PMOI’s Ideological Revolution

Iranian opposition members refuse to leave Iraq outpost

Invited by Saddam: Iranian opposition members refuse to leave Iraq outpost

(Marriage here is forbidden. There have been no children for years)

The isolated Camp Ashraf of MKO cult was visited by media workers after the Iraqi authorities took control of the Camp. Jane Arraf Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor reported her visit including interviews with some Ashraf Residents. In her report she describes the isolated brainwashed members of Rajavi’s cult who allegedly “have left family life behind”.

Texas-born Elham Kiamanesh seems thoroughly American, but in the last decade she’s spent working to overthrow the Iranian regime, this military camp with its tree-lined avenues and flower-filled parks north of Baghdad is the only home she’s known.

"You can call me Ellie, that’s my nickname," says Ms. Kiamanesh as she explains why she gave up normal life and her love of children to try to topple the government of a country she’s never visited.

Kiamanesh is one of some 3,400 residents, including several hundred Westerners, in the middle of one of the strangest episodes in the dramatic shift in relations between Iran, Iraq, and the United States.

In the 1980s, in the midst of Iraq’s bitter eight-year-war with Iran, Saddam Hussein invited the Iranian opposition to set up military operations here. When Saddam’s regime was toppled, US forces disarmed the group. In January, Camp Ashraf reverted to control by the Iraqi government, which plans to close the base as a sign of goodwill toward Iran.

Its residents – members of the People’s Mujahadeen (Mujahadeen e- Khalq, known by the Farsi acronyms MEK or MKO) – are either to return to Iran or to the third countries where they have citizenship. But to the Iraqi government’s consternation, they are not going willingly.

Militarily irrelevant, but still symbolic

Disarmed, Camp Ashraf has become militarily irrelevant. But as an embarrassment to both the Iranian and Iraqi governments, it still has considerable symbolic value.

In the first media visit granted by Iraqi authorities since they took control of the camp this year, residents told The Christian Science Monitor they would not voluntarily leave.

"I’ve decided to stay here until there’s a free Iran," says Hassan Mohammad. Mr. Mohammad lived in the camp with his mother until the age of eight and then was sent to Canada where the family had refugee status during the 1991 war over Kuwait. He returned here at the age of 17 and spent the next several years with a MEK tank unit in the south of Iraq.

Now, he spends his time here in computer classes and the evenings occasionally watching movies on the Iranian opposition’s television channel. "The last one was "Slum Dog Millionaire,’ " he says.

The sprawling camp, one of the biggest military bases in Iraq, has its own university classrooms and hospital. Men and women live in separate dormitories and for the most part study or work in segregated classes. The MEK’s philosophy is a mix of Marxism and Islam teaching with a dose of feminism and a very large element of control.

Marriage here is forbidden. There have been no children for years.

"We have left family life behind," says Hossein Madani, an urbane former aerospace instructor in Virginia and a senior official at Camp Ashraf.

Iraq: ‘The party is over’

Mr. Madani and other MEK officials invite guests into a cool, white reception room and serve tea and cake while producing a wide variety of documents and letters that do little to alleviate the ambiguity over the camp’s legal status.

Madani dismisses the issue of Iraqi law, which authorities say makes the MEK residents illegal foreigners in the country. Instead he cites the Geneva Conventions, under which the US military had recognized the MEK as noncombatants in the war and pledged to protect them.

"This is purely an agenda forced by the Iranian regime. Why do we have to give in to such a thing?" he says of the Iraqi government’s plan to shut down the camp and move residents to a more remote location in Iraq as a prelude to leaving the country.

Iraqi National Security Advisor Muwaffaq al-Rubaie has a simple answer for them.

"They have to understand that the party is over for them," Mr. Rubaie told journalists recently, after refuting allegations from the MEK that their members were being mistreated. "They need to understand that they have to leave. This is not [the era of] Saddam Hussein using them against Iran. We will never use them against Iran."

Describing the residents as "brainwashed cult members from a high- trained terrorist organization," Rubaie says Iraq does not intend to forcibly deport them but "if they resist and carry out this engineered crisis there will be some pain."

The Iraqi government is pressuring other countries to take back about one-third of the camp residents with either foreign passports or travel documents. The rest will be given the Iranian passports they are entitled to and a plane ticket home.

Plenty of places to go, but this is home

The residents include Americans, Canadians, Swedes, and Dutch. Rubaei says another 309 could legally return to France, where the MEK is based. While the US lists the group as a terrorist organization, the European Union has dropped that designation. As individuals, MEK members are also free to return to the US unless there are specific arrest warrants for them.

After 2003, the US military seized the MEK’s tanks and other weapons and confined its residents to the isolated base. All of the camp residents renounced violence and underwent background screening by US authorities.

MEK members argue that their cooperation entitles them to stay.

"We used our own money to build this, to plant every single tree and plant in this place," Madani says bitterly, driving past parks and streets punctuated with giant sculptures of tulips and birds. "This is their home. There are cemeteries, people who have died here, they are buried here, they have lived here.’

Outside the museum dedicated to Iranian atrocities, Kiamanesh sits with her friend, Gohar Mohajeri, on a walkway planted with flowers. Ms. Mohajeri was born in New York but grew up in Germany. She has never been to Iran.

"For outsiders, when they don’t know what our goal and aim is, obviously our life is abnormal for them," says Mohajeri. Kiamanesh translates for her from Farsi.

Neither seem to realize how isolated they are at the camp. "I do believe this is the greenest place in all of Iraq," says Kiamanesh, a former law student who without a headscarf would look like the girl next door. "Why would anyone ever want to leave this place

Jane Arraf Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

April 11, 2009 0 comment

MEK Camp Ashraf

Iranian dissidents in Iraq. Where will they all go?

Iranians in Iraq who fought against the Islamic Republic face a shaky future

“IT WAS one of the strangest places I’d ever seen,” says one of the few Farsi-speaking Westerners to have spent weeks in Camp Ashraf, 65km (40 miles) Members are completely cut off from contact with their families. When wavering group members was enabled to talk to their some of their parents refused to believe it was their children, for they had been told by the PMOI that they were dead north-east of Baghdad, where some 3,400 Iranian dissidents are hunkered down and are now threatened with expulsion from Iraq, perhaps even back to Iran. It was “like a spiffy midsized town in Iran”, with parks, offices and buildings—but no children. It was “sterile, soulless and sad”. Nearly two decades ago, families living in the camp were “dissolved”, couples were forcibly divorced, and their children sent away, many of them to live with supporters living in the West, to be brought up in the faith of a movement widely described by independent observers as a cult.

For the past six years, the Americans have protected the camp, whose raison d’être is generally opposed by the surrounding Iraqi communities and by most Iranians, whether or not they are for or against the clerical regime in Tehran. But as American troops prepare to go home, the Iraqi government, which wants cosy ties with Iran, now says the camp must be closed and its inhabitants dispersed, probably back to Iran, where they would face an uncertain future, to put it mildly.

The group is variously known as the People’s Mujahedeen of Iran (PMOI) or the Mujahedeen-e Khalq Organisation (abbreviated as both MEK and MKO). Founded in 1965 as a youthful underground opposition to Iran’s Shah, it was usually described as “Islamic Marxist”. When the Shah fell it at first backed Ayatollah Khomeini but soon fell out with him, embarking on a campaign of violence and bombings which, on a single occasion, is reckoned to have killed 70 civilians, including several senior clerics; the withered arm of Iran’s current supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was a result of that bomb. The group’s political umbrella is called the National Council of Resistance of Iran.

The PMOI’s leader, Massoud Rajavi, fled to France in 1981 but he and his followers, many of them women, relocated in 1986 to Iraq, where Saddam Hussein gave them a big base at Camp Ashraf, which is thought to be around 20km in circumference. Saddam abundantly supplied the PMOI with Brazilian and British tanks (captured from Iran during the war of 1980-1988) and Russian armoured personnel carriers, among other arms. In return, the PMOI made attacks on Iran itself, which is why Iranians of all stripes tend to regard the group as traitors. It is also said to have spearheaded Saddam’s attacks on rebellious Iraqi Kurds and Shias in 1991, after the first Gulf war, a charge it strongly denies.

Follow my leader

No less controversially, the PMOI is widely reviled by human-rights groups for nurturing a messianic cult of personality around Mr Rajavi and his wife, Maryam, and for enforcing a totalitarian discipline on its adherents. Several defectors testify, in the words of one of them, to a “constant bombardment of indoctrination” and a requirement to submit utterly and unquestioningly to the cause. No sources of news are allowed without the PMOI’s say-so. According to one defector, around 50 members who rebelled were sent to Saddam’s prison in Abu Ghraib, west of Baghdad.

Members are completely cut off from contact with their families. When the above-mentioned Farsi-speaking Westerner, who visited Ashraf in 2004, enabled wavering group members to talk to their families in Iran by satellite telephone, some of their parents refused to believe it was their children, for they had been told by the PMOI that they were dead.

No one is sure whether Mr Rajavi is alive but most think not; he has not been heard of since the American invasion of 2003. His wife, known as “the president-elect”, travels the world, soliciting support from a wide range of sympathisers, including some in the American Congress, the European Parliament and the British House of Lords. No one is sure who really controls the PMOI in Camp Ashraf. It is thought that nearly 400 residents have voluntarily returned to Iran, where they are said to have been treated adequately so far. But who can really tell? Several hundred more are seeking refugee status elsewhere. A few dozen have—or rather had—passports to Western countries, some of which have verified their bona fides.

In the past year, the European Parliament and Britain’s courts have removed the label of “terrorist” from the PMOI, mainly on the ground that the group says it has disavowed violence, is not known to have carried out any acts of terror since, at the latest, 2002, and surrendered its weapons (at any rate, its heavier ones) at Camp Ashraf after the American invasion. This has irritated several national governments, especially the British and French ones, which think the PMOI is a nasty nuisance and its presence on their soil bad for relations with both Iraq and Iran.

The outfit is still officially deemed a terrorist organisation in the United States but has a fierce lobby there too, backed by a mix of neoconservatives and leftists, that accepts at face value the group’s insistence that it is a secular and democratic movement with mass support in Iran and a real chance of eventually displacing the mullahs’ regime. Its lobby in Europe is much exercised by recent statements of Muwafaq al-Rubaie, Iraq’s national security adviser, who makes it plain he wants the camp disbanded and its people sent abroad, mostly to Iran, whose rulers have become more vociferous in calling its fellow reigning Shias in Baghdad to send them back.

The PMOI has a sophisticated network of ardent supporters. Without a doubt, its voice of despairing outrage will rise to a squeal if the Americans give way to Iraqi and Iranian demands to cut the movement loose. But it may happen.

The Economist print edition

http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13447429

April 11, 2009 0 comment

Massoud Rajavi

Inter-organizational defiance of a cult leader

As already elaborated on, irreparable damages to Mojahedin Khalq Organization (MKO) under Rajavi’s lead had their roots mainly in his flaws and characteristics like his arrogance, egotism, ambitiousness, narcissism, etc. They are so inherently rooted in him that even organizational instructions and indoctrinations succeeded not in changing his attitude and to convince him take a different approach.
Here the aim is to review his ambition to submit members and as he calls it exploit organizational hierarchy that turned to a principle in his initiated ideological revolution and gave him the pretext to make internal purges. The open-minded and impartial readers may raise the question why, despite the existence of more experienced members who were more intimately related to MKO founders, Rajavi assumed power while he was less qualified and had revealed signs of weakness in some phases like the interrogations conducted by SAVAK (Pahlavi’s notorious security agency) in prison. There is no doubt that Rajavi had some qualifications and enjoyed an open and active mind and was good in lectures and theoretical discussions; however, they made MKO founders more concerned rather than pleased. In addition to factors referred to at which Rajavi grabbed to attain a high rank in the organization, there are other factors contributing to his organizational promotion.
In fact, if we consider the ideological revolution of Rajavi as an instrument at his hands to fulfill his ambitious objectives, we have to take his role as an MKO member into consideration to find out how he managed to usurp the leadership of Mojahedin after the mass arrests of 1971 despite the presence of more qualified cadres. This is a question posed by many remnants of MKO answered in different ways with regard to various factors. According to an MKO former member:
There is a point to be noted: Rajavi was one of those not to go a long way in the organization recruitment. MKO leaders were affected by his youth and foray and soon entered him in the central cadre. I think he was the youngest member of the central cadre of the organization in 1971. 1
As his intimates state, Rajavi lost his popularity in a phase of his imprisonment due to his anti-revolutionary and anti-value characteristics and activities. Taking a look at the events of 1971 and mass arrests reveals that he used all possible means to eliminate more qualified cadres. In addition, he made an attempt to indoctrinate founders and leaders with the idea that he had the required potentiality to shoulder major responsibilities. From a professional point of view, he was rightful in competing with others to prove his qualifications; however, in a revolutionary organization, blowing the organization for achieving personal ambitions is considered an anti-value phenomenon.
There are many evidences that Rajavi was always after questioning and criticizing cadres and leaders to make them passive and give them a feeling of inferiority to obtain organizational rise. Even in some cases he openly declared his objective in competing against other cadres and eliminating them from the organization scene. In a condition that his activities can affect MKO founders like Asqar Badizadagan, its influence on lower cadres seems inevitable. As Meisami puts into words:
Masoud [Rajavi] acted in a way that made all cadres including Asqar [Badizadegan] subject to inferiority. As Behrooz stated, he acted in a way that Asqar [Badizadegan] even left teaching chemistry and function of explosives. 2
Or when the organization decides to make contact with Al-Fatah (a Palestinian organization) to exchange experience and military training, Rajavi considers himself the most qualified member, even more qualified than the organization founder, Hanifnejad, and says:
I have the qualification to write a letter to Palestinians. 3
Lotfollah Meisami refers to the same event in more details and writes:
Rajavi went to Palestine as a translator and refrained to pass the instructional phase and there made all cadres (Badizadegan, Bakeri, and Torab Haqshenas) feel inferiority. When members decided to write an article for Palestinians, Rajavi said he is the one who could write it and made other members passive. Asqar [Badizadegan] who was a chemical engineer left teaching the formula of explosives to members under the influence of Rajavi. 4
It has to be pointed out that Rajavi pursued his egocentric activities in a condition when the organization founders and Hanifnejad in particular put a great deal of significance on ethical principles and considered anti-value features of members destructive. The reasons why they blinked at Rajavi’s violations may constitute the subject of other articles.

References:
1. The memoirs of Dr. Mohammad Mehdi Jafari: MKO from inside, Negah-e Emruz publication, 2002, p.48.
2. The memoirs of Lotfollah Meisami, vol. 2, 2002, Tehran, p.75.
3. ibid.
4. Meisami, Lotfollah, Degeneration of a Mojahed, No. 32.

February 21, 2009 0 comment

Massoud Rajavi

Rajavi’s position in the schism of 1975

The ideological schism of MKO in 1975, when actually the leaders of the group were in Pahlavi’s notorious prisons, resulted in different reactions on the part According to Rastegar, Rajavi made an attempt to hide his personal errors and stabilize his leadership over the organization by concealing the truth and labeling the former leaders as traitors as agents of Mojahedin. The serious errors of Rajavi after the separation of Marxist wing following its declared manifesto was elaborated on and those aware of the course of events in that particular period of time were unanimous that the main mistake made by Rajavi was issuing his twelve-point statement that was considered to be the position taken by all non-Marxist Mojahedin about the schism. It stated that Mojahedin would consider the converted members as their strategic allies and openly revealed their opposition to religious members. It happened at a time when all MKO remnants except Rajavi insisted on reviewing and revising the organizational principles and ideological errors of MKO under the impact of Marxism. Karim Rastegar, an ex-member, elaborates on the impacts of this event saying that after the Marxist wing’s manifesto, Rajavi adopted a dual mannerism of keeping unwavering inclination to the left while role-played a devoted religious inside the prison.
An interesting point is that while siding with the non-Marxist wing, Rajavi took a different position toward the leaders of Marxist wing, i.e. Taqi Shahram, Bahram Aram and against truthful leaders opposed to Marxist wing like Majid Sharif Vaqefi and Morteza Samadieh Labaf. According to Rastegar, Rajavi made an attempt to hide his personal errors and stabilize his leadership over the organization by concealing the truth and labeling the former leaders as traitors as agents:
The leaders inside prison, and Rajavi in particular, tried to acquit themselves of accusations and after the terror of Sharif Vaqefi and Samadieh for a long time overturned the truth calling them traitors and introduced the leftist Vahid Afrakhteh as a hero. For instance, they quoted falsely of committee members that Vahid Afrakhteh has turned to a mythical figure under torture. 1
A more interesting point is that his appreciation of some problematic members like Vahid Afrakhteh intensified the crises and increased the doubt of religious members in Rajavi thus making the ground for his increasingly parting with them. In addition, Rajavi took an antagonist position against religious forces inside prison and worsened the conditions:
The behaviors of Masoud inside prison resulted in marginalization of religious forces. Evidently, appropriate reactions could prevent conflicts and detachments. The organization leadership tried to conceal the realities for five months calling us extremists and compromisers while everyone was well aware of the reality. It was no longer possible for us to bear lies and labels given to the religious members Muslims. Our complaint to the conditions resulted in our total boycott. Nobody dared to communicate with us. Some were so heated that even would kill us if they were allowed to. The news of our boycott by organization leaked to SAVAK and they regarded it a precious opportunity. 2
On the other hand, there is the status and position of Marxist wing. Although they took an overall defensive position regarding the ideological schism, their position is preferred to that of Rajavi that was dualistic and divisive. However, many are unanimous that the main reason of ideological schism of MKO was the dualistic and eclectic viewpoints of the early founders of MKO toward Islam rather than the effect of Marxists therein. Torab Haqshenas, a key figure of MKO in that period of time abroad, refers to significant points on the differences between inside as well as outside looking at the ideological schism of Mojahedin and the divisive position of Rajavi in this regard, saying:
In my opinion, the ideological schism had a principle that was neglected and it was the fact that we should not lie to ourselves. It is correct that we made some mistakes and acknowledged it in 1979 and criticized it, but the main point was that we should not lie to people. When we came to the point that our guide was no longer ideologically religious and it was of no effect to help us in struggle, we had to say it clearly to all people even if it resulted in our losing of many facilities and separation of many members. 3
However, it does not mean that religion was incapable to offer solutions for the challenges of MKO. It is another issue and needs to be investigated in depth. As he says, the hypocrisy and duality of Mojahedin, their eclectic ideology, lack of knowledge on religious precepts and refraining to take a clear position in this regard resulted in the occurrence of schism. In fact, the twelve-point statement of Rajavi issued inside prison was a summary of his real intention and ideas. Shahsavandi, a member of MKO sentenced to death by the order of the Marxist wing’s central committee clarifies the effects of this statement in escalation of inter-organizational tensions and conflicts inside prison:
These twelve articles defined the identity of MKO to the point that members and sympathizers had to recognize it as the basics of their activities word by word with no addition or omission and to transfer it to other prisons and those active outside. 4
The significance of this statement lies in the fact that according to Shahsavandi, it had a decisive role in the future events like that of June 1981:
These twelve articles were in fact the manifesto of Mr. Rajavi against the Marxist drift inside organization. It was a manifesto that led to the revival and reorganization of MKO and worked as infrastructure of activities after the victory of Iranian revolution. 5
Also, he elaborates on the key role of Rajavi in the development of the statement:
The essence and core of this issue is related to Masoud Rajavi and it was mainly for this reason that he tried to stabilize his leadership and bring his role to light. 6
Reviewing the points of this statement and the mistakes made by Rajavi in this regard requires another discussion of its own.

References:
1. Dr. Karim Rastegar’s interview with Cheshmandaz journal on the events of June 1981
2. ibid
3. Torab Haqshenas
4. Saeed Shahsavandi interview with the voice of Iran, part 38.
5. ibid
6. ibid, part 40.

February 3, 2009 0 comment

The Ideology of the MEK

An ideological schism with no parting edge

The ideological schism of 1975 constitutes one of the critical phases of MKO. Following the mass arrests of 1971, the leadership cadre found it necessary to review the past events to find the reasons underlying the strategic failure of the organization. Since two ranking members of organization, Taqi Shahram and Bahram Aram, were converted to Marxism this review led to the overall ideological shift of MKO to Marxism. However, one of the organization activists, Dr. Karim Rastegar, informed Rajavi, already in prison, of the conversion of the organization leaders. Not only did Rajavi desist to make any reaction to their perversive activities but also accused Rastegar of cynicism and fundamentalism up to the time when the ideological shift of the organization was declared openly through Marxism wing manifesto.
This event influenced the imprisoned members to a great extent and many more converted to Marxism and declared it openly. Although after the declaration of the Marxism wing Rajavi falsely made a promise to make his best to modify and revise the ideological principles of MKO, he failed to do so and instead held grab to ideological and political purging of those prisoners who were in favor of religious leadership in Iran. The consequences of the declaration of the Marxism wing inside and outside prison necessitated it for Rajavi to deny having any relation and inclination to Marxism since the past history of Marxists in preventing social movements of Iran like the destructive activities of Tudeh party in the course of nationalization of oil industry and betrayal of Shahram and Aram led to the intensification of the sensitivity of religious prisoners toward Marxists. Then, Rajavi was expected to revise organizational principles taking a firm position against Marxists and in favor of religious prisoners.
However, all those trying to find the roots of the June 1981 crises are unanimous that the position taking of Rajavi in this phase was intentionally aimed at keeping distance from religious forces and especially clerical leaders while inside prison. They acknowledge the fact that his twelve-point declaration, first distributed orally from inside the prison, formed the main pillars of his position taking and he acted amateurishly in demarcating with the ideological shift of the organization and its founders. Two out of the twelve points were more effective in intensifying the crises between Rajavi and religious prisoners. One pointed out that the organization would keep its previous position toward Marxists. In other words, it considered the converted members as an opportunist group not real Marxists so there would be no change in the organization relations towards them. The second and the most important point was triggering a more intense reaction on the part of religious members calling them reactionaries.
It is evident that jailed Mojahedin under the leadership of Rajavi considered Marxist members as their ideological allies and even preferred them to members with religious inclinations. These events as well as Rajavi’s declaration letter intensified the crises inside prisons even more. Saeed Shahsavandi, already an intimate friend of Rajavi, putting the contents of the twelve-point letter in writing expounds on the course of events after the declared manifesto of Marxist Mojahedin. Almost all members except Rajavi believed in the necessity of revising the ideological principles of the organization at that particular period of time. According to Shahsavandi:
I dare say that almost all high rankings but Rajavi came to the conclusion that the organization had made some mistakes in the past that were to be modified and these modifications were to have religious and in political terms rightist inclinations. 1
He further refers to the internal and external trends inside prison trying to revise the fundamentals and principles of MKO and revive Mojahedin making them free from dualistic views replaced by pure religious position and Rajavi’s opposition to these trends by issuing his twelve-point declaration. As he puts into words, almost all political trends and individuals were to find the roots of MKO schism and also a solution to terminate the crises. Yet, Rajavi paid no attention to the existing conditions and issued his twelve-point “declaration of MKO position toward leftist perverted opportunist trend” worsening the conditions.
It has to be pointed out that some prominent figures outside prison like ayatollah Motahari wrote a letter to ayatollah Khomeini, at the time living in Najaf in exile, referring to the deviation and schism of Mojahedin asking him to find an immediate solution for their challenges:
Marxist views have been slinked into some political groups like Mojahedin. They were primarily a political group and are gradually turning to a religious sect with their own ideology and interpretations from Islam. They claim to have come to a point where they no longer need religious instructions and teachings. They respect both Marx as Shiite Imams and also claim to be true Muslims. Others have converted to Marxism declaring it openly. 2

References:
1. The interview of Saeed Shahsavandi with the voice of Iran, part 38.
2. A review of the life of ayatollah Motahari

Research Bureau – Mojahedin.ws – January 18, 2009

January 19, 2009 0 comment

Former members of the MEK

MKO’s silence on the separation of a leadership cadre

It is almost two years that Mojahedin.ws has suggested the necessity of reviewing the content of Masoud Rajavi’s so-called ideological revolution making its best to obtain its fulfillment which has been accelerated by means of communicating with the organization’s ex-members. Following the statements made by Batool Soltani, of the ex-leadership cadre of MKO, with the Sahar NGO on different aspects of MKO cultic relations including the ideological revolution, it seems necessary to have a further reference to the suggestion mentioned before. Among the statements on the personal, organizational, and political aspects of her life in MKO, that of ideological revolution is of utmost importance as she is the first female Mojahed ex-member paying enough attention to this fundamental issue.
In addition, her recruitment in the leadership council of MKO leading to close relations and intimacy with the organization leadership, Masoud Rajavi and Maryam Azdanlu, has made her statements trustworthy and reliable. We do really appreciate her precision and sensitivity in this subject paving the way for other MKO ex-members to elaborate on various aspects of the ideological revolution of Mojahedin. Even her seemingly repetitious statements manage to clarify some untold truth on the real nature of MKO and its leadership.
Another factor highlighting the significance of her statements is that they may work to persuade other MKO members to break their silence on the critical issue of the ideological revolution of Mojahedin. Before, some factors like resorting deliberately to passivity and refraining to pose challenges to the organization in order not to be put under the attack of terror of personality were stated on the reasons why MKO ex-members have kept quiet on the issue of the ideological revolution while the fact is that merely grabbing at biography writing is of no effect and fails to present a challenge for Mojahedin; on the contrary, it is welcome by Mojahedin who aim to cover the facts on the real nature of their cultist relations the uncovering of which is a terrible nightmare coming true for them.
This issue is of a significance for Mojahedin that they have refused to show any reaction to their being accused of having cultic relations since they are well aware that even their common procedure of using bad language in this matter may be destructive since in that case they are obliged to elaborate on some cultic indices pertained to them leading to the subject being updated and widespread. Therefore, instead of taking an aggressive stance and offensive position toward this accusation, they have kept quiet even on the report of the US state department in April 2007 in which MKO was referred to as a cult of personality. Taking these facts into consideration may give us a better understanding of the significance of this issue and the necessity of disclosing the content of the ideological revolution of Mojahedin.
It is a fact that Mrs. Soltani’s disclosing statements have a wide variety of functions. First, the silence of Mojahedin on her separation shows the considerable importance of the subject for them. Second, disclosing facts on the relation of Rajavi with female Mojaheds by a detached female MKO member may pose a challenge of a high cost and many negative consequences for Mojahedin. Third, it is unbearable for Rajavi that females on whom he has made so much investment leave the organization. Mojahedin’s keeping silent proves that they are truly accused of censorship and banning the release of news in camp Ashraf among rank-and-files. In fact, in practice they prove their controlling and filtering of news spread lest Ashraf residents become aware of the separation of a member of leadership council.
Here it is worthy to refer to some major points on the consequences of Mrs. Soltani separation and the covert reactions of the organization to it underlining the importance of the subject. First, as she claims Masoud Rajavi has once asserted we have no separated female member so he dares not confirm the separation of Mrs. Soltani not to be accused of giving false promises to members as previously done.
Second, Mrs. Soltani claims that her separation is of great significance for the leadership of Mojahedin to the point that they hold grab to sending secret message asking her to go wherever she wants refraining to publicize her separation from MKO. However, her separation as well as the secret message of MKO leadership has been publicized at a high cost for Masoud Rajavi and MKO.
Third, Mojahedin are not willing to acknowledge the fact that despite all the controls exerted on members willing to separate and developing the hegemony of women on men, they failed to meet the desires and inclinations of members and women in particular and all the efforts made by Rajavi to stabilize the presence of women in MKO relations proved futile to the point that many female members leave the organization upon getting the least opportunity to do so. In addition, the way Mrs. Soltani has escaped from the organization reveals the amount of her frustration over the conditions of the organization.
Anyway, contrary to what Mojahedin leaders are after, Mrs. Soltani is expounding on the tragic and disastrous facts of the internal relations of MKO to which Mojahedin make no negative and public reaction. The fact is that despite her children being at the hands of Mojahedin as hostages and attempts to use them as blackmail for her keeping silent, she insists on revealing the real nature of MKO and Rajavi due to her years of suffering and pain inside MKO. Although her efforts are just for humanistic causes, she is to be appreciated and sympathized for the costs she has paid in the past and is likely to pay in the future.

January 17, 2009 0 comment

Mujahedin Khalq Organization as a terrorist group

Who cares about the MKO?

The non-Iranian Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO), since the overthrow of the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, is seeking another alternative in the west. The MKO strove under the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein to become the Iraqi MKO and now is striving to become the Israeli MKO.

Since 1985 when the Internal Ideological Revolution and the Divine Leadership of the Rajavis were introduced within the MKO, and the cultic characteristics reached their full development, and since 1986 when the leadership of the MKO moved to Iraq under the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein and participated in the war against Iran and as well as suppressing the people of Iraq as Saddam’s private army, the organization not only had no presence inside Iran but it was also much hated as far as the Iranian people were concerned.

Since then until the fall of Saddam Hussein, the activities of the MKO against the Iranian regime included border assaults and sabotage activities and sending terror teams from Iraq inside Iran with the aid of the security forces of Saddam Hussein as well as political propaganda in the west. The assaults and terrorist activities were of course ceased when the dictator was toppled in Iraq and the organization was disarmed by the American forces in 2003, and therefore the activities of the MKO were limited to political propaganda in the west; the sort of propaganda of course which would pave the way for terrorism in the future.

Hence since that point up to now the MKO and its leadership have relied not on the Iranian people but on foreign powers to gain rule in Iran and at the present time they are seeking an alternative for Saddam Hussein (this time in the west of course) and have based their strategy on gaining support from potential enemies such as the US, Israel and the UK in place of the previous toppled enemy.

Therefore the presence of the MKO now is merely in the form of the Ashraf garrison (the MKO base in Iraq) and the Maryam garrison (the European base of the MKO in France) which initially is the problem of the newly formed government of Iraq and then the western countries, and is by no means the concern of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

As far as the Iraqi government is concerned, this government knows the MKO as a terrorist group and one of the many miseries left from the era of Saddam Hussein for the people of Iraq and a threat for Iraq’s internal security; and therefore the Iraqi government is demanding that the Ashraf garrison be closed forever, and righteously expects the western governments who have had their use of the organization against Iran to accept them in their countries for their retirement stage.

The political process to de-proscribe the MKO in the EU was begun some time ago. As the UK initiated the proscription of the organization (for any reasons), now the UK is again stepping forward to remove their name from the EU list of terrorist groups, and most likely this will be done in the very near future.

What consequences will arise if the MKO is kept in or removed from the EU list of terrorist groups?

As far as Iran is concerned, the MKO is a matter for the past and whether they are designated as a terrorist group or not would not have the smallest effect. Neither when they moved into the list were any facilities created for the Iranians and nor when they move out will any problem arise in their way. The opposite of course applies for the MKO.

As far as the European countries are concerned they know best how to deal with a terrorist cult in their own territory regarding their national security. If the EU is convinced that the organization is no longer a terrorist group so be it, and we do hope that their judgment is right and the MKO and its leader have truly put aside terrorism; although we do not have any indications for such assumptions.

From the Iraqis’ point of view, who demands that the MKO (who have cooperated with Saddam Hussein in killing innocent people) leave Iraq, de-proscribing the MKO in Europe is good news since the west has no excuses for not accepting them in their countries any more. In the last meeting we had with the Iraqi ministry of foreign affairs they explained that the ministry had invited all European ambassadors in Baghdad to a meeting and urged them to accept the members of the MKO in their countries as political refugees, but they all rejected the request and their excuse was that the group has been designated as a terrorist organization by the EU. But now the Iraqis can of course put their demands forward again.

But the only side who would really suffer from de-proscribing the MKO in Europe is of course the prime victims of such a destructive cult, meaning the members who will be more mentally manipulated when this is shown to them as a victory of the cult and will ensue their continued mental captivity; and therefore their families must pay the price by being away from them and have no news from their beloved ones.

On the issue of closing the Ashraf garrison in Iraq, the MKO is trying hard to make it an entirely Iranian concern. The west is also following the same pattern and demanding an increase in the price of the MKO supposedly for a deal with the Islamic Republic, and perhaps the policy of de-proscribing them in Europe which has started sometime ago is in this line. The MKO is pretending in its propaganda that it is a major issue for Iran and they claim to the world that Iran is striving to get hold of the inhabitants of the Ashraf garrison to take them to Iran and put them on trial and torture them and eventually kill them. Anyone who has the least of knowledge of the MKO surely knows that the claim made by the MKO is somehow ‘escaping forward’ [farar be jelow]. The MKO is merely trying to create such an atmosphere in order to falsify the main issue. Certainly the Islamic Republic is not seeking to get back dead bodies which the owners don’t want anymore. On the contrary Iran logically is trying to smartly use the dissidents of the MKO against it (refer to the quotations made from a western diplomat in Iran in an article written by Geroges Malbrunot in Le Figaro dated December 23) and it is obvious that the Iranian regime is more eager that they are moved to Europe in order to send back the products of a terrorist cult in the shape of human robots to their original place. It is also worth mentioning that in the time of Saddam Hussein’s rule in Iraq, Massoud Rajavi the leader of the MKO did not send the group’s defectors to Europe and instead handed them over to the Iranian regime. He said clearly on many occasions that the Iranian regime would not do anything to the members of the MKO who have no arms in their hands.

The leaders of the MKO claim that if the US forces move from the Ashraf garrison and leave the posts for the Iraqis, they would not have security in Iraq. This could be true since many Kurdish and Shiites groups in Iraq know this organization as their ruthless enemy who cooperated with Saddam Hussein to suppress them and would wish to take revenge. The solution of course is not for the US to keep their forces there for their security forever. The answer to this problem is that the western governments take them back to their own countries in order to preserve their security. It is worth pointing out that most of these people were political refugees in the west and have been recruited and sent to Iraq from there to join in the National Liberation Army.

Whether the MKO is designated as a terrorist entity or not and whether the US forces stay outside the Ashraf garrison or not makes no big difference to anyone and we are not much concerned about it. As far as the Sahar Family Foundation in Iraq is concerned and we have focused our attention on it, the inhabitants of the Ashraf garrison must enjoy free meetings with their families in some place outside the garrison and without the presence of the MKO authorities and they must have the benefit of having contacts with the outside world and also to have the mental pressures and thought controls lifted from them; and we will stay firm in Iraq and continue our activities until we reach this very important humanitarian goal.

January 15, 2009 0 comment

Massoud Rajavi

The instrumental misuse of MKO history

Rajavi owes his leadership to a number of factors among which misusing and manipulating the history of the organization and its founders is of utmost significance paving the way for imposing Rajavi on the organization and expansion of his authoritarian leadership therein. The short-term relationship of Rajavi with the organization’s founders, and Mohammad Hanifnejad in particular, is an instrument in the hands of Rajavi and his fellows to manipulate the history of the organization in his favor.

A number of factors like the mass arrests of the early founders and high-rankings in 1971 and their execution as well as Rajavi’s escape from execution made the background for him to manipulate the history of the organization at avail himself of the critical conditions after the schism of the organization. Promotion of Rajavi to the membership of the central cadre after the assertion of Hanifnejad was the beginning of the later seizure of leadership. According to many eyewitnesses it was most accelerated due to Rajavi’s egocentricity and narcissism that prepared for Rajavi and his catalysts to make false interpretations of it. Step by step and especially after the initiation of the armed phase, this illusion turned to reality and many newcomers came to believe that Rajavi was the heir to the leadership after Hanifnejad. It would not be wrong to say that Rajavi’s had a key role in creating this illusion either in gaol or after their freedom in 1979.

There are evidences that the main part of this process has been taken place since 1985 when Rajavi used the ideological revolution as an instrument to stabilize his totalitarian and egocentric leadership in the organization and to legitimize the ideological revolution and its consequences. In the early days of the ideological revolution, some members like Davari, Abrishamchi, and Hayati were tasked with fabricating false memories of the interest of Hanifnejad in Rajavi and the complimentary statements made by Hanifnejad on the political, organizational, and ideological qualifications of Rajavi.

This process was externalized when the central office of the organization issued a declaration on the initiation of the ideological revolution and the ideological leadership of Masoud Rajavi. The declaration asserted that after the execution of the organization’s founders, and Hanifnejad in particular, Rajavi would be the leader of the organization, responsible for its survival and development. It focused on the point that Hanifnejad himself had appointed Rajavi as his successor and the next leader of MKO. Since Rajavi was well aware that his own fabrication of memories was of no effect, he ordered his fellows and catalysts including those arrested in 1971, to make false statements in the intra-organizational sessions of the ideological revolution. Here some of these fabrications will be reviewed. Abbas Davari, whose some instances of offensive behavior towards Rajavi was quoted by some MKO former members, in his article “The point of perfection” published in the organization’s official organ, Mojahed, writes:

Saeed Mohsen was very sensitive about the freedom of Masoud and when Masoud was offered a clemency and his execution was replaced by life imprisonment as a result of the efforts of Dr.Kazem Rajavi [his brother], Mohsen was too happy and asked me to convey his message to Masoud. He said: “Extend my greetings to Masoud and tell him that his responsibility is very heavy at the time being since he is the only remnant of the central cadre and the manifestation of our principles and experiences. He is endowed with a great responsibility in this phase. He will be beset with many problems and may suffer many disturbances. We will receive all praises since we enter the reign of martyrdom yet he will face all accusations since he will continue the struggle and would have a status much higher than ours. He will be martyred every day and every hour. Yes, he will be an alive martyr. 1

In another article, he has pointed out that:

The necessity of ensuring the continuity of this way and developing the revolutionary Islam was evident to the founders and the person who arrived at the very summits of honor. The organization founders accomplished their responsibility and before their martyrdom appointed Masoud as the next leader not to leave the organization without a head. 2

These statements are pre-determined reactions to the objections and accusations made against the ideological marriage of Masoud and Maryam and the issue of Rajavi’s fabricated Imamate. Mohammad Seyedi Kashani makes a statement in this regard, stating:

The most significant thing I remember from the martyr Asqar Badizadegan is the statements he made about Masoud and his seriousness and rigidity. He always said that Mohammad (Hanifnejad) was more interested in Masoud among all members of the central cadre and loved him more than others doing his best to train and teach him as a true Mojahed. Some years later when I got acquainted with Masoud, I found out the reason why the founders had appointed him preferably as the leader among all members of central cadre and those with a longer history in the organization. 3

References:

1. Davari, Abbas, Mojahed journal, no. 456

2. The book of Founders, MKO publications, 2002, p.91.

3. ibid, the statements of Mohammad Seyedi Kashani, p.111

December 21, 2008 0 comment

The cult of Rajavi

A Call To Disclose Cult Abnormalities

More than two decades ago when Massoud Rajavi informed of the great change and ideological revolution within Mojahedin Khalq Organization (MKO), still believing to be active as a political group, hardly anybody first came to assume that it was actually the beginning of a long path leading the organization into the abyss of internal and external challenges. Although Rajavi’s marriage with his comrade’s wife received appreciations of a novel move in the group’s internal relations, soon the magnitude of the marriage itself was faded in comparison with other significant consequences of the move that required time to be actualized. The intended personality change in the insiders could not take effect overnight ant it really consumed time to accomplish Rajavi’s plotted ideological principles. Even Rajavi himself anticipated prolongation of the process when he said: “If you fail to comprehend now, be patient. I do not know, maybe you come to understand in one, five or ten years”.

It was in no way an overstated assertion since he knew well what would come out of his initiated revolution. Still many aspects of his devised ideological ploy and its profound effects remain concealed and beyond the scope of the world. Only in the recent years, and following the disclosures made by many defected members, the outside world has been to some extent informed of the organization’s cultic aspects and internal human tragedies. Interestingly enough, the modern world was even shocked to a great degree to learn about horrible, deplorable stories related by the ex-members about what passes inside the organization.

Of the most outrageous, scandalous cult records recently revealed are hysterectomy operations and Rajavi’s sex scandal, his polygamous marriage with the female cadres of the Leadership Council. Being under the constant influence of cultic behaviors that show most abnormal to the outsiders, the insiders and even the separated members consider them as typically normal. As expounded by Thaler Singer “If you spend enough time in any environment, you will develop a personal history of experience and interaction in it. When that environment is constructed and managed in a certain way, then the experiences, interactions, and peer relations will be consistent with whatever public identity is fostered by the environment and will incorporate the values and opinions promulgated in that environment”. 1

It is of great importance to perceive to what extent the detached members of MKO have come to incorporate abnormal experiences and interactions of the group’s cultic environment now out of that milieu. Long being engaged in cooperative activities with other comrades in an environment that hardly could they realize its cultic structure under the cover of political campaign, these members fail to perceive that they had been coerced into many abnormalities. It has to be pointed out that it is a fact most cult members have experienced and as Singer explains “when you engage in cooperative activity with peers in an environment that you do not realize is artificially constructed, you do not perceive your interactions to be coerced. And when you are encouraged but not forced to make verbal claims to "truly under- standing the ideology and having been transformed," these inter. actions with your peers will tend to lead you to conclude that you hold beliefs consistent with your actions. In other words, you will think that you came upon the belief and behaviors yourself”. 2

So explicitly explained by cult experts, the insiders and newly defected members are unaware of the change in them while in the cult and which are regarded bizarre behaviors by the outside onlookers. The defectors should know that whatever they consider as the mist ordinary, normal and unimportant are much objectionable, bizarre and abnormal to the outside societies. Then, it is best recommended that the defected members of MKO be sensitive to whatever monotonous regularity they were putting up with in the cult and to disclose them to the world to judge for itself.

References:

1. Thaler Singer, Margaret, Cults in our midst, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass; A Wiley Imprint, p.76.

2. Ibid.

November 19, 2008 0 comment

The cult of Rajavi

MKO and Batinis, two cults with identical projects of sterilization

The disclosing speech of Nasrin Ebrahimi in the European Parliament on the latest cult approach of MKO in making women infertile, as another phase of the ideological revolution of Mojahedin, gives a clear picture of cultic malevolent practices committed within the cult of Mojahedin. The fact that Ms. Ebrahimi has escaped from Camp Ashraf refusing to undergo the hysterectomy indicates that evidently there are many other female members forced to have the surgery; therefore, this case is to be pursued legally. Having another look at the numerous similarities found between the approaches adopted by MKO leaders and those of notorious historical cults may clarify the real cultic nature of MKO.

Sterilization is one of the strategies adopted by leaders of certain cults. It has taken two forms in cultic relations, i.e. mental and physical. Mental sterilization is accomplished through the very same brainwashing techniques and thought reform, a common practice in almost all cultic groups, and MKO in particular, as acknowledged by a great number all former members. In addition, there are evidences that physical sterilization by means of hysterectomy is a frequently used procedure in MKO, a technique analogous to that of the cult of Batinis, a historical and notorious Iranian cult. The process of convincing or forcing members to undergo this operation has its own mechanisms and features on which due investigation is to be carried out. Interestingly, MKO leaders resort to explanations for their inhuman deed that are similar to those of the leaders of the historical cult of Batinis. What follows are instances of excuses made by the leaders of Batinis to convince follower to give their assent emasculation.

In a discussion between Musa Neishaburi (a newcomer to Alamut castle) and Shirzad Fahestani (commander of Alamut castle), Fahestani made an attempt to justify the reason why members of Alamut castle had to be emasculated, stating:

Emasculation is a kind of test, an assessment to find out whether a disciple is ready to sacrifice everything for his faith and Batinist brothers as well. It is not so difficult to sacrifice one’s life since there are many who freely offer to die on the rise of emotions. But it is too difficult to have control over one’s lusts. It is a touchstone to test the extent of one’s sacrifice of his lusts for the cause and interests of the group. 1

The devoted followers were required to give up sexual urges and yearn to prove loyalty to the group and leadership. An idea prevailed that the disciples had to act like bees that thought of nothing but their own duty and who had to serve the leader, Hasan Sabbah, at the top of the hierarchy and whose advantages were beyond anybody’s reach and question. In the course of their controversy, Musa asked Shirzad why Hasan Sabbah was excluded from what others had no rights to. He said:

‘You told me yesterday that the Lord of Alamut is married. You meant why you cannot get married while he can. Have you read the Arabic books on bees in the school of Nezamieh?’ Musa answered, ‘Yes, I have’. Shirzad asked him, ‘what was written there about their breeding?’ Musa answered: ‘bumblebees are killed and the females remain alive.’ Shirzad stated, ‘it is so since after that bees engage in nothing but making honey. Likewise, absolute devotees have to make efforts just to do the duties appointed for them. Batinist devotees should not be considered inferior to that of bees. 2

Musa was not convinced and asked for more explanation calling sterilization a kind of heresy. Here Khorshid-kolah, another theoretician of the cult of Hasan Sabbah, referred to issues like the requirements of that particular period of time and the omniscience of their leader as two more grounds demanding the process of sterilization:

Our lord is an all-knowing vicegerent and thus he can issue orders not issued before. Each time has its own necessities and now is a time when followers have to be made without posterity to think of nothing but being sacrificed for their faith. 3

In addition to theoretical reasoning, cult leaders resort to other levers in order to convince initiates to stay with the cult, or in Batinists case, submit to be emasculated. Hardly a Batinist initiate wished to withdraw after experiencing the pleasures offered to him but doubt was unforgivable and could be deterred only by death. As observed in the dialogue between Musa and Fahestani:

Shirzad looked at young Musa and said, ‘have you changed your mind to be an absolute devotee?’ He answered, ‘not yet discouraged but in doubt.’ Shirzad said that doubt leads to withdrawal. Musa asked him what came if he refused to join the group and the commander answered, ‘Then, we will kill you.’ 4

Altogether, there were many more threats of retribution than promises of felicity and the general tone was uncompromising and tough. Candidates for initiation would have needed to be serious and determined and allegiance had to be unquestionably blind. The following argument of Fahestani on the fact that a follower was not allowed to have contention concerning the issued orders of the leaders is reminiscent of the reasons mentioned by Rajavi in his lecture on the ideological revolution of Mojahedin in 1980:

The discussion between Musa Neishaburi and Shirzad Fahestani, the commander of Tabas castle, on the philosophy of emasculation came to a point where Shirzad got angry and told Musa, “Are you contending?’ Musa answered, ‘Please forgive me, I wasn’t to contend but I wanted to learn something.’ The commander said, ‘Those who want to learn have no place here to become absolute devotees. You had to learn in the school of Nezamieh where you came from not here. This is a place where you have just to obey what is said.’ 5

The intellectual discrimination is another factor differentiating between leaders and followers. The acknowledged intellectual gifts of a cult leader frustrate any form of raised controversy by followers; he is the one whose wisdom rationalizes what might be irrational to others:

One of the members of the castle called Khorshid-kolah told Musa, ‘Do you think you understand more than others do and those who have consented to be emasculated do not understand? Sometimes only one among hundred thousands is intellectually gifted. This is the reason why only a handful of men in a generation become scientists. God grants not wisdom to all humans equally. 6

Then, why enforced emasculation in the cult of Batinis could not take the form of hysterectomy in the cult of Mojahedin? Mojahedin too have tried a variety of justification to convince those who underwent the operation. Added to the comments made by Nasrin Ebrahimi on the obligatory illegal action of sterilization practiced within MKO, the law enforces that no experiment have be performed without the consent of participants. Therefore, it is evident that Mojahedin are involved in another law-breaking activity opposed to international codes. According to Dr. Singer:

Professionals engaged in legitimate supervised medical and psychological research are held to certain standards that have been in place since the end of World War II and the establishment of the Nuremberg code of ethics, which states that in any setting where any type of human experimentation is done, the experiment cannot be performed without the informed consent of those who are to be participants. In getting this consent, the experimenters are to explain everything that will or may happen as a consequence of the person’s coming into the experimental program, and the person must be fully capable of understanding those consequences. 7

It seems that none of western legal enforcements can stop violation of human rights by the cult of Mojahedin. The negative consequences of a cultic group’s activity that challenges the social health fails to be a cost totally paid by the public; the responsibility of the governments are even greater since they act as their nations representative to protect them against whatever challenges them regardless of political interests.

References:

1. Amir, Paul. Hasan Sabbah: the Lord of Alamut.

2. ibid

3. ibid

4. ibid

5. ibid

6. ibid

7. Thaler Singer, Margaret, Cults in our midst, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass; A Wiley Imprint, p.79.

November 1, 2008 0 comment

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