Cults’ Methodology
The Ideology of the MEK
There are evidences indicating the critical situation within MKO. It is far more serious than what the organization has been suffering through the past recent years. Two strategic causes, among some others, seem to be noteworthy:
1- Uncertainty of the organization’s next destination to encamp
2- The start of countdown to the US president election
In his messages delivered from the hideout after a long interval and incommunicado, Rajavi has reiterated two important issues; the preservation of Camp Ashraf regardless of the price it might cost and the promise that the Iranian regime would collapse in a span of two years. In a message issued in 2006, he fixed January 2009 as the deadline for the collapse. In fact, when he was fixing the time, the Bush Administration had just entered the countdown to its last two years and Rajavi promised that if nothing happen at the end of the two years, all the Ashraf residents were free to stay or leave: “Anyone who wants may leave, and I will myself throw out all those who are worthless. I will keep the rest who are pure, and then, I will tell them what they can do for me”.
It is not the first time Rajavi has fixed a deadline. But even if his prediction of intensification of the tension between the US and Iran that could led to war came true, no fish would be the share of MKO out of this troubled water. The ploy has so far worked for Rajavi, since he believes that to promise the insiders the moon at least can keep them waiting a bit more.
Something is different this time. On the one hand, Rajavi has fixed a deadline; and on the other hand, the Iraqi government is determined to expel MKO from Iraq. There are other factors, like a new assessment by American intelligence agencies that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003, which have totally disappointed MKO. Disclosure of Iran’s nuclear threat made the cornerstone of the group’s democratic campaign; an issue that MKO believed could keep the friction between Iran and other countries at its highest.
However, Rajavi’s fixed deadline is the question of to be or not to be, the survival or demise of MKO. A device is needed to measure the pulse rate of MKO to be vigilant of the time passing; a sand-clock seems to suffice. The significance of a sand-clock lies in the fact that first it can make Rajavi sit watching the countdown to his fixed deadline and stop him of making empty rhetoric. Second, it grants Ashraf residents and other members in Western countries enough time for further contemplation and to decide for their future. Third, it counts and illustrates the last remained days of the organization to think of any ploy to escape the cries.
Noteworthy, Rajavi’s deadline for the first time delineates the truth over which the members have long been kept in dark. At least through the past three decades, Rajavi in many occasions has outlined short and long-term plans for toppling the Iranian regime, none of which came true. Following the failed strategy of the armed struggle and its proscription as a terrorist organization, MKO temporarily abandoned the guerrilla warfare and resorted to a gambit of pro-democracy. Even its pseudo-democratic activities that were nothing beyond mercenary and espionage acts proved to be unproductive.
The promised deadline decides Rajavi’s own destiny and that of his forces. Besides, it grants the members an opportunity, after many years of indecisiveness, to make a rational decision. The sand-clock might keep them alert of Rajavi’s further tricks if he intends to take them in by his tempting promises. Rajavi is well aware that he cannot possibly hold the members through a verity of cult-like brainwashing techniques and persuasion against their will forever. The sand-clock keeps count of the days that promises the insiders’ release from the bond of the terrorist cult of the Rajavis and the therapy that they would eventually receive to be relieved of the mind-numbing techniques that had long blocked critical and evaluative thinking and had subjugated their independent choice in a context of strictly enforced cult hierarchy.
Mojahedin.ws,December 28, 2007
The case of State Department report on Mojahedin Khalq Organisation Open letter to the Judges of the Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission (POAC)For the Attention Of the judges of the Proscribed Organizations Appeal Commission (POAC) who have recently asked for the Mojahedin Khalq Organization (MKO, MEK or PMOI) to be removed from the Government’s list of Proscribed Terrorist Organization, an order which the British government rejected and is appealing against. Dear Judges, The newly reviewed report from the State Department in 2007, upgrading the position of Mojahedin Khalq Organization from a "Terrorist Group" to a "Terrorist Cult" is hardly in line with its claim to have rejected violence since 2001". It claims that right now (year 2007), "…MEK leadership and members across the world maintain the capacity and will to commit terrorist acts in Europe, the Middle East, the United States, Canada, and beyond…" The report reads: http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/82738.htm "… The MEK advocates the violent overthrow of the Iranian regime and was responsible for the assassination of several U.S. military personnel and civilians in the 1970’s. MEK leadership and members across the world maintain the capacity and will to commit terrorist acts in Europe, the Middle East, the United State, Canada, and beyond…" "… In addition to its terrorist credentials, the MEK has also displayed cult-like characteristics. Upon entry into the group, new members are indoctrinated in MEK ideology and revisionist Iranian history. Members are also required to undertake a vow of "eternal divorce" and participate in weekly "ideological cleansings." Additionally, children are reportedly separated from parents at a young age. MEK leader Maryam Rajavi has established a "cult of personality." She claims to emulate the Prophet Muhammad and is viewed by members as the "Iranian President in exile…"." "…In 2003, French authorities arrested 160 MEK members at operational bases they believed the MEK was using to coordinate financing and planning for terrorist attacks. Upon the arrest of MEK leader Maryam Rajavi, MEK members took to Paris’ streets and engaged in self-immolation. French authorities eventually released Rajavi. Although currently in hiding, Rajavi has made appearances via video-satellite to"motivate" MEK-sponsored conferences across the globe. According to evidence which became available after the fall of Saddam Hussein, the MEK received millions of dollars in Oil-for-Food program subsidies from Saddam Hussein from 1999 through 2003, which supported planning and executing future terrorist attacks…" http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/82738.htm The US State Department report (presumably more valid for you than the claims brought in by Mr. Mohammed Mohaddessin and/or Mrs. Maryam Rajavi cult leaders of MKO in the absence of fugitive cult leader Massoud Rajavi, who are currently under investigation for terrorism related charges in France) clearly indicates the use of millions of dollars of "Oil-for_Food" program subsidies by Mojahedin Khalq and Saddam Hussein to "plan and execute terrorist attacks" up to "year 2003" when they were disarmed and no longer capable of carrying out acts of terror. The report (last updated 2007) clearly emphasizes that" …MEK leadership and members across the world maintain the capacity and will to commit terrorist acts in Europe, the Middle East, the United State, Canada, and beyond…" In addition, the report of course continues describing "Mojahedin Khalq Organization" by pointing out: – The assassination of US military and civilian personnel in Iran during 1970s, – Stressing the ability and the will of MKO members and leadership to conduct terrorist operations across the world, – Introducing the MKO as one of the most violent political groups, established during 60s, – Emphasizing the fact that MKO was disliked by Iranians, following the Islamic Revolution, – Underlining the fact that for more than 3 decades, MKO used its bases in Iraq and Europe to conduct terror attacks against Iran, – Expansion of financial base, military skills and leaders’ activities in Europe. – Showing cult-like characteristics, in addition to terrorist ones, – Ideological pressure on members and offering them distorted history of Iran, – Stressing the existence of compulsory divorces, cleansing sessions and separation of kids from their parents, – Establishing cult-of-personality around Rajavi. The report continues talking about the "Activities" of Mojahedin Khalq: – Confessing that despite US efforts, MKO members and leaders have never been taken to court for their role in illegal activities, – MKO has been supported by reprehensible regimes, like that of Saddam Hussein. – Stressing that MKO conducted terrorist operations from its bases in France for 5 years, – Citing reports that showed Maryam Rajavi encouraged members to ‘’crush Kurds under the tanks", – That 7 Iranians had been arrested by FBI for transferring 400000 dollars to the MKO for buying weapons, – Voluntarily surrender to coalition, after the ouster of Saddam, and submitting heavy weaponries, – Arrest of 160 MKO members, including Maryam Rajavi, in France for using its bases in France for planning and financing terrorist operations, – Self-immolations by MKO members, following the detention of Maryam Rajavi, – Maryam Rajav’s going to hiding, and using video-satellite to motivate members, – Discovering documents that prove MKO received the money of oil-for-food program and used the money for terrorist attacks, – Citing documents that prove MKO-Saddam ties: lists, a film showing Saddam when he gives a suitcase of money to MKO’s known leaders, and a footage of MKO members being trained by Iraqi army. ———- Below you can consider the stand of US towards terrorist Organizations including MKO (Mujahedin-e-Khalq Organization) and its front Organizations during the past ten years: http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1996Report/1996index.html http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1997Report/1997index.html http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1998Report/1998index.html http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1999report/1999index.html http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/fto_1999.html http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2000
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2002 http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/c14818.htm http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005 http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/82738.htm
———- I will be sending other relevant materials on regular bases. Yours Massoud Khodabandeh Leeds, UK, December 16, 2007
Also see: I rest my case m lord… (No.1) – The case of the Mojahedin Khalq LOGO https://www.nejatngo.org/index_en.php?news_id=772
Massoud Khodabandeh, December 20, 2007 www.Khodabandeh.org
Preceding articles investigated two major factors leading to the development of internal ideological revolution of Mojahedin and the role they played therein. The encountered crises following declaration of armed struggle as well as the failed strategy of overthrow were grave challenges threatening the organization. Rajavi’s hurried and unreasoning resort to armed phase followed by an illogically drawn timetable of short-term toppling of Iranian regime heavily affected the internal and external relations of Mojahedin. The third factor that forced the organization to cling to the alternate of the ideological revolution was the gradual dwindling of its social prestige and legitimacy. Besides, feelings of distrust began to arise among the cadres as a result of observing ever increasing anti-democratic relations within the organization.
Gradual dwindling of MKO’s social prestige
An optimistic analysis of MKO’s failure in the accomplishment of its short-term promise of overthrowing Iranian regime well indicate that Rajavi had an incorrect and subjective evaluation of the public element, namely, masses. His alliance with Bani-Sadr and confidence in the supposed potentiality of sympathizers and members gave him the illusion that Mojahedin was highly supported. He was under the false impression that the march of a number of members and sympathizers might lead to the elimination of any public fear that prevented masses from entering onto the scene in support of the group. The failed rally on 27 September 1991 made it clear to Mojahedin that masses walked in an opposite track which totally disappointed them of relying on social support as their last winning card from the very beginning months of the armed phase. However, the overall failure of this event was a severe put-down to the false illusion of Rajavi. Niyabati, in his review of this phase of armed struggle, points to the fact that it had no gain for Mojahedin but disappointment. He also believes that the September rally made Rajavi reconsider about having any faith in masses’ support. In fact, it was a test that convinced Mojahedin not only people accounted them no political-ideological legitimacy but also would engage in battle against them if needed:
After the wide-range military offences of Mojahedin in the summer 1981, the organization withdrew to take a defensive position; it was decided to test the social element once more. As such, Mojahedin started masterminding armed rallies in late summer 1981 in order to prompt people onto the scene. At the peak of these rallies, the test of the social element was ascertained to be negative. (1)
The confession well approves the strategic miscalculation on the part of Rajavi and Mojahedin. Although Niyabati tries to hide the lack of social support under the banner of the controlling strategies used by the regime, he acknowledges the fact that Mojahedin came to realize that they could in no way rely on the masses to bring about regime’s downfall:
The fact was that Mojahedin were still facing the problem of mobilizing masses for armed struggle that was known to be a locked strategic bolt and the three-year-long plan to overthrow the regime proved to a an absolute failure.(2)
The test being failed, Mojahedin turned to target the ‘social elements’, besides top official figures, to retaliate the defeats. His hopes totally frustrated, Rajavi this time termed the ‘social element’ as tip-fingers of the regime to intensify challenging ordinary people. He states that against his expectation, the masses had played a different role against Mojahedin. Elaborating on Mojahedin’s shift of attitudes in terrorist actions Niyabati has said:
The failure of Mojahedin in bringing the social element onto the scene, so as to unite them with the vanguard forces, through organizing rallies sheltered by Mojahedin’s military units results in the continuation of resistance by cutting the tip-fingers of the regime. (3)
Hadi Shams-Haeri, an MKO ex-member, analyses the 27 September rally as follows:
The organization’s analysis was that people supported the rally in heart but did not dare to participate since they were not armed. So we had to assure them that we would support them in case of firing from the side of [regime’s] guards to encourage them. Therefore, the 27 September rally was organized but again the masses refused to come and the strategy failed. The organization had predicted that 27 September was the regime’s last day and it would assume the power in the evening, but nothing happened. (4)
It is self-evident that the leadership’s miscalculations not only failed to work up support but also took away the little prestige it had already gained. Besides, the organization had to deal with the consequent challenges faced from within. Although it took some time to get internal tensions externalized, their invisible internal impacts cannot to be ignored. To curb internal reactions of any form, a number of decisive decisions had to be made.
The increase of distrust in the leadership
The first serious and critical consequences were the rapid grow of distrust in Rajavi’s leadership. Rajavi’s egocentric decision makings all resulting in strategic failures put the blame on him and made many doubtful about Rajavi’s ideological and political qualification. In spite of the fact that his inefficiency came to be even more palpable after the ideological revolution, according to Mehdi Abrishamchi, in any circumstance Rajavi was the one who said the last word:
Even prior to the internal ideological revolution, it was evident to all of us that Massoud was the key answer to all the ideological necessities of revolution in this historical phase. (5)
As such, it goes without saying that the leader was the one mostly met by crises and the consequent result would be escalation of distrust. As Niyabati openly points out:
The failure of Mojahedin in the short-term overthrowing of the regime as well as the failure of NCRI, considered as the sole democratic alternative, in recruiting all the anti-Shah and anti-sheikh political forces made Mojahedin subject to intolerable pressure both from inside and outside of NCRI. Evidently, the main target of all pressures in the first place was Massoud Rajavi. (6)
The rapid swelling of distrust within the organization put no other solution before the leadership but to resort to preventive measures to meet internal challenges.
The increase of anti-democratic relations in MKO
The only solution to the internally threatening critical conditions was to put an end to the question of leadership and his criticism forever. Cultivation of anti-democratic relations in MKO and NCRI was Rajavi’s short-term solution. However, a fundamental change in the organization’s internal and ideological structure deemed necessary. Still, before the initiation of the ideological revolution, the encountered serious backlashes were severely repressed in a variety of forms. Going into details about organizational reactions, Norooz-Ali Rezvani has said:
In 1984, MKO imprisoned more than 700 members out of whom 73 members, including me, had criticized the organization’s ideological, strategic flaws like accuracy of armed warfare and lack of any democratic internal relations and violation of the members’ democratic rights. I spent 10 days in gaol and 47 days in solitary confinement in the cities of Kahrizeh and Soleymanieh [in Iraq]. Finally, we cut our ideological connection with the organization and announced we were ideologically detached. (7)
The dispersion of organization’s forces
Rajavi called upon all members of the resistance cells and sympathizers inside Iran to leave the country. It led to the dispersion of members who now completely desolate, had to submit to Rajavi’s hegemony. Therefore, the reformation and revival of organizational relations and exercise of hegemony on members demanded a new mechanism to bring and control all the members under a single leadership:
It seemed something much unattainable at the end of 1984 if the past [organizational] framework had to be maintained. Therefore, to safeguard the new revolution and prevent another failure of Iranian people in struggle against repression and colonialism, the integrity and strategic stability of the leading organization had to be preserved. (8)
References:
1. Niyabati, Bijan; A Different Look at Mojahedin’s Ideological Revolution, Khavaran Publication, p.14.
2. ibid, p.16
3. ibid, p.54
4. Shams-Haeri, H. (1996). The Swamp, vol 2. Khavaran publication, p.90
5. The lecture delivered by Mehdi Abrishamchi on the ideological revolution.
6. Niyabati, Bijan; A Different Look at Mojahedin’s Ideological Revolution, Khavaran Publication, p.15.
7. Rezvani, n. (1996). Neo-Scholasticism in Rajavi’s cult, p.8.
8. Niyabati, Bijan; A Different Look at Mojahedin’s Ideological Revolution, Khavaran Publication, p.18.
Bahar Irani,Mojahedin.ws,December 14, 2007
Immediately after the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 Massoud Rajavi, guru of the Mojahedin Khalq cult went into hiding. After three years incommunicado, a statement was issued in 2006 in his name. In it Rajavi announced his timescale for toppling the Iranian regime: "in the next two years". Little attention was given at the time. Rajavi has made this kind of claim frequently over the past 30 years without effect.
Information from inside the cult, however, indicates that the specific deadline of January 2009 is part of a more sinister plan by the cult leaders. Following the announcement of this date, every member was required to sign a piece of paper giving their oath that they will not leave the cult until January 2009 – by which time, according to Rajavi, the regime must be toppled.
Rajavi’s message states that when the deadline of January 2009 arrives: ‘anyone who wants to can leave, and I will myself throw out all the useless ones. I will keep the rest who are pure, and I will tell them then what they have to do for me’. Experts on the MKO’s cult jargon interpret this as Rajavi’s intention to have his followers ‘wreak havoc’; the most predictable scenarios being mass suicide in Camp Ashraf and/or attacks on external interests with suicidal intensity in other parts of the world where the MKO cult has bases. That is, the ‘pure’ MKO operatives will kill all Rajavi’s opponents in Europe and then kill themselves.
The 2006 US State Department Country Reports on Terrorism, which describes the Mojahedin as a terrorist entity with cult-like characteristics, warned: "Many MEK leaders and operatives, however, remain at large, and the number of at-large MEK operatives who received weapons and bomb-making instruction from Saddam Hussein’s regime remains a source of significant concern."
A similar plan was previously exposed by Iran-Interlink [see links below]. On November 3rd 2001 in response to 9/11, Rajavi announced the Black Phase – if US forces attacked Iraq, the MKO would launch an all-out attack on Iran.
http://www.iran-interlink.org/files/child%20pages/pending_human_rights_disaster.htm
http://www.iran-interlink.org/files/info/brief_3.htm
Over thirty years, Rajavi has consistently sought conflict and chaos to keep his cult alive. Since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003 Rajavi has tied his fate to the US neo-conservative/far-right Israeli agenda of regime change. The MKO has repeatedly and emphatically offered itself to be used as an agent for regime change.
Banking on an aggravated standoff between Iran and the USA, Rajavi had hoped the US (or Israel) would attack Iran before the end of the Bush administration. But by 2006 the MKO leadership had grasped that after January 2009 the current Bush Administration would lose any possibility of starting a war with Iran, and any successor would be unlikely to start a war soon after. Ordering his followers to adhere to his deadline serves to ensure that the cult does not disintegrate from within before that date. The deadline is also a warning to western governments, the MKO will wreak havoc in the cities of Europe if I, and my cult, are not supported.
Now with the US National Intelligence Estimate report on December 3rd effectively removing any reason for war with Iran for the foreseeable future, there is nothing left for Rajavi to fill the void between now and January 2009. His deadline for destruction appears to have arrived sooner than he anticipated.
ENDS
Contact
Anne Singleton, Iran-Interlink
editor@iran-interlink.org
www.iran-interlink.org
Iran-Interlink
PO Box 148
Leeds LS16 5YJ
UK
Iran Interlink Brief, December 08, 2007
Failure in overthrowing the regime
The short-term plan to overthrow the Iranian regime announced by Rajavi at the peak of MKO’s wave of internal terrorist actions, such as the explosions in the central office of the Islamic Republican Party and the Prime Ministry Building, constituted the most controversial issue that challenged the Mojahedin’s leadership. Believing that these bloody terrorist deeds would lead to destabilization of the regime, Rajavi declared that it ultimately took six months to finalize the collapse.
The prime aftermath of the declared phases of armed warfare following Khordad 30th (20 June 1981) was that Rajavi’s promise proved to be a chimera. Although insignificant at the beginning, after a while and following the military failures and stalemates, the challenge turned into serious crises within MKO.
Again and again Rajavi, overconfident of terrorist actions that he referred to as ‘great operations’, predicted a short time overthrow in his press interviews. He even classified the definite time of overthrow into three periods: short, mid, and long and finally fixed the exact date in a 5 year span. A review of Rajavi’s position taking reveals the fact that after 20 June, he began to evade determining an exact date for the overthrow. Finally he postponed his promise until the death of the leader of Islamic Republic.
From the phase of 20 June on, followed by the formation of NCR, Rajavi promoted himself atop of both MKO and NCRI as the egocentric decision-maker. Although everybody was aware that he was the one to say the last word, later on, and in the course of ideological revolution, Mehdi Abrishamchi referred to the decisive role of Rajavi in critical decisions such as that which initiated the armed phase. Even the Western media were interested in his hegemonic leadership atop of the organization in those years. Many of them asserted that he cleverly dodged the reporters’question and in one case, Jean Gueyras tells the story of Rajavi and his misuse of power for his personal ambitions:
Hidden away in his country bunker in Auvers-sur-Oise, Mr. Massoud Rajavi, the leader of the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI) has mastered the art of allying the useful with the pleasurable. He sugar coats his decisions, even those about his private life, with politico-ideological statements of considerable grandiloquence. Thus, in October 1982, to justify his marriage to Firouzeh Bani Sadr, daughter of the former President of the Islamic Republic only eight months after the tragic death of his first wife, Ashraf Rab’i (killed on 8 February 1982 by the Pasdaran); he published a joint bulletin of the PMOI’s Politburo and Central Committee in which his marriage was presented as ‘one of the most important revolutionary decisions ever taken by the Mojahedin’ and as an initiative which would help consolidate the unity of the Iranian nation’. (1)
Antoine Gessler’s Autopsy of an Ideological Drift well explains that Rajavi and his organization are badly in need of being at the center of the world’s attention and are very afraid of being sunk into oblivion. Rajavi’s promises of victory to motivate his forces have never come true:
It involves an organization in permanent panic of being forgotten, a threat that grows day by day, and must, therefore, motivate its militants who have never witnessed the victory announced thousands of times in the past (2).
Such evidences prove the fact that even years before the ideological revolution and his promotion as the ideological leader, Rajavi had succeeded to maintain his unbeatable authority over the organization. After a while, the internal crises were well controlled but unsolved question of overthrow, in spite of the heavy responsibility of rampant terrorist operations, remained as an internal challenge that negatively affected Mojahedin’s relations. Then the circumstances lead to a condition in which Mojahedin were forced to deny the possibility of short- and mid-term overthrow. The critical situation of Mojahedin on the one hand and Iran’s prevailing over internal crises on the other hand corroborated fallacy of MKO’s promise of short-term overthrow. Although the leadership never acknowledged the fact openly, the analysis of the ideological development confirmed it. Niyabati’s outspoken fashion leaves no doubt that the leadership was convinced of the fact that the organization was structurally no match to cause regime’s downfall:
A summary of the political, military, organizational, and ideological aspects in fall 1984 made one point clear to Mojahedin, that was, the short-term overthrow of the regime was impossible due to the ideological-organizational structure on the one hand and outer-organizational political relations with various political trends active inside and outside of the country. (3)
According to Niyabati, such a particular phase was in fact the turning point of internal challenges Mojahedin had encountered. He refers to two years earlier when Mojahedin took the wrong path of the so-called phase of armed struggle that founded the background to such challenges. He further elaborates on two strategic solutions of Mojahedin in this regard and writes:
The year 1984 was a determining phase to reach a final settlement in political, military, strategic, and ideological scenes. The political and military impasse of armed resistance as well as the failure in short-term overthrow of the regime that came to light at the end of 1982 and became a proven fact at the beginning of 1983, led Mojahedin into a dilemma. (4)
Mehdi Khanbaba-Tehrani, an NCRI ex-member, in his review of the phase refers to failures and their aftermath within MKO and NCRI and concludes that the ideological revolution worked as the decisive solution to the desperate question of overthrow that was pressing hard on Rajavi and NCRI:
In my opinion, MKO has met serious crises due to the failure of the short-term plan of overthrow and its aftermath that has gravely questioned the organization’s leadership. Actually, the ideological revolution was the manifestation of such internal conflicts. To keep the integrity and life of the organization, Mojahedin’s leadership arrived at a compromise that resulted in pluralizing the leadership by means of adding a woman atop who had to change her name and get married to Rajavi. (5)
Hadi Shams-Haeri, another former member, considers the strategic stalemates and failures of MKO to be a result of Rajavi’s ineptitude, having no realistic appraisal of the situation inside Iran, and finally continuation of keeping the insiders in dark about the realities and insisting on the futile tactic of overthrow:
Of the Rajavi’s betrayals was advertising the overthrow of the Islamic republic as a possibly easy and quick task. In this regard, Rajavi never referred to the real problems and shortcomings that would be encountered on the route. (6)
Haeri also has the opinion that Rajavi is the sole responsible for the wrong decision of overthrow and the move on 20 June. He writes:
In fact, the armed warfare that initially aimed at overthrowing the regime in short-term and assuming the political power lasted not more than 1.5 years and ended in a complete strategic failure. The pioneer forces not only lost the ground but were strangled due to adverse circumstances. It happened as a result of inadequate and incorrect appraisal of forces’capacity on 20 June. (7)
As such, the issue of overthrow which acted as a motivator for winning the support of opposition groups, as well as some states standing in shadow, gradually turned into a factor arousing opposing reactions within MKO and NCRI.
References:
1. Gessler, Antoine; Autopsy of an Ideological Drift, Chapter 22.
2. ibid, chapter 19.
3. Niyabati, B. A different look at the ideological revolution within MKO. Khavaran publication, p.16.
4. ibid, p.16.
5. An inside look at left movements in Iran, some interviews with Mehdi Khanbaba-Tehrani, the interview 17.
6. Shams-Haeri, H. The swamp, Khavaran publication, p.35.
7. ibid.
Bahar Irani,Mojahedin.ws,December 6, 2007
The ideological revolution within Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO) that led the whole organization onto the precipice of being labeled as a notorious cult of personality was not the result of an abrupt and overnight decision. A look at a multitude of the crises the organization ran into following its declare of armed warfare after the initiation of the Islamic Republic in Iran well explain that the organization’s resort to ideological shift was the last option to surmount crises and guarantee the organization’s survival. However, the key role of Massoud Rajavi in the process of deviation is of great significance.
Majority of the organization’s theoreticians are unanimous that the ideological revolution was the byproduct of a strategic dilemma but none of them attempts to dig out the truth about the roots of successive defeats and crises. An investigation into the history of the organization since 1975 and following the great schism within it discloses indisputably critical role of Rajavi since his assuming the lead. His decisions, regardless of their grave impact on strategic, political and ideological deviation, were inventions of a deviant mind spoiled by power ambitions. That is true that power corrupts but his later ideological revolution to gain full hegemony over the organization is a proof that the absolute power corrupts absolutely; no better destiny could be destined for the organization with Rajavi atop but a cult of personality.
The intention here is to examine the roots of the ideological revolution and the causes behind its start with Rajavi behind the steer. The following is an outline of the factors to be studied in detail.
The failed strategy of armed warfare and the aftermath crises
Failure in overthrowing the regime
Gradual dwindling of MKO’s social prestige
Possible occurrence of schism within the organization
serious deterioration of NCRI
political bankruptcy and loss of external backing
The statements and accounts by other opposition groups, active members of the organization as well as the separated members are the best presented evidences throughout the study. Bijan Niyabaty’s A Different Look at the Ideological Revolution within MKO, since it is a source composed by an active left sympathizer of the organization, can give detailed accounts on the process.
The failed strategy of armed warfare and the aftermath crises
The failed strategy of overthrowing the newly established ruling system in Iran is rooted in the irrationally adopted tactic of armed warfare following the organization’s first mass movement on 20 June in 1981. The turning point that was broadly being propagated at the time an which was supposed to speed up the inevitable collapse of the regime could no more stand the heavy squash of defeats and crises. As a result, the tone of Rajavi changed in justifying his unreasonably taken decision saying that his decision abided by no political, ideological and organizational logic but was a move following the example of Ashura. [1]
Being a fallacy or anything else, his reasoning worked well in wining over a multitude of insiders who supposedly had to challenge him and his ineffectiveness. Publicized passionate speeches and writings could easily convince and hush up whoever presumed to criticize:
Khordad 30th (20 June 1981) is our ‘Ashura”. On that day we had to stand up and resist Khomeini’s bloodthirsty and reactionary regime, even if it meant sacrificing our lives and the whole of our organization. We had to take this road to Karbala to keep alive our tawhidi ideology, follow the example set by Imam Hosayn, fulfill our historic mission to the Iranian people, and fight the most bloodthirsty, most reactionary, and most savage regime in world history. [2]
It took at least two decades to be admitted by a left analyzer of the organization that what MKO anticipated being a supposed mass movement turned to be nothing but failed militia warfare:
The strategy of a widespread and national-wide armed struggle was nothing more than declining a massive public uprising into the level of a limited militia struggle with no prospect. [3]
Rajavi’s strategy of urban militia warfare expanded into much sophisticated tactics of resistance cells, suicidal and armed operations following the June 20 uprising. Niyabati assumes that even long before, Mojahedin had lost their hope in the utility of the so called ‘esistance cells’ and Mojahedin’s strategic tactic had proved to be nothing but a great failure:
Now after five years, the armed warfare is still immobilized in the first stage of preparing a mass uprising. Mojahedin have so far tried all the possible approaches, from the urban militia warfare to the formation of resistance cells and from the suicidal operations to guerrilla warfare launched in the mountains and woods. [4]
In his analysis of Mojahedin’s received heavy blow on 8 February 1982, the raid of Iranian police forces into a MKO’s safe-house in Tehran that resulted in the killing of 20 members of Mojahedin including Musa Khyabani, MKO commander inside Iran after Rajavi’s escape to France, and Ashraf Rabiee, Rajavi’s first wife, Niyabati once more questions the accuracy of Mojahedin’s strategy of armed struggle:
The strategic blow on 8 February 1982 was an end to the accuracy of the urban guerilla warfare. [5]
The consequent doubts and uncertainty raised among a portion of the rational minds though remained covered up, but in the eyes of the leaders were undeniable facts that could possibly intensify internal crises. A large number of separated members admit that it created the best opportunity to persuade an internal reconsideration of the organizational strategies, but instead, unfounded justification and excuses gave way to a rapid grow of internal challenges. The seriousness of the challenge even worsens when one comes across the fact that before facing the crises, unquestionable faith in armed struggle was an essential prerequisite for the recruits of the organization. It was a taboo nobody was permitted to touch upon and any criticism of the approach was absolutely illegitimate even if convincing explanation and facts were adduced beforehand:
Any criticism of the widespread strategy of armed warfare adopted by Mojahedin in the military phase, if made to disapprove the essentiality of the armed resistance, is definitely illegitimate. [6]
Rajavi’s frequent shift to adopt various unsound tactics more than anything indicates a telling indecisiveness in Mojahedin’s leadership. Not only it deepens the already existing crises but also makes the organization vulnerable to further crushing crises that can hardly be curbed. Depicting a much realistic view, an ex-member has said:
What can be done? Does it mean that we should again resort to urban militia warfare? This vicious circle is the work of Rajavi; from the urban militia to terror teams, then to war in fronts, then to an army, and then to cross the border operation teams to launch mortar attacks. It seems he cannot, or does not want, decide on any tactic but associated with arms. [7]
Rajavi’s egocentric decision making has exposed him to the criticism of the insiders to the core. Although he never desists from rejecting allegations of leading the organization to total decadence, his critics believe he lacked the needed political acumen and experience as well as mental aptitude to surmount the crises:
Of course, this guy [Rajavi] suffers a lack of mental aptitude, political experience and insight. If he were experienced and his studies were not restricted to those of Marxist texts or was not hampered by organizational enterprise, that is much a pseudo-security and clandestine activity than political, actually the 20 June incident would never happen. [8]
Notes:
[1]. A historical incident when the third Shiit imam, Imam Hosayn, rose against the tyrant of the time and was martyred along with his 72 followers in Karbala in Iraq on 10 Moharram 61 A.H., publically called Ashura. Mojahedin from the very beginning argued that they were exemplifying the model of his uprising to justify their misdeeds. Mehdi Rezai, a member of Mojahedin, tried and executed by Pahlavi’s regime, in his court testimonies declared ‘each day should be turned into Ashura and each place into Karbala arguing that ‘history had taught the organization one clear lesson: that the only path to liberation is the armed struggle. (The court testimony of martyred mojahed Mehdi Rezai) (1973), pp. 90-3.
[2]. Mojahed, 129-31 (2-16 December 1982).
[3]. Niyabati, Bijan; A Different Look at the Ideological Revolution within MKO, Khavaran Publication, p. 14.
[4]. Ibid, 69.
[5]. Ibid, 14.
[6]. The statute of the National Council of Resistance
[7]. Soliloquies in solitude, a collection; interview with an ex-member of MKO.
[8]. Ibid.
The formation of the MKO’s National Liberation Army (NLA) in 1987, that heavily relied on financial, logistic and arms aids of Saddam and Baath Party, definitely constituted a new phase of militarism within MKO that escalated the group’s across the border terrorist operations. The failure of the guerilla warfare inside Iran, the separation of the Kurdistan Democrat Party from the NCR as well as the impossibility of using the soil of Iran’s neighboring countries were the main causes leading to the formation of the so-called NLA. The army was supposed to be an amalgamation of the forces that were unanimous in overthrowing the Iranian ruling system to bring about regime change regardless of their political and ideological incongruities. Although the idea of the very formation of a people’s army was first theoretically criticized by the left parties such as Fadaiyan-e Khalq, after a while, and particularly after the strategic failure of the Operation Eternal Light, it took an absolutely ideological form and consequently turned into a tool for perpetration of terrorist operations inside Iran. Expounding on the features of a people’s army Ashraf Dehqan has said:
In the formation process of a people’s army, the class diversity of the forces as well as the unanimity of the leadership has to be considered. As such, in an anti-imperialist revolution, there should not be but one army. If any organization and group plans to have its own army or childishly call itself an army, it appears that not only it has no true understanding of the army but is also challenging one of the basic concerns of the Iranian revolution. [1]
These position takings before anything highlight the lead of hegemonic and egoistical mannerism in Mojahedin on the one hand and their manipulation of passive and aimless forces of opposition groups on the other hand. Fedaiyan-e Khalq, as an active militia force, disapproved formation of a liberation army; it explicitly implies that Mojahedin had no alliance in tactical form. Still the claimed liberation army was destined to failure since it lacked the required features of a people’s army. The failure of the army in the operation Eternal Light actually ended in the transformation of a supposed people’s army into a predestined apparatus of terrorism since it had to be either dissolved or metamorphosed. As Niyabati states:
The encountered conditions provided Mojahedin with a new option. They had to either continue focusing on the key role of the ‘liberation army’, which was neither prudent nor possible to be called national but ideological, or change their strategy and abandoned the idea of the ‘modern liberation war. [2]
The formation of the liberation army mainly aimed at distancing the organization from the terrorist allegations and winning legitimacy from the West. Today, the organization has changed to pose as a democratic alternative for the same reason. Antoine Gessler in his Autopsy of an ideological drift precisely explains that Mojahedin’s so-called liberation army could in no way convince the west that it was moving on the same strategic line of a real National Liberation Army:
The Mojahedin’s "National Liberation Army" has never really acted as an army in the Western sense of the word. After some stunning defeats during its conventional attacks, its soldiers fell back on the tried and true methods of guerrilla political terrorism. These are techniques which have advantages and disadvantages for the PMOI. On one hand, the organization could loudly and widely claim that it had a military capability. Later, it tried to build its "legitimacy" to the Iranian diaspora -who entertained no illusions about them. Finally, it tried to establish itself as the only possible alternative to the power in place. Most of the actions carried out inside the national borders were followed by a communiqué claiming responsibility. [3]
Rajavi’s insist on the militia and terrorist potentiality of an army that is actually disarmed and fallen short of engagement in any military operation is the unambiguous truth about NLA. It is an undeniable fact that its successive military defeats detached it from the make-up of an army and turned it into an absolute ideological annex that took a paramilitary structure to launch terrorist operations inside the Iranian soil. A supposed people’s army whose main objective was liberation of people was now targeting the same defenseless people through shelling mortars and terrorist ambushes. Elaborating on the tactic adopted by Mojahedin, Gessler says:
But, since the Liberation Army has only limited means and a limited number of recruits, especially compared to the numbers and armaments fielded by the regular Iranian Army, they can only plan small acts of force. Mortar attacks, attacks with explosive charges. Nothing important in itself, but actions that kill. Usually the victims are innocent civilians, if they are not targeted murders. This does not help the PMOI, especially when it hopes for a real popular representation in country. And this they lack completely. It is necessary not to sink into oblivion but the use of bloody mean: attracts harsh criticism on the international stage. There, the decision seems clearly taken to wipe out all extremist groups preaching the use of violence. Since then, Mr Rajavi and his friends gild the lily in grasping at prestigious straws. Many times, he has spoken of General de Gaulle’s legacy ill an attempt to draw self-serving conclusions [4].
The importance of this entirely ideological structure for MKO’s leadership lies not in its military potentialities but in its blind obedience. As Rajavi himself says, he prefers the arms carriers to the arms itself. An obedient veteran, even if disarmed and disguised, is on the alert apparatus, restricted by no place and uniform, to accomplish cult ambitious throughout the world.
References:
1. Niyabati, Bijan; A different look at the ideological revolution within MKO, p.41.
2. ibid, p.68.
3. Gessler, Antoine; Autopsy of an Ideological Drift, chapter 7.
4. ibid.
Bahar Irani,Mojahedin.ws,November 24, 2007
The ideological marriage of Maryam and Massoud [1984] and intra-organizational obligatory divorces [1988] constitute the strategic hallmarks of the ideological revolution within Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization [MKO] or the Mojahedin Cult as notoriously entitled. Although there is a five-year interval between the two events, ideological divorces are a complementary step to the marriage of Maryam and Massoud that deteriorated the status of family life in MKO. Mehdi Abrishamchi, Maryam Rajavi’s late husband, justifies the act of Maryam’s divorce from him and her remarriage to Massoud as removing the problem of family as a barrier in the way of Maryam and Massoud. It is the first time the structure of family life is put into challenge. He says:
Maryam had to be either unquestionably promoted to a high status in the organization released of any [conjugal] obligation, just like Massoud, and be totally devoted to revolution or had to give it up. Here, the simple issue of family was creating an incongruity. [1]
The contradiction solved through the marriage of Maryam and Massoud as a necessary and inevitable phenomenon, it leads to a peaceful coexistence in the organization. According to Abrishamchi, since Maryam was being promoted to a leadership status and every decision in the organization had to be made by Maryam and Massoud together, the matrimonial obligations and restrictions prevented Maryam to be in Massoud’s company all the time. She had to deny all her obligations and tear whatever bonded her except to Massoud and the revolution. As such, her divorce and remarriage before anything was the accomplishment of a revolutionary obligation. The organization moving on a revolutionary path required Maryam’s all-time presence and thus the marriage was regarded to be totally ideological and revolutionary. As justified by Abrishamchi:
We had to accept the fact that it was probable that in the future there happened an event in which there was a one percent probability that Maryam would be unable to take part in decision making and Massoud had to solve the problems alone or by his other assistants since Maryam was obliged to her husband. In such a condition, Maryam could not take part in confrontation of all organizational challenges and could lead to losing her organizational status. However, the essentiality of being unified with her responsibility was her ever-presence in revolutionary problem solving; otherwise her status of compeer was nothing more than an ideological formality. [2]
However, it is not all the reason justifying the mechanism of Maryam’s divorce and remarriage. It really takes time to develop a true understanding of inter- organizational obligatory and ideological divorces that Abrishamchi termed as an act of ‘sacrifice’ and ‘beheading the emotions’. In fact, the ideological marriage was the first taken step that explicitly predicted what would be required of the members in near future. Niyabati writes:
On that day [Maryam’s divorce and remarriage] it was difficult to fathom what was happening. It was only a matter of a few years to generalize the divorce and remarriage model in the organization, a criterion to decide members’ degree of ideological loyalty. As Massoud had already put it, ‘If you fail to understand now, then wait. I don’t know how long, but one, five or ten years later you will come to understand’. [3]
The strategic objective of the marriage of Maryam and Massoud and finally generalization of obligatory divorces in the organization is an issue which needs to be reflected on carefully and as Rajavi had said, it took some time to be surfaced.
Another possibility that led the organization to mastermind and theatricalize such a show was to open a passage out of the encountered strategic cul-de-sac following the organization’s failure in overthrowing the Iranian regime on the one hand and to deter the possibility of any organizational split or demise on the other hand. According to Abrishamchi and Niyabati, the ideological revolution was a process of externalizing the contradictions and paradoxes in order to prevent any rapture or split in the organization. The marriage in itself was working as a mechanism of shock that could lead to externalizing the doubts and ambiguities remained long latent in the members. As described by Niyabati, the ceremony worked as a key to open those closed boxes which the leadership had failed to open up to that time:
The year 1985 is to accomplish the integrity of Mojahedin organization. The arranged regular revolutionary sessions that were held at the beginning among the top layers of the organization, at the end of the year began to encompass even the most distant spheres of the organization. The doubtful sympathizers who expected inevitable demise of their ideal organization were suddenly coming face to face with scenes that had never been imagined before. Surprisingly in these sessions, they were witnessing both men and women expressing their feelings and emotions openly before hundreds of people disregarding what would be thought of them or happen to them in the future. In such sessions, it was for the first time that some closed boxes were opened; boxes that neither wives nor husbands had ever opened for each other. [4]
Both Niyabati and Abrishamchi acknowledge the fact that ideological revolution in fact was an instrument to unlocking the concealed interior chaotic situation. It was a risk that in the most optimistic presupposition culminated in organizational schism or absolute demise if one was pessimistic. Niyabati speaks more frankly than Abrishamchi when he acknowledges the marriage as the first stage of the ideological revolution:
To unlock the boxes [minds of members] is the main theme and the first stage of ideological revolution. [5]
A larger number of MKO’s separated members especially in recent years have exclusively focused on the ideological revolution and the internal objectives Rajavi sought. In his review, Hadi Shams Haeri writes:
The so-called ideological revolution in 1985 that was much a cover for the strategic failure of the organization and a move aimed at averting accusations posed against Rajavi could not achieve all its objectives and acquit Rajavi completely. Therefore, it deemed necessary to find a scapegoat for the organizational failures and the strategic impasse. The plotted conspiracy against [Ali] Zarkesh was the continuation of the conspired [ideological] revolution in 1985. As such, we come to the conclusion that the other consequent ideological revolutions were in fact conspiracies in order to overcome the challenges at hand in every stage. [6]
A number of other former MKO members also evaluate the ideological revolution in the same way and believe that the ideological revolution was based on the mechanism of externalizing the internal contradictions within the organization and delineating a new line of relation based on an all-encompassing and blind obedience to Rajavi.
As pointed before, Niyabati and Abrishamchi have referred to the objective in their writings. It is worth noting that nearly two years before the development of the ideological revolution and obligatory divorces, Rajavi held a completely different idea on intra-organizational marriages and the concept of family. Believing to be modeling on some legal, Islamic ideological creeds, he encouraged marriage and foundation of family as a revolutionary act. In summarizing his one-year struggle in armed phase, Rajavi has said:
In organizational reports, there are cases in which those members who have lost their wives or husbands in armed operations are so emotionally depressed that have declared they prefer to remain single for ever… But this is not a perfect and revolutionary idea since the Prophet, Islamic Imams and also all the reformers and revolutionary leaders of the world have denounced it. Therefore, the organization advises such members, and also the unmarried, to get married to anybody they will if possible. According to the Holy Quran and the doctrines of our ideological leaders, we have to consider the marriage as a part of our struggle not something to be thrown away. [7]
Resources:
1. the delivered lecture by Mehdi Abrishamchi on the internal ideological revolution within MKO, [1985].
2. Ibid
3. Niyabati, Bijan. A different look at the internal ideological revolution within MKO, Khavaran publication, p.38.
4. Ibid, p.42
5. Ibid, p.44
6. Shams-e Haeri, Hadi; The swamp.
7. Summary of one-year armed struggle, p.186
Mojahedin.ws
Peace Movement is a kind of movement in which various people are active. Its principal objective is challenging wars especially imperialistic wars. And of course, in all peace movements most of their efforts are focused on fighting US imperialism since the thing that is important to Europeans and Americans is the take over of neo-cons and neo-liberals in Europe and America. Neo-cons and neo-liberals have violated people‘s civil rights and social and political freedom. They also caused several billion dollars paid by American and European tax-payers, slope to warship against innocent people. Democrat chief of US congress said:” 10 million children, in the US enjoy no health services and the Bush administration refuses the plan for the development of health services at the same time asks for two billion dollars for its war in Iraq or Afghanistan while it can provide health services for 10 million children with the money spent for 40 days fighting in Iraq. The same system is working in Europe now, because the reforms are developing against the benefits of low class of the society and the neo-liberal governments are trying to load the expenses on poor people. Therefore the gap between poor and rich, according to European media and experts, is becoming bigger and bigger. Thus the Europeans and Americans have figured out that “war on terror” has become a pretext for Imperialists in order to pour much more money into big concerns and to violate human rights. Now the people of Europe and America know well of the atrocities made in Iraq and Afghanistan, in the name of “civilized” world and are well-informed of the nature of such wars.
The public hatred toward war has also made right wing Iranian oppositions such as monarchists, Mujahedin, PKK and Komola and a part of republicans apparently oppose the war but actually and practically they act along with the objectives of war-mongers. This is particularly obvious in Muajhedin-e-Khalq whose leader Maryam Rajavi asks for “The absence of military intervention” but suggests a third option of which you can only find the war odor and from the other side she strongly supports Bush’s policy under the name of “Democracy from Tehran to Damascus” including sanctions. Her lobbies throughout Europe and America are feeding the propaganda machine of Imperialism mass media. MKO’s representative in the US, Ali Reza Jaafarzade is an employee of Fox News Cannel which belongs to Mordakai, a Zionist Lobby which has a lot of mass Medias in Europe, America and Australia. And this is a significant example of MKO’s cooperation for hitting war drums. Also it should be told that Ali Reza Jaafar Zade has a political expertise office in Washington DC and serves as a foreign affair analyst and also political advisor for neo-cons. He has close relations with Zionist lobbyist like Richard Perle and neo-cons’ channels and warmongers of Israel lobby including Raymond Tanter former American security advisor. Therefore whenever the US brings an issue to its propaganda field in order to incite war, MKO also does its best to heat the war up and sharpens its propaganda services trying to present itself including holding press conference on Bush’s propaganda for “war on terror”.
Along with warmongers, Mujahedin have shown their deep hatred toward peace and antiwar movements and they claim that any analysis against warmongers of Bush administration is linked to Islamic Regime. Now they try to criticize the whole peace movement claiming “Islamic Regime’s lobbies in peace movement” in order to destroy any effort for peace using lies and slanders. MKO’s leader hostility against peace movement is exactly along with their warmonger policies. They intentionally want to link all peace movements to regime’s lobby so that they can impose suffocation
atmosphere to peace movements. The same work they do to their own dissidents that anyone who criticizes their ideology automatically is viewed as an element of regime! Those elements are of course among politicmen of Iranian oppositions or international Medias or even the leaders of other countries!
With this method of considering people as white or black so oppressively, now Mujahedin are entering a new scene for suppression of their dissidents and that is Peace Movement. Speaking ambiguously of Iranian regime lobbies and their links with Peace Movement, They try to pollute Peace Movement with Islamic Regime so that they can show any peaceful movement as pro-Islamic regime, accusing peace supporters and oppressing them psychologically and politically. Millions people around the world have shown their opposition to war mongers’ policies not only while the occupation of Iraq but also today (like last weekend when several thousands of broad –minded people demonstrated against Bush’s aggressive policies, in various cities in the United States). This shows the failure of the plots of Iranians Chalabis who don’t have any coverage on their actions anymore and neither have they denied their cooperation with war firms and for their services as mercenaries they are paid by Americans. The good example is Ali Reza Jaafarzade’s service office in Washington DC where he gives services to propaganda machine of Imperialism, Israeli lobbies in the US and Mujahedin’s communications in Bagdad. Another example is what the director of the war institute “Edition Global” said;" I have had relations with MKO since thirty years ago.” Thus you can conclude the entire story.
MKO’s policy has always had double standards and their slogans have always been contradictory to their actions. During Iran-Iraq war MKO became a close friend of Saddam Hussein and according to Rajavi they concluded a “ pact of brotherhood”, shouting freedom and peace slogans they benefited from the overture ,contradiction and fight between Iran and Iraq along with the massacre of millions of innocent people, However they yelled peace slogans, they were drumming up for the war. Even after the American occupation of Iraq their analysis was that Islamic Regime is living with crisis and to pass the crisis it would again get war with Iraq and because of that they made the waters more troubled. Today, as what they did before, they face the Iran-America relations with a contradictory policy, for example Maryam Rajavi speaks of “the absence of military intervention” and bargains for the removal of MKO from terror list but virtually she tries to deteriorate the war crisis. Such a movement must have a deep hostility against Peace Movement since it sees everything in American invasion to Iran in order to get rid of the dangerous situation it has stuck in, in Iraq: exposing the risk of expulsion. Besides it has encountered a lot of restrictions in France! The MKO’s leaders have allegedly said “any alternative for them is better than the current situation and the war is one of the alternatives.”
Ali Shams
Translation: Nejat Society