The fighters are being held as protected combatants under a United Nations charter, though some groups in Iraq have sought to try the MEK for atrocities it allegedly committed in league with Mr. Hussein.

Leaders of the MEK and National Council of Resistance, meanwhile, have aggressively moved to highlight the threats posed by Iran’s nuclear programs. In a string of news conferences tracing back more than a decade, first the MEK and then the resistance council have accused Tehran of flouting its international treaty obligations by clandestinely seeking to produce nuclear-weapons fuel.

In an August 2002 news conference, council leaders in Washington specifically charged Iran with running a stable of centrifuges to enrich uranium in the central Iranian city of Natanz. International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors would confirm the accusations a few months later. U.S. officials, including President Bush, have cited the role played by Iranian exile groups in exposing Iran’s nuclear programs.

Still, the MEK remains a deeply divisive issue inside Washington. In 2002, 150 members of Congress signed a letter seeking the MEK’s removal from the terrorism list. Lawmakers also have quizzed the State Department on the MEK’s status in recent weeks, after it was again named to the U.S. list of global terrorist groups.

"It’s the only group on the terrorist list that’s been more helpful to the U.S. and more harmful to our enemies," said Rep. Brad Sherman (D., Calif.), who is among those representatives questioning the MEK’s designation. "It played a very important role in telling us what happened in Natanz. We should be clear on what we expect of them to get off the list."

Despite this support in Congress, however, many current and former U.S. officials say the Bush administration should stay clear of any dealings with the MEK. They describe the group as operating like a cult under the control of its founder, Massoud Rajavi, and his France-based wife, Maryam. They say the two have very little support in Iran and face deep hostility from the populations of Iran and Iraq, due to the MEK’s alleged complicity in Mr. Hussein’s atrocities.

"An enemy of my enemy is not my friend" in this case, said Mr. Rubin, the former Pentagon official. "From a policy standpoint, the problem with the war on terrorism is the propensity for moral relativism. But we shouldn’t accept certain terrorists and not others."

The Wall Street Journal – Jay Solomon – 22 May 2006

August 9, 2006 0 comment

Iraq

Iraqi Lawyer Advocates Rights of Terrorists

In an interview published in Washington Post on 10 June 2006, Kamal Hamdoun, the head of Iraq’s lawyers’ union, deplored the dominant anarchy in Iraq saying: "We are living in terror. For example, I’m unable to move around freely. And there’s a gun in my drawer". He had further explained that "The control of the jungle is for those who have claws and fangs".

Now, nearly 50 days after his complaint against the Iraq’s chaotic situation, Mr. Hamdoun leaps forward enthusiastically to advocate Mojahedin Khalq’s presence in Iraq saying “No one can strip them of this right without a legitimate legal argument”.

Reported by NCRI website, Mr. Kamal Hamdoon, in an interview with Mojahedin’s television station, announced:

The rights of PMOI members have been recognized based on international conventions and the UN Charter, and we at the Iraqi lawyers’ League are with them to the end… The Mojahedin were granted political asylum status in the past. No one can strip them of this right without a legitimate legal argument. Recent remarks by some Iraqi officials against the Mojahedin have no legal or religious basis.

Mr. Hamdoun has to be reminded that the “recent remarks by some Iraqi officials against the Mojahedin” do have legal basis because they are the words of the Iraqi legal Prime Minister and the cabinet. For sure, not all honorable, Iraqi lawyers share your opinion because they are well aware that the only way to end conflict and disorder in a war-torn country is to disband the terrorist groups. Mr. Hamdoun is recommended to refer to the list of the proscribed groups and entities for more information if he is in doubt.

If Mr. Hamdoun still insists on his previously stated comment that "The control of the jungle is for those who have claws and fangs", let’s imagine he is living in a depicted jungle of himself, and advocates the law of the jungle over the canon and sanctioned laws for the practice of justice, then, we should congratulate Mr. Hamdoun for having found the best ones with “claws and fangs" to have along. Mojahedin’s atrocities against Iraqi people in Saddam’s time prove them to be the most prefect choice to cause chaos and to fan the flames of turbulence. Be tolerant of the Iraqi authorities’ wisely made decision.

mojahedin.ws – A. Afshar – August 6, 2006

August 9, 2006 0 comment

Mujahedin Khalq; A proxy force

MKO’s Crisis Escalates with UN’s Move

After months of political struggle on Iran’s nuclear issue, the US took advantage of the Israeli war on Lebanon to pass a resolution against Iran in the UN Security Council; The Council that, under the pressure of the US, has so far failed to even condemn the crimes of the Israelis.

The US’s history, of course, is full of such unrighteous approaches. It is always looking for the approval of Capitulation in different countries, refuses to all Iraqi government to try US soldiers, and ….it also uses all diplomatic means to support Israel’s crimes.

Apart from the weaknesses and legal defections in the resolution, one can say that the approval of this resolution was aimed at diverting attentions from Israel crimes; even US ambassador to UN, John Bolton said in the UN that Iran’s nuclear issue was more important than the crisis in Lebanon!

However, the interesting point is that Maryam Rajavi, representing Massoud Rajavi’s treacherous gang, rushed to welcome this anti-Iran resolution to prove her faithfulness to Americans (whom she hopes will support her after Saddam Hussein).

The main purpose of Maryam Rajavi, of course, is to boost the morale of restricted MKO members who have been waiting for this resolution for years.

While those who passed this resolution admit that sanctions will have no political impact on Iran, MKO leaders try to introduce it as an important issue that will save the group. But the gang of Rajavi will face more severe problems from now on, since the hopes they gave their members were tied to the referral of Iran’s case to UN Security Council and a resolution against Iran.

However, now that a resolution has been passed against Iran, MKO leaders have to use more energy to keep the members and make them hopeful about the next stage. In fact, the members who have been locked in Iraq for more than 18 years have lost most of their capabilities so that the major problems for the group are: efforts of the forces to leave the group and efforts of the group to keep and control them.

Predicting future’s events depends on several factors, but it’s hard to say that diplomatic solutions will be excluded from Iran’s agenda.

On the other hand, even if we expect a process for Iran like those of North Korea or Iraq, Rajavi’s gang should still think about keeping its low morale members in Ashraf for the next 10 years, the time that will never be given to this group by the Iraqi government.

Irandidban – 2006/08/03

August 5, 2006 0 comment

Massoud Rajavi

Rajavi, the man who wanted to be a king

The operation Eternal Light (Forugh Javidan), is deemed by its leader a turning point in MKO’s history. The operation, no doubt, remains a black spot in history because of the significant strategic and military factors being considerably disregarded. In spite of the fact that Rajavi has recurrently admitted to have been aware of being no equal to Iran’s military strength, yet he would insist to recognize the operation as an integral part of MKO’s existence. To vindicate the necessity of launching the operation regardless of the outcomes, Rajavi has said:

Namely, at the crucial, serious situation that changes were speeding, the National Liberation Army had to be either checkmated or to sit waiting with the made excuses of not being prepared or the time was not ripe for the action… . [1]

Can it be the mere prove that the operation, with no rational raison d’être, was just a reaction to unpredictable conditions? Of course, the operation’s aftermath and the panorama Rajavi depicted for the forces on the eve of the operation well justify the claim. Talking on the outcomes of the operation before its initiation, Rajavi, commanding rather than asking, stated:

Now to be recorded in the history as you are making a great, prime decision unprovoked by emotions, although no revolution can de dissociated of its emotions, but absolutely based on military-political calculations, I tell you, raise your hands if you agree to go, if you think leaving for the operation, with whatever result, is quantitatively better that sitting idle. Whoever is convinced it behooves us to leave for operation and it makes it much worse if we don’t, raise the hand. I want to see this moment recorded in the history. [2]

Being well aware of the consequent failure of the coming operation, Rajavi cleverly sought to pick up surrogates to accept the responsibility of the inevitable defeat by stirring up the members that operation was the sole way to overthrow the Iranian ruling power. His rhetorical speeches provoked the members to both launch the operation and accept the responsibility for the consequent defeat. In fact, no body was to question Rajavi for the defeat but he was the one to reprimand all.

Really, how did Mojahedin justify the causes for the Operation Eternal Light? Was Rajavi so credulous to talk of “conquering Tehran and overthrowing the Islamic rule”? Did he think that Mojahedin in 1988 were in a better fitted situation than their previous 20 June uprising or the forces had a potentiality above the after-revolution days when they had infiltrated deep into the regime’s political and security institutions? What changes had occurred in Mojahedin’s structure to believe the organization had gained a military potentiality far above the previous guerrilla warfare tactics to form a liberation army able to topple the regime? What ever they were, one thing was evident for Rajavi and other rank cadres; the operation could not possibly succeed. To justify the force inequality, Rajvi gave promises that on the road to Tehran Mojahedin would be warmly received and welcomed by the townsmen and villagers who then would join them.

Before the acceptance of the Resolution 598 by Iran, Mojahedin had been convinced that an imposed peace on Iran would inevitably edge the regime to the brink of collapse. They were, however, overtaken by the acceptance the Resolution 598 that frustrated the prepared third solution of liberating Iran with reliance on the liberation army as they no more could receive the overall protection of the Iraqi army. Talking on the importance of this latter factor, Bijan Nyabati has stated:

The new liberation war was Mojahedin’s proper response to the huge deployment of forces with the aim of invoking a shelling priority powered by Iraqi army potentialities; it had nothing to do with Mojahedin’s previous strategy of the classic guerilla warfare. [3]

In spite of his chanting superficial counter-war slogans, Rajavi preferred the state of war as a good coverage to test war potentialities of the liberation army. In fact, the end of war meant a complete blockade of Rajavi’s tactic:

Overtaken by such unexpected decision (the acceptance of the Resolution 598), Rajavi decided to counteract. Noteworthy, in the strategic order of the liberation army, actually there existed no place for peace and cease-fire. [4]

Mojahedin took advantage of the unstable truce to test their military potentialities once more to topple the regime. Rajavi hoped unexpected outcomes when he let the forces be perished to guarantee his own power hegemony. He was under the illusion that the operation, although a complete failure, from a politically point of view had struck the most crushing blow over the body of the regime. His explanatory comments before and after the operation are in total contradiction.

The ideological revolution was the product of a solution to conduct the organization out of its political stalemate. He impudently declared the individual weakness in forces was the cause of failure and that the leader’s potentiality was far above the understanding and tolerance of the forces. In a later justification in general gathering on the anniversary of the operation in 2001, he talked of the operation’s achievements and that it was a proof of Mojahedin’s being independent of Iraqi’s military, financial, and political aids. Quoting words of a few Iranian authorities, Rajavi concluded that Mojahedin proved to be the sole recognized threatening force against the Islamic Republic.

All these words said, what really peopled Rajavi to commit such an organizational suicide was to shoot his last arrow. Seeing his long-existing dream of succeeding to power coming to nothing, he got ready to sacrifice all his devotees to take his chances. His command calling for the urgency of the operation was a shock to all and Mojahedin were watching restlessly that his decision was parching the remaining chances. He horridly prepared to face with the greatest challenge since the failed 20 June event with the consequent of his expulsion from Iran. His previously stated purpose of “conquering Tehran and overthrowing the Islamic rule” infers he had a hallucination of walking on a red carpet spread from the Iranian border to Tehran. The illusion of grandeur as a result of his authoritarian rule over Mojahedin had left him under the impression that the Iranian people, in no way an equal to Mojahedin combatants, would submit on his pass to Tehran. Alas, the idolized king never reached Tehran.

Notes

[1]. “The tenth anniversary of the Eternal Light”; the first book, Mojahedin’s Publications, 12.

[2]. ibid, refer to back-cover text.

[3]. Nyabaty, Bijan: A look within MKO’s ideological revolution, 70.

[4]. ibid.

mojahedin.ws – Bahar Irani – July 30, 2006

August 5, 2006 0 comment

Mujahedin Khalq 's Terrorism

The Operation Eternal Light, a Product of Hegemony

Now, eighteen years after Mojahedin Khalq’s military Eternal Light operation, the feat is referred to as a turning point by Mojahedin while its dissidents regard it as a challenge. The dissidents, non-mojahedin diaspora as well as defectors, unanimously believe the operation was nothing more than a suicide en masse on proven evidences. Unlike them, Mojahedin, by reason of their self-analyzed achievements, in any occasion bring it up as the first initiated solution to overthrow the Islamic Republic.

The major discrepancies between the two reasoning are too wide to help arrive at a sound judgment. One has to penetrate into the inner layers of the organization to unravel paradoxes. Before going any further, it should be noted that Mojahedin’s organizational structure and its echelon are under the impact of the party philosophy of Marxism, exclusively Leninism. A look at its early works and pamphlets explaining on the necessity of establishing a revolutionary organization founded on democratic centralism as well as its methodology and epistemological foundations well identifies it to be a paradigm of Stalinism that spread the shadow of terror over half of the world during the Stalin’s domination over the Communism Party. These early works are the cornerstone of Mojahedin’s first theoretic achievements to justify pertaining principles of the party dictatorship on individuals and, consequently, on all political relations.

The philosophy of party in Marxism explains for the domination of a class as a vanguard that leads perforce to ascertain a proletariat dictatorship that, being intrinsically anti-democratic, leads to an authoritative autocracy over the party. Stalinism was the product of such a party structure that heavily influenced Mojahedin. The influence, according to many Mojahedin’s critics, led to Hanifnejad’s invisible dictatorship. As the charismatic leader of Mojahedin, he was known to be the main cause of inflicting the crushing blow on the organization in August 1971 (when SAVAK arrested the majority of Mojahedin’s members). He was succeeded by another leader who in a four-year process fundamentally changed the ideology of the organization under his hegemony. Taqi Shahram changed Mojahedin’s Marxist-Islamic eclecticism and discarded Islam completely in favor of Marxism.

Massoud Rajavi continued the same organizational structure of his two descendants tightening his hegemonic leadership atop the pyramid power of the organization. His hegemony had to be strengthened through justifiable ideological principles and it happened in 1974 following the internal ideological revolution, first secretly revealed to upper layers of the leading cadre and then to lower layers through the organizational general assemblies. The cornerstone of the ideological revolution was to discard collective leadership in favor autocracy. He was turned to an absolute leader to whom all had to submit with unquestioning obedience. In a definition to this essence of the ideological revolution we read:

For the first time in the history of the contemporary revolutions, a revolutionary organization dismissed its principal matrix of “democratic centralism”, an achievement of hundreds- years of organized revolutionary struggle experiences, to submit to a leader who is responsible only before God. [1]

The ideological revolution, in fact, legitimized Rajavi’s perpetual hegemony that was deep rooted in the organization’ structure and which was invisibly practiced by its first charismatic leader Hanifnejad. Tinctured with sacredness, the pillars of hegemony would be stabilized and ended any further wrangling.

The main core of Mojahedin’s ideological revolution was to solve the issue of leadership. It could put an end to a problem known to be the Achilles’ heel in most contemporary revolutions and movements; only a stabilized theory of imamate inside the organization could lead the new revolution. [2]

The ideological metamorphosis opened a new gate onto a path where, in the first place, the rationality and even the social-political understanding of individuals were targeted. In other words, individuals would be transmuted into obedient and subjugated creatures serving the wills of the leader. The whole idea can be concluded as:

That is clear that such process could pursue in no rational route. The dominant element in the process is “love” and “emotion” that bypass “logic and reason”. The means are not those of polemics and persuasions but self-devotion. That is the point where Massoud claims Mojahedin’s heart. [3]

It is a preliminary course to transform from a Marxist political party into a highly clandestine, sect-like establishment. All the adopted political and ideological principles as well as the insiders’ long recorded struggle backgrounds lose their legitimacy and the main criterion to assess the members’ potentialities is the extent of their devotion to the leader. To be regarded as the followers under the guidance of the guru, the members had to surrender physically and psychologically:

In processing a good, modern understanding of the same ideology, Mojahedin are required not only to offer their life but also their soul. To bestow the physical body does not suffice; the individual’s highest emotions and dearest attachments are targeted. Not the physical body but the emotions have to be sacrificed. It is the least accepted thing in the organization. [4]

The move to Iraq was a political test to assess the members’ degree of devotion and the Operation Eternal Light was the culmination. An operation doomed from the start needed devoted volunteers to be sacrificed on the leader’s demand in blind obedience. Rajavi, before the operation, insisted on the necessity of launching the operation itself rather than expecting any achievement. That is why he congratulated the forces in the explanatory convention on the eve before the operation:

The result of the operation, above common calculations, is a work of divine providence. But as far as it concerns Iranian Mojahedin Khalq and the National Liberation Army, I congratulate you one by one beforehand regardless of what the result might be. [5]

The operation before anything was a resolution of Rajavi’s own volition, a proven suicide operation excluding the leader himself. The failure proved to be a victory for Rajavi; the made amendments to the ideological revolution after the operation guaranteed his position as a hallowed figure with the sole authority to question anybody while the members were not in the least permitted to violate the leader’s sacramental sphere. Thus, the operation’s aftermath had the priority over its military achievements, a self-administered purge to remove all who had avoided accepting Rajavi’s leadership as their article of faith:

To create a compelling control atop, all the individual attachments and values had to be detached. The detachment did not include physical spectrum, but above that, psychological scopes. The physically divorce of spouses and children did not suffice; they, as well as the world outside, had to be cleaned of the mind and devalued. One has to replace them with an alternative that is no one but Massoud Rajavi. [6]

The discussion serves as a good response to all those who search an iota of rationality behind the operation. It was not the product of a rational mind; it was the practical part of an intrinsically mal-founded ideology.

Notes

[1]. Nyabati Bijan; “A distinct look at Mojahedin’s internal revolution, slightly from inside, slightly from outside”, 35.

[2]. Ibid, 90.

[3]. Ibid, 113.

[4]. Ibid, 57.

[5]. “The tenth anniversary of Eternal Light”; the first book, Mojahedin’s Publications.

[6]. Nyabati Bijan; “A distinct look at Mojahedin’s internal revolution, slightly from inside, slightly from outside”, 113.

mojahedin.ws – Omid Pouya – July 31, 2006

August 5, 2006 0 comment

Mujahedin Khalq; A proxy force

MKO Rebuke Nyabati for Reviling Israel

Bijan Nyabati, a left member of NCRI, MKO’s political branch, in a recent jeremiad in Persian lamented the Qana village tragedy of thirty seven innocent Lebanese women and children killed under the Israeli heavy shelling. In fact, deliberately or unknowingly, he swam against MKO’s policy taken towards Israel. Long trying to win the support of the Israeli lobbyist in the US Congress, MKO have shown enough prudence not to disappoint the US and Israeli advocates.

Compelled to react against the Israeli bloodshed in Lebanon, more because peoples like Nyabati had poked their nose into something they shouldn’t have, Mojahedin took a moderate position in condemning the Israeli bloodshed never mentioning the Israel itself. Have a look at its statement for instance:

The Iranian Resistance condemns the killing of innocent people in Lebanon and expresses its condolences to the people of Lebanon and in particular to the families of those who have lost their loved ones.

Enraged by Nyabati’s act of overstepping the organization’s red line, Hooshang Behdad, penning in Mojahedin-run andesheh.com, denounced Nyabati’s condemning Israel for what it has not been responsible. Indirectly, Mojahedin warn Nyabati not to get too emotional when he has to remain unconcerned. Putting the blame of the human tragedy in Lebanon on all but the Israel itself, in a part of his criticism addressed to Nyabati, Behdad stated:

Demonstrating a leftist stance, taking an anti-imperialism position, condemning Israel, and thoroughly forgetting the warmongering, terrorist sponsor regime [Iran] is absolutely inexcusable… What other outcomes could one have expected when such an army [Israel] is provoked and Israel is threatened to be wiped out, its military and non-military zones are rocketed, and its soldiers are abducted?

Mojahedin have learned their dictated lessons well. The Bush Administration had earlier announced that Israel had the right to defend itself. The Israeli Ambassador to the UN had also castigated the Hizbollah forces and the sponsoring countries for the killings and rejected to accept any responsibility.

mojahedin.ws – 03/08/2006

August 5, 2006 0 comment

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